Charles v. Chartier et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
KEVIN CHARLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRANDON CHARTIER, and
MCGARVEY TOWING,
Defendants.
No. 25-cv-10529-DLC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
CABELL, U.S.M.J.
Introduction
Plaintiff 	Kevin 	Charles 	contends 	that 	Massachusetts 	State
Police 	Trooper 	Brandon 	Chartier 	violated 	his 	rights 	during 	a
traffic stop that culminated in Charles’ arrest and the towing of
his 	car. 	Charles 	initiated 	this 	action 	by 	filing 	an 	original
complaint 	against 	(1) 	the 	Massachusetts 	State 	Police 	(MSP), 	(2)
MSP 	Trooper 	Chartier, 	and 	(3) 	McGarvey 	Towing, 	the 	company 	that
towed 	his 	car, 	but 	then 	filed 	an 	amended 	(operative) 	complaint
which, among other things, dropped the MSP as a defendant. 	(D. 1,
27). 	Three 	motions 	pend 	against 	this 	backdrop: 	(1) 	McGarvey
Towing 	moves 	to 	dismiss 	the 	original 	complaint 	(D. 	17); 	(2) 	the
MSP 	moves 	to 	dismiss 	the 	original 	complaint 	(D. 	25); 	and 	(3)
Charles moves for leave to file yet a second amended complaint (D.
29).
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The two motions to dismiss are moot because the filing of the
amended 	complaint 	rendered 	the 	original 	complaint 	null 	and 	void
and 	thus 	mooted 	any 	pending 	related 	motions 	to 	dismiss 	it. 	See
e.g., Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 96 (1st Cir. 2008);
Kolling 	v. 	Am. 	Power 	Conversion 	Corp., 	347 	F.3d 	11, 	16 	(1st 	Cir.
2003). 	Independently, the MSP’s motion to dismiss is moot because
Charles 	dropped 	the 	MSP 	as 	a 	defendant 	when 	he 	filed 	the 	amended
complaint. 	The 	court 	will 	accordingly 	deny 	the 	two 	motions 	to
dismiss as moot.1
1 To be clear, although McGarvey Towing apparently consents to Charles’ filing
of the proposed second amended complaint, it argued in its now-moot motion to
dismiss, 	and 	presumably 	would 	continue 	to 	argue, 	that 	assuming 	the 	case 	is
dismissed against Trooper Chartier, it should also be dismissed against McGarvey
Towing, 	because 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	is 	based 	on 	federal 	question
jurisdiction, and the only federal claim asserted in this case is the section
1983 claim against Trooper Chartier. 	As such, the court would lack subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the state common law claims against it were the
section 1983 claim to go away. 	See e.g., Yaghoobi v. Tufts Medical Center,
Inc., 762 F.Supp.3d 85, 97 (D. Mass. 2025); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 	The court agrees with the proposition, but it is not
implicated here because, as discussed infra, the court finds that the proposed
second 	amended 	complaint 	pleads 	a 	valid 	section 	1983 	claim. 	Moreover, 	the
proposed 	complaint 	now 	also 	alleges 	diversity 	and 	an 	amount 	in 	controversy
exceeding 	$75,000 	as 	a 	basis 	for 	federal 	court 	jurisdiction. 	To 	be 	sure,
McGarvey Towing argues that it should be dismissed from any suit against Trooper
Chartier regardless of whether there is jurisdiction over it, because the claims
against the defendants do not arise from a common nucleus of facts. 	While this
argument 	is 	not 	patently 	unreasonable, 	at 	this 	juncture 	the 	court 	finds 	on
balance that they do. 	Even accepting that the core claim against each defendant
focuses on different, distinct events, they do arise generally from the same
event and there may be some overlap of mutually relevant conduct where the same
piece 	of 	discovery 	could 	be 	relevant 	as 	to 	both 	defendants. 	The 	proposed
complaint avers, for example, that McGarvey Towing acted at Trooper Chartier’s
direction 	and 	was 	present 	when 	the 	plaintiff’s 	car 	was 	searched 	at 	the 	MSP
barracks in Revere.
All of that said, the court will read the proposed amended complaint to assert
just 	a 	single 	claim 	of 	conversion 	against 	McGarvey 	Towing. 	The 	plaintiff
purports 	to 	bring 	separate 	claims 	for 	conversion 	(count 	two) 	and 	conversion
involving intentional and malicious conduct (count three), but Massachusetts
common law does not recognize a separate cause of action for a conversion that
is 	committed 	intentionally 	and 	maliciously. 	On 	the 	contrary, 	every 	alleged
conversion 	must 	involve 	conduct 	that 	is 	intentional 	and 	knowingly 	wrongful.
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Regarding 	the 	plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	file 	a 	second
amended 	complaint, 	he 	purports 	to 	“clarify 	factual 	allegations,
refine 	claims, 	and 	ensure 	that 	all 	pleadings 	are 	accurate 	and
reflect the current legal details of the case.” 	(D. 29). 	Federal
Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	15(a) 	instructs 	that 	a 	party 	seeking 	to
file a second amended complaint may do so “only with the opposing
party's 	written 	consent 	or 	the 	court's 	leave.” 	Here, 	the 	court
credits 	the 	plaintiff’s 	representations 	that 	he 	sought 	the
defendants’ 	consent, 	and 	that 	McGarvey 	Towing 	consents 	to 	the
proposed 	amendments, 	but 	Trooper 	Chartier 	does 	not. 	Trooper
Chartier has in fact filed an opposition to the motion. 	(D. 32).
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the court will grant the
plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the second amended complaint,
in part.
Legal Framework
Ordinarily, 	leave 	to 	amend 	is 	“freely 	given 	when 	justice 	so
requires” 	absent 	an 	adequate 	basis 	to 	deny 	amendment, 	such 	as
futility, bad faith, undue delay or a dilatory motive. 	Maine State
Building and Construction Trades Council, AFLCIO v. United States
Department of Labor, 359 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2004); Glassman v.
Computervision 	Corp., 	90 	F.3d 	617, 	622 	(1st 	Cir. 	1996). 	“An
See e.g., Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Six Consignments of Frozen Scallops, 4 F.3d
90, 95 (1st Cir. 1993). 	Even if the malicious nature of a defendant’s conduct
could bear on damages, it would not give rise to a separate, second conversion
claim.
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amendment 	is 	futile 	if 	it 	could 	not 	withstand 	a 	Rule 	12(b)(6)
motion 	to 	dismiss.” 	Menard 	v. 	CSX 	Transp., 	Inc., 	840 	F.Supp.2d
421, 427 (D. Mass. 2012); accord Rife v. One W. Bank, F.S.B., 873
F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2017) (“‘Futility’ means that the complaint,
as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted”). 	To 	survive 	a 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	the
proposed 	claims 	must 	include 	factual 	allegations 	that 	when 	taken
as 	true 	demonstrate 	a 	plausible 	claim 	to 	relief, 	even 	if 	actual
proof 	of 	the 	facts 	is 	improbable. 	See 	Bell 	Atlantic 	Corp. 	v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-58 (2007). 	Thus, while “not equivalent
to 	a 	probability 	requirement, 	the 	plausibility 	standard 	asks 	for
more 	than 	a 	sheer 	possibility 	that 	a 	defendant 	has 	acted
unlawfully.” 	Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). 	“[A]ccepting as true all well-
pleaded facts in the complaint and making all reasonable inferences
in 	the 	plaintiff's 	favor,” 	id. 	at 	64, 	the 	“factual 	allegations
‘must 	be 	enough 	to 	raise 	a 	right 	to 	relief 	above 	the 	speculative
level.’” 	Gorelik 	v. 	Costin, 	605 	F.3d 	118, 	121 	(1st 	Cir. 	2010)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Here, 	the 	plaintiff 	contends 	that 	leave 	to 	amend 	should 	be
given because he has not acted with undue delay or bad faith, there
would 	be 	no 	undue 	prejudice 	to 	the 	defendants, 	and 	amendment 	is
not 	futile 	because 	the 	complaint 	pleads 	valid 	claims. 	In
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opposition, 	Trooper 	Chartier 	argues 	that 	amendment 	would 	be
futile. 	The court thus focuses on that issue.
The Proposed Second Amended Complaint
According 	to 	the 	proposed 	second 	amended 	complaint, 	the
plaintiff was driving to a friend’s house on an evening in November
2023 when he entered an intersection “on a changing yellow and red
light.” 	(D. 	29-1, 	¶ 	10). 	Trooper 	Chartier 	then 	pursued 	and
approached 	the 	plaintiff 	on 	foot 	at 	a 	left-turn 	signal 	light,
ordered 	the 	plaintiff 	to 	exit 	the 	vehicle, 	conducted 	a 	pat-down
search 	of 	plaintiff 	and 	then 	handcuffed 	him, 	and 	did 	all 	of 	this
without explaining why he stopped or searched the plaintiff. 	(D.
29-1, ¶ 11).
Trooper 	Chartier 	subsequently 	brought 	the 	plaintiff 	to 	his
police 	vehicle 	and 	conducted 	another 	pat-down 	search 	without 	the
plaintiff’s consent. 	(D. 29-1, ¶ 12). 	Trooper Chartier informed
the 	plaintiff 	that 	his 	car 	would 	be 	towed 	for 	having 	an 	expired
registration and proceeded to conduct a warrantless search of the
vehicle 	and 	destroy 	some 	of 	the 	plaintiff’s 	property 	in 	the
process. 	(D. 29-1, ¶ 13).
Trooper 	Chartier 	at 	some 	point 	subsequently 	discovered 	an
ammunition 	magazine 	inside 	a 	locked 	firearms 	box. 	(D. 	29-1, 	¶
14). 	He 	then 	called 	McGarvey 	to 	tow 	the 	car 	to 	the 	MSP’s 	Revere
Beach Barracks, where the plaintiff alleges that further searches
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and 	property 	damage 	occurred. 	Id. 	The 	plaintiff 	was 	thereafter
jailed for three nights. 	(D. 29-1, ¶ 16)
Meanwhile, 	after 	the 	second 	search 	of 	the 	vehicle, 	McGarvey
towed 	the 	plaintiff’s 	car 	to 	their 	facility 	in 	Saugus,
Massachusetts. 	(D. 	29-1, 	¶ 	15). 	Following 	his 	release 	on 	bond,
the plaintiff attempted to recover his vehicle but McGarvey refused
to release it unless he paid a presumably unwarranted amount, and
McGarvey subsequently held the plaintiff’s vehicle for over a year,
significantly 	diminishing 	its 	value. 	(D. 	29-1, 	¶¶ 	18-19). 	All
criminal 	and 	civil 	charges 	against 	the 	plaintiff 	were 	eventually
dismissed. 	(D. 29-1, ¶ 20).
The 	proposed 	second 	amended 	complaint 	asserts 	two 	claims
against each defendant. 	As to Trooper Chartier, Count One alleges
under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	that 	Trooper 	Chartier 	violated 	the
plaintiff’s 	rights 	under 	the 	Fourth 	and 	Fifth 	Amendment 	of 	the
U.S. 	Constitution 	by 	searching 	his 	car 	and 	arresting 	him 	without
just 	cause. 	Count 	Four 	alleges 	that 	Trooper 	Chartier 	falsely
imprisoned 	and 	unlawfully 	detained 	the 	plaintiff 	where 	he 	caused
the plaintiff to be “det[ained] for three days without presenting
the 	complaint 	to 	a 	magistrate 	to 	ensure 	probable 	cause
determination within 48 hours.” 	Regarding McGarvey Towing, Count
Two 	charges 	it 	with 	conversion 	and 	Count 	Three 	charges 	it 	with
conversion involving intentional and malicious conduct.
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Discussion
In 	arguing 	futility, 	Trooper 	Chartier 	argues 	that 	the
plaintiff 	cannot 	show 	that 	Trooper 	Chartier 	violated 	his 	federal
rights 	because 	the 	plaintiff 	admits 	that 	he 	entered 	the
intersection in violation of state law, which in turn gave Trooper
Chartier 	cause 	to 	conduct 	a 	traffic 	stop. 	Trooper 	Chartier
contends 	that 	this, 	along 	with 	the 	subsequent 	discovery 	that 	the
plaintiff’s registration was expired, gave him the right to arrest
the plaintiff and search the plaintiff’s car pursuant to official
MSP 	policy. 	As 	such, 	so 	Trooper 	Chartier 	argues, 	he 	cannot 	be
found to have violated the plaintiff’s rights. 	Relatedly, Trooper
Chartier 	argues 	that 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity 	where
the 	facts 	fail 	to 	show 	that 	he 	violated 	the 	plaintiff’s 	federal
rights.
The 	court 	does 	not 	find 	the 	defendant’s 	argument 	persuasive
at this early juncture for two reasons. 	First, the court does not
agree 	that 	the 	plaintiff 	admits 	that 	he 	violated 	the 	law 	when 	he
“entered 	the 	intersection 	on 	a 	changing 	yellow 	and 	red 	light.”
The 	state 	regulation 	the 	defendant 	cites 	to, 	946 	CMR, 	§ 	5.09,
instructs that a driver approaching an intersection where the light
is 	yellow 	“shall 	stop 	at 	such 	point 	unless 	so 	close 	to 	the
intersection 	that 	a 	stop 	cannot 	made 	in 	safety.” 	The 	defendant
extrapolates 	that 	he 	would 	have 	been 	permitted 	to 	pull 	the
plaintiff 	over 	for 	a 	motor 	vehicle 	infraction 	assuming 	the
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plaintiff 	admits 	that 	he 	drove 	through 	an 	intersection 	when 	the
light was yellow. 	But per the regulation, a vehicle entering the
intersection 	would 	not 	need 	to 	stop 	if 	it 	were 	so 	close 	that 	a
stop 	could 	not 	be 	made 	in 	safety. 	Even 	assuming 	the 	proposed
complaint 	is 	read 	to 	admit 	that 	the 	plaintiff 	entered 	the
intersection 	on 	a 	yellow 	light, 	it 	does 	not 	admit 	that 	the
plaintiff could have stopped safely, and the court has no basis to
assume 	the 	same. 	Trooper 	Chartier 	contends 	that 	additional 	body
and 	dashboard 	camera 	evidence 	will 	show 	that 	his 	actions 	were
justified but he acknowledges that such evidence is “not ripe for
review 	at 	this 	juncture.” 	As 	such, 	the 	court 	cannot 	agree 	that
the 	proposed 	complaint 	admits 	to 	conduct 	that 	justified 	Trooper
Chartier’s subsequent conduct.
Second, 	even 	assuming 	arguendo 	that 	Trooper 	Chartier 	was
authorized to stop the plaintiff’s vehicle, the proposed complaint
alleges that he independently took actions that were excessive and
unreasonable where he summarily “ordered the plaintiff out of his
car, conducted a ‘pat-down’ search, and handcuffed him without an
explanation 	of 	probable 	cause,” 	and 	then 	conducted 	another 	pat-
down 	search 	after 	walking 	the 	plaintiff 	to 	his 	vehicle. 	In 	this
regard, 	it 	appears 	to 	be 	undisputed 	that 	that 	the 	plaintiff’s
registration 	was 	expired, 	but 	the 	proposed 	complaint 	appears 	to
allege that Trooper Chartier may have taken some of these actions
before that fact was known. 	See D. 29-1, ¶¶ 11-13.
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Consequently, even assuming Trooper Chartier was entitled to
conduct a traffic stop, such that the stop itself would provide no
basis 	for 	Charles 	to 	seek 	redress, 	the 	proposed 	complaint 	would
still continue to allege that Trooper Chartier used excessive force
and 	effected 	an 	arrest 	without 	probable 	cause. 	Discovery 	may
vindicate Trooper Chartier’s position; he contends after all that
video evidence will support his narrative. 	But for now, the court
cannot 	agree 	that 	the 	proposed 	complaint 	fails 	to 	allege 	a 	valid
section 1983 claim.
And because Trooper Chartier’s opposition to the plaintiff’s
proposed unlawful imprisonment claim is based on similar grounds,
it too for now survives 12(b)(6) scrutiny, but only to the limited
extent 	it 	alleges 	that 	Trooper 	Chartier 	knowingly 	caused 	the
plaintiff to be held in custody, at all, without cause. 	The court
does 	not 	find 	the 	plaintiff’s 	three-day 	delay 	in 	being 	brought
before a court to be actionable against Trooper Chartier on these
allegations. 	Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 provides
that a “defendant who has been arrested and is not released shall
be brought for arraignment before a court if then in session, and
if 	not, 	at 	its 	next 	session.” 	Mass. 	R. 	Crim. 	P. 	7. 	Here, 	the
plaintiff 	was 	arrested 	on 	the 	evening 	of 	November 	17, 	2023, 	a
Friday, 	and 	was 	brought 	to 	court 	for 	arraignment 	on 	November 	20,
2023, 	the 	following 	Monday, 	at 	9:00am. 	(D. 	27-4, 	p. 	2). 	That
would 	appear 	to 	accord 	with 	both 	the 	word 	and 	spirit 	of 	Rule 	7.
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Id.; 	see 	also 	Jenkins 	v. 	Chief 	Justice 	of 	Dist. 	Court 	Dep't, 	416
Mass. 	221, 	224–25 	(1993) 	(“If 	the 	arrest 	occurs 	on 	a 	Friday, 	the
arrestee remains in custody for the duration of the weekend.”).2
Conclusion
In 	light 	of 	the 	foregoing, 	Defendant, 	McGarvey 	Towing’s
Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	(D. 	17) 	is 	DENIED 	as 	moot; 	Defendant
Massachusetts 	State 	Police’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	Plaintiff’s
Complaint 	(D. 	25) 	is 	DENIED 	as 	moot; 	and 	plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (D. 29) is ALLOWED IN PART;
the second amended complaint shall assert a section 1983 claim and
an unlawful imprisonment claim against Trooper Chartier, and shall
assert a single claim of conversion against McGarvey Towing.
___/s/_Donald L. Cabell_ ______
DONALD L. CABELL, U.S.M.J.
DATED: January 5, 2026
2 Trooper Chartier urges the court to find that he is entitled to qualified
immunity on all claims against him. 	The qualified immunity doctrine shields
public officials from liability for civil rights violations if “their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” 	Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
The salient question is “whether, under the circumstances that confronted the
official, ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violate[d] that right.’” 	Berthiaume v. Caron, 142 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir.
1998) (quoting Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640). 	Even assuming Trooper Chartier
may ultimately be able to advance a non-frivolous claim of qualified
immunity, the court declines to consider the claim now on an undeveloped
record. 	At the motion to dismiss stage, “it is the defendant's conduct as
alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for ‘objective legal
reasonableness.’” 	Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309, (1996) (emphasis
original). 	As such, “[i]t is not always possible to determine before any
discovery has occurred whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity,
and courts often evaluate qualified immunity defenses at the summary judgment
stage.” 	Giragosian v. Bettencourt, 614 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010).
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