Perez et al v. First Option Mortgage Corporation et al

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN RE 	)
JOSE PEREZ 	)
DEBTOR 	)
______________________________ 	)
JOSE PEREZ & 	)
MARIA C. NIEVES, 	)
) 	CHAPTER 13
Plaintiffs, 	)
v. 	)
) 	CASE NO. 08-40693-JBR
FIRST OPTION MORTGAGE CORP., 	)
FERNANDO DA SILVA MACHADO, 	)
WMC-GEMB MORTGAGE CORP., 	) 	AP. NO. 08-4081
SECURITIZED ASSET BACK 	)
RECEIVABLES TRUST 2006-WM3, & 	)
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL 	)
TRUST, TRUSTEE 	)
)
Defendants 	)
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This matter came before the Court on Motions of Defendants, First Option Mortgage
Corporation (“First Option”) and Deutsche Bank National Trust (“DBNT”), to Dismiss (Docket
# # 6 and 18) and Plaintiffs’ Oppositions to the Motions to Dismiss. (Docket # # 14 and 20).
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Docket # 5) contains seven counts: objecting to DBNT’s claim
(Count I), seeking a declaration that Powers of Attorney executed by Plaintiffs and mortgages
executed by Fernando Da Silva Machado (“Machado”) on Plaintiffs’ behalf are void (Counts II
& III), alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act by First Option (Count IV), alleging a
breach of fiduciary duty by First Option (Count V), alleging unfair and deceptive acts or
practices in violation of M.G.L. c. 93A, § 2 by First Option (Count VI), and seeking an award of
attorney’s fees against First Option (Count VII). DBNT withdrew its Motion to Dismiss Count I,
and Plaintiffs have assented to dismissal without prejudice of Count IV. Therefore, Count I is not
addressed in this decision and the Court dismisses Count IV without prejudice.
FACTS
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 10

2
The facts are drawn from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. For the purpose of deciding
these Motions to Dismiss, the Court assumes that all of the facts contained in Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint are true. See LeGoff v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 23 F. Supp.2d 120, 130
(D. Mass. 1998). Plaintiff, Debtor Jose Perez (“Perez”), was approached by Machado at some
point during April of 2006 with the prospect of purchasing a home. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 11). At
that time, and at least up until July 31, 2006, Machado was employed by, or acting as an agent
of, First Option. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 15). Machado represented that he could secure a mortgage
for Perez at a fixed interest rate that would carry a monthly payment of $1,200 including
principal, interest, taxes, and insurance. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 11). Machado later informed Perez
that his credit was subpar and asked Perez to find a person to co-sign the loan necessary to
purchase a home. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 14). Plaintiff, non-debtor Maria Nieves (“Nieves”), who
is Perez’s mother, agreed to co-sign the loan. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 14).
A closing was held on July 31, 2006 and Plaintiffs, as joint tenants, received a deed to 12
Derwin Street, Leominster, MA for a $269,900.00 purchase price. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 16). At
the closing, Machado executed two promissory notes, supposedly as Attorney in Fact for Nieves,
and two mortgages, supposedly as Attorney in Fact for Nieves and Perez. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶
17). Although Machado executed the mortgages securing the notes as Attorney in Fact for both
Perez and Nieves, Machado executed both notes as Attorney in Fact only for Nieves, and not
Perez. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 17, 38). The first note was for $215,920.00, carried an initial
monthly payment of $1,660.24 at a rate of 8.5% for two years, and thereafter the interest rate
would adjust to the six-month LIBOR plus 7% with subsequent adjustments every six months.
(Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 19). The second note was a 15-year balloon note for $53,980.00 and carried
a monthly payment of $513.66 at 10.99%. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 21). The payments on the loans
during the first two years, including property taxes and insurance, would total $2,481 per month.
(Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 29). 	Perez could not afford this payment with a monthly gross income of
$4,217.25 and when the loans reached their fully indexed rates the debt-to-income ratio of both
loans combined would be 66%. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 29).
The Powers of Attorney that Machado utilized to purportedly act on behalf of Plaintiffs
as their Attorney in Fact at the closing appear to bear Plaintiffs’ signatures, are notarized, and are
filed in the North Worcester Registry of Deeds. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 22-23). Plaintiffs maintain
that they did not sign the Powers of Attorney or signed them under the mistaken belief that they
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 10

3
were some another type of document. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 22-23). During the closing, Plaintiffs
waited in a lobby area outside the office of the attorney handling the closing. (Pls.’ Am. Compl.
¶ 18). First Option received compensation of at least $8,972.80 from the mortgage transaction.
(Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 24).
After the closing, Perez protested the terms of the loans to Machado, and Machado
responded by promising that he would arrange refinancing within six months that would
consolidate the two loans into one before the first interest rate change. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 27).
Perez continuously attempted to contact Machado in the months after the closing to no avail.
(Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 28). Nine months after the closing, Perez successfully reached Machado,
and Machado stated that he was no longer a mortgage broker and could not help Perez. (Pls.’
Am. Compl. ¶ 28).
On or about June 22, 2007, someone submitted an application in the name of Jose Nieves
of 12 Derwin Street, Leominster, MA to refinance the original loan to First NLC Financial
Services, LLC (“First NLC”) (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 30). Perez did not submit this application, and
alleges that no one by the name of Jose Nieves resides at 12 Derwin Street. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶
28). Five other refinance loan applications regarding the 12 Derwin Street property were
submitted to First NLC by unknown persons. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 31). Plaintiffs did not
authorize submission of these loan applications, and believe that Machado and/or First Option
are responsible for such submissions. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 31-32). During 2007, several entities,
which appear to be mortgage lenders, obtained Plaintiffs’ credit reports for the alleged purpose
of processing the loan applications that Plaintiffs believe were submitted by Machado and/or
First Option. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 33). Perez fell behind on his mortgage payments in
September of 2007 and a foreclosure sale was scheduled for March 22, 2008, which was stayed
when Perez’s bankruptcy case was filed. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 34).
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
First Option argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Nieves’ claims because First
Option and Nieves are non-parties to the bankruptcy proceedings and the outcome of her claims
will not affect administration of the bankruptcy estate. Nieves argues that this Court has
jurisdiction to hear her claims because they are “related to” Perez’s main bankruptcy case by
virtue of the fact that Nieves and Perez own the subject property as joint tenants. In the
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 10

4
alternative, Nieves argues that her claims are within the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
First Option argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim for relief against it
because Machado acted outside the scope of his authorized activities, while Plaintiffs argue that
the scope of an agency relationship cannot readily be determined on a motion to dismiss.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that even if Machado was acting outside the scope of the agency
relationship, First Option’s receipt of compensation from the loan transaction is sufficient at this
stage to suggest that First Option ratified the transaction. Plaintiffs argue that a fiduciary
relationship was created with First Option because of representations that Machado made to
Perez, because First Option had the discretion to negotiate a loan for Plaintiffs, and because
Plaintiffs executed a power of attorney with Machado. First Option argues that representations
made by Machado did not create a fiduciary relationship.
First Option argues that Machado’s representations describing the $1,200 per month
mortgage payment that he would arrange for Perez were not unfair or deceptive because there is
no information to indicate that Perez would not have qualified for such a loan. Plaintiffs argue
that Machado’s actions were unfair and deceptive because Machado misrepresented Perez’s
ability to qualify for a certain mortgage payment, Perez believed that this would be his payment
for the home he purchased, and Machado brokered loans with inherently unfair terms.
DBNT argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claims because
Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants engaged in fraud and unfair and deceptive actions in
procuring loans and mortgages are non-core, common law and statutory claims that fall outside
the scope of core proceedings authorized by the Bankruptcy Code. In the alternative, DBNT
requests that the Court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs
argue that Counts II & III are core matters because they allege fraudulent procurement of Powers
of Attorney which will determine the validity of DBNT’s mortgages. See 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(2)(K). Plaintiffs also argue that DBNT lacks standing to challenge the Court’s
jurisdiction over Counts V-VII because they are only directed at First Option, not DBNT.
DISCUSSION
A. 	Nieves’ Claims (Counts II, V, VI, & VII)
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 10

5
First Option argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Nieves’ claims. This Court’s
jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 157. This Court has jurisdiction to “hear and determine all
cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title
11 [if] referred [by the district court],” 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), as well as non-core matters “that
[are] otherwise related to a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). The District of
Massachusetts has referred all such proceedings to the bankruptcy court. L.R. D. Mass. 201.
Nieves argues that this Court has jurisdiction to hear her claims because they are “related to”
Perez’s bankruptcy case.
The First Circuit has limited “related to” jurisdiction to instances where the outcome of
the litigation could “potentially have some effect on the bankruptcy estate, such as altering
debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action . . . .” In re Boston Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc.,
410 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2005); see also In re N. Atl. Millwork Corp., 155 B.R. 271, 280
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (stating that there is “related to” jurisdiction when the outcome of the
dispute will “affect[] the amount of property available for distribution or the allocation of
property among creditors.”). Nieves is not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings. Any damages
that she may recover from Defendants will not be “available for distribution . . . among the
creditors” of the debtor. Id. Nieves’ argument that this Court has “related to” jurisdiction
regarding the validity of her power of attorney and mortgage because Nieves and Perez own the
property as joint tenants with “inextricably bound” rights and obligations is also unavailing.
Perez and Nieves are joint tenants, each owning an undivided interest in the property. The
validity of Nieves’ mortgage does not impact Perez’s undivided interest because Nieves’
mortgage, if valid, will only encumber Nieves’ undivided interest. See, e.g., Heffernan v.
Wollaston Credit Union, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 171, 177 (1991) (“During the lifetime of the parties,
a single joint tenant in a traditional joint tenancy may not convey or encumber the entire interest
in the jointly-held property but only his own limited interest . . . .”). Therefore, this Court lacks
“related to” jurisdiction to hear Nieves’ claims because their outcome will not “potentially have
some effect on the bankruptcy estate.” See In re Boston Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 410 F.3d at 105.
Finally, Nieves argues that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction to hear her claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Nieves cites Montana v. Goldin (In re Pegasus Gold Corp.),
394 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2005) for the proposition that bankruptcy courts can exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. No other Circuit has ever adopted this holding. In fact, Judge Feeney
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 10

6
has labeled the argument that bankruptcy courts have supplemental jurisdiction as a “dubious
proposition.” In re Adamson, 334 B.R. 1, 12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); see also In re Found. for
New Era Philanthropy, 201 B.R. 382, 398 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (deciding that bankruptcy
courts do not have supplemental jurisdiction because § 1367 “makes no reference to the
bankruptcy court”). This Court sees no basis to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Montana
recognizing supplemental jurisdiction for bankruptcy courts. Consequently, Nieves Counts II, V,
VI, and VII shall be dismissed.
B. 	Perez’s Claims
1. 	Validity of Perez’s Power of Attorney and Mortgage (Count III)
DBNT argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Perez’s claims because Perez’s
allegations that Defendants engaged in fraud and unfair and deceptive actions in procuring loans
and mortgages are non-core, common law and statutory claims that fall outside the scope of core
proceedings authorized by the Bankruptcy Code.1 Perez argues that this Court has jurisdiction to
determine the validity of Perez’s power of attorney and mortgage under 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(2)(K), which provides that the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to “determine[] . . . the
validity, extent, or priority of liens.” The crux of Perez’s argument is that the mortgage is invalid
because it was executed on his behalf under the authority of a fraudulently procured power of
attorney. Determination of the validity of the power of attorney will therefore determine the
validity of the mortgage purportedly granted to DBNT by Perez. Consequently, this Court has
jurisdiction to hear Count III pursuant to § 157(b)(2)(K) and DBNT’s Motion to Dismiss Count
III shall be denied.
2. 	Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Disgorgement of Mortgage Broker
Compensation (Count V)
First Option argues that Perez’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint.” Dixon v. Shamrock Fin. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 2d 172, 174 (D. Mass. 2007). In order
to survive the motion, the complaint must allege a “plausible entitlement to relief” and contain
1 DBNT moved to dismiss Perez’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, 93A claim, and claim for attorney’s fees (Counts
V-VII) on this basis as well, but Plaintiffs have made clear in their opposition to DBNT’s Motion to dismiss that
Counts V-VII are only directed at First Option. Since DBNT is not a defendant as to Counts V-VII, the Court will
deny DBNT’s Motion to Dismiss Counts V-VII for lack of standing.
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 10

7
“factual allegations” that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965-67 (2007). The court deciding the motion must assume
that “all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. The court must also
“draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Dixon, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
First Option argues that Machado did not create a fiduciary duty with Perez. Perez has
pled that Perez may have signed a power of attorney that, if found valid, would enable Machado
to act on Perez’s behalf. In Massachusetts, it is well settled that execution of a power of attorney
creates a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Coombs, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 144, 154
(2005). Furthermore, Perez also argues that representations made by Machado to Perez created a
fiduciary relationship. Machado represented to Perez that Machado would be able to arrange a
fixed-rate mortgage for Perez that would carry a monthly payment of $1,200 including principal,
interest, taxes, and insurance. In Massachusetts, assertions and representations made by an agent
holding himself out as a “specialist, consultant, or counselor” can create a fiduciary relationship
when reliance results. Cf. Baldwin Crane & Equip. Corp. v. Riley & Rielly Ins. Agency, Inc., 44
Mass. App. Ct. 29, 31-32 (1997) (insurance broker). First Option argues that Perez cannot show
that he relied on Machado’s representations. However, Perez’s protestations of the terms of the
loan after the closing, and subsequent inability to make payments on the loan are sufficient
allegations that Perez may have relied upon Machado’s representations. Therefore, Perez has
pled “plausible” factual allegations that, if proved, would establish a fiduciary relationship.
First Option argues that it cannot be liable for Machado’s actions while acting under the
authority of a power of attorney because such actions were outside the scope of Machado’s
authorized activities. The scope of an agent’s authority is a question of fact. See Choate v. Bd.
of Assessors of City of Boston, 304 Mass. 298, 300 (1939). First Option relies on the statutory
definition of mortgage brokers contained in M.G.L. c. 255E, § 1 to support this argument.2 First
Option argues that Machado acted outside the scope of his authorized activities because
“executing documents on the borrower’s behalf” under a power of attorney is not included in this
statutory definition. First Option’s reliance on M.G.L. c. 255E, § 1 is misplaced. This statutory
definition does not restrict what activities mortgage brokers can engage in, but rather sets forth
the business activities that trigger the requirement to obtain a mortgage broker license from the
2 Chapter 255E, § 1 defines a mortgage broker as “any person who for compensation or gain, or in the expectation of
compensation or gain, directly or indirectly negotiates, places, assists in the placement, finds or offers to negotiate,
place, assist in the placement or find mortgage loans on residential property for others.”
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 10

8
Commissioner of Banks of the Commonwealth. See generally M.G.L. c. 255E, § 2-5. First
Option was certainly permitted to authorize Machado to engage in activities above and beyond
what the statutory definition contains. Therefore, the statutory definition cannot serve as
dispositive authority for determining that Machado was acting outside the scope of his
authorized activities. Finally, even if this Court were to accept First Option’s argument that
Machado’s acted outside the scope of his authorized activities, Perez’s allegation that First
Option received $8,972.80 from the mortgage transaction is a “plausible” claim that, if proved,
would “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” for First Option’s ratification of
Machado’s actions. See Colony of Wellfleet, Inc. v. Harris, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 529-30
(2008) (finding ratification where principal received proceeds of the sale).
Lastly, First Option argues that Machado did not breach a fiduciary duty because the
mortgage fee derived from the transaction was not excessive. Receipt of excessive compensation
is a breach of a fiduciary duty. See Bessette v. Bessette, 385 Mass. 806, 809 (2008) (stating that
directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary capacity and cannot receive salaries greater than
what their day of work is fairly worth). Perez has sufficiently pled that a fiduciary relationship
was established and that First Option breached this duty by deriving excessive compensation. At
this stage, this Court is unable to determine whether or not receipt of commission in the amount
of $8,972.80 for a $269,900 mortgage transaction is excessive as a matter of law. Consequently,
First Option’s Motion to Dismiss Count V shall be denied.
3. 	93A Claims (Count VI)
First Option argues that Perez’s claim of violations of M.G.L. c. 93A, § 2 fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Chapter 93A, § 2 makes “unfair or deceptive acts in the
conduct of trade or commerce” unlawful. The statute vests the authority to make rules and
regulations interpreting the provisions of Chapter 93A, § 2 with the Attorney General. One such
regulation declares that:
[i]t is an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a mortgage broker to make any
representation or statement of fact . . . [that] is false or misleading . . . or if the
mortgage broker or lender does not have sufficient information upon which a
reasonable belief in the truth of the statement could be based. Such claims or
representations include . . . the availability, terms, conditions, or charges, incident
to the mortgage transaction and the possibility of refinancing.3
3 940 Mass. Code Regs. 8.06(1). This regulation was in effect when Machado’s conduct allegedly took place.
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 10

9
The thrust of Perez’s 93A claim is that Machado’s statement that he would arrange a
mortgage loan for Perez carrying a monthly payment of $1,200 including principal, interest,
taxes, and insurance was a misrepresentation because Perez ultimately received mortgage loans
carrying monthly payments of $2,481. First Option argues that this allegation fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted because there is no information to suggest that Perez
would not have qualified for such a loan. However, whether or not Perez would have qualified
for a mortgage carrying a monthly payment of $1,200 is not determinative because Perez has
pled facts alleging that Machado represented he would arrange a mortgage loan with a fixed
interest rate carrying a monthly payment of $1,200. It is undisputed that Perez never received
such a loan. Specifically, Perez received mortgage loans with adjustable interest rates that
required payments of more than double the amount represented by Machado. Therefore, Perez’s
allegations establish a “plausible” claim that, if proved, would “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” for Machado’s false representations as to the “availability, terms, conditions,
or charges incident to the mortgage transaction.” 940 Mass. Code Regs. 8.06(1). Consequently,
First Option’s Motion to Dismiss Count VI shall be denied.
4. 	Attorney’s Fees (Count VII)
Attorney’s fees are a potential remedy available for violations of Chapter 93A. The
Court treats this count as a remedy sought for Count VI, which the Court does not dismiss.
Therefore, First Option’s Motion to Dismiss Count VII shall be denied.
C. 	Abstention
DBNT requests that the Court abstain from hearing Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs make no
argument in opposition to this request. “[I]n the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity
with State courts or respect for State law [the bankruptcy courts may] . . . abstain[] from hearing
a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.” 28
U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1). Among the factors for the Court to consider when faced with a request for
abstention include “the interests of judicial economy,” In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised
Price Antitrust Litig., 456 F. Supp.2d 13, 161 (D. Me. 2006) (citing In re Colarusso, 382 F.3d
51, 57 (1st Cir. 2004)) and “minimiz[ing] additional expense[s] to the parties.” In re Toro, 185
B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1995). Here, the Court has determined that it does not have
jurisdiction to hear Nieves’ claims. Nieves’ claims are based upon the same exact set of facts as
Perez’s claims. If the Court were to deny DBNT’s request for abstention, the end result would
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 10

10
be that Perez’s claims would proceed in this Court, while Nieves’ claims would proceed in state
court. Such a result would turn a blind eye to “the interests of judicial economy” and would
substantially increase the parties’ litigation expenses. Accordingly, the Court will abstain from
hearing all of Plaintiffs’ claims to promote the interests of judicial economy and to minimize the
parties’ litigation expenses.
CONCLUSION
First Option’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED with respect to Nieves’ Counts II,
V, VI, and VII.
DBNT’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED with respect to Perez’s Count III.
First Option’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED with respect to Perez’s Counts V,
VI, and VII.
Perez’s voluntary dismissal is hereby GRANTED without prejudice with respect to
Count IV.
The Court will abstain from deciding all of Plaintiffs’ claims.
A separate order will issue.
Dated: September 3, 2008 	By the Court,
________________________
Joel B. Rosenthal
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Case 08-04081 Doc 37 Filed 09/03/08 Entered 09/03/08 11:05:07 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 10