Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
JOSE ARNULFO GUERRERO ORELLANA, 	)
on behalf of himself and others 	)
similarly situated, 	)
)
Petitioner-Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action
) 	No. 25-cv-12664-PBS
ANTONE MONIZ, Superintendent, 	)
Plymouth County Correctional 	)
Facility, et al., 	)
)
Respondents-Defendants. 	)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 19, 2025
Saris, J.
INTRODUCTION
This 	class 	action 	concerns 	the 	scope 	of 	the 	government’s
authority to detain noncitizens pending their removal proceedings
without 	the 	opportunity 	for 	release 	on 	bond 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Since July 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) has asserted that all noncitizens who entered the
United States without inspection and are later apprehended inside
the 	country 	must 	be 	detained 	without 	a 	bond 	hearing 	during 	their
removal 	proceedings, 	regardless 	of 	how 	long 	they 	have 	resided 	in
the 	United 	States 	or 	whether 	they 	have 	a 	criminal 	history.
Specifically, 	DHS 	has 	taken 	the 	position 	that 	such 	noncitizens
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remain 	“applicants 	for 	admission” 	and, 	thus, 	are 	subject 	to
mandatory 	detention 	throughout 	their 	removal 	proceedings 	under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) rather than discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 	1226(a). 	The 	Board 	of 	Immigration 	Appeals 	(“BIA”) 	adopted 	this
interpretation of the statute in a precedential decision issued on
September 5, 2025. See Matter of Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220
(B.I.A. 2025).
DHS’s 	recent 	application 	of 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	and 	the 	BIA’s
decision 	in 	Matter 	of 	Hurtado 	are 	contrary 	to 	the 	longstanding
agency 	interpretation 	that 	mandatory 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	applies 	only 	to 	noncitizens 	seeking 	admission 	at
the 	border 	or 	a 	port 	of 	entry. 	The 	Seventh 	Circuit 	and 	most
district 	courts 	to 	have 	addressed 	the 	issue 	have 	rejected 	the
government’s 	new, 	more 	expansive 	interpretation 	of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
__ 	F.4th 	__, 	__ 	(7th 	Cir. 	2025) 	[2025 	WL 	3552514, 	at 	*8-10]
(addressing 	the 	issue 	on 	a 	motion 	to 	stay 	pending 	appeal); 	Barco
Mercado v. Francis, __ F. Supp. 3d __, __ (S.D.N.Y. 2025) [2025 WL
3295903, 	at 	*4 	& 	nn.22-23, 	*13-14] 	(collecting 	district 	court
decisions).
Petitioner-Plaintiff 	Jose 	Arnulfo 	Guerrero 	Orellana, 	the
class representative, entered the United States without inspection
in 2013. He has no criminal record. On September 18, 2025, he was
detained 	by 	DHS 	and 	placed 	into 	removal 	proceedings. 	He
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subsequently 	filed 	this 	petition 	for 	writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	and
class 	action 	complaint 	to 	challenge 	his 	detention 	without 	a 	bond
hearing and the government’s recent interpretation of the scope of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	He 	alleges 	that 	his 	and 	the 	class 	members’
detention without a bond hearing is unlawful for three reasons: 1)
the 	government 	has 	misclassified 	them 	as 	subject 	to 	mandatory
detention 	under 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	when 	the 	statute 	only 	authorizes
their discretionary detention under § 1226(a) (Count I); 2) their
detention 	violates 	their 	constitutional 	right 	to 	due 	process
(Counts II-IV); and 3) the BIA’s decision in Matter of Hurtado is
contrary 	to 	law 	and 	arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	in 	violation 	of 	the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Count
V).
On October 3, 2025, the Court issued a preliminary injunction
requiring 	the 	government 	to 	release 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	unless 	it
provided 	him 	with 	a 	bond 	hearing. 	See 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	v. 	Moniz
(Guerrero Orellana I), __ F. Supp. 3d __, __ (D. Mass. 2025) [2025
WL 	2809996, 	at 	*10]. 	The 	Court 	found 	that 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	was
likely 	to 	succeed 	on 	the 	merits 	of 	Count 	I, 	namely 	that 	the
government lacked statutory authority to detain him without a bond
hearing 	under 	§ 	1225(b)(A)(2) 	and 	that 	he 	was 	subject 	to 	the
government’s 	discretionary 	detention 	authority 	in 	§ 	1226(a). 	See
id. 	at 	__ 	[2025 	WL 	2809996, 	at 	*9]. 	He 	was 	subsequently 	released
on bond by an immigration judge. The Court then certified a class
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of 	noncitizens 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under 	the
government’s 	recent 	interpretation 	of 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	who 	are
either 	detained 	within 	Massachusetts 	or 	subject 	to 	the
jurisdiction 	of 	an 	immigration 	court 	in 	Massachusetts. 	See
Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz (Guerrero Orellana II), __ F. Supp. 3d
__, __ (D. Mass. 2025) [2025 WL 3033769, at *14].
The parties have now filed cross-motions for partial summary
judgment 	on 	Count 	I. 	After 	hearing 	and 	for 	the 	reasons 	explained
below, the Court agrees with Guerrero Orellana that § 1225(b)(2)(A)
does 	not 	authorize 	the 	mandatory 	detention 	of 	the 	class 	members
without 	a 	bond 	hearing. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	ALLOWS 	Guerrero
Orellana’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 90) and DENIES
the 	government’s 	cross-motion 	for 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	(Dkt.
94).
BACKGROUND
I. 	Statutory Framework
As 	the 	Court 	has 	previously 	explained, 	“[t]he 	crux 	of 	this
case 	is 	a 	question 	of 	statutory 	interpretation 	involving 	the
interplay between 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226.” Guerrero Orellana I,
__ F. Supp. 3d at __ [2025 WL 2809996, at *2]. The former provision
establishes 	procedures 	for 	inspection 	of 	an 	“applicant 	for
admission,” 	that 	is, 	a 	noncitizen 	“present 	in 	the 	United 	States
who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8
U.S.C. 	§ 1225(a)(1). 	After 	inspection 	by 	an 	immigration 	officer,
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certain 	applicants 	for 	admission 	who 	are 	deemed 	inadmissible 	are
subject 	to 	expedited 	removal, 	unless 	they 	express 	a 	fear 	of
persecution 	or 	an 	intent 	to 	apply 	for 	asylum. 	See 	id.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 	see 	also 	Dep’t 	of 	Homeland 	Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 	591 	U.S. 	103, 	108-11 	(2020) 	(describing 	expedited
removal). Otherwise, § 1225(b)(2)(a) provides that “in the case of
an 	alien 	who 	is 	an 	applicant 	for 	admission, 	if 	the 	examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien
shall 	be 	detained 	for” 	removal 	proceedings. 	8 	U.S.C. 	§
1225(b)(2)(A). 	A 	noncitizen 	detained 	under 	this 	provision 	may 	be
paroled 	“for 	urgent 	humanitarian 	reasons 	or 	significant 	public
benefit.” Id. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281, 300 (2018). In all other cases where § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies,
the 	provision 	“mandate[s] 	detention 	of 	applicants 	for 	admission
until [removal] proceedings have concluded.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at
297.
Section 1226 permits the government “to detain certain aliens
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.”
Id. at 289. Under § 1226(a), “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney
General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision
on 	whether 	the 	alien 	is 	to 	be 	removed 	from 	the 	United 	States.” 	8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). The government then “may continue to detain the
arrested” 	noncitizen 	during 	removal 	proceedings 	or 	“may 	release”
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the 	noncitizen 	on 	bond 	or 	conditional 	parole. 	Id. 	§ 	1226(a)(1)-
(2). A noncitizen whom the government decides to detain under this
discretionary 	provision 	may 	seek 	review 	of 	that 	decision 	via 	a
bond (i.e., custody redetermination) hearing before an immigration
judge. 	See 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	236.1(d)(1); 	Johnson 	v. 	Guzman 	Chavez, 	594
U.S. 	523, 	527 	(2021); 	Hernandez-Lara 	v. 	Lyons, 	10 	F.4th 	19, 	26
(1st 	Cir. 	2021). 	At 	that 	hearing, 	the 	immigration 	judge 	must
release 	the 	noncitizen 	unless 	the 	government 	establishes 	either
“by clear and convincing evidence that [he] poses a danger to the
community” or “by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] poses
a flight risk.” Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41.
Section 1226(c), 	however, 	“‘carves 	out 	a 	statutory 	category
of 	aliens 	who 	may 	not 	be 	released’ 	during 	removal 	proceedings,
outside 	of 	certain 	limited 	circumstances.” 	Reid 	v. 	Donelan, 	17
F.4th 	1, 	4 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021) 	(quoting 	Jennings, 	583 	U.S. 	at 	289);
see 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1226(a) 	(authorizing 	discretionary 	detention
“[e]xcept 	as 	provided 	in 	subsection 	(c)”). 	This 	mandatory
detention provision applies to noncitizens who are inadmissible or
deportable on certain criminal or terrorist grounds. See Johnson,
594 U.S. at 527 n.2; Reid, 17 F.4th at 4.
II. 	Factual Background
The 	following 	facts 	are 	undisputed. 	Guerrero 	Orellana, 	a
citizen 	of 	El 	Salvador, 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	without
inspection 	in 	2013. 	He 	lives 	in 	Massachusetts 	with 	his 	family,
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including 	his 	one-year-old 	U.S. 	citizen 	daughter. 	He 	has 	no
criminal record.
On September 18, 2025, DHS arrested Guerrero Orellana during
a 	vehicle 	stop 	in 	Everett, 	Massachusetts, 	which 	is 	not 	at 	the
border. 	Shortly 	after 	his 	arrest, 	DHS 	served 	Guerrero 	Orellana
with a notice to appear charging him as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present in the United States without
admission 	or 	parole 	and 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i) 	for
lacking valid entry documents. Guerrero Orellana intends to apply
for cancellation of removal during his removal proceedings.
Guerrero 	Orellana 	was 	detained 	following 	his 	arrest 	at 	the
Plymouth 	County 	Correctional 	Facility 	in 	Massachusetts. 	The
government asserted that it was detaining Guerrero Orellana as an
“applicant 	for 	admission” 	under 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Based 	on 	the
government’s position, Guerrero Orellana was subject to mandatory
detention and ineligible for a bond hearing before an immigration
judge under the BIA’s decision in Matter of Hurtado.
III. Procedural History
On 	the 	day 	of 	his 	arrest, 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	filed 	a 	habeas
petition 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 2241 	to 	challenge 	the 	legality 	of 	his
ongoing detention without a bond hearing. He subsequently filed an
amended 	complaint 	and 	habeas 	petition 	asserting 	both 	individual
claims 	and 	claims 	on 	behalf 	of 	a 	class 	of 	noncitizens 	subject 	to
mandatory 	detention 	under 	the 	government’s 	interpretation 	of
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§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	He 	alleges 	that 	his 	and 	the 	class 	members’
detention 	without 	a 	bond 	hearing 	is 	unlawful 	for 	three 	reasons:
1) the 	government 	has 	misclassified 	them 	as 	subject 	to 	mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) when they are actually subject to
discretionary 	detention 	under 	§ 	1226(a) 	(Count 	I); 	2) 	their
detention 	violates 	their 	constitutional 	right 	to 	due 	process
(Counts II-IV); and 3) the BIA’s decision in Matter of Hurtado is
contrary 	to 	law 	and 	arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	in 	violation 	of 	the
APA (Count V).
On October 3, 2025, the Court issued a preliminary injunction
requiring 	the 	government 	to 	release 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	unless 	he
was provided with a bond hearing before an immigration judge. See
Guerrero 	Orellana 	I, 	__ 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	__ 	[2025 	WL 	2809996, 	at
*10]. 	In 	finding 	that 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	was 	likely 	to 	succeed 	on
the merits of Count I, the Court rejected the government’s position
that 	any 	noncitizen 	who 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	without
inspection 	is 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	pending 	removal
proceedings under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See id. at __ [2025 WL 2809996,
at 	*4-9]. 	The 	Court 	concluded 	that 	the 	government’s 	authority 	to
detain 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	rested 	instead 	on 	§ 	1226(a) 	and, 	thus,
that 	he 	had 	a 	right 	to 	a 	bond 	hearing 	in 	immigration 	court. 	See
id. at __ [2025 WL 2809996, at *9]. Six days later, an immigration
judge 	held 	a 	hearing 	and 	ordered 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	released 	on
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bond. 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	posted 	bond 	the 	following 	day 	and 	was
released from custody.
Guerrero 	Orellana 	also 	moved 	for 	class 	certification 	under
Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	23. 	The 	Court 	certified 	the
following class for Count I only:
All 	people 	who 	are 	arrested 	or 	detained 	in
Massachusetts, 	or 	are 	detained 	in 	a 	geographical 	area
over 	which, 	as 	of 	September 	22, 	2025, 	an 	Immigration
Court 	located 	in 	Massachusetts 	is 	the 	administrative
control 	court, 	or 	who 	are 	otherwise 	subject 	to 	the
jurisdiction 	of 	an 	Immigration 	Court 	located 	in
Massachusetts, where:
(a) 	the person is not in any Expedited Removal process
under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b)(1), 	does 	not 	have 	an
Expedited 	Removal 	order 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1), and is not currently in proceedings
before 	an 	immigration 	judge 	due 	to 	having 	been
found to have a credible fear of persecution under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii);
(b) 	for the person’s most recent entry into the United
States, 	the 	government 	has 	not 	alleged 	that 	the
person 	was 	admitted 	into 	the 	United 	States 	and
has not alleged that person was paroled into the
United 	States 	pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) at the time of entry;
(c) 	the 	person 	does 	not 	meet 	the 	criteria 	for
mandatory 	detention 	pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1226(c);
(d) 	the 	person 	is 	not 	subject 	to 	post-final 	order
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231; and
(e) 	the 	person 	is 	not 	a 	person 	whose 	most 	recent
arrest 	occurred 	at 	the 	border 	while 	they 	were
arriving 	in 	the 	United 	States 	and 	has 	been
continuously detained thereafter.
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Guerrero 	Orellana 	II, 	__ 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	__ 	[2025 	WL 	3033769, 	at
*14]. 	The 	parties’ 	cross-motions 	for 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	on
Count I followed.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	“if 	the 	movant 	shows 	that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“A 	genuine 	dispute 	is 	one 	which 	‘a 	reasonable 	jury 	could
resolve . . . in the favor of the non-moving party,’ and a material
issue is one with the ‘potential to affect the outcome . . . under
the 	applicable 	law.’” 	Kinzer v. 	Whole 	Foods 	Mkt., 	Inc., 	99 	F.4th
105, 	108 	(1st 	Cir. 	2024) 	(alterations 	in 	original) 	(quoting
Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy, 877 F.3d 14, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2017)).
In 	determining 	whether 	to 	grant 	summary 	judgment, 	a 	court 	must
construe “the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party” 	and 	“draw[] 	all 	reasonable 	inferences” 	in 	his 	favor. 	Id.
(quoting Harley-Davidson Credit Corp. v. Galvin, 807 F.3d 407, 408
(1st Cir. 2015)).
This standard does “not change where the parties file cross-
motions for summary judgment.” Roberge v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co.
of Am., 112 F.4th 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2024). On cross-motions, a court
must “determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as
a 	matter 	of 	law 	on 	facts 	that 	are 	not 	disputed.” 	Johansen 	v.
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Liberty 	Mut. 	Grp., 	118 	F.4th 	142, 	149 	(1st 	Cir. 	2024) 	(quoting
Anvar v. Dwyer, 82 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2023)).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Jurisdiction
The 	government 	first 	presses 	various 	challenges 	to 	the
Court’s jurisdiction over this action. The government asserts that
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and (g) bar Guerrero Orellana’s suit because
he 	contests 	decisions 	about 	immigration 	detention 	that 	are
inextricably tied to, and arise from, the commencement and pendency
of 	removal 	proceedings. 	The 	government 	also 	argues 	that 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1252(e) prohibits class certification in this case and required
Guerrero 	Orellana 	to 	file 	his 	class 	action 	in 	the 	U.S. 	District
Court 	for 	the 	District 	of 	Columbia 	within 	sixty 	days 	of 	the
government’s implementation of its new policy regarding the scope
of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court rejected identical jurisdictional arguments in its
preliminary injunction and class certification decisions and does
so again here for the same reasons. See Guerrero Orellana I, __ F.
Supp. 	3d 	at 	__ 	[2025 	WL 	2809996, 	at 	*3-4]; 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	II,
__ 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	__ 	[2025 	WL 	3033769, 	at 	*5-6]. 	In 	short, 	the
First 	Circuit 	has 	held 	that 	neither 	§ 1252(b)(9) 	nor 	§ 	1252(g)
strips 	district 	courts 	of 	jurisdiction 	over 	claims 	like 	Guerrero
Orellana’s that concern “the legality of a petitioner’s detention”
and 	are 	collateral 	to 	removal 	proceedings 	or 	the 	execution 	of
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removal 	orders. 	Kong 	v. 	United 	States, 	62 	F.4th 	608, 	614-15 	(1st
Cir. 2023).
Moreover, 	§ 	1252(e)’s 	restrictions 	on 	judicial 	review 	--
which 	apply 	in 	relevant 	part 	to 	systemic 	challenges 	to
“determinations 	under 	[§] 	1225(b) 	. 	. 	. 	and 	its 	implementation,”
8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1252(e)(3)(A) 	-- 	do 	“not 	limit 	judicial 	review 	of
Guerrero 	Orellana’s 	claim 	that 	the 	government 	is 	unlawfully
subjecting him and the other class members to mandatory detention
under 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) because 	the 	mandatory 	detention 	provision
does not apply at all.” Guerrero Orellana II, __ F. Supp. 3d at __
[2025 	WL 	3033769, 	at 	*6]. 	In 	other 	words, 	since 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A)
“does 	not 	govern 	the 	detention 	of 	individuals 	in 	Guerrero
Orellana’s position in the first place, he is not seeking judicial
review of the ‘implementation’ of § 1225(b).” Id. Since this Court
first held in its class certification decision that § 1252(e) does
not apply to this lawsuit, a number of other district courts have
similarly interpreted the scope of that jurisdictional provision.
See Barron Moncada v. Noem, No. 25-cv-3354, 2025 WL 3458894, at *1
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2025); Ardon-Quiroz v. Assistant Field Dir., No.
25-cv-25290, 	2025 	WL 	3451645, 	at 	*2-3 	(S.D. 	Fla. 	Dec. 	1, 	2025);
Lieogo v. Freden, No. 25-cv-06615, 2025 WL 3290694, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 26, 2025); Bautista v. Santacruz, __ F. Supp. 3d __, __ (C.D.
Cal. 2025) [2025 WL 3289861, at *4].
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The Court therefore has jurisdiction over Count I of Guerrero
Orellana’s 	lawsuit. 	The 	Court 	now 	turns 	to 	the 	merits 	of 	that
claim.
II. 	Scope of § 1252(b)(2)(A)
Count I of Guerrero Orellana’s amended complaint alleges that
the 	government 	has 	misclassified 	the 	class 	members 	as 	subject 	to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) instead of discretionary
detention under § 1226 in contravention of the relevant statutory
provisions. 	At 	core, 	this 	claim 	poses 	a 	question 	of 	statutory
interpretation regarding the scope of § 1225(b)(2)(A). “Questions
of 	statutory 	interpretation 	are 	questions 	of 	law,” 	Hernández-
Miranda v. Empresas Díaz Massó, Inc., 651 F.3d 167, 170 (1st Cir.
2011), 	so 	Guerrero 	Orellana’s 	claim 	is 	appropriately 	resolved 	on
summary 	judgment, 	see 	Brown 	v. 	United 	States, 	557 	F.3d 	1, 	3 	(1st
Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “a question of law” is “grist for the
summary judgment mill”).
The 	parties 	offer 	dueling 	constructions 	of 	the 	scope 	of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	That 	provision 	states 	that 	“in 	the 	case 	of 	an
alien 	who 	is 	an 	applicant 	for 	admission, 	if 	the 	examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien
shall 	be 	detained 	for 	a 	[removal] 	proceeding.” 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). The government argues that this provision applies
to 	any 	“applicant 	for 	admission” 	-- 	including 	any 	noncitizen 	who
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entered 	the 	United 	States 	without 	inspection, 	regardless 	of 	how
long 	he 	or 	she 	has 	been 	present 	in 	the 	country 	-- 	who 	is 	not
subject to the expedited removal process under § 1225(b)(1). It is
undisputed 	that 	the 	class 	members 	are 	all 	“applicants 	for
admission” because they were neither admitted nor paroled, see id.
§ 1225(a)(1), so, under the government’s interpretation, they are
all subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Guerrero 	Orellana 	interprets 	the 	relevant 	statutory
provisions 	differently. 	In 	his 	view, 	mandatory 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) only applies to noncitizens “seeking admission” at
a 	port 	of 	entry 	or 	by 	crossing 	the 	border, 	while 	§ 	1226(a)’s
discretionary 	authority 	governs 	the 	detention 	of 	noncitizens
arrested within the United States, whether or not they entered the
country unlawfully.
The Court addressed the question of statutory interpretation
at the heart of this claim in its preliminary injunction decision
in 	this 	case. 	There, 	the 	Court 	agreed 	with 	Guerrero 	Orellana’s
argument 	that 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	only 	authorizes 	the 	detention 	of
noncitizens arriving at a port of entry or crossing the border and
does not apply to noncitizens who entered the United States without
inspection and are later apprehended while residing in the country.
See Guerrero Orellana I, __ F. Supp. 3d at __ [2025 WL 2809996, at
*4-9]. 	The 	Court’s 	conclusion 	rested 	on 	the 	plain 	and 	ordinary
meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s text, namely the requirement that the
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noncitizen 	be 	“seeking 	admission”; 	the 	presumption 	against
construing 	the 	statutory 	provision 	in 	a 	manner 	that 	would 	render
superfluous 	language 	in 	the 	provision 	itself 	and 	in 	Congress’s
recent amendment to § 1226(c); the description of the government’s
pre-removal 	order 	detention 	authority 	in 	the 	Supreme 	Court’s
decision 	in 	Jennings, 	see 	583 	U.S. 	at 	287-89; 	and 	longstanding
agency 	practice. 	See 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	I, 	__ 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	__
[2025 	WL 	2809996, 	at 	*6-9]. 	Following 	the 	Court’s 	preliminary
injunction decision, the Seventh Circuit, the only court of appeals
to have addressed the issue, held that the government is not likely
to 	succeed 	in 	its 	argument 	about 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s 	scope. 	See
Castañon-Nava, __ F.4th at __ [2025 WL 3552514, at *8-10].
Because 	the 	parties’ 	arguments 	at 	this 	stage 	largely 	rehash
those 	presented 	in 	their 	preliminary 	injunction 	briefing, 	the
Court need not analyze those arguments at length. For the reasons
provided 	in 	its 	preliminary 	injunction 	decision, 	the 	Court
concludes 	that 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	does 	not 	authorize 	the 	mandatory
detention 	of 	noncitizens 	who 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	without
inspection 	and 	are 	detained 	while 	residing 	in 	the 	country. 	See
Guerrero Orellana I, __ F. Supp. 3d at __ [2025 WL 2809996, at *6-
9].
The 	Court 	briefly 	responds 	to 	two 	of 	the 	government’s
arguments 	that 	it 	has 	not 	yet 	addressed. 	First, 	the 	government
points 	to 	language 	in 	an 	implementing 	regulation 	for 	§ 1225(b)
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providing 	that 	“[a]n 	alien 	who 	was 	not 	inspected 	and 	admitted 	or
paroled into the United States but who establishes that he or she
has been continuously physically present in the United States for
the 	2–year 	period 	immediately 	prior 	to 	the 	date 	of 	determination
of 	inadmissibility 	[i.e., 	is 	not 	subject 	to 	expedited 	removal]
shall 	be 	detained 	in 	accordance 	with 	[§ 1225(b)(2)].” 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 235.3(b)(1)(ii). 	In 	the 	government’s 	view, 	this 	language
indicates 	that 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	applies 	to 	all 	“applicants 	for
admission” 	not 	subject 	to 	the 	expedited 	removal 	process 	and 	is 	a
“contemporaneous[]” 	agency 	interpretation 	“useful 	in 	determining
[§ 	1225(b)(2)(A)]’s 	meaning.” 	Loper 	Bright 	Enters. v. 	Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024).
Despite 	the 	government’s 	reliance 	on 	this 	regulatory
language, 	the 	Court 	is 	ultimately 	unpersuaded 	to 	alter 	its
interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A). As an initial matter, questions
of 	statutory 	interpretation 	rest 	with 	the 	court, 	which 	must
“independently 	interpret 	the 	statute 	and 	effectuate 	the 	will 	of
Congress 	subject 	to 	constitutional 	limits.” 	Id. 	at 	395.
Additionally, the language cited by the government appears in the
subsection 	of 	the 	regulation 	addressing 	expedited 	removal. 	See 	8
C.F.R. 	§ 	235.3(b). 	By 	contrast, 	the 	subsection 	that 	actually
implements 	§ 	1225(b)(2) 	applies 	more 	narrowly 	to 	“any 	arriving
alien 	who 	appears 	to 	the 	inspecting 	officer 	to 	be 	inadmissible,
and 	who 	is 	placed 	in 	[regular] 	removal 	proceedings.” 	8 	C.F.R.
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§ 235.3(c)(1) 	(emphasis 	added). 	An 	“arriving 	alien,” 	in 	turn, 	is
“an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the
United 	States.” 	Id. 	§ 	1.2. 	As 	many 	other 	district 	courts 	have
noted, 	§ 	235.3(c)(1) 	thus 	“treats 	‘arriving 	alien’ 	as 	roughly
interchangeable with an ‘applicant . . . seeking admission’” under
§ 	1225(b)(2)(A). 	Martinez 	v. 	Hyde, 	792 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	211, 	219 	(D.
Mass. 	2025) 	(alteration 	in 	original), 	appeal 	filed, 	No. 	25-1902
(1st Cir. Sep. 29, 2025); see, e.g., Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, __
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	__, 	__ 	(N.D. 	Cal. 	2025) 	[2025 	WL 	2741654, 	at 	*10],
appeal filed, No. 25-7472 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025); Lopez Benitez
v. 	Francis, 	795 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	475, 	489 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2025). 	This
interpretation 	of 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A) 	finds 	further 	support 	in
longstanding 	agency 	practice, 	which 	for 	decades 	after 	the
enactment of the statutory provision applied § 1226 to noncitizens
who entered without inspection and were detained while residing in
the 	United 	States. 	See 	Castañon-Nava, 	__ 	F.4th 	at 	__ 	[2025 	WL
3552514, 	at 	*9 	n.13]; 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	I, 	__ 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	__
[2025 	WL 	2809996, 	at 	*8]. 	The 	government 	has 	not, 	therefore,
identified 	a 	persuasive 	agency 	interpretation 	that 	has 	“remained
consistent over time.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 394.
Second, 	the 	government 	argues 	that 	all 	“applicants 	for
admission” 	are 	by 	definition 	“seeking 	admission” 	and 	are, 	thus,
subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A). 	The
strongest language the government offers on this point is another
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provision in § 1225 that refers to noncitizens “who are applicants
for 	admission 	or 	otherwise 	seeking 	admission.” 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(3) 	(emphasis 	added). 	Yet 	if 	all 	“applicants 	for
admission” 	are 	“seeking 	admission,” 	Congress 	would 	not 	have
specified 	that 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A) 	applies 	“in 	the 	case 	of 	an 	alien
who is an applicant for admission” and who is “seeking admission.”
Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Adopting the government’s construction of the
statute 	would 	improperly 	render 	meaningless 	the 	phrase 	“seeking
admission” 	in 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	See 	Castañon-Nava, 	__ 	F.4th 	at 	__
[2025 	WL 	3552514, 	at 	*9]; 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	I, 	__ 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at
__ [2025 WL 2809996, at *7]; see also City of Providence v. Barr,
954 	F.3d 	23, 	37 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020) 	(“Courts 	generally 	ought 	not 	to
interpret 	statutes 	in 	a 	way 	that 	renders 	words 	or 	phrases 	either
meaningless or superfluous.”).
In 	sum, 	the 	Court 	holds 	that 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A) 	does 	not
authorize 	mandatory 	detention 	pending 	removal 	proceedings 	for
noncitizens who enter the United States without inspection and are
later apprehended while residing within the country. The detention
of 	any 	such 	noncitizen 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	his 	removal
proceedings is instead governed by § 1226(a), unless he is subject
to the expedited removal process under § 1225(b)(1), humanitarian
parole 	revocation 	under 	§ 1182(d)(5)(A), 	or 	mandatory 	detention
based on criminal or terrorist grounds under § 1226(c). The Court
therefore grants summary judgment to Guerrero Orellana on his claim
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that the government lacks statutory authority to subject the class
members to mandatory detention without a bond hearing.
The government does, however, raise one meritorious argument
regarding the proper scope of the class. The class definition that
the 	Court 	certified 	excludes 	any 	noncitizen 	who, 	“for 	[his] 	most
recent 	entry 	into 	the 	United 	States, 	the 	government 	has 	not
alleged . . . 	was 	paroled 	into 	the 	United 	States 	pursuant 	to 	8
U.S.C. 	§ 	1182(d)(5)(A) 	at 	the 	time 	of 	entry.” 	Guerrero 	Orellana
II, __ F. Supp. 3d at __ [2025 WL 3033769, at *14]. This exclusion
reflects 	that 	when 	a 	noncitizen’s 	humanitarian 	parole 	ends, 	he
“shall 	forthwith 	return 	or 	be 	returned 	to 	the 	custody 	from 	which
he was paroled.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Thus, a noncitizen who
is 	detained 	under 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A) 	upon 	entry 	into 	the 	United
States, is released on humanitarian parole, and is again detained
upon 	the 	end 	of 	his 	parole 	returns 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	As 	the 	government 	points 	out, 	this 	rationale
applies to any noncitizen released on humanitarian parole, whether
he 	receives 	parole 	“at 	the 	time 	of 	entry” 	or 	subsequently. 	The
Court 	therefore 	modifies 	this 	aspect 	of 	the 	class 	definition 	to
exclude 	any 	noncitizen 	who 	“for 	[his] 	most 	recent 	entry 	into 	the
United 	States, 	the 	government 	has 	not 	alleged . . . 	was 	paroled
into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) at the
time 	of 	entry 	or 	after 	continuous 	detention 	upon 	arrival.” 	See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class
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certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”);
Brown 	v. 	Colegio 	de 	Abogados 	de 	P.R., 	613 	F.3d 	44, 	50 	(1st 	Cir.
2010) 	(“Courts 	may 	alter 	[class] 	certification 	orders 	prior 	to
final judgment . . . .”).
III. Declaratory Judgment
Having resolved the merits of Count I in Guerrero Orellana’s
favor, the Court turns to the question of remedy. Guerrero Orellana
seeks 	a 	declaration 	that 	the 	class 	members 	are 	subject 	to
discretionary 	detention 	under 	§ 	1226(a), 	not 	mandatory 	detention
under 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A), 	and 	that 	they 	are 	entitled 	to 	an 	initial
custody determination by an immigration officer and, upon request,
a 	custody 	redetermination 	(i.e., 	bond) 	hearing 	before 	an
immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). Apart from
challenging 	the 	merits 	of 	Guerrero 	Orellana’s 	claim, 	the
government 	does 	not 	contest 	the 	language 	of 	the 	proposed
declaratory judgment.
The government does, though, renew its argument that the Court
lacks 	jurisdiction 	to 	issue 	a 	class-wide 	declaratory 	judgment
because such relief “restrain[s] the operation of” § 1225(b)(2)(A)
in 	violation 	of 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1252(f)(1). 	As 	the 	Court 	explained 	in
its class certification decision, binding First Circuit precedent
forecloses 	the 	government’s 	argument 	that 	§ 	1252(f)(1) 	bars
declaratory relief. See Guerrero Orellana II, __ F. Supp. 3d at __
[2025 	WL 	3033769, 	at 	*12]; 	see 	also 	Brito 	v. 	Barr, 	22 	F.4th 	240,
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252 (1st Cir. 2021) (“[D]eclaratory relief remains available under
[§] 1252(f)(1).”). 	The 	Court 	will 	therefore 	issue 	a 	declaratory
judgment in favor of the class.
IV. 	Certification of Partial Final Judgment
Guerrero Orellana next asks the Court to issue partial final
judgment 	on 	Count 	I 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	54(b).
The government agrees to this relief should the Court conclude, as
it 	does, 	that 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	is 	warranted 	in 	Guerrero
Orellana’s favor. Rule 54(b) provides that in an action with “more
than 	one 	claim 	for 	relief 	. 	. 	. 	or 	when 	multiple 	parties 	are
involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one
or 	more, 	but 	fewer 	than 	all, 	claims 	or 	parties 	only 	if 	the 	court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b).
To 	certify 	a 	partial 	final 	judgment 	under 	this 	provision, 	a
court 	“first 	must 	ensure 	that 	the 	ruling 	underlying 	the 	proposed
judgment 	is 	final.” 	Nystedt 	v. 	Nigro, 	700 	F.3d 	25, 	29 	(1st 	Cir.
2012). 	This 	“finality 	requirement 	is 	satisfied 	as 	long 	as 	the
‘trial 	court 	action 	underlying 	the 	judgment 	disposed 	of 	all 	the
rights 	and 	liabilities 	of 	at 	least 	one 	party 	as 	to 	at 	least 	one
claim.’” Amyndas Pharms., S.A. v. Zealand Pharma A/S, 48 F.4th 18,
28 	(1st 	Cir. 	2022) 	(quoting 	Credit 	Francais 	Int’l, 	S.A. 	v. 	Bio-
Vita, Ltd., 78 F.3d 698, 706 (1st Cir. 1996)). Here, the entry of
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partial summary judgment on Count I fully resolves that claim and,
thus, is sufficiently final.
Rule 54(b) also requires the court to find that “there is no
just reason for delay” in entering judgment on the resolved claims.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see Amyndas, 48 F.4th at 28. This standard
calls 	for 	“an 	individualized 	assessment 	of 	the 	desirability 	and
effect of an immediate appeal.” Quinn v. City of Boston, 325 F.3d
18, 	26 	(1st 	Cir. 	2003). 	The 	court 	must 	bear 	in 	mind 	the 	“long-
settled and prudential policy against the scattershot disposition
of 	litigation.” 	Amyndas, 	48 	F.4th 	at 	28 	(quoting 	Spiegel 	v. 	Trs.
of 	Tufts 	Coll., 	843 	F.2d 	38, 	42 	(1st 	Cir. 	1988)). 	Other 	relevant
factors 	include 	“whether 	the 	disputed 	ruling 	raises 	legal 	or
factual issues that overlap with any claims that remain pending in
the 	district 	court” 	and 	“how 	the 	equities 	and 	efficiencies 	of
piecemeal 	review 	would 	compare 	to 	those 	in 	a 	single 	proceeding.”
Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 27 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999).
The Court concludes that there is no just reason for delay in
entering judgment on Count I. Guerrero Orellana’s victory on this
count 	and 	the 	issuance 	of 	a 	declaration 	in 	the 	class’s 	favor 	may
well obviate the need to address the remaining counts, which allege
that the class members’ mandatory detention without a bond hearing
is 	unlawful 	for 	other 	reasons. 	See 	Quinn, 	325 	F.3d 	at 	27
(explaining 	that 	such 	circumstances 	“mean[] 	that, 	in 	all
probability, there will be no significant duplication of effort in
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litigating 	one 	set 	of 	claims 	to 	a 	conclusion 	and 	then 	addressing
the remaining set of claims”). More importantly, Guerrero Orellana
has 	“establish[ed] 	a 	compelling 	reason 	for 	accelerated 	appellate
review.” 	Amyndas, 	48 	F.4th 	at 	29. 	This 	action 	implicates 	the
liberty interests of the class members. Delaying entry of judgment
while 	the 	Court 	resolves 	all 	the 	claims 	brought 	by 	Guerrero
Orellana 	would 	force 	class 	members 	to 	endure 	ongoing 	irreparable
harm 	as 	they 	continue 	to 	be 	unlawfully 	subject 	to 	mandatory
detention 	without 	a 	bond 	hearing. 	See 	Guerrero 	Orellana 	I, 	__ 	F.
Supp. 	at 	__ 	[2025 	WL 	2809996, 	at 	*9]; 	see 	also 	Ferrara 	v. 	United
States, 370 F. Supp. 2d 351, 360 (D. Mass. 2005) (“Obviously, the
loss 	of 	liberty 	is 	a 	. 	. 	. 	severe 	form 	of 	irreparable 	injury.”).
Put 	differently, 	“the 	nature 	of 	the 	rights 	at 	issue 	here 	. 	. 	.
factors in favor of speedier review.” Amyndas, 48 F.4th at 29.
Having concluded that there is no just reason for delay, the
Court will enter partial final judgment on Count I.
V. 	Notice and Identification of Class Members
Finally, Guerrero Orellana requests that the Court order the
government to 1) provide individualized notice to class members of
the 	action 	and 	their 	right 	to 	seek 	release 	from 	detention;
2) identify to class counsel all present members of the class and
then 	identify 	new 	class 	members 	on 	a 	weekly 	basis; 	and 	3) 	notify
class 	counsel 	of 	the 	transfer 	of 	any 	class 	member 	out 	of
Massachusetts, 	Maine, 	Rhode 	Island, 	Vermont, 	or 	New 	Hampshire 	at
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least 	twenty-four 	hours 	prior 	to 	transfer 	or, 	if 	such 	notice 	is
not reasonably practicable, within twenty-four hours of initiation
of the transfer. The government opposes these requests.
A 	district 	court 	has 	discretion 	to 	“require 	-- 	to 	protect
class members and fairly conduct the action -- giving appropriate
notice 	to 	some 	or 	all 	class 	members 	of 	. 	. 	. 	any 	step 	in 	the
action.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	23(d)(1)(B)(i); 	see 	id. 	advisory
committee’s 	note 	to 	1966 	amendment 	(noting 	that 	this 	provision
“does not require notice at any stage, but rather calls attention
to its availability and invokes the court’s discretion”). The Court
concludes 	that 	simply 	posting 	notice 	of 	the 	declaratory 	judgment
in 	detention 	facilities, 	as 	the 	government 	suggests, 	would 	not
adequately ensure that class members are informed of their rights
in 	light 	of 	DHS’s 	ability 	to 	transfer 	class 	members 	between
facilities 	and 	the 	fact 	that 	many 	class 	members 	may 	not 	speak
English 	or 	have 	counsel. 	Thus, 	individualized 	notice 	of 	the
declaratory judgment is also warranted at this stage. Cf. Brito v.
Barr, 	415 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	258, 	271 	(D. 	Mass. 	2019) 	(ordering 	the
government 	to 	provide 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	court’s 	declaratory 	judgment
and permanent injunction to all class members in a case concerning
immigration 	detention), 	aff’d 	in 	part, 	vacated 	in 	part, 	22 	F.4th
240 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021). 	The 	government 	argues 	that 	identifying 	the
applicable 	detention 	authority 	for 	each 	immigration 	detainee 	--
and, thus, determining who should receive individualized notice as
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a class member -- is an onerous undertaking for DHS. Accordingly,
the Court orders the government to give notice to all noncitizens
whom 	the 	government 	reasonably 	believes 	may 	be 	members 	of 	the
class.
At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the
parties 	extensively 	debated 	the 	feasibility 	and 	burden 	of
requiring 	Defendants 	to 	identify 	to 	class 	counsel 	information
about class members and the transfers of any class member outside
the region. Based on the current record, the Court lacks adequate
information 	on 	these 	topics 	to 	determine 	what 	identification 	and
reporting 	obligations 	to 	class 	counsel, 	if 	any, 	are 	appropriate.
At this stage, then, the Court does not impose any identification
and 	reporting 	obligations 	on 	the 	government. 	The 	parties 	shall
file supplemental briefs on this issue by January 7, 2026, and are
encouraged 	in 	the 	interim 	to 	confer 	to 	see 	if 	they 	can 	reach 	any
agreement.
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Guerrero 	Orellana’s 	motion 	for
partial summary judgment (Dkt. 90) is ALLOWED, and the government’s
cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 94) is DENIED.
The Court modifies the class definition to read as follows:
All 	people 	who 	are 	arrested 	or 	detained 	in
Massachusetts, 	or 	are 	detained 	in 	a 	geographical 	area
over 	which, 	as 	of 	September 	22, 	2025, 	an 	Immigration
Court 	located 	in 	Massachusetts 	is 	the 	administrative
control 	court, 	or 	who 	are 	otherwise 	subject 	to 	the
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jurisdiction 	of 	an 	Immigration 	Court 	located 	in
Massachusetts, where:
(a) 	the person is not in any Expedited Removal process
under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b)(1), 	does 	not 	have 	an
Expedited 	Removal 	order 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1), 	and 	is 	not 	currently 	in 	proceedings
before 	an 	immigration 	judge 	due 	to 	having 	been
found to have a credible fear of persecution under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii);
(b) 	for the person’s most recent entry into the United
States, 	the 	government 	has 	not 	alleged 	that 	the
person was admitted into the United States and has
not alleged that person was paroled into the United
States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) at the
time 	of 	entry 	or 	after 	continuous 	detention 	upon
arrival;
(c) 	the person does not meet the criteria for mandatory
detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c);
(d) 	the 	person 	is 	not 	subject 	to 	post-final 	order
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231; and
(e) 	the person is not a person whose most recent arrest
occurred at the border while they were arriving in
the 	United 	States 	and 	has 	been 	continuously
detained thereafter.
By January 7, 2026, the parties shall file supplemental briefs
of 	no 	more 	than 	ten 	pages 	on 	any 	identification 	or 	reporting
obligations the Court should impose.
The Court issues the following declaratory judgment and will
enter a separate partial final judgment on Count I.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
The 	Court 	declares 	that 	the 	members 	of 	the 	certified 	class
are 	not 	subject 	to 	detention 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b)(2).
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Defendants’ policy of subjecting members of the certified class to
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without consideration for
bond and a custody redetermination (i.e., bond) hearing is unlawful
and 	violates 	the 	Immigration 	and 	Nationality 	Act 	and 	its
regulations. 	The 	members 	of 	the 	certified 	class 	are 	subject 	to
detention 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a), 	including 	access 	to
consideration 	for 	release 	on 	bond 	and/or 	conditions 	before
immigration 	officers 	and 	Immigration 	Judges. 	After 	joining 	the
class, 	the 	member 	of 	the 	certified 	class 	shall 	remain 	subject 	to
this 	order 	notwithstanding 	any 	subsequent 	change 	in 	their
location, 	facility 	of 	detention, 	or 	venue 	of 	immigration
proceeding.
The Court also orders that:
1. 	The 	notice 	of 	the 	declaratory 	judgment 	that 	Defendants
are ordered to give shall be in the form attached in the
appendix 	hereto. 	Defendants 	shall 	forthwith 	translate
the 	notice 	into, 	at 	minimum, 	Spanish, 	Portuguese, 	and
Haitian Creole.
2. 	Within 	seven 	days, 	Defendants 	shall 	post 	the 	notice 	in
English, 	Spanish, 	Portuguese, 	and 	Haitian 	Creole 	in
common 	areas 	of 	any 	facility 	holding 	immigration
detainees 	in 	Massachusetts 	or 	in 	any 	geographic 	area
over 	which, 	as 	of 	September 	22, 	2025, 	an 	Immigration
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Court 	located 	in 	Massachusetts 	is 	the 	administrative
control court.
3. 	Within fourteen days, Defendants shall serve the notice
on all noncitizens already in immigration detention who
Defendants 	reasonably 	believe 	may 	be 	members 	of 	the
class. The notice shall be in a language the noncitizen
understands. 	Should 	Defendants 	not 	have 	the 	notice
translated 	into 	a 	language 	the 	noncitizen 	understands,
they shall secure an interpreter to translate the notice
as soon as feasible.
4. 	Starting no later than seven days after the date of this
order, Defendants shall promptly serve the notice on all
noncitizens 	who 	are 	newly 	arrested 	or 	detained 	by
immigration 	officers 	and 	who 	Defendants 	reasonably
believe may be members of the class. The notice shall be
given 	at 	the 	time 	the 	noncitizen 	is 	processed 	in 	a
language 	the 	noncitizen 	understands. 	Should 	Defendants
not 	have 	the 	notice 	translated 	into 	a 	language 	the
noncitizen understands, they shall secure an interpreter
to translate the notice as soon as feasible.
5. 	Defendants 	shall 	record 	the 	service 	of 	each 	notice 	and
retain a copy of each such notice served.
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6. 	Defendants 	shall 	provide 	the 	noncitizen 	with 	access 	to
a 	telephone 	to 	call 	an 	attorney 	within 	one 	hour 	after
the noncitizen receives the notice.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS__________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge
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APPENDIX
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
JOSE ARNULFO GUERRERO ORELLANA, 	)
on behalf of himself and others 	)
similarly situated, 	)
)
Petitioner-Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action
) 	No. 25-cv-12664-PBS
ANTONE MONIZ, Superintendent, 	)
Plymouth County Correctional 	)
Facility, et al., 	)
)
Respondents-Defendants. 	)
)
CLASS ACTION NOTICE
You may be a member of a class that has been certified by the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in
Guerrero 	Orellana 	v. 	Moniz, 	No. 	25-cv-12664 	(D. 	Mass. 	2025). 	On
December 19, 2025, the District Court issued a ruling that certain
immigration 	detainees 	may 	be 	unlawfully 	detained 	and 	may 	seek
release 	on 	bond 	or 	conditional 	parole 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a).
Therefore, 	you 	may 	be 	entitled 	to 	request 	release 	on 	bond 	or
conditional 	parole 	by 	immigration 	officers; 	you 	may 	also 	be
entitled 	to 	a 	bond 	hearing 	upon 	your 	request 	to 	the 	Immigration
Court. 	At 	the 	bond 	hearing, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	may 	determine
that 	you 	are 	eligible 	to 	be 	released 	on 	bond 	while 	your 	removal
proceedings are pending.
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If you have questions about your potential membership in the
class 	or 	your 	rights 	under 	the 	District 	Court’s 	ruling, 	you 	may
call the attorneys representing the class at (857) 347-5502.
Served on date: _____________________
Served at location: _____________________
Name of person served: _____________________
Alien number of person served: _____________________
Name of officer serving notice: _____________________
ID number of officer serving notice: _____________________
Signed by serving officer: ____________________________________
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