President and Fellows of Harvard College v. United States Department of Homeland Security et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF
HARVARD COLLEGE,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 25-cv-11472-ADB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Plaintiff, the President and Fellows of Harvard College (“Plaintiff” or “Harvard”), brings
this suit against the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Kristi Noem,
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Todd Lyons, Student and Exchange
Visitor Program, James Hicks, United States Department of Justice, Pamela Bondi, United States
Department of State, and Marco Rubio (collectively, “Defendants”) following Defendants’
revocation of Harvard’s ability to host international students. [ECF No. 54 (“Amended
Complaint” or “Am. Compl.”)]. Harvard challenges on constitutional and regulatory grounds the
lawfulness of both a May 22, 2025 letter from Secretary Noem revoking the university’s Student
and Exchange Visitor Program (“SEVP”) certification (the “SEVP Revocation Letter”) and
Presidential Proclamation 10948 titled “Enhancing National Security by Addressing Risks at
Harvard University” made on June 4, 2025 prohibiting foreign nationals from entering the
country to attend Harvard (the “Proclamation”).
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Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Harvard’s Amended
Complaint in its entirety. [ECF No. 85 (“Motion to Dismiss” or “MTD”)]. For the reasons
stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT and the case is STAYED
pending resolution of Defendants’ appeal of the Court’s June 23, 2025 ruling, [ECF No. 75
(“Proclamation Preliminary Injunction Memorandum and Order” or “Proclamation PI M&O”)].
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
The Court has already detailed the relevant factual background for this case in its
Proclamation Preliminary Injunction Memorandum and Order granting Harvard’s motion for a
preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Proclamation, [Proclamation PI M&O at 2–
12], and the following discussion assumes familiarity with that background.
B. 	Procedural History
On May 22, 2025, DHS sent Harvard the SEVP Revocation Letter in which it stated that
it was revoking Harvard’s SEVP certification, effective immediately. [Am. Comp. ¶¶ 150–58].
The following day, Harvard filed a complaint and a motion for a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) to stop the enforcement of the SEVP Revocation Letter. [ECF Nos. 1, 4]. The Court
granted the TRO on May 23, 2025. [ECF No. 11]. On May 28, 2025, DHS filed a copy of a
Notice of Intent to Withdraw advising Harvard that it intended to withdraw the school’s SEVP
certification through the administrative process provided for in 8 C.F.R. § 214.4 (the “NOIW”).
[ECF No. 49]. The Court held a hearing on May 29, 2025, during which Defendants represented
that the SEVP Revocation Letter would not be in force while the NOIW proceedings took place.
[ECF No. 52 at 15:11–16].
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On June 4, 2025, the President issued the Proclamation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f),
barring F-1 and M visas for “any alien . . . to pursue a course of study at Harvard University” and
J-1 visas for “any alien . . . to participate in an exchange visitor program hosted by Harvard
University.” [ECF No. 54-7 at 5]. On June 5, 2025, Harvard filed a motion for another TRO,
this time to enjoin the implementation of the Proclamation, [ECF No. 56], which was granted the
same day, [ECF No. 59].
On June 20, 2025, the Court granted Harvard’s request for a preliminary injunction
enjoining Defendants from giving effect to the SEVP Revocation Letter, see [ECF No. 73], and
on June 23, 2025, the Court granted Harvard’s request for a preliminary injunction enjoining
Defendants from giving effect to the Proclamation, see [Proclamation PI M&O]. On June 27,
2025, Defendants appealed this Court’s ruling on the Proclamation preliminary injunction, [ECF
No. 77], and that appeal remains pending before the First Circuit Court of Appeals as of the date
of this decision, appeal docketed, No. 25-1627 (1st Cir. July 1, 2025).
On August 6, 2025, Defendants filed a stipulation stating that they would not rely on the
SEVP Revocation Letter “to revoke Harvard’s SEVP certification or [EVP] designation.” [ECF
No. 84 at 1 (the “Stipulation”)].1 Two days later, on August 8, 2025, Defendants filed their
Motion to Dismiss Harvard’s Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See [MTD]. Harvard
opposed the motion on September 5, 2025. See [Opp.].
1 Harvard argues, however, that DHS has yet to actually rescind or disavow the SEVP
Revocation Letter, [ECF No. 89 at 16–17 (“Opposition” or “Opp.”)].
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II. 	DISCUSSION
Although no party has objected to the Court’s jurisdiction to rule on the Motion to
Dismiss while Defendants’ appeal of the Proclamation Preliminary Injunction Memorandum and
Order is pending, “[a] federal court must always satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction.” Riley v.
Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 273 (2025) (citing United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 572 U.S. 402, 408–09
(2015)). “[A]s a general rule, the filing of a notice of appeal ‘divests a district court of authority
to proceed with respect to any matter touching upon, or involved in, the appeal.’” United States
v. Brooks, 145 F.3d 446, 455 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1061
(1st Cir. 1993)); see Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (finding
that the filing of an appeal “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case
involved in the appeal”); Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 788 F. Supp. 1498, 1511
(S.D. Cal. 1992) (“During the pendency of the appeal, the district court retains only the limited
jurisdiction to assist the appellate court in its resolution of the appeal. . . . The rule derives from
the desire to avoid the confusion and inefficiency that might result from two different courts
deciding the same issue at the same time.” (first citing United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 627
(3d Cir. 1975); and then citing Masalosalo by Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955,
956 (9th Cir. 1983))). Absent a stay issued by a higher court, however, “further proceedings in
the same controversy often may continue in the district court while an appeal in an earlier phase
is pending,” Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., Ltd., 649 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.
2011) (citing Ex parte Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156, 162 (1906)), and the
interlocutory appeal of a preliminary injunction does not necessarily “divest the trial court of
jurisdiction or prevent it from taking other steps in the litigation while the appeal is pending,” id.
(quoting 11A Charles C. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2962, at 438–39 (2d
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ed. 1995)); see Rigby v. Damant, 486 F. Supp. 2d 222, 225 (D. Mass. 2007) (“Appeal from an
interlocutory order does not divest this court of jurisdiction to proceed with matters unrelated to
the appeal.” (emphasis added)).
Here, the First Circuit has not entered a stay preventing this Court from exercising
jurisdiction over the Motion to Dismiss. There is, however, considerable overlap of the
substantive issues on appeal and the arguments made in Defendants’ memorandum in support of
their Motion to Dismiss, including whether the Proclamation satisfies the standard articulated in
Hawaii v. Trump, 585 U.S. 667 (2018), and Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), and the
applicable standards of review and causation for Harvard’s constitutional claims, see Brief for
Defendants-Appellants, President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. DHS, No. 25-1627, (1st Cir.
Aug. 25, 2025); [ECF No. 86 (“Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss” or “MIS
MTD”)]. Indeed, almost all of Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss
is dedicated to these topics, see generally [MIS MTD], which are highly relevant to the
evaluation of most of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court is reluctant, therefore, to proceed with ruling
on the Motion to Dismiss insofar as it involves the matters that are currently on appeal to the
First Circuit.
While these jurisdictional considerations alone could necessitate a stay, at least in part,
the Court also “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its
own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S.
248, 254 (1936)). “[F]ederal district courts possess the inherent power to stay pending litigation
when the efficacious management of court dockets reasonably requires such intervention.”
Marquis v. F.D.I.C., 965 F.2d 1148, 1154 (1st Cir. 1992) (collecting cases). Courts have utilized
this inherent power in similar situations. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, No. 22-cv-00560, 2025 WL
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1124621, at *2–4 (D.N.H. Apr. 16, 2025) (finding “[a] stay for the duration of the appeal [to be]
reasonable to avoid duplicative litigation and a risk of inconsistency”); Amadi v. McManus, No.
16-cv-11901, 2017 WL 11509440, at *1 (D. Mass. June 15, 2017) (issuing stay sua sponte while
appeal of related case was pending); Latta v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 653 F. Supp. 3d 435, 437–38
(S.D. Ohio 2023) (issuing stay of case challenging student loan forgiveness program sua sponte
while two other cases challenging the program were on appeal to the Supreme Court). That said,
“stays cannot be cavalierly dispensed: there must be good cause for their issuance; they must be
reasonable in duration; and the court must ensure that competing equities are weighed and
balanced.” Marquis, 965 F.2d at 1155 (collecting cases).
Here, the extensive overlap between the issues on appeal and those implicated in
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in conjunction with the risk of inconsistent rulings from this
Court and the First Circuit, as discussed supra, justify the issuance of a stay that is limited in
duration to the pendency of the appeal of this Court’s earlier ruling. Further, a temporary stay
pending appeal will have little impact on the equities of either party. With respect to Harvard,
the SEVP Revocation Letter and the Proclamation are currently enjoined, [ECF No. 73];
[Proclamation PI M&O], and Defendants have stipulated that the SEVP Revocation Letter will
not be used to revoke Harvard’s SEVP certification or EVP designation, see [Stipulation].
Regarding Defendants, the Court has already found that Harvard is likely to prevail on the merits
of its First Amendment claims and that it is “skeptical that . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) authorizes the
Proclamation,” [Proclamation PI M&O at 20], rendering it unlikely that Defendants would
succeed in dismissing those claims at this juncture of the litigation. That would largely leave for
consideration Defendants’ arguments as to Harvard’s equal protection and bill of attainder
claims, to the extent they are based on the Proclamation, and Defendants’ mootness argument as
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to Harvard’s claims involving the SEVP Revocation Letter. See [MIS MTD at 29–31]. At least
one of these arguments, that pertaining to Harvard’s equal protection claim, overlaps
considerably with certain issues implicated on appeal. See [Proclamation PI M&O at 42 (stating
that Harvard’s equal protection claim is largely coextensive with its First Amendment retaliation
claims)]. The Court finds, therefore, that the equities of the parties are sufficiently balanced, and
that the most prudent path forward is to temporarily stay this case pending resolution of the
appeal in order to promote judicial economy and lower the risk of inconsistent judgments.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons described herein, this case is STAYED pending the resolution of
Defendants’ appeal of the Proclamation Preliminary Injunction Memorandum and Order.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT without prejudice, and Defendants will
be permitted to file a revised motion to dismiss after the stay is lifted. The parties are directed to
submit a status report within 10 days of the decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
March 31, 2026 	/s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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