1:06-ap-01090•V2R, LLC et al v. Schneider
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Case 06-01090 Doc 20 Filed 05/23/06 Entered 05/23/06 11:41:13 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 4
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INFORMATION Case 06-01090 Doc 20 Filed 05/23/06 Entered 05/23/06 11:41:13 Document UNITED STATES FC DISTRICT OF LOL OM OD ODO ODL OD DL OD OL OD OD OL Od PD OD OD OD PE OD Pd Pd Pd Pred Pd Ps In re DANIEL SCHNEIDER, Debtor ed ad id ed ed od ed ded aie eae V2R, LLC, and SPECIAL SITUATIONS FUND, IV, LLC, Plaintiff Vv. DANIEL SCHNEIDER, Defendant OO OD ON OND DOL RY OD OS OD OD OD dd PD Od Od Od dd OD nd Pd Pd Ped Pd O Desc Main Page 1 of 4 BANKRUPTCY COURT MR THE MASSACHUSETTS oda dade da Chapter 7 Case No. 05-2382-JNF PY et Adv. P. No. 06-01090 RDER Upon consideration of 1) the threetcount Complaint filed in the above-referenced proceeding;' 2)the Debtor's “Motion to Dig miss complaint For failure to State a claim upon ' The counts include Count I: Fraud; Count II: Breach of Fiduciary Duties; and Count III: Embezzlement or Larceny. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (4). In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that on M ay 6, 2005 they commenced an action in Seminole County, Florida, alleging, among other things, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of contract against the July 18, 2005, the Plaintiffs and the Debtot was approved by the state court on Augu Debtor. Approximately six weeks later, on entered into a Settlement Agreement, which bt 2, 2005. The Plaintiffs stated in their AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT GPO Case 06-01090 Doc20 Filed 05/23/06 Entered 05/23/06 11:41:13 Desc Main Document Page 2 of 4 which relief can be granted;” 3) the “Creditors, V2R, LLC, and Special Situations Fund IV, LLC’s Opposition in Response to the Dé btor’s Motion to Dismiss” and accompanying Memorandum; 3) the representations and arguments made at the April 24, 2006 hearing on the Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss; 4) the Debtors [sic] Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss; 5) the Creditors, V2R, LLC, and Special Situations Fund IV, LLC’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Re sponse to Debtor’s Memorandum of Law; 6) the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003), and Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979);? 7 ) the decision in In re Jacobs, 243 B.R. 836, 847 n.5 Complaint the following: “Mr. Schneider failed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement and otherwise defaulted pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. As such, on or about September 12, 2005, in the amount of $1,418,511.00.” a Final Judgment was entered against Debtor *In Archer v. Warner, the Supreme Court stated in pertinent part the following: [T]he Court's basic reasoning in Brown applies here. The Court pointed out that the Bankruptcy Code’s no originally covered “only ‘judgmen 99 S.Ct. 2205. Congress later chang such “liabilities.” Ibid. This chang ndischargeability provision had ts’ sounding in fraud.” 442 U.S., at 138, ed the language so that it covered all e indicated that “Congress intended the fullest possible inquiry” to ensure that “all debts arising out of” fraud are “excepted from discharge,” no U.S.C. § 523(a) (current “any debt” matter what their form. Ibid.; see also 11 language). Congress also intended to allow the relevant determination (whether a debt arises out of fraud) to take place in bankruptcy court, not to force it to occur earlier in state court at a time when nondischargeability concerns “are not directly in issue and neither party has a full incentive td litigate them.” Brown, 442 U.S., at 134, 99 S.Ct. 2205. The only difference we can find between Brown and the present case consists of the fact that the relevant debt here is embodied in a settlement, not in a stipulation and consent judgment. But we do not see how that difference could prove determinative. The dischargeability provision applies to all debts that ‘ 2205; see also Cohen v. de la Cruz, 3 L.Ed.2d 341 (1998). A debt embodi aris[e] out of” fraud. Id., at 138, 99 S.Ct. 23 U.S. 213, 215, 118 S.Ct. 1212, 140 ed in the settlement of a fraud case Case 06-01090 Doc20 Filed 05/23/06 Entered 05/23/06 11:41:13 Desc Main Document (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000)(Florida’s econom! the essence of the complaint involves bread conversion; not breach of contract.”); and Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 complaint we follow, of course, the accepte for failure to state a claim unless it appeat set of facts in support of his claim which 1 denies the Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court finds that the Debtor’: misplaced. The facts alleged by the Plainti Court's decisions in Archer v. Warner and Page 3 of 4 ic loss rule does not bar this proceeding because th of fiduciary duty, larceny, embezzlement and 1 8) the decision of the United States Supreme -46 (1957)(“In appraising the sufficiency of the -d rule that a complaint should not be dismissed ts beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no would entitle him to relief.”), the Court hereby § attempt to distinguish Archer v. Warner is ffs fit squarely within the ambit of the Supreme rownv. Felsen. Similarly, the Debtor’s reliance on res judicata and Florida’s economic | establish that there was a judgment on th “arises” no less “out of” the underl stipulation and consent decree. Pol disputes, like those that favor “rep at issue here than in Brown. See 441 Brown, the doctrine of res judicata underlying claim of fraud, just as t 1469. See supra, at 1465-1466. Despil . what has not been established meant to resolve the issue of fraud for purposes of a later claim of nor word, we can find no significant di now before us. 538 U.S. at 321-22. oss rule are unavailing. The Debtor failed to e merits as a result of the Florida Court’s order ying fraud than a debt embodied ina icies that favor the settlement of ose,” are neither any more nor any less P U.S., at 133-135, 99 S.Ct. 2205. In itself ensured “a blanket release” of the he contractual releases did here, post, at te the dissent’s protests to the contrary, here, as in Brown, is that the parties or, more narrowly, to resolve that issue dischargeability in bankruptcy. Ina fference between Brown and the case Case 06-01090 Doc20 Filed 05/23/06 Entered 05/23/06 11:41:13 Desc Main Document Page 4of4 approving the settlement so as to implicalte the doctrine of res judicata, and the Florida economic loss rule has no application in the context of a nondischargeability complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (a)(4). Jacdbs, 243 B.R. at 847 n.4. °y the Court, - lee how ? [. Fi & —— ~ Joan N. Feeney a x United States Bankruptcy J cee Dated: May ‘~ ; 2006 cc: Theodore W. Connolly, Esq., Daniel Schneider
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