Sheehan v. Town of Carver,Ma et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
MARGARET E. SHEEHAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF CARVER, MA, TOWN OF
PLYMOUTH, MA, ALAN G. GERMAIN,
STEPHEN G. GRAY, BETTY CAVACCO,
MICHAEL MAIN, A.D. MAKEPEACE
COMPANY, JAMES F. KANE, SLT
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
PETER OPACHINSKI, and MICHAEL
MCVEIGH,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 24-cv-12347-ADB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Plaintiff Margaret E. Sheehan (“Plaintiff” or “Sheehan”) is an environmental lawyer who
has embarked on a multi-year campaign to curtail unpermitted sand mining and hauling
operations in Southeastern Massachusetts. She brings this action alleging that the towns of
Carver and Plymouth and various town committee members (the “Municipal Defendants”) have
conspired with local sand mining and trucking companies (the “Makepeace Defendants” and the
“SLT Defendants” and, collectively with the “Municipal Defendants,” “Defendants”) to violate
her First Amendment rights and, in their attempts to silence her activism, have defamed her and
committed various other Massachusetts torts. See generally [ECF No. 106 (“Amended
Complaint” or “Am. Compl.”)]. Currently before the Court are a motion to dismiss by Michael
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McVeigh pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [ECF No. 129], and a special
motion to dismiss by A.D. Makepeace Co. (“Makepeace”), James Kane, Michael McVeigh, SLT
Construction, and Peter Opachinski (the “anti-SLAPP Defendants”) pursuant to the
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) statute, [ECF No.
135]. For the reasons set forth below, the anti-SLAPP Defendants’ special motion to dismiss is
DENIED and McVeigh’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
The Court set out many of the facts relevant to this case in detail in its Memorandum and
Order issued on May 7, 2025, [ECF No. 94], and it assumes the reader’s familiarity with those
facts and incorporates them herein. The following supplements that prior writing and largely
addresses the allegations added to Sheehan’s Amended Complaint and the facts that are of
particular relevance to the two pending motions to dismiss.
The following facts are taken primarily from the Amended Complaint. For purposes of
McVeigh’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes these facts to be true,
Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014), and as it may on a motion to
dismiss, the Court has also considered “documents incorporated by reference in [the complaint],
matters of public record, and other matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Giragosian v. Ryan,
547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers
Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2003)). For purposes of the anti-SLAPP Defendants’ special
motion to dismiss, the Court will consider the pleadings and the affidavits filed in connection
with the motion “without indulging inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Bargantine v.
Mechs. Co-op. Bank, No. 13-cv-11132, 2013 WL 6211845, at * 2 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 2013).
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1. 	The Towns
The Town of Carver, Massachusetts (“Carver”) is a municipality in Southeastern
Massachusetts. [Am. Compl. ¶ 41]. The Town of Plymouth, Massachusetts (“Plymouth”) is a
municipality in Southeastern Massachusetts that is not formally incorporated. [Id. ¶ 7].
2. 	The Parties
i. 	Plaintiff
Sheehan is a lawyer and an environmental advocate who represents regional
environmental groups and individuals without charge in Southeastern Massachusetts. [Am.
Compl. ¶ 15]. In 2021, Sheehan helped form an environmental advocacy group called Save the
Pine Barrens, Inc. (“STPB”),2 which was largely focused on Makepeace’s efforts to clear areas
of the Atlantic Coastal Pine Barrens to mine sand from the forest. [Id. ¶ 36]; see also [id. ¶ 20].
ii. 	The Municipal Defendants
Alan G. Germain (“Germain”) owns and operates Alan Germain Trucking (“AGT”).
[Am. Compl. ¶ 5]. Germain has served, among other positions, as Chair and Vice Chair of the
Carver Conservation Commission and for some years during the relevant period as Chair of the
Carver Finance Committee. [Id. ¶¶ 5, 25]. He also serves as the Carver Town Moderator,
having been elected in April 2024. [Id. ¶ 25]. His company, AGT, contracts with Defendant
SLT Construction Corporation (“SLT”), discussed further infra, to haul sand and gravel
excavated by SLT from at least one site located in Carver. [Id.]. Stephen G. Gray (“Gray”) is
1 The Court notes that the Amended Complaint repeats certain paragraph numbers beginning on
page 55. For purposes of this opinion, the Court will cite to the first 143 paragraphs in the
Amended Complaint by paragraph number and any subsequent paragraphs by the page number
on which they appear.
2 Sheehan’s Save the Pine Barrens group was later rebranded, in part, as “the Community Land
& Water Coalition (“CLWC”), a project of STPB.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 49].
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domiciled in Carver, has been on the Carver Zoning Board of Appeals (“Carver ZBA”) for some
thirty years, and he continues in the role of Chair of that body as of the filing of the Amended
Complaint. [Id. ¶ 6]. Betty Cavacco (“Cavacco”) has served, among other positions, as Chair of
the Plymouth Select Board. [Id. ¶ 8]. As of the filing of the Amended Complaint, she is a
member of the Community Preservation Committee and an elected member of Plymouth’s Town
Meeting. [Id. ¶ 8]. Michael Main (“Main”) serves as Chair of the Plymouth Zoning Board of
Appeals (“Plymouth ZBA”). [Id. ¶ 9].
iii. The Makepeace Defendants
Makepeace is a corporation headquartered in Wareham, Massachusetts, that excavates,
mines, and sells silica and gravel products commercially. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 16–17]. James F.
Kane (“Kane”) is the Chief Executive Officer and President of Makepeace. [Id. ¶ 11]. Michael
McVeigh (“McVeigh”) is an attorney at Makepeace. [Id. ¶ 12]. McVeigh operated the
previously anonymous Facebook page named “Meg Cost Us Millions” (the “MMP” or “Meg
Millions Page”) and at least one digital impersonator profile under the name “Rebecca
Newhouse.” [Id. ¶ 19].
iv. The SLT Defendants
SLT is a Carver-based company that excavates, mines, trucks, and sells silica sand. [Am.
Compl. ¶ 13]. SLT contracts with AGT and others to haul excavated sand and gravel from
mining sites, which are almost exclusively located in Carver, to other locations for cleaning and
sale. [Id. ¶ 23]. Peter Opachinski (“Opachinski”) is the President and co-owner of SLT and
works from its headquarters in Carver. [Id. ¶ 14]. Opachinski is a professional and personal
friend of Germain, with whose company SLT contracts. [Id. at 55].
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3. Offline Incidents from 2021 to 2024
In 2021, Sheehan and Defendants began clashing due to Sheehan’s environmental
litigation and activism efforts in Southeastern Massachusetts. See [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36–37].
From 2021 to 2024, Sheehan and her allies had various run-ins with Defendants, including at
multiple public meetings and hearings related to STPB’s challenges to Defendants’ mining
operations. See generally [Am. Compl.]. The ongoing conflict involved, among other incidents,
an allegedly pretextual visit from United States Department of Interior agents to a film journalist
working on a project for Sheehan, [id. ¶ 41], threats from Germain that caused Sheehan to be
afraid for her physical well-being, [id. ¶ 42], the video taping of Sheehan by Makepeace security
personnel, [id. ¶ 71], and multiple instances of allegedly disrespectful treatment of Sheehan at
town meetings and hearings, see [id. ¶ 74].
4. The Meg Millions Social Media Campaign
On or about January 8, 2023, McVeigh created the anonymous Meg Millions Page and
began posting on it. [Am. Compl. ¶ 58]. Sheehan alleges that on at least some occasions,
McVeigh posted on the Meg Millions Page during the workweek and in Wareham,
Massachusetts, where Makepeace is headquartered. [Id.].
Sheehan alleges that shortly after creating MMP, McVeigh updated the page with a new
profile picture “showing a thermometer-style gauge with the ‘mercury’ approaching the $2.5
million level, entitled ‘The Meg Sheehan Wasted Taxpayer Money Chart,’ with a partially
obscured picture behind it of Sheehan with hundred-dollar bills fanning out in each hand.” [Am.
Compl. ¶ 60]. Sheehan alleges that this $2.5 million amount was false, and that Plymouth’s
incurred costs connected to her clients’ lawsuits and other endeavors were only a fraction of that
amount. [Id.]. On January 16, 2023, McVeigh also created and began posting through an
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anonymous YouTube channel named “@megcostsusmillions,” including uploading a video of a
January 4, 2023 ZBA hearing with the caption, “Meg gets scolded at the 1/4/2023 ZBA
meeting . . .” [Id. ¶ 59]. Also in January 2023, McVeigh allegedly posted a clown photo of
Sheehan on MMP, with a caption stating that MMP would be partnering with an X (formerly
“Twitter”) account named “Exposing Meg Sheehan,” and most of the MMP postings were
thereafter posted to the X page. [Id. ¶ 61]. Sheehan alleges that McVeigh then began
anonymously posting “a steady drum beat of demeaning, ridiculing, harassing, and libeling”
posts on the MMP for over a year and half, [id. ¶ 62], and SLT, Opachinski, Cavacco, and
Germain “repeatedly reposted libelous and demeaning comments from, or . . . commented
directly on, MMP,” broadening the dissemination of the content, [id. ¶ 63].
On January 28, 2023, McVeigh posted on MMP that “Meg can pat herself on the back
(since that is what [sic] this is all about anyways – self-image)” in connection with a developer’s
decision to proceed on a project in a manner disfavored by Defendants, stating further,
“Claremont was going to donate $$ millions towards a much-needed booster pump but low-IQ
Meg Sheehan muddied the waters, so to speak. So now Claremont said f- it and they’re just
going around the town with a 40B. THANKS MEG, you literally cost us millions.” [Am.
Compl. ¶ 64].
On January 30, 2023, McVeigh posted an image overlayed with the words, “Meg
Sheehan is what happens when you have too much unearned money, unchecked narcissism and a
desperate thirst for relevance. She truly is an unaccomplished bozo,” which McVeigh
“attribute[d] . . . to a brutal British military officer,” Myles Standish. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65–66].
Around this time, McVeigh also began posting on the MMP that Sheehan had “too much
unearned money,” calling her “Sheehan, the hypocrite.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 67]. Sheehan alleges
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that in his MMP posts, McVeigh repeatedly insinuated that Sheehan had the ability to control L.
Knife & Son, an Anheuser-Busch wholesale distributor of which her father was the sole voting
stockholder, despite knowing that she did not control the company. [Id. ¶¶ 67–69]. Sheehan
points to a legal complaint, which McVeigh posted on MMP, that she claims laid out the control
and structure of L. Knife, clearly showing that Sheehan had no voting power in the company and
only a small ownership interest. [Id. ¶ 68]. McVeigh allegedly continued to post about
Sheehan’s hypocrisy “in furtherance of his and Makepeace’s goals to destroy [her] credibility
and stop her advocacy,” and that Germain, Opachinski, and Cavacco “further disseminated the
falsehoods.” [Id. ¶ 69]. On February 2, 2023, McVeigh posted on MMP about L. Knife, stating:
Did the town of Kingston account for all the earth removed from Meg Sheehan’s
company headquarters during their expansions? Where are the truck counts?
How was all this work approved so close to the Jones River? Did Meg and L.
Knife and Son follow all local, state and federal laws? Where are the wetland
reports?
[Id. ¶ 68].
On April 15, 2023, McVeigh posted multiple times on MMP, including a post claiming
that Sheehan had cost the town “an enormous amount” in legal defense fees, stating that “it made
[him] sick,” and that Sheehan was “not Erin Brockovich. Cruella De Vil maybe.” [Am. Compl.
¶ 77]. McVeigh further stated:
You’re just a vile old attention seeking carpetbagger with the luxury of free time
and money from your dad’s trust funds. You have accomplished nothing in your
years long campaign against this area. Wait, you have accomplished one thing:
you’ve wasted an enormous amount of tax payer money on meritless, poorly
drafted and downright silly claims. You’re a vampire and you’re only in this for
your own vanity. You should be ashamed of yourself but you’re probably
incapable of that.
[Id.]. In the same post McVeigh, also stated that Sheehan is paying her supporters, which he
called “mutants.” [Id.]. Sheehan alleges that Germain and Opachinski “joined in, amplifying
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MMP’s hateful words and labeling Sheehan and her clients ‘eco-terrorists.’” [Id. ¶ 78]. Also on
April 15, McVeigh posted a photograph of a sign stating “Meg loses, again!!!” with a pine tree,
hauling truck, and excavator. [Id. ¶ 79]. Opachinski responded to the post with criticism of the
mining opponents, and McVeigh, through the “Rebecca Newhouse” account, responded, “I’ve
watched this witch waste Carver’s money[,] time and resources for years. Glad she’s facing the
music finally.” [Id.]. Sheehan alleges that the physical sign featured on MMP was posted by
someone connected with SLT. [Id. ¶ 80]. That same day, McVeigh again posted on MMP, and
Germain commented on the post that L. Knife was “destroying the value of a residential
neighborhood with non-stop trucking day and night. Only one way in and one way out. I’m sure
the neighbors are thrilled.” [Id. ¶ 81]. James Martin, SLT’s General Manager and Health and
Safety Officer, reposted Germain’s post and made his own post emphasizing Sheehan’s
hypocrisy, which Germain then reposted. [Id.].
On April 24, 2023, McVeigh posted on MMP warning Wareham, Massachusetts,
residents to “be watchful” for Sheehan and her supporters, stating:
Just a reminder to Wareham residents to be watchful for Meg Sheehan and her
supporters tonight. They do not live in Wareham and their intent is to disrupt
your town meeting. Meg recently tried (unsuccessfully) to influence Carver’s
town meeting. She and the members of her various groups . . . will likely try and
cause trouble. Ultimately the only thing they’ll accomplish will be increased
legal costs borne by the town and the taxpayer.
[Am. Compl. ¶ 83].
On April 28, 2023, McVeigh posted on MMP a letter from Cavacco, acting as Chair of
the Plymouth Select Board, to the Southeastern Massachusetts Pine Barrens Alliance, Inc.
(“SEMPBA”), a corporation unaffiliated but having common interests with STPB, accusing
SEMPBA of subletting office space to Sheehan without town approval. [Am. Compl. ¶ 84].
McVeigh posted the letter on MMP before SEMPBA’s president received it and claimed that
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Sheehan had sublet space from SEMPBA in order to gain standing to sue Plymouth. [Id. ¶¶ 84–
85]. Three days later, McVeigh posted again on MMP with “legal analysis” related to the letter.
[Id. ¶ 85]. Germain and Opachinski commented on these posts. [Id.].
On May 6, 2023, McVeigh posted on MMP about the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by
Sheehan, and, in the post, he referred to Sheehan as an “attention seeking hag” and a “[b]ogus
activist” engaging in “a pathetic attempt to validate her unremarkable life.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 86].
Germain responded to the post, stating that Sheehan’s “claims are lies” and that “[s]he thinks she
knows all about the millions of dollars sand mining brings in, she knows nothing.” [Id.
(emphasis in original)]. McVeigh continued posting on MMP throughout May 2023, calling
Sheehan “Meg ‘beer cashier’ Sheehan” and “Meg the ‘Natural Disaster’ Sheehan,” [id. ¶ 87],
and uploading a “photo-shopped picture of Sheehan about to take a swig from a bottle of
Budweiser” and a “photo-shopped picture of Sheehan’s head imposed on a man’s body pushing a
dolly transporting crates of beer,” [id. ¶ 88]. He also posted about Sheehan purportedly “running
an unlawful business in a multi-family home belonging to an LLC that she owned in New
Hampshire” along with a graphic showing “‘Booze Trucker’ Sheehan clutching paper money in
each fist” and set on fire. [Id. ¶ 90]. In response to a commenter allegedly questioning the
validity of MMP’s source, McVeigh commented:
Anyone who has a problem with these posts or our page simply has not been
paying attention. Watch Meg’s appearances at town boards. They’re on youtube.
Go read her twitter page. It’s filled with insane and unsubstantiated attacks on
good businesses. SHE’S TRYING TO PUT GOOD PEOPLE OUT OF
BUSINESS. Wake the f up. She is beneath civility.
[Id. ¶ 91].
On May 22, 2023, McVeigh posted an image of a fake newspaper named “NEWS” and
described as “the most important news from around the world” with the main headline “MEG
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LOSES AGAIN . . . Two More Losses,” accompanied by a photo of Sheehan. [Am. Compl.
¶ 93]. The Sheehan related “story” stated that “Plymouth voters summarily rejected Meg
Sheehan’s select board candidate Frank Mand and the new Town Charter. ‘I’ve never seen
anyone be this unsuccessful in everything they do, it’s really quite extraordinary’ writes national
political pundit Lawrence Spoon. ‘She has the reverse Midas touch.’” [Id.]. The other “stories”
on the cover describe, for example, a tight presidential race between John Doe and John Smith
and two Russian farmers catching an extraterrestrial humanoid with a fishing net. [Id.].
Three days later, McVeigh posted an image of a fake book titled “Meg Sheehan and the
Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Week” with a “photo-shopped picture of Sheehan
metamorphosed into a scowling witch-like face” on the cover and a list of “losses” that Sheehan
had purportedly faced that week, including in two legal or administrative proceedings, the
rejection of a new town charter, the election loss of someone running for the Select Board, and a
U.S. Supreme Court decision curtailing the Environmental Protection Agency’s powers. [Id.
¶ 94].
In July 2023, McVeigh posted an article on MMP about “the marketing of an
undeveloped parcel by a Sheehan family company, falsely attributing the marketing
to . . . Sheehan,” though Sheehan claims she strongly opposed the marketing. [Am. Compl.
¶ 97]. Others reposted the information on other social media pages, and Opachinski responded
to the post stating, “[l]ike the author has written before . . . a lying, vile old hag!” [Id.].
In August 2023, McVeigh posted on MMP criticizing Sheehan’s family for donating a
Kingston parcel of land to the Native Land Conservancy, Inc. instead of another parcel to the
Town of Plymouth. [Am. Compl. ¶ 100]. Opachinski responded to the post with multiple
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criticisms, including calling Sheehan a “hypocrite,” stating “[a]ll she does is lose in court” and
that this was “[j]ust another one of the vile hag’s scams!” [Id.].
In or around September 2023, Sheehan posted on the STPB social media page referring
to Defendants as “sand mining thugs.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 102]. Seemingly in response, McVeigh
posted on MMP stating, in part:
Only someone as narcissistic and stupid as Meg Sheehan could post something so
dumb. In her mind it’s OK to file dozens of frivolous lawsuits, waste piles of
money and protest businesses with posters of skull & crossbones, and then cry
when people have had enough. It would be funny if she wasn’t wasting so many
public resources. What a wretched person, truly.
[Id.].
On January 14, 2024, McVeigh posted on MMP an email allegedly sent in by a reader.
[Am. Compl. ¶ 105]. The email appears to show a communication from Sheehan asking
Plymouth residents to join a lawsuit for $1,000. [Id.]. The image is captioned, “[s]ent in by a
reader. She is truly heinous.” [Id.]. Sheehan alleges that the email was a “fraudulent mock-up”
created to convey “the impression that she had violated the ethical rules applicable to all
Massachusetts attorneys, and potentially to raise the specter that she had committed the crime of
bribery.” [Id.]. Germain reposted the image on both the Fair and Open Government for Carver
page and the All Things Plymouth page. [Id. ¶ 106]. Cavacco reposted it on her Plymouth Rant
page. [Id. ¶ 107].
On February 13, 2024, McVeigh posted on MMP a “Meg’s Bingo Board” image with
squares that included phrases such as, “some squawks about dust,” “Meg says ‘you have a
duty,’” and “Meg’s few supporters look like an unmade bed.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 108].
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On May 22, 2024, McVeigh posted on MMP about an incident in which Sheehan had
disclosed to a court3 that an engineering expert she had hired had temporarily had his license
suspended. [Am. Compl. ¶ 109]. Sheehan claims she was unaware of this when she retained the
expert and that the suspension was not in effect when he performed the engineering services for
her; McVeigh, however, still accused Sheehan of “lying” and did not include Sheehan’s “side of
the facts” in his post. [Id.]. In a comment that followed, McVeigh stated, “[t]his woman is a
serial liar. If you agree, make a complaint to the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers and
show them this video.” [Id.]. Martin and Germain both commented on the MMP post, with
Martin stating that Sheehan “should be disbarred” and “disciplined” for her “blatant ethics and
professional violations,” and stating that she was “lying[,] cheating and misrepresenting the truth
at every turn.” [Id.].
On July 17, 2024, at a public hearing, Gray read aloud an email he had received from
“Tim Westover,” allegedly a Carver resident, who used the same “Proton Mail” email domain as
McVeigh. [Am. Compl. ¶ 115]. In the email, “Tim Westover” stated that he had been watching
“for the past three years” and that “[t]his woman has no shame as she forces our town to spend
huge sums of legal bills defending against her garbage. When will this stop?” [Id. ¶ 116].
Sheehan alleges that the official listing of Carver residents for 2022 and 2024 and her search of
the internet show no Carver resident named “Tim Westover.” [Id. ¶ 117].
B. 	Procedural History
Sheehan filed her complaint on September 12, 2024, alleging twenty-five counts and
naming all Defendants except McVeigh, whose identity was unknown at the time. [ECF No. 1].
3 It is unclear from the Amended Complaint what court is referenced here.
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A few days later, Sheehan also filed an emergency motion for early discovery, [ECF No. 5],
which the Court granted, [ECF No. 26]. The Municipal Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(e), [ECF No. 27], which Sheehan
opposed, [ECF No. 29]. Makepeace and Kane then moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
[ECF No. 33], which Sheehan opposed, [ECF No. 37], and Makepeace and Kane replied, [ECF
No. 45]. The SLT Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(b)(6), [ECF No. 43],
which Sheehan opposed, [ECF No. 49], and the SLT Defendants replied, [ECF No. 65].
The Court held a hearing on January 30, 2025, [ECF No. 66], at which it denied the
Municipal Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(e) and the SLT Defendants’
motion to the extent it was premised on Rules 8 and 12(e), [ECF Nos. 66, 67]. The Court took
the pending motions to dismiss under advisement to the extent they were premised on Rule
12(b)(6) and ordered the Municipal Defendants to file a motion on those grounds by February
21, 2025. [ECF No. 67]. The Municipal Defendants timely filed their motion, [ECF No. 70],
which Sheehan opposed on March 7, 2025, [ECF No. 78], and the Municipal Defendants filed a
reply in support of their motion on March 21, 2025, [ECF No. 91]. The Court heard oral
argument on the pending motions to dismiss on April 9, 2025. [ECF No. 93]. At the end of the
hearing, the Court took the motions under advisement. [Id.].
On May 7, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part the pending motions to
dismiss. [ECF No. 94]. Specifically, the Court dismissed Sheehan’s § 1983 claims against the
Municipal Defendants in their official and individual capacities to the extent they were premised
on alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment; her § 1985(3) claims against the SLT
Defendants, Makepeace, and Kane; her defamation claims against the Municipal Defendants in
their official capacities; her defamation claim against Makepeace and Kane; her intentional-
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infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against the Municipal Defendants in both their individual
and official capacities; and her Massachusetts Privacy Act claim against all Defendants, not
including McVeigh. [Id.].
On June 25, 2025, Sheehan filed an Amended Complaint adding McVeigh as a party,
identifying McVeigh as the creator and operator of the Meg Millions Page and the Rebecca
Newhouse account, and adding a new defamation claim against the Makepeace Defendants along
with McVeigh. See generally [Am. Compl.]. On August 8, 2025, McVeigh moved to dismiss
Counts 17 and 18 of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 129].
Sheehan opposed the motion, [ECF No. 131], and McVeigh replied, [ECF No. 134]. On August
25, 2025, Makepeace, Kane, McVeigh, SLT, and Opachinski (collectively, the “anti-SLAPP
Defendants) filed a special motion to dismiss Counts 6, 7, 8, 16, 17, and 18 of the Amended
Complaint pursuant to the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute. [ECF No. 135]. Sheehan opposed
the motion, [ECF No. 140], and the anti-SLAPP Defendants replied, [ECF No. 146].
II. 	MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTE
A. 	Legal Standard
The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H, was “enacted
by the Legislature to provide a quick remedy for those citizens targeted by frivolous lawsuits
based on their government petitioning activities.” Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 63
(Mass. 2005). The statute permits a party to bring a special motion to dismiss when the
allegations against it “are based on said party’s exercise of its right of petition under the
constitution of the United States or of the [C]ommonwealth.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H.
“[W]hile the statute’s applicability turns on the special motion proponent’s constitutional rights
of petition, the statute does not ‘rely solely on these rights, as defined by the United States
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Supreme Court or [the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court], to determine the scope of
protected activity, and instead provides its own express - and broad - definition of
“petitioning.”’” Bristol Asphalt, Co., Inc. v. Rochester Bituminous Prod., Inc., 227 N.E.3d 1019,
1032 (Mass. 2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 187 N.E.3d 393, 393 n.3
(Mass. 2022)); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H (defining “a party’s exercise of its right
of petition”).
The standard of review under the anti-SLAPP framework is “fundamentally different
from a Rule 12 motion” because it “incorporates additional fact-finding beyond the facts alleged
in the pleadings.” S. Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham, No. 07-cv-
12018, 2008 WL 4595369, at *10 (D. Mass. Sep. 30, 2008). “In this inquiry, courts consider
pleadings and affidavits without indulging inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”
Bargantine, 2013 WL 6211845, at * 2.
Special motions to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute are adjudicated using a two-step
burden shifting framework. Bryan v. Ascend Learning, LLC, No. 24-cv-10583, 2024 WL
5170211, at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2024). First, the movant “must ‘make a threshold showing
through the pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it are “based on” the [party’s]
petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in addition to the
petitioning activities.’” Bristol Asphalt, Co., 227 N.E.3d at 1037 (quoting Duracraft Corp. v.
Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1998)). “[T]o determine if statements are
petitioning, [courts] consider them in the over-all context in which they were made.” Bryan,
2024 WL 5170211, at *4 (alteration in original) (quoting N. Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. P’ship v.
Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mass. 2009)). “While ‘[t]he typical mischief that the legislation
intended to remedy was lawsuits directed at individual citizens of modest means for speaking
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publicly against development projects,’ the statute provides for broader protection in certain
situations.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Duracraft, 691 N.E.2d at 940). Some “[t]ypical
categories of petitioning activities include ‘reporting violations of law, writing to government
officials, attending public hearings, testifying before government bodies, circulating petitions for
signature, lobbying for legislation, campaigning in initiative or referendum elections, filing
agency protests or appeals, being parties in law-reform lawsuits, and engaging in peaceful
boycotts and demonstrations.’” Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Cavatorta N. Am., Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d
317, 324 (D. Mass. 2016) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 859 N.E.2d 858, 863 (Mass.
2007)). “Mixed claims, that is, those based on a proponent’s petitioning along with substantial
conduct other than or in addition to the petitioning activities, inevitably involve an inquiry into
both sides’ legitimate petitioning rights.” Bristol Asphalt, Co., 227 N.E.3d at 1036; see also
Columbia Plaza Assocs. v. Northeastern Univ., 227 N.E.3d 999, 1009 (Mass. 2024) (“[I]f the
special motion proponent cannot demonstrate that the claim is based solely on the proponent’s
own petitioning activity, the special motion must be denied.”). The Court’s analysis of these
“mixed claims” is, therefore, “best addressed in the course of ordinary litigation, where both
sides’ claims and defenses can be fully analyzed based on a more complete record, not special
motions to dismiss.” Bristol Asphalt, Co., 227 N.E.3d at 1036.
If the movant meets the burden in step one, step two “requires allowance of the special
motion to dismiss, ‘unless the [opponent] shows’ that the special motion proponent’s exercise of
its right of petition ‘was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law’
and . . . ‘caused actual injury to the [opponent].’” Bristol Asphalt, Co., 227 N.E.3d at 1038
(quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H).
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B. 	Timeliness of the Special Motion to Dismiss
Sheehan filed her initial complaint on September 12, 2024, [ECF No. 1], and all
Defendants, aside from McVeigh, filed motions to dismiss, which the Court granted in part and
denied in part on May 7, 2025. [ECF No. 94]. Sheehan then filed her Amended Complaint on
June 25, 2025, [Am. Compl.], and the anti-SLAPP Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H on August 25, 2025, [ECF No. 135].
Special motions to dismiss pursuant to Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP law must be “filed
within sixty days of the service of the complaint, or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time
upon terms it deems proper.” Shire City Herbals, Inc. v. Blue, No. 15-cv-30069, 2016 WL
2757366, at *3 (D. Mass. May 12, 2016) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H). Other
sessions of this Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court have indicated that the filing of an
amended complaint triggers a new sixty-day period in which a defendant may file a special
motion pursuant to the anti-SLAPP law. See Greenspan v. MasMarques, No. 23-cv-10134, 2025
WL 2234498, at *2 (D. Mass. July 14, 2025) (denying request to file an anti-SLAPP motion
based on the length of time that had passed since the date the amended complaint was filed);
Maxwell Conservation Trust, Ltd. v. Bjorklund, No. 06–P–613, 2007 WL 601944, at *1–2
(Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 27, 2007) (affirming dismissal of special anti-SLAPP motion filed more
than 60 days after the filing of the amended complaint and amended counterclaims); Shire City
Herbals, Inc., 2016 WL 2757366, at *3 (allowing a special anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss filed
after the filing of an amended complaint and when the case was still “in its infancy”). Further, as
of August 25, 2025, the Court had recently ruled on the Municipal Defendants, SLT Defendants,
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Makepeace, and Kane’s motions to dismiss, and discovery was still in the early stages.4
Accordingly, the Court finds that the anti-SLAPP Defendants’ special motion to dismiss was not
untimely.
C. 	Step One: “Based On” Petitioning Activity
Sheehan’s claims in Counts 6 (violation of the Massachusetts Civil Right Act, Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 12, § 11H et seq.), 7 (libel and slander), and 8 (intentional infliction of emotional
distress (“IIED”)) against SLT and Opachinski, Count 17 (libel) against Makepeace and
McVeigh, and Counts 16 (Violation of the Massachusetts Civil Right Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
12, § 11H et seq.) and 18 (IIED) against Makepeace, Kane, and McVeigh are all based at least in
part, and some entirely, on the online statements that the anti-SLAPP Defendants posted on
MMP and other social media pages. See [Am. Compl. at 57–61, 71–74]; [ECF No. 136 at 13,
20–21]; [ECF No. 140 at 6]. As the movants, the anti-SLAPP Defendants must make a threshold
showing that the claims they move to dismiss are “based on [their] petitioning activities alone
and have no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities.” Bristol
Asphalt, Co., 227 N.E.3d at 1037 (quoting Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 935).
The anti-SLAPP Defendants argue that Sheehan’s claims in counts 6, 7, 8, 17, and 18 are
based on the anti-SLAPP Defendants’ attempts to seek regulatory permitting from a
governmental entity, and that the MMP posts qualify as petitioning activity because they were
“reasonably likely to encourage consideration of review of issues connected to regulatory
approvals” and to “encourage public participation in issues before governmental bodies.” [ECF
4 The Court notes that the parties’ initial disclosures were due August 15, 2025, amendments to
pleadings were due December 19, 2025, and fact discovery was to be completed by May 15,
2026. [ECF No. 128].
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No. 136 at 13, 16]. They claim that many MMP readers were individuals involved in the
permitting processes, including Germain, Gray, Cavacco, and Main, and that the anti-SLAPP
Defendants’ “advocacy” on MMP was almost certain to reach members of the relevant
administrative bodies. [Id. at 16]; [ECF No. 136-3 (“McVeigh Aff.”) ¶¶ 17–18].
In support of these arguments, the anti-SLAPP Defendants point to language in the
Amended Complaint where they claim Sheehan acknowledges the connection between their
statements and their petitioning activities. [ECF No. 136 at 14–15]. For example, Sheehan
alleges that McVeigh’s post in July 2023, which states that “[i]t is baffling how Meg hasn’t been
disciplined by the BBO yet for gross misconduct and intentional misrepresentation” and that if
he were Sheehan’s client, he would be “asking for [his] money back and threatening to sue for
malpractice,” [Am. Compl. ¶ 99], was posted in response to the denial of a preliminary
injunction that Sheehan had filed, [ECF No. 136 at 15]. The anti-SLAPP Defendants also
highlight that the alleged May 22, 2023, fake newspaper post pertained to two “court or
administrative matters related to Makepeace,” and that the alleged posts about Sheehan’s
engineering expert were made in connection with SLT’s Rickett’s Pond Business Park project,
[ECF No. 136 at 15]; see [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93, 109].
Sheehan, on the other hand, argues that her claims do not challenge any of the anti-
SLAPP Defendants’ actual petitioning activities, such as their permitting and approval actions,
but instead challenge their use of social media to humiliate her, damage her reputation, and cause
her substantial emotional distress. [ECF No. 140 at 8, 10]. She further argues that even if the
Court determines that some of the anti-SLAPP Defendants’ actions were petitioning activity, “a
(very) substantial portion” of their actions, including their use of anonymous and impersonative
accounts, did not constitute petitioning activities. [Id. at 9]. Sheehan also argues that the anti-
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SLAPP Defendants’ actions were not “legitimate” petitioning activities, namely because hiding
behind anonymous accounts “strip[ped] away any veneer of legitimacy” that they may have had.
[Id. at 12].
As to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the Court finds that the anti-SLAPP
Defendants have not met their burden of showing that Sheehan’s claims in Counts 6, 7, 8, 16, 17,
and 18 are based solely on their legitimate petitioning activities as defined under the statute.
While some of the statements made by the anti-SLAPP Defendants are plausibly at least
tangentially related to their permitting or regulatory approval activities, others appear to be
wholly untethered to any legitimate petitioning actions. For example, it is unclear which, if any,
of the defendants’ petitioning activities were furthered by McVeigh’s January 30, 2023 MMP
post stating that “Meg Sheehan is what happens when you have too much unearned money,
unchecked narcissism and a desperate thirst for relevance. She truly is an unaccomplished bozo.”
[Am. Compl. ¶ 65]. McVeigh’s use of photo-shopped images of Sheehan drinking beer and
pushing crates of beer, [id. ¶ 88], calling her “Meg ‘beer cashier’ Sheehan” and “Meg the
‘Natural Disaster’ Sheehan,” [id. ¶ 87], and his allegations on MMP that Sheehan was running an
unlawful business in New Hampshire are also seemingly unmoored from any of the defendants’
actual petitioning activities. [Id. ¶¶ 81, 88, 90]. Similarly, multiple of Opachinski’s online posts,
such as his comment stating, “[s]o where does Meg actually live and pay her taxes?
Massachusetts or New Hampshire??” [Id. ¶ 90], or his response to an MMP post about the
marketing of an undeveloped parcel by a Sheehan family company in which he called Sheehan
“a lying, vile old hag!” [Id. ¶ 97], are not legitimate petitioning activity on the part of SLT.
These statements, and others described in the Amended Complaint, lack a “plausible nexus” to
any governmental proceeding, and they were not “made before or submitted to a legislative,
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executive, or judicial body” or reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review by such of
a specific issue. See de Lench v. Archie, 406 F. Supp. 3d 154, 158–59 (D. Mass. 2019) (quoting
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H). Because some of the anti-SLAPP Defendants’ alleged actions
do not qualify as legitimate petitioning activity, Sheehan has brought, at a minimum, “mixed
claims” based on substantial conduct other than or in addition to any potentially legitimate
petitioning activities.
Defendants attempt to rebut this conclusion by arguing that statements made on social
media can constitute petitioning. [ECF No. 146 at 5–7]. While this is generally true, see Tresca
Bros. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Waller, No. 2181-cv-02071, 2022 WL 2387400, at *2 (Mass.
Super. Ct. May 20, 2022) (finding that allegations made on Facebook and YouTube were
legitimate petitioning activities), it does not follow that all statements on social media made by
an individual or entity that, at times, engages in petitioning activity are necessarily protected. “A
mere ‘oblique reference,’ ‘tangential comment,’ or ‘incidental observation’ regarding genuine
petitioning activity is not protected by the anti-SLAPP law . . . More specifically, the anti-
SLAPP law ‘does not protect tangential statements intended, at most, to influence public opinion
in a general way unrelated to government involvement.” Shire City Herbals, Inc., 2016 WL
2757366, at *5 (quoting Glob. NAPS, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 529, 530,
533, 534 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)). Even considering the overall context of the ongoing dispute
between Sheehan and the Defendants, some of the anti-SLAPP Defendants’ statements
contained, at most, only “oblique references” to the defendants’ legitimate petitioning activities.
See [id.]. To conclude otherwise would essentially give parties involved in petitioning
protection for any statements made about each other, no matter how unrelated they may be to
any genuine petitioning activities.
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Because the anti-SLAPP Defendants have not met their burden under step one of the anti-
SLAPP analysis, the Court will not proceed to examine step two. Bristol Asphalt, Co., 227
N.E.3d at 1037. Accordingly, the anti-SLAPP Defendants’ special motion to dismiss is
DENIED.
III. 	MCVEIGH’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 12(B)(6)
A. 	Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must provide ‘a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Cardigan
Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
The pleading must include “more than labels and conclusions,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 545 (2007), and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court “first must distinguish the
complaint’s factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal
allegations (which need not be credited).” Cardigan Mountain Sch., 787 F.3d at 84 (citation
modified). “Second, the court must determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient to
support the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” García-
Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation modified). In conducting
this analysis, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and analyze those facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff's theory, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
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plaintiff. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 383 (1st Cir.
2011).
B. 	Defamation Claim Against McVeigh (Count 17)
In Count 17, Sheehan claims that McVeigh and Makepeace, with McVeigh acting as
Makepeace’s agent and in furtherance of the company’s interests, repeatedly libeled Sheehan
through MMP and at least one digital impersonator. [Am. Compl. at 72–73]. McVeigh now
moves to dismiss Sheehan’s libel claim against him in so far as it is based on nineteen specific
statements which he has identified in his motion to dismiss, see [ECF No. 130 at 11–25],
contending that these nineteen statements are not actionable under First Amendment principles.
[Id. at 7]. Sheehan responds that McVeigh cannot move to partially dismiss Count 17 by
“cherry-picking” individual statements that do not meet the requirements for a libel claim, and
that in so doing, he implicitly acknowledges that the other statements described in the Amended
Complaint, see [ECF No. 130-1], support Sheehan’s libel claim, [ECF No. 131 at 1–2]. She
further asserts that only claims can be dismissed, not individual facts; that the nineteen facts
McVeigh has identified should be reviewed in the full context of the public discourse, not in
isolation; and that the Court has already addressed these allegations against McVeigh in the
Memorandum and Order from May 7, 2025. [ECF No. 131 at 2–9]. She does not individually
address each of the nineteen statements that McVeigh claims do not support a libel claim. See
generally [id.].
To state a claim for libel under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that ‘[t]he
defendant made a [written] statement, concerning the plaintiff, to a third party’; (2) that the
statement was defamatory such that it ‘could damage the plaintiff’s reputation in the
community’; (3) that ‘[t]he defendant was at fault in making the statement’; and (4) that ‘[t]he
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statement either caused the plaintiff economic loss . . . or is actionable without proof of
economic loss.’” Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2012) (alterations in original)
(quoting Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 782 N.E.2d 508, 510–11 (Mass. 2003)). Additionally,
“[s]uperimposed on any state’s defamation law are First Amendment safeguards.” McKee v.
Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 2017).
“As Massachusetts case law observes, [i]n the defamation context, an expression of pure
opinion is not actionable. Thus, a statement cannot be defamatory if it is plain that the speaker is
expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than
claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts.” Afrasiabi v. United Press Int’l, 561
F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D. Mass. 2021) (quoting Piccone v. Bartels, 785 F.3d 766, 771–72 (1st Cir.
2015). As is relevant to this dispute, however, “[a] statement, even if couched as an opinion, will
give rise to liability if it implies the existence of underlying false and defamatory facts as its
basis; conversely, a statement is immunized so long as the speaker discloses all of the facts
undergirding it and none of them are both false and defamatory.” McKee, 874 F.3d at 61
(citation modified). “In other words, when the speaker ‘outlines the facts available to him, thus
making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and
leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by
the First Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282, 289 (1st Cir. 2002)).
Beginning with Sheehan’s argument that McVeigh can only move to dismiss entire
counts of the Amended Complaint rather than individual “allegations of fact,” [ECF No. 131 at
4], McVeigh contends that he properly challenges a part of the Amended Complaint, and that
dismissing certain statements in Sheehan’s libel claim would “streamline discovery, narrow the
issues before the Court, and prevent a further ‘damper on freedom of expression.’” [ECF No.
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130 at 9]. McVeigh points to multiple cases where a defamation claim was dismissed in so far as
it was based on some statements, but not others. [ECF No. 134 at 3–4]; see also Encompass Ins.
Co. of MA v. Giampa, 522 F. Supp. 2d 300, 317 (D. Mass. 2007) (allowing motion to dismiss a
defamation counterclaim in so far as it was based on certain statements but not others); Lewis v.
Abramson, 673 F. Supp. 3d 72, 101 (D.N.H. 2023) (allowing defamation claim to proceed to the
extent it was premised on 7 of 41 statements identified in the complaint); Biro v. Conde Nast,
883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“If the Court finds that some of the statements are
actionable but others are not, then the Court may dismiss the claims based on the nonactionable
statements and allow the claims based on the actionable statements to go forward.”). The Court
agrees with McVeigh’s approach and will proceed, therefore, to analyze each of the nineteen
statements he contends do not support a claim for libel. While the Court will analyze each of
these nineteen statements in context of all of the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, see
Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014) (“The tweet cannot be read in isolation, but
in the context of the entire discussion.”), Sheehan must still show that each statement itself is
defamatory in order for the statement to support a libel claim, see Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35,
41 (1st Cir. 2003) (requiring that the plaintiff show each allegedly defamatory statement was
materially false).
Sheehan argues that this Court has already addressed the sufficiency of all the allegations
that McVeigh now challenges, [ECF No. 131 at 7], and that because the nineteen statements
were described in the “Factual Background” section of the Courts prior memorandum and order,
see [ECF No. 94], those facts are “well-pleaded” and must be “taken as true” for the purposes of
this motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 131 at 7]. When the Court accepts allegations as true for the
purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss it does not accept the legal sufficiency of those
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alleged facts, see Cardigan Mountain Sch., 787 F.3d at 84; therefore, McVeigh’s motion to
dismiss remains ripe for decision.
1. 	January 16, 2023, MMP YouTube post captioned: “Meg gets
scolded at the 1/4/2023 ZBA meeting . . .” with a video of the hearing.
[Am. Compl. ¶ 59].
McVeigh argues that this statement is inactionable because it constitutes his subjective
view that Sheehan was “scolded” at the ZBA meeting, and because the post provides the video as
the full factual basis for his statement. [ECF No. 130 at 11]. The Court agrees that this
statement is inactionable. “[A] statement, even if couched as an opinion, will give rise to
liability if it implies the existence of underlying false and defamatory facts as its basis;
conversely, a statement is immunized so long as the speaker discloses all of the facts
undergirding it and none of them are both false and defamatory.” McKee, 874 F.3d at 61. “In
other words, when the speaker ‘outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the
challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free
to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment.’”
Id. (quoting Riley, 292 F.3d at 289). Here, McVeigh’s post included the video in which he
claims Sheehan was scolded, and, therefore, he disclosed all the facts “undergirding” his
subjective interpretation of the situation. Id.
2. 	MMP’s profile picture “showing a thermometer-style gauge
with the ‘mercury’ approaching the $2.5 million level, entitled ‘The
Meg Sheehan Wasted Taxpayer Money Chart,’” and a “partially
obscured picture behind it of Sheehan with hundred-dollar bills fanning
out in each hand.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 60].
McVeigh first argues that the “totality of the context” shows that MMP’s profile picture
is not actionable because it was posted on Facebook, which he contends is an informal setting
“typically regarded as . . . for stating opinions.” [ECF No. 130 at 11–12 (quoting Rosa v. Eaton,
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No. 23-cv-06087, 2024 WL 3161853, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2024)]. He also claims that the
statement is not false because the “actual text does not purport to represent facts about municipal
spending,” that “wasted” is a subjective opinion, and that the image of Sheehan with the fanned-
out bills reinforces the profile picture’s hyperbolic and satirical nature. [Id. at 12]. The Court
disagrees.
“Whether a statement is fact or opinion is determined by whether the statement would be
understood by a reasonable reader as containing ‘objectively verifiable facts.’” Conformis, Inc.
v. Aetna, Inc., 58 F.4th 517, 531 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Scholz v. Delp, 41 N.E.3d 38, 45
(Mass. 2015)). Moreover, “[a]t the pleading stage . . . a statement that can reasonably be
understood as either fact or opinion is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. Even given
the purported satirical tone of the profile photo, the allegation that Sheehan had cost taxpayers
close to $2.5 million strikes the Court as objectively verifiable. While McVeigh’s
characterization of the use of money as a “waste” may be his subjective opinion, see L. Offs. of
David Freydin, P.C. v. Chamara, 24 F.4th 1122, 1130 (7th Cir. 2022), the “$2.5 million” shown
in the chart could reasonably be interpreted as an objectively verifiable fact concerning how
much money Sheehan had caused taxpayers to incur, regardless of whether or not it is considered
a waste. Sheehan asserts that the $2.5 million figure is far above the legal fees taxpayers would
have incurred, which she claims would be measured in thousands, not millions. [Am. Compl. ¶
56].
3. 	January 2023 MMP post of a “clown photo of Sheehan, with
the caption, ‘we’re excited to announce a partnership with the
Twitter/X account ‘Exposing Meg Sheehan.’” [Am. Compl. ¶ 61].
McVeigh argues that Sheehan has not alleged that this statement is false, and that even if
Sheehan had alleged the statement was false, it could not be interpreted as an objectively
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verifiable fact. [ECF No. 130 at 13]. The Court agrees that Sheehan has not properly alleged
that this statement was false. “Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation action under
Massachusetts law . . .” Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 42
(1st Cir. 1998). Sheehan does not claim that there was not a partnership between the MMP
Facebook account and the MMP Twitter/X account, and she states herself that after this post,
“[m]ost, if not all, of the MMP posts were thereafter also posted on X,” [Am. Compl. ¶ 61],
which supports the idea that there was a “partnership” of some sort between the two accounts.
With respect to the clown photo, McVeigh contends that the use of the image was
hyperbolic or figurative, and that no reasonable viewer would interpret the image as a statement
that Sheehan was actually a clown. [ECF No. 130 at 13]. “[H]yperbolic statements, or those
using loose, figurative language, are protected as long as no ‘reasonable person could interpret
the statement to provide actual facts about the individual . . . it describes.’” Ayyadurai v.
Floor64, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 3d 343, 361 (D. Mass. 2017) (quoting Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 131 (1st Cir. 1997)). “For better or worse, our society has long since
passed the stage at which the use of the word ‘bastard’ would occasion an investigation into the
target’s lineage or the cry ‘you pig’ would prompt a probe for a porcine pedigree.” Levinsky’s,
127 F.3d at 128. The Court agrees that McVeigh’s use of the clown photo was figurative or
hyperbolic, and is not an actionable statement.
4. 	January 30, 2023 MMP post of an image overlaid with the
words, “Meg Sheehan is what happens when you have too much
unearned money, unchecked narcissism and a desperate thirst for
relevance. She truly is an unaccomplished bozo. -Myles Standish.”
[Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65–66].
McVeigh contends that this fake quote posted on MMP cannot be the basis for a libel
claim because it contains only “mere epithets” and statements that are objectively unverifiable,
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and he argues that the false attribution to Myles Standish was “plainly for dramatic and satirical
effect.” [ECF No. 130 at 14]. The Court agrees. “Ridicule and simple verbal abuse do not give
rise to liability for defamation.” Mullane v. Breaking Media, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 102, 112 (D.
Mass. 2020) (finding that the challenged statements calling the plaintiff “rude,” “dumb,”
“unethical,” “a little entitled ponce,” or a “dauphin” were mere epithets and inactionable); see
also Steiner v. eBay, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 3d 144, 162 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding that statements
referring to the plaintiff as “shoddy,” “biased,” “bush league,” “drivel,” or “BS” were mere
epithets that were “insufficiently fact-based” to support a defamation claim). The fake quote
used here contains only mere epithets, and is therefore inactionable.
With respect to the false attribution to Myles Standish, while “[a]ttributing a false
quotation to another can be a defamatory statement,” Yong Li v. Reade, 746 F. Supp. 2d 245,
253–54 (D. Mass. 2010), courts have generally addressed this issue in the context of quotations
falsely attributed to the individual bringing the defamation claim, see id.; Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511–512 (1991) (analyzing whether a fabricated quotation caused
injury because it attributed untrue factual assertions to the speaker or associated a negative trait
or attitude with the speaker); King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 512 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Mass. 1987)
(finding that a fake press release falsely attributed to the plaintiff could not reasonably be
understood as the plaintiff’s own commentary). Here, the Court finds that the attribution to a
dead British military officer was satiric because a reasonable reader would not interpret the
statement to be a true and accurate quote given the context of the entire online debate on MMP
and the fact that Myles Standish died centuries before this fight with Sheehan came about.
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5. 	Sheehan “the hypocrite.” [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67–69, 81–82, 87].
McVeigh next identifies several instances in the Amended Complaint where Sheehan
alleges that MMP embraced the “central theme” that Sheehan was a “hypocrite.” [ECF No. 130
at 14]. While McVeigh correctly claims that a “theme” without reference to one or more specific
statements is not actionable, [id. at 15]; see Bryan, 2024 WL 5170211, at *9 (finding that the
plaintiffs were required to give fair notice of the statements at issue), it is not clear that Sheehan
even intended this “theme” to serve as part of the basis for the libel claim against McVeigh.
Accordingly, the Court agrees that the hypocrisy “theme” as described by Sheehan in her
Amended Complaint is not independently actionable. To the extent that Sheehan has set forth
other specific statements in her Amended Complaint that are related to this hypocrisy theme, the
Court will address those statements individually as warranted.
6. 	February 2, 2023 MMP post stating: “Did the town of
Kingston account for all the earth removed from Meg Sheehan’s
company headquarters during their expansions? Where are the truck
counts? How was all this work approved so close to the Jones River?
Did Meg and L. Knife and Son follow all local, state and federal laws?
Where are the wetland reports?” [Am. Compl. ¶ 68].
McVeigh argues that this MMP post expresses only “theory, conjecture, or surmise” and
does not claim to be based on objectively verifiable facts. [ECF No. 130 at 16 (quoting Cheng v.
Neumann, 51 F.4th 438, 444 (1st Cir. 2022))]. While “statements that present or imply the
existence of facts that can be proven true or false are actionable under state defamation
law . . . ‘if it is plain that the speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory,
conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the
statement is not actionable.’” Gray v. St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243, 248 (1st Cir. 2000)
(quoting Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993)). Here, the Court
finds that McVeigh was expressing a conjecture or surmise about the actions of Sheehan’s family
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company. Although the questions McVeigh posed reference factual disputes that could
potentially be proven true or false, the framing and the overall tone of the statement indicates
that it is merely a conjecture or theory, rendering this statement inactionable.
7. 	April 15, 2023 MMP post with a photo of a yellow “Meg loses,
again!!!” sign with images of a hauling truck and an excavator. [Am.
Compl. ¶ 79].
McVeigh argues that Sheehan did not allege that the statement “Meg loses again” was
false, and further, that the phrase and surrounding images were a nonactionable expression of
opinion. [ECF No. 130 at 16–17]. The Court agrees. Sheehan does not contend that the
statement, which presumably relates to one of the legal or regulatory proceedings in which she
was involved, is false, and the statement that she has “lost” is not an objectively verifiable fact.
In the context of MMP’s post and the ongoing dispute between Sheehan and Defendants, a
reasonable person could understand the sign to mean that Sheehan had “lost” one or more of the
legal or regulatory proceedings in which she was involved. See Gray, 221 F.3d at 249 (finding
that the statement that a party had “failed” by selling its firm was nonactionable, and stating that
if the speaker had “said or even implied that [the plaintiff] went bankrupt or did not make a
profit, these would be statements of fact that could be proved true or false.”).
8. 	April 15, 2023 comment by Rebecca Newhouse on the MMP
post of the yellow sign stating: “I’ve watched this witch waste Carver’s
money[,] time and resources for years. Glad she’s facing the music
finally.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 79].
McVeigh contends that this statement is a nonactionable expression of his personal
observations and opinions of Sheehan. [ECF No. 130 at 17]. The Court agrees. As discussed
above, whether money and resources a town has spent on engaging in litigation or regulatory
proceedings were “wasted” is a subjective opinion that cannot truly be proven true or false. See
Gray, 221 F.3d at 248 (“[I]f it is plain that the speaker is expressing a subjective view, an
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interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of
objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.”); Law Offs. of David Freydin, P.C.,
24 F.4th at 1130 (“[T]here are numerous reasons why someone may . . . suggest that a product or
service would be a ‘waste of money.’”). And, as discussed above, statements that use
“hyperbole, exaggeration, [or] caricature,” such as calling someone a “witch” are not typically
considered defamatory. King, 512 N.E.2d at 245. With respect to the second part of this
statement, “[g]lad she’s facing the music finally,” the Court finds that this language is a
“nonfactual figure of speech,” Kelleher v. Lowell Gen. Hosp., 152 N.E.3d 126, 132 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2020), that a reasonable observer would understand to be subjective, and, therefore, is
nonactionable.
9. 	April 24, 2023 MMP post stating: “Just a reminder to
Wareham residents to be watchful for Meg Sheehan and her supporters
tonight. They do not live in Wareham and their intent is to disrupt
your town meeting. Meg recently tried (unsuccessfully) to influence
Carver’s town meeting. She and the members of her various
groups . . . will likely try and cause trouble. Ultimately the only thing
they’ll accomplish will be increased legal costs borne by the town and
the taxpayer.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 83].
McVeigh argues that this is an inactionable statement because it contains speculation
about Sheehan’s motivations and intent, and that Sheehan has not alleged that the statement is
false. [ECF No. 130 at 17–18]. The Court agrees that the statement is inactionable. “‘[A]nyone
is entitled to speculate on a person’s motives from the known facts of his behavior.’ . . .
Accordingly, statements concerning a person’s motivation or intent are not actionable because
they are incapable of being proved true or false.” Ayyadurai, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 365 (quoting
Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1227). Sheehan does not contest the truth of the statement that she and her
supporters “do not live in Wareham.” See [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 83–84]; [ECF No. 131]. The
remainder of the statement contains only speculation about Sheehan’s intentions, including that
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“their intent is to disrupt your town meeting,” that they “will likely try and cause trouble,” and
“[u]ltimately the only thing they’ll accomplish will be increased legal costs borne by the town
and the taxpayer,” or McVeigh’s subjective opinion that “Meg recently tried (unsuccessfully) to
influence Carver’s town meeting,” neither of which are actionable.
10. 	May 6, 2023 MMP post about the dismissal of a lawsuit on
standing grounds, calling Sheehan an “attention seeking hag,” and a
“[b]ogus activist,” and stating that Sheehan had engaged in “a pathetic
attempt to validate her unremarkable life.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 86].
In the Amended Complaint, Sheehan seemingly admits it was true that a lawsuit in which
she was involved was dismissed for standing reasons, [Am. Compl. ¶ 86], and McVeigh argues
that the “nasty slights” he made about Sheehan were nothing more than epithets and not
objectively verifiable. [ECF No. 130 at 18]. The Court agrees. As discussed above, “[r]idicule
and simple verbal abuse do not give rise to liability for defamation,” see Mullane, 433 F. Supp.
3d at 112; Steiner, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 162, and these insults fall squarely within that category.
11. 	Statements made on MMP around May 2023: “Meg, ‘beer
cashier’ Sheehan” and “Meg the ‘Natural Disaster’ Sheehan.” [Am.
Compl. ¶ 87].
McVeigh contends, and the Court agrees, that these “labels” are figurative expressions
that no reasonable reader would believe were factual. [ECF No. 130 at 18]. These statements,
like those discussed in statement ten above, while ridiculing and insulting, are nonactionable
epithets. No reasonable reader would believe that Sheehan was truly a natural disaster, and
given the context of other posts on MMP and the ongoing discussion around Sheehan, a
reasonable reader would not understand McVeigh’s statement to mean that Sheehan was an
actual “beer cashier.”
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12. 	May 2023 MMP posts with photoshopped pictures of Sheehan
“about to take a swig from a bottle of Budweiser” and “Sheehan’s head
imposed on a man’s body pushing a dolly transporting crates of beer.”
[Am. Compl. ¶ 88].
McVeigh argues that these photographs are “artistic rhetorical hyperbole” used to
emphasize his view that Sheehan was a hypocrite given her family business. [ECF No. 130 at
19]. Sheehan does not provide copies of the two images in the Amended Complaint, but she
agrees that they were photoshopped and intended to “scorn and ridicule” her. [Am. Compl.
¶ 88]. “In determining whether a statement can reasonably be construed as a statement of fact, it
is appropriate to consider ‘the medium by which the statement is disseminated.’” King, 512
N.E.2d at 244–45 (quoting Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1021, 1025
(Mass. 1982)); see Keller v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 778 F.2d 711, 718 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“Cartoons are seldom vehicles by which facts are reported; quite the contrary, they are
deliberate departures from reality designed forcefully, and sometimes viciously, to express
opinion.”). Reasonable readers are well aware that “[c]artoonists employ hyperbole,
exaggeration, and caricature to communicate their messages.” Keller, 778 F.2d at 716. Other
courts have found, for example, that a “crudely photoshopped, mock image [was] . . . clearly not
intended to be authentic,” Baffert v. Wunderler, No. 23-cv-01774, 2024 WL 5237441, at *5
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2024), and that “obviously doctored [images and video clips], further
underscore the non-factual nature of [a video],” Rapaport v. Barstool Sports, Inc., No. 22-cv-
02080, 2024 WL 88636, at *4 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 2024). Because of the photoshopped nature of the
images and their purported content, which was intended to scorn and ridicule Sheehan, the Court
finds that a reasonable reader would not have understood the images to be conveying a factual
representation or statement, and the images, therefore, are inactionable.
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13. 	May 2023 MMP comment stating: “[a]nyone who has a
problem with these posts or our page simply has not been paying
attention. Watch Meg’s appearances at town boards. They’re on
youtube. Go read her twitter page. It’s filled with insane and
unsubstantiated attacks on good businesses. SHE’S TRYING TO PUT
GOOD PEOPLE [sic] OUT OF BUSINESS. Wake the f up. She is
beneath civility.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 91].
Sheehan claims that this MMP comment was made in response to a commentor who
challenged the veracity of an earlier MMP post that accused Sheehan of running an unlawful
business in New Hampshire. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90–91]. In his motion to dismiss, McVeigh does
not address the contents of that MMP original post; he argues, however, that MMP’s statement in
this comment is mere speculation as to Sheehan’s intent, and that the statement is based solely on
Sheehan’s public YouTube and Twitter pages, which readers could review themselves. [ECF
No. 130 at 19–20]. The Court agrees that McVeigh’s statement in this comment is inactionable.
In the comment, McVeigh directly suggests that readers access the underlying set of facts upon
which his statements are based, specifically the content on Sheehan’s YouTube and Twitter
pages. See McKee, 874 F.3d at 6 (“[W]hen the speaker ‘outlines the facts available to him, thus
making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and
leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by
the First Amendment.”).
14. 	May 22, 2023 MMP post showing a fake newspaper cover. The
headline states: “Meg Loses Again,” and the sub-heading states, “Two
More Losses.” The paragraph below the sub-heading states:
“Plymouth voters summarily rejected Meg Sheehan’s select board
candidate Frank Mand and the new Town Charter. ‘I’ve never seen
anyone be this unsuccessful in everything they do, it’s really quite
extraordinary’ writes national political pundit Lawrence Spoon. ‘She
has the reverse Midas touch.’” [Am. Compl. ¶ 93].
McVeigh argues that, viewed in context, this “fake newspaper meme” is not actionable
due to its satirical nature. [ECF No. 130 at 20–22]. The Court agrees. “[S]atirical speech enjoys
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First Amendment protection. . . . [A] satire or parody must be assessed in the appropriate
context; it is not actionable if it ‘cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an
individual.’” Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 24 (1990) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., in dissent
agreeing with majority)). Further:
In deciding whether statements can be understood reasonably as fact or opinion
“the test to be applied . . . requires that the court examine the statement in its
totality in the context in which it was uttered or published. The court must
consider all the words used, not merely a particular phrase or sentence. . . . [and]
the court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the statement,
including the medium by which the statement is disseminated and the audience to
which it is published.”
Cole, 435 N.E.2d at 1025 (quoting Info. Control Corp. v. Genesis One Comput. Corp., 611 F.2d
781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980)). “The sum effect of the format, tone and entire content” are to be
considered when evaluating a potentially defamatory statement. Phantom Touring, Inc. v.
Affiliated Publ’ns, 953 F.2d 724, 729 (1st Cir. 1992).
Here, MMP’s fake newspaper post, as a whole, was a parody and is therefore
inactionable. Several aspects of the cover clearly indicate that it was not a serious publication.
The name of the publication being simply “News,” the description, “the most important news
from around the world,” and the obviously fake stories below and to the right of the statements
about Sheehan, including one which references a presidential election between John Doe and
John Smith and another which discusses two Russian farmers catching an extraterrestrial
humanoid with a fishing net, would indicate to any reasonable reader that the post was a parody.
The quote in the Sheehan “story” stating, “[i]’ve never seen anyone be this unsuccessful in
everything they do, it’s really quite extraordinary . . . [s]he has the reverse Midas touch,”
constitutes an opinion and adds to the totality of the circumstances indicating that the newspaper
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cover is a parody. Further, Sheehan does not contend that the statements about the rejection of
the board candidate and the new town charter are false, and MMP’s statement that those two
events constituted “losses” for Sheehan is not a provable assertion of fact, as discussed above.
15. 	May 25, 2023 MMP post showing “an adaption of the title and
book cover (with no attribution) from a childhood classic, ‘Meg
Sheehan and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Week,’ and a
cruelly photo-shopped picture of Sheehan metamorphosed into a
scowling witch-like face,” and a list of “terrible events” including two
court or administrative matters related to Sheehan, the defeat of a new
town charter, the election loss of a Select Board candidate, and a U.S.
Supreme Court decision curtailing the Environmental Protection
Agency’s powers, all attributed as “losses” for Sheehan. [Am. Compl. ¶
94].
McVeigh argues that the “format, tone and entire content” of this post clearly indicate
that it was a parody of a children’s book and intended to express a viewpoint. [ECF No. 130 at
22 (quoting Phantom Touring. Inc., 953 F.2d at 729)]. The Court agrees that, like the fake
newspaper, this MMP post was clearly a parody. Further, Sheehan does not allege that the
administrative and litigation matters referenced in the post were false; rather, she only insinuates
that some of the events were not related to her. See [Am. Compl. ¶ 94]. And, as with the
newspaper, McVeigh’s statements that these events were “losses” for Sheehan is not a provable
assertion of fact, and therefore, are inactionable.
16. 	MMP “attacks” on Sheehan in August 2023 related to the
Sheehan family’s donation of land for preservation. [Am. Compl.
¶ 100].
McVeigh claims that Sheehan’s description of events in August 2023 is inactionable as
defamation because Sheehan did not allege specific information as to any statement McVeigh
made on the topic or why it was defamatory. [ECF No. 130 at 23]. Based on the Amended
Complaint, it is unclear whether Sheehan intended for these “attacks” to serve as a basis for her
libel claim against McVeigh or whether the information was merely provided for context as to
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other allegations. If Sheehan’s mention of “attacks” was intended to describe a statement,
McVeigh is correct that the Amended Complaint fails to provide adequate facts to give fair
notice of the defamatory statement. Although a plaintiff is “not required to set forth the alleged
defamatory statements verbatim,” North Shore Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Breslin Assocs.
Consulting, 491 F. Supp. 2d 111, 124 (D. Mass. 2007), they must “explain the essential ‘who,
what, when, and where,’” of the statements, Hogan v. Teamsters Loc. 170, 495 F. Supp. 3d 52,
61–62 (D. Mass. 2020). Here, Sheehan provides screenshots of Opachinski’s responses to the
referenced MMP posts, but she does not explain what McVeigh stated or how it was defamatory,
only claiming that “McVeigh was aggrieved that the [Sheehan] family had not donated a
different parcel to the Town of Plymouth.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 100]. Accordingly, to the extent that
Sheehan intended for paragraph 100 of the Amended Complaint to form a basis for a libel claim
against McVeigh, the Court finds that it does not.
17. 	February 13, 2024 MMP post of “Meg’s Bingo Card” with an
“unflattering” photo of Sheehan in the middle labeled “Free Square”
and other squares stating: “some squawks about dust,” “Meg says ‘you
have a duty,’” and “Meg’s few supporters look like an unmade bed.”
[Am. Compl. ¶ 108].
McVeigh contends that this “bingo card” and the accompanying photo and statements are
nonactionable ridicule or verbal abuse. [ECF No. 130 at 23–24]. The Court agrees. As
discussed above, “[r]idicule and simple verbal abuse,” Mullane, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 112, and
mere epithets that are insufficiently fact-based, Steiner, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 162, do not give rise
to liability for defamation. The “bingo card” at issue here contains only insults and ridicule and
does not support a libel claim against McVeigh.
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18. 	May 22, 2024 MMP post with a “recap” of events
“surrounding an incident in which Sheehan voluntarily disclosed to the
Court that her engineering expert’s license had been temporarily
suspended due to a failure to file mandatory forms or paperwork” and
an accompanying comment in which McVeigh stated, “[t]his woman is
a serial liar. If you agree, make a complaint to the Massachusetts
Board of Bar Overseers and show them this video.” [Am. Compl.
¶ 109].
McVeigh argues that he disclosed the salient facts upon which these statements were
based, that the Board of Bar Overseers comment reflected his own opinion based on the facts
disclosed, and that he did not have to include Sheehan’s “side” of the story as long as he
disclosed the underlying facts related to his statements. [ECF No. 130 at 24]. The Court agrees
that these statements, as described in the Amended Complaint, are inactionable. First, in the
Amended Complaint, Sheehan does not provide a specific description of how McVeigh
“recapped” the events surrounding the engineering expert issue. [Am. Compl. ¶ 109]. She also
does not allege that McVeigh’s recap was false, only that it did not include Sheehan’s “side of
the facts.” [Id.]. Because a defendant need not give a “balanced two-sided story,” if they
provide the facts on which the statement was based, McKee, 874 F.3d at 63–64, McVeigh was
not required to provide Sheehan’s “side of the facts.” His comment calling Sheehan a liar and
suggesting that readers complain to the Board of Bar Overseers if they agreed directed readers to
a video, which McVeigh claims, and Sheehan does not dispute, contained the underlying facts
necessary for readers to come to their own conclusion as to whether Sheehan was lying.
19. 	July 2024 email from “Tim Westover” to the Chairman of the
Carver ZBA stating that he had been watching “for the past three
years” and that Sheehan “has no shame as she forces our town to spend
huge sums of legal bills defending against her garbage. When will this
stop?” [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 115–16].
McVeigh argues that Sheehan has failed to allege that McVeigh made this statement or
that it was about Sheehan. [ECF No. 130 at 25]. He also claims that even if Sheehan had
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attributed the statement to him, it is not actionable because it includes non-objectively verifiable
opinions. [Id.]. The Court agrees as to both arguments. First, Sheehan does not specifically
allege that McVeigh created or used the Tim Westover persona email account, only that the
email domain was the same as Rebecca Newhouse’s domain. [Am. Compl. ¶ 115]. Sheehan has
therefore not properly alleged the “who” aspect of the “who, what, when, and where” of the
claim. See Hogan, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 62. Second, even if Sheehan had alleged that McVeigh
was responsible for the Tim Westover email, the statement that Sheehan “has no shame” and is
causing the town to incur “huge” bills to defend against Sheehan’s “garbage” expresses a
“subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise,” not “objectively verifiable
facts,” and is therefore inactionable. See Gray, 221 F.3d at 248.
In sum, based on the reasoning above, McVeigh’s motion to partially dismiss Count 17
against him is DENIED in so far as Count 17 against him is based on the statement described in
section III.B.2 and GRANTED as to the other eighteen statements described herein. The Court
makes no determination of actionability of any other statements described in the Amended
Complaint and not expressly addressed herein.
C. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Against McVeigh
In Count 18, Sheehan brings a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) against McVeigh, Makepeace as McVeigh’s employer, and Kane as the CEO of
Makepeace and McVeigh’s supervisor. [Am. Compl. at 73–74]. McVeigh now moves to
dismiss the IIED claim against him in so far as it is based on the nineteen statements examined
above in connection with the libel claim. [ECF No. 130 at 25]. He contends that the IIED claim
against him is based entirely on allegedly defamatory statements he made through MMP and
other social media accounts and argues that the Court should find that the nineteen statements at
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issue are not defamatory, as discussed above, and that Sheehan’s IIED claim likewise cannot be
based on those statements. [Id.].
Under Massachusetts law, to assert an IIED claim, Sheehan must allege: “(1) that [the
defendant] intended, knew, or should have known that his conduct would cause emotional
distress; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the conduct caused emotional
distress; and (4) that the emotional distress was severe.” Galvin v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 852 F.3d
146, 161 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Polay v. McMahon, 10 N.E.3d 1122, 1128 (Mass. 2014)). “The
standard for making a claim of [IIED] is very high.” Id. (quoting Polay, 10 N.E.3d at 1128).
“There is no liability even if the defendant acted ‘with an intent which is tortious or even
criminal,’ with ‘malice,’ or with ‘a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to
punitive damages for another tort,’” and “[n]ot even an ‘inten[t] to inflict emotional distress’ is
sufficient.” Id. (quoting Polay, 10 N.E.3d at 1128). “Conduct qualifies as extreme and
outrageous only if it go[es] beyond all possible bounds of decency, and [is] regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (quoting Polay, 10 N.E.3d at
1128). “Repeated harassment . . . may compound the outrageousness of incidents which, taken
individually, might not be sufficiently extreme to warrant liability for infliction of emotional
distress,” Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Boyle v. Wenk, 392
N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Mass. 1979)), and “the jury are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from
the totality of the circumstances,” Boyle, 392 N.E.2d at 1055 (“[t]he flaw in Wenk’s argument is
that he isolates each individual incident”).
McVeigh argues that the nineteen statements described above are not defamatory for the
purposes of Count 17, and therefore, cannot be “recycled” as a basis for an IIED claim. [ECF
No. 130 at 25]. McVeigh is correct that “a failed defamation claim cannot be recycled as a tort
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claim for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress,” Shay, 702 F.3d at 83 (finding
that the plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim failed because it grew “out of
the same nucleus of operative facts that spawn[ed] her defamation claim”), and the First
Amendment “can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of
emotional distress,” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011). McVeigh’s partial motion to
dismiss, however, concerns only a subset of the allegations made in the Amended Complaint, see
[ECF No. 130-1 (identifying at least 29 statements alleged against McVeigh)]; [ECF No. 131 at
3, n.1 (“Plaintiff does not accept McVeigh’s efforts to circumscribe the number of factual
statements that support Counts 17 and 18 against him.”)], and it is not clear to what extent
Sheehan’s IIED claim against McVeigh “grows out of the same nucleus of operative facts” as
her defamation claim against him or how much the relevant allegations overlap. Accordingly,
the Court finds that Sheehan’s IIED claim against McVeigh fails to the extent that it is premised
on the eighteen statements that the Court has determined are not actionable under a libel theory.
McVeigh’s motion to partially dismiss Count 18 against him is therefore GRANTED in so far as
it is premised on those eighteen statements, but otherwise DENIED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the anti-SLAPP Defendants’ special motion to dismiss is
DENIED. McVeigh’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Specifically, McVeigh’s motion to dismiss Counts 17 and 18 is GRANTED is so far as
Sheehan’s libel and IIED claims against him are based on the statements discussed supra under
sections III.B.1 and III.B.3–19, and DENIED in so far as Sheehan’s libel and IIED claims
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against him are based on the statement described in section III.B.2 or other allegations in the
Amended Complaint not discussed herein.
SO ORDERED.
March 25, 2026 	/s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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