In Re Pacifico et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
In re:
RICHARD PACIFICO,
Debtor,
RICHARD PACIFICO,
Appellant,
v.
14-16 PLEASANT STREET
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION;
RICHARD KING, UNITED STATES
TRUSTEE FOR REGION 1; U.S. BANK
TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS
TRUSTEE OF TREEHOUSE SERIES V
TRUST AS SERVICED BY SN
SERVICING CORPORATION;
CAROLYN A. BANKOWSKI, CHAPTER
13 TRUSTEE.
Appellees.
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Civil Action No. 25-cv-13848-ADB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Currently before the Court is Debtor-Appellant Richard Pacifico’s (“Appellant’s”)
emergency motion to stay foreclosure, enjoin further collection and fee escalation, and preserve
the status quo pending appeal. [ECF No. 21 at 1 (“Motion for Stay Pending Appeal”)].
Appellant claims that his mortgage creditor has initiated foreclosure proceedings, and that
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“[a]bsent immediate relief, Appellees will continue using a disputed and legally unsupported
debt structure to push the property further toward foreclosure.” [Id.].
The Court is mindful that filings by pro se litigants are “to be liberally construed,” Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), “[h]owever, pro se status does not insulate a party from
complying with procedural and substantive law,” Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st
Cir. 1997) (citing Eagle Eye Fishing Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 20 F.3d 503, 506 (1st Cir.
1994)). According to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007, a motion for a stay pending
appeal may be filed in the court where the appeal is pending upon a showing that either “moving
first in the bankruptcy court would be impracticable; or . . . if a motion has already been made in
the bankruptcy court, state whether the court has ruled on it, and if so, state any reasons given for
the ruling.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b); see also In re Schwalb, No. 25-cv-03624, 2026 WL
100575, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026). The motion must include: “(A) the reasons for granting
the relief requested and the facts relied on; (B) affidavits or other sworn statements supporting
facts subject to dispute; and (C) relevant parts of the record.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(3).
Here, Appellant’s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal does not provide any information as
to why moving first in the Bankruptcy Court would be impractical or, if he has already moved
for relief in the Bankruptcy Court, whether the Bankruptcy Court has ruled on his earlier motion,
and, if so, the reasons given for the ruling.1 See [ECF No. 21]. He has also failed to include the
1 The Court notes that Appellant previously moved for a stay of “judgments, orders, proceedings,
and enforcement pending appeal” in the Bankruptcy Court on December 18, 2025, which
included a request to stay the foreclosure of his property. [ECF No. 5-1 at 48 (Docket No. 450)].
The Bankruptcy Court denied his motion on December 22, 2025, [id. at 49 (Docket No. 455)],
and his subsequent motion for reconsideration on January 5, 2026, [id. at 50 (Docket No. 468)].
In denying his request for a stay pending appeal, the Bankruptcy Court held that Appellant had
“failed to demonstrate a strong showing of success on the merits of [his] appeal.” In re Pacifico,
No. 20-10325, Docket No. 455 (Bankr. D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2025).
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relevant parts of the record in his Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. [Id.]. Accordingly,
Appellant has not complied with the procedural requirements outlined in Rule 8007, warranting
dismissal of his Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(2)–(3); In re
Correia Contracting, LLC, No. 24-cv-13097, 2025 WL 401198, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2025)
(finding that debtor’s failure to comply with Rule 8007 warranted dismissal of debtor’s
emergency motion for stay pending appeal).
Even if Appellant had complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 8007, he has
not met the substantive requirements meriting a stay. In order to succeed on a motion for a stay,
the movant must show: “(1) likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal, (2) likelihood of
irreparable harm in the absence of a stay, (3) whether the balance of equities tips in movant’s
favor, and (4) whether the stay is consistent with the public interest.” In re Correia Contracting,
LLC, 2025 WL 401198, at *1 (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). Here,
Appellant has failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of his appeal. According to
his opening brief, the issue Appellant raises on appeal is whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in
conferring secured and priority status for a claim filed by the 14-16 Pleasant Street
Condominium Trust (the “Condominium Trust”). See [ECF No. 10 at 3].
Appellant is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his appeal for multiple reasons. First,
Appellant failed to file a timely objection to the Condominium Trust’s claim. On March 31,
2020, the Condominium Trust filed proof of a secured claim for outstanding fees and
assessments with the basis of perfection listed as Mass. Gen. Laws ch. § 183A. See In re
Pacifico, No. 20-10325, Claim Register Entry No. 8 (Bankr. Mass. Dec. 15, 2025). A proof of
claim filed in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case is allowed unless a party in interest objects, 11
U.S.C. § 502(a), and according to the Local Bankruptcy Rules for the District of Massachusetts,
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“[o]bjections to claims shall be served and filed with the Court within (30) days after the
deadline for filing proofs of claim . . . [a]ny claim to which a timely objection is not filed shall be
deemed allowed and paid by the chapter 13 trustee in accordance with the provisions of the
confirmed plan,” D. Mass. L. Bankr. R. 13-13(g) In this case, the deadline to file a proof of
claim was April 15, 2020, and the deadline for Appellant to file an objection to a claim was May
15, 2020. See [ECF No. 5-1 at 2]. Appellant did not file an objection to the Condominium
Trust’s claim before that deadline, before the confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan, or during the
multiple amendments subsequently made to his plan. See generally [ECF No. 5-1].
Second, even if Appellant’s objection had been filed in a timely manner, it is unlikely
that he could show that the Bankruptcy Court erred in determining that the Condominium Trust’s
lien was secured. The Bankruptcy Court previously held that, according to Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 183A, § 6, the “[r]ecording of the master deed constitutes record notice
and perfection of [the] lien; no further recordation of any claim of lien for assessment under this
section is required,” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183A § 6(c), and, therefore, “[n]o further recording
was required by the condominium association to assert a secured lien,” In re Pacifico, No. 20-
10325, Docket No. 436 at 2 (Bankr. D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2025). Appellant has provided no
indication that the Condominium Trust’s claim did not comply with the requirements under
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 183A § 6 such that its claim was improperly considered in
Appellant’s Chapter 13 plan. See Wellington Condo. Trust v. Pino, 686 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122
(D. Mass. 2010) (stating that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183A, §§ 6(a)(i) and (c) provide that
“recording of the master deed constitutes record notice and perfection” of the lien on a unit for
any common expense assessment and finding that the condominium trust had created a lien for
unpaid expenses when it properly recorded its master deed).
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For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, [ECF No. 21], is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
April 10, 2026 	/s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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