Anctil Plumbing & Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and Robert Anctil

1:05-bk-17495MabMar 10, 2009

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
EASTERN DIVISION
_________________________________________
IN RE
ANCTIL PLUMBING & MECHANICAL Chapter 7
CONTRACTORS, INC., Case No. 05-17495-WCH
DEBTOR
_________________________________________
IN RE
ANCTIL LEASING, LLP, Chapter 7
DEBTOR Case No. 05-21832-WCH
_________________________________________
IN RE
ROBERT ANCTIL, Chapter 7
DEBTOR Case No. 05-21817-WCH
_________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION
The matters before the Court are the Application of Schultz & Company For Allowance of
Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Counsel to the Chapter 11 Debtor Robert Anctil
(the “Individual Fee Application”), the Application of Schultz & Company For Allowance of
Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Counsel to the Chapter 11 Anctil Plumbing &
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (the “Corporate Fee Application”) filed by Gordon N. Schultz and
Schultz & Company (collectively, “Schultz”), and the objections thereto filed by Donald R.
Lassman, the Chapter 7 trustee of the estates of Anctil Plumbing & Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (the
“Corporation”), Anctil Leasing, LLP (“Leasing”), and Robert Anctil (“Anctil”) (collectively, the
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I note, however, that the first Billing Statement contains at least one balance adjustment1
that I cannot link to any service performed. See Docket No. 354, Ex. 1 at 5 ("Previous Balance . .
. $49").
The corrected figures are attached to this decision as Appendix I.2
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“Debtors”), (the “Trustee”). Through his objections, the Trustee asserts that the fees incurred
preparing the Corporate Fee Application are excessive and unreasonable and that fees incurred
during the pendency of Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case prior to its conversion to Chapter 11 are non-
recoverable where he was not employed by the Trustee. For the reasons set forth below, I will
sustain the objections and approve the Individual Fee Application and the Corporate Fee Application
in part.
From the outset, I note that both fee applications are replete with mathematical errors. The
spreadsheets attached to the Corporate Fee Application (the “Spreadsheets”) contain numerous
errors. Although the billing statements attached to the Individual Fee Application (the “Billing
Statements”) were produced using billing software, I am only able to reconcile the services and
expenses listed with each statement’s total and not the running “Balance Due.” The fee applications1
themselves fall victim to miscalculations generated from the time entries, and are also riddled with
clerical and scrivener’s errors. Despite spending over 50 hours preparing both the Corporate Fee
Application and Individual Fee Application, the end result was sloppy and required a considerable
expenditure of the Court’s resources to review and correct. For purposes of this decision, I will
reference only the corrected values as the errors are too pervasive to identify individually.2
II. BACKGROUND
On August 19, 2005, the Corporation filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition. The Corporation
was in the business of providing plumbing and mechanical services to commercial construction
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Anctil originally sought to convert his case to one under Chapter 13, but the Trustee3
objected on the grounds that he exceeded the debt limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) and
was thus ineligible for Chapter 13 relief.
Although the Debtors did not object to the United States Trustee's Motion to Convert, I4
note that a hearing on the matter was continued numerous times over the course of a year to give
the Debtors an opportunity to file a Chapter 11 plan and disclosure statement.
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projects. Leasing filed its Chapter 11 case on October 11, 2005. On November 8, 2005, I granted
a motion to substantively consolidate the two cases. Anctil’s individual case was filed under Chapter
7 on October 13, 2005. In January, 2006, Anctil moved to convert his case to Chapter 11 and to
jointly administer his case with the Corporation’s and Leasing’s cases. The motion was granted on3
January 20, 2006, and his case has been treated in parallel to the other two cases. On March 20,
2008, the consolidated case, as well as Anctil’s jointly administered case, was converted to Chapter
7 upon an uncontested motion filed by the United States Trustee.4
Schultz filed each case on behalf of the Debtors. He was subsequently employed as counsel
for the Corporation on September 19, 2005, and as counsel to Anctil on April 4, 2006. A Disclosure
of Compensation Paid to Schultz was attached to each application for employment. The disclosure
attached to the application for employment in the Corporation’s case (the “Corporate 2016(b)
Disclosure”) indicated that Schultz received a pre-petition retainer of $20,000 (the “Pre-Petition
Retainer”), from which $3,500 had been withdrawn for pre-petition services and $893 for the filing
fee. Similarly, the disclosure attached to the application for employment in Anctil’s case (the
“Individual 2016(b) Disclosure”) revealed that Schultz had received $1,509 prior to the petition date,
and that Anctil agreed to pay a retainer of $8,400 for services to be rendered in connection with the
Chapter 11 proceeding, $3,400 of which he had already paid. On May 9, 2008, Schultz amended the
Individual 2016(b) Disclosure to reflect that $5,000 was inadvertently paid to Schultz from the
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Presumably, this $5,000 was the unpaid balance of the pre-petition retainer that Schultz5
received post-petition. As no further disclosures were filed, it is unclear whether Schultz ever
received the full amount promised.
Both were filed in the Corporation’s case. See Docket Nos. 256 and 257.6
See Lassman v. Schultz, Adv. P. No. 08-1131.7
Lamie v. United States, 540 U.S. 526 (2004).8
4
Corporation’s funds and were remitted to the Trustee. Presently, the balance of either retainer is5
unclear.
On February 19, 2008, four days after the United States Trustee filed her Amended Motion
to Convert, the Corporation paid Schultz $2,500 by a check drawn from the Corporation’s
debtor-in-possession account (the “Chapter 7 Retainer”). Schultz subsequently filed two statements
disclosing that the Corporation paid $2,500 to Schultz as a “flat fee retainer,” and that Anctil agreed
to a fee of $2,500, of which nothing was paid. On May 21, 2008, the Trustee filed an adversary6
proceeding seeking turnover under 11 U.S.C. § 542 or recovery of the Chapter 7 Retainer as an
unauthorized post-petition transfer under 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550, asserting that Schultz was not
entitled to be paid from estate funds under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) because he was not employed by
the Trustee. He also sought to surcharge the fees and costs of that proceeding against the balance7
of the Pre-Petition Retainer paid to Schultz or, in the alternative, to surcharge those amounts against
fees to be paid to Schultz in the principal case.
Schultz moved to dismiss the Trustee’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, arguing that the Chapter 7 Retainer was appropriately paid under the “flat fee
retainer exception” recognized by Lamie v. United States and the subsequent decision by Judge8
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Morse v. Ropes & Gray (In re CK Liquidation Corp.), 343 B.R. 376 (D. Mass. 2006).9
11 U.S.C. § 541(a).10
Lassman v. Schultz (In re Anctil Plumbing & Mech. Contractors, Inc.), 394 B.R. 1, 711
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (footnotes omitted).
Because the facts were not in dispute, I treated the motion to dismiss and the Trustee’s12
opposition thereto as cross-motions for summary judgment.
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Gorton of this District in In re CK Liquidation Corp. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, I9
took the matter under advisement. On September 15, 2008, I issued a Memorandum of Decision in
which I stated:
[T]he Chapter 7 Retainer was, with a quiet nod to Lamie, denominated as a flat fee
retainer. This, however, is an inadequate invocation of the exception as the Chapter
7 Retainer had been paid not only pre-conversion, but post-filing, and that makes all
of the difference. When the petition is filed, property of the estate comes into
being. Lamie expressly states that 11 U.S.C. “§ 330(a)(1) does not authorize10
compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds unless they are
employed as authorized by § 327.” While perhaps a bit confusing on its face, this
statement is completely consistent with the previously quoted dicta on which Schultz
relies. The Supreme Court’s conclusion that “[s]ection 330(a)(1) does not prevent
a debtor from engaging counsel before a chapter 7 conversion and paying reasonable
compensation in advance to ensure that the filing is in order,” simply does not mean
that 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) specifically authorizes such a payment from property of
the estate. Rather, it implicitly recognizes that individual debtors may have “property
of the debtor” made up of exempt assets form which they could pay counsel for legal
services performed in advance of a conversion to Chapter 7 while a bankruptcy case
is pending under another chapter.11
Finding Schultz’s position meritless, I denied the motion to dismiss and entered judgment for the
Trustee. Moreover, having found that surcharging the Trustee’s legal fees against the Pre-12
Petitioner Retainer was appropriate, I approved the Trustee’s application for interim fees in the
amount of $4,987.50 on November 4, 2008.
Schultz filed the Corporate Fee Application and Individual Fee Application on November
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See Docket No. 353, Ex. 1-P.13
Docket No. 353 at ¶ 83.14
Docket No. 353, Ex. 1-P.15
Docket No. 353, Ex. 2.16
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24, 2008. Attached to each were copies of time entries, counsels’ biographies, the Corporation’s and
Anctil’s fee agreements, and the orders approving Schultz’s employment in each Chapter 11 case.
Additionally, the Individual Fee Application attached monthly Billing Statements as detailed time
entries, while the Corporate Fee Application relied on the Spreadsheets organized by project
categories.
Through the Corporate Fee Application, Schultz requests allowance of fees in the amount
of $109,060 and reimbursement of expenses of $4,778.71. As part of the fees requested, Schultz
seeks payment of $8,910 for 48.4 hours spent between November 9, 2008, and November 24, 2008,
preparing the Corporate Fee Application. In support of these fees, Schultz explained that these13
services included “time spent by both attorneys and staff to manually segregate and allocate to the
required Project Category and Narrative Sections, using an Excel Spreadsheet, each of the individual
fee charges from each of the Statements regularly sent to the Debtor over the three-year (3) period
of the engagement, and then the actual drafting[,] ECF filing, and service on the Debtor of the Fee
Application.” The attached Spreadsheet relating to these fees provides only a daily breakdown of14
each person’s time and does not describe any discrete tasks performed. Schultz also requests15
reimbursement of the $893 Chapter 11 filing fee despite his prior disclosure that it was paid from
the Pre-Petition Retainer.16
In the Individual Fee Application, Schultz seeks allowance of fees in the amount of
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Although the final Billing Statement reflects a closing date of February 29, 2008, the17
last charge listed was on the November 15, 2007, Billing Statement.
Docket No. 354 at ¶ 4.18
The Trustee also objected to the reimbursement of costs in the amount of $1,298.28 on19
the basis that these expenses were already included in the running balance reflected in the Billing
Statements. Having thoroughly reviewed the Billing Statements and recalculated the figures
therein, the Trustee is correct that the amount requested is miscalculated, but the reason for the
error is unclear. As such, I will sustain the Trustee’s objection.
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$13,972.50 and reimbursement of expenses of $1,278.28 for services rendered in this case from
November 3, 2005, to February 29, 2008. Although not included in the Billing Statements, he17
explained that the total fees requested were increased by $1,375 to include the 3 hours spent
preparing the Individual Fee Application and the estimated 2 hours for the hearing thereon.18
On December 12, 2008, the Trustee filed objections to both fee applications. In his objection
to the Corporate Fee Application, the Trustee asserted that Schultz failed to disclose the exact
balance of the Pre-Petition Retainer, that the Chapter 11 filing fee was already paid from the Pre-
Petition Retainer, and that the fees charged to prepare the Corporate Fee Application are excessive
and unreasonable. With respect to the Individual Fee Application, the Trustee objected to the
recovery of any fees for legal services rendered in Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case. Two days later,19
Schultz filed a single response to both objections conceding an error regarding the Chapter 11 filing
fee, but arguing that the fees incurred in preparing the Corporate Fee Application were reasonable
under the circumstances and that the fees incurred in Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case are recoverable
as “pre-petition services.”
I conducted a hearing on the fee applications and objections thereto on December 17, 2008.
At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Schultz would file an affidavit itemizing receipts and
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disbursements with respect to the Pre-Petitioner Retainer account. At the conclusion of oral
argument, I took the matters under advisement.
III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Trustee
First, the Trustee contends that 26.4 hours of attorney time and 22 hours of paralegal time,
resulting in $8,910 in fees, to prepare a fee application in a small Chapter 11 case is unreasonable
and excessive under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3). He asserts that despite using computerized billing
software, which the Trustee contends automatically categorizes time and expense charges, Schultz
essentially created a new bill from his prior billing statements, namely, the Spreadsheets, to attach
to the Corporate Fee Application. The Trustee argues that preparation of a bill is simply part of the
overhead of practicing law and therefore not compensable. Asserting that a reasonable charge to
review billing worksheets and prepare a fee application in this case should not exceed $1,500, the
Trustee states that he has no objection to allowing Schultz fees in that amount for this task.
Second, the Trustee argues that Schultz’s request for fees incurred in Anctil’s original
Chapter 7 case is barred by Lamie and my prior decision in Lassman v. Schultz. Relying on those
cases, he states that Schultz was not retained by the Trustee and therefore is not entitled to
compensation from the estate for services rendered in the original Chapter 7 case. Moreover, the
Trustee argues that it is irrelevant that the services rendered related to the conversion to Chapter 11
because only those employed under 11 U.S.C. § 327 are entitled to compensation from the estate.
Subject to the condition that Schultz file the stipulated affidavit regarding the Pre-Petition
Retainer, the Trustee does not object to the balance of the fees in either fee application.
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Paragraph two of the [Corporation]’s Application for Authority to Employ Counsel20
Under General Retainer provides in relevant part:
Prior to the commencement of this proceeding, the Debtor engaged Counsel with
respect to certain legal matters, including an assessment of the advisability and
feasibility of restructuring of the Debtor’s financial affairs. The Debtor wishes to
retain Counsel to represent it in these proceedings.
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Schultz
In support of his fees incurred preparing the Corporate Fee Application, Schultz states that
the individual time entries previously entered into his computerized billing system could no longer
be accessed, and therefore categorized, when the Corporate Fee Application was prepared. As such,
he was forced to re-enter and categorize them in a separate spreadsheet in addition to simply drafting
the Corporate Fee Application. Under these circumstances, Schultz argues that approximately three
days to prepare the Corporate Fee Application is not unreasonable. Moreover, even had the
computerized entries been available, he contends that considerably more than $1,500 worth of time
would have been spent reviewing those entries and preparing the Corporate Fee Application given
the number of entries.
With respect to the fees incurred in Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case, Schultz argues that
Lamie is inapposite because no retainer is involved and the services were rendered in contemplation
of conversion to Chapter 11. Schultz contends that these “pre-petition services” related to eligibility
and other pre-filing considerations are within the proper scope of what is accomplished before a
Chapter 11 case is filed and therefore should be compensable. Further, he asserts such services are
evaluated under a reasonableness test rather than a benefit to the estate test. Additionally, Schultz
notes that these services were referenced in the application for employment filed in the Corporation’s
case.20
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Docket No. 362, Ex. 2.
In re Tundra Corp., 243 B.R. 575, 581 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (citing Boston & Maine21
v. Moore, 776 F.2d 2 (1st Cir. 1985); In re Smuggler's Beach Properties, Inc., 149 B.R. 740
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re Bank of New England Corp., 134 B.R. 450 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991), aff'd, 142 B.R. 584 (D. Mass. 1992)) (textual citations omitted); see also In re McMullen,
Case No. 00-10151-WCH, 2009 WL 530296 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 18, 2009) (thoroughly
reviewing a fee application filed by Schultz in a Chapter 13 case).
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IV. DISCUSSION
“The standards for allowance of fees for actual and necessary services and reimbursement
of expenses are well known to practitioners before this Court, and are set forth not only in numerous
decisions in this circuit . . . but in 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(A) as well. These standards will not be
repeated here.”21
A. Fees Incurred During the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases
Despite the Debtors’ conversion to Chapter 7, which resulted from the Corporation’s failure
to secure continued workers’ compensation insurance, Schultz’s services rendered during their
Chapter 11 cases were necessary and beneficial to their estates. Due to his efforts, the Corporation
continued operations as a debtor in possession and generated regular income for Anctil from August,
2005, to March, 2008. With Schultz’s assistance, the Corporation concluded a cash collateral
stipulation with its secured lender, arranged the continuation of credit with the its various suppliers,
and recovered a substantial portion of its outstanding accounts receivable. Schultz also negotiated
settlements of two substantial litigations with Bowdoin Construction Corporation that resulted in the
release of all claims against the Debtors and a $50,000 payment to the Corporation. Additionally,
he expended considerable time negotiating and drafting a combined disclosure statement and plan
of reorganization. I further note that the Trustee does not object to any fees incurred during the
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$12,971.25 (Category A) + $11,895 (Category C) + $19,686.25 (Category D) +22
$7,492.50 (Category E) + $2,427.50 (Category G) + $5,801.25 (Category I) +$14,510 (Category
J) + $19,838.75 (Category L) + $5,527.50 (Category M) = $100,150.
Because Schultz conceded that the Chapter 11 filing fee was included in error, I will23
subtract $893 from the total expenses incurred during the Corporation’s Chapter 11 case.
($4,778.71 - $893 = $3,885.71).
Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538.24
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Debtors’ Chapter 11 cases. As such, I will allow fees in the amount of $100,150 and22
reimbursement of expenses of $3,885.71 with respect to the Corporate Fee Application for services23
rendered between August, 2005, and March 20, 2008. Similarly, I will allow fees in the amount of
$5,522.50 and reimbursement of expenses of $438.54 with respect to the Individual Fee Application
for services incurred between January 20, 2006, and March 20, 2008.
B. Fees Incurred During Anctil’s Original Chapter 7 Case
Whether fees incurred during Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case prior to its conversion to
Chapter 11 are compensable is merely a variation on the same issue I previously ruled on in the
related adversary proceeding Lassman v. Schultz. As stated in that case, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’
attorneys from estate funds unless they are employed under 11 U.S.C. § 327. Schultz disputes the24
applicability of Lamie, and without citing any authority, contends that services rendered pre-
conversion are compensable as “pre-filing services.” This argument is flawed for a number of
reasons.
First, Lamie’s holding is unequivocal. There is no basis to conclude that the language of 11
U.S.C. § 330(a)(1), which the Supreme Court found unambiguous, ceases to apply when debtor’s
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Id. at 534.25
Id.26
11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (“Conversion . . . does not effect a change in the date of the filing of27
the petition”).
In addition to expenses incurred during Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case, I further28
reduced the expenses by $780 as Schultz’s Billing Statements reflect that a filing fee of $780 was
paid from Client funds on February 18, 2006.
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counsel renders services in contemplation of conversion. To the contrary, Lamie expressly states25
that “[u]nless the applicant for compensation is in one of the named classes of persons in the first
part [of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)], the kind of service rendered is irrelevant.” Second, Lamie’s26
holding is not restricted to retainers or post-conversion services. Again, the language of 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(1) extends to all Chapter 7 cases, regardless of if, or when, the case is converted. Third,
Schultz’s argument ignores the fact that conversion of a case from one chapter to another does not
affect the petition date so as to render the conversion a new filing. Although pre-conversion27
services in many cases may be analogous to those performed pre-petition in contemplation of a new
filing, the former are subject to the rules and restrictions imposed by an already pending bankruptcy
case.
Here, it is undisputed that Schultz was not employed in Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case and
therefore, he is not entitled to fees for services rendered during that period. Accordingly, I will
disallow fees in the amount of $7,075 and reimbursement of expenses of $859 for services rendered28
prior to January 20, 2006.
C. Fees Incurred Preparing the Fee Applications
While the Trustee asserts that the $8,910 Schultz incurred preparing the Corporate Fee
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Exhibit 1-P reflects that the Corporate Fee Application was prepared between29
November 9, 2008, and November 24, 2008, over seven months after the Corporation’s case was
converted to Chapter 7. See Docket No. 353, Ex. 1-P. Though not relevant to the outcome, I
further note that Exhibit 1-P does not conform to the Massachusetts Local Bankruptcy Rules
2016-1(a)(1)(C) as each time entry does not identify specific task performed.
See In re CK Liquidation Corp., 343 B.R. at 385.30
Because Schultz is not entitled to compensation for post-conversion services, I need not31
address the issue of whether fees incurred reconstructing billing invoices to conform with the
local rule is compensable or whether the time spent in the present case was excessive and
unreasonable.
See, e.g., In re Bank of New England Corp., 134 B.R. at 467-468; In re Smuggler's32
Beach Properties, Inc., 149 B.R. at 743; In re McMullen, 2009 WL 530296 *28.
13
Application is excessive and unreasonable, he does not consider that the Corporate Fee Application
was prepared after the Debtors’ cases converted to Chapter 7. In effect, Schultz once again seeks29
compensation from the estate for services rendered in a Chapter 7 case in which he was not
employed under 11 U.S.C. § 327. Even though the preparation of the Corporate Fee Application
relates to the prior Chapter 11 case for which Schultz had been duly employed, his employment
under 11 U.S.C. § 327 was terminated on March 20, 2008. As such, for the same reasons stated30
above, I will disallow fees in the amount $8,910 for preparing the Corporate Fee Application.31
Although the Trustee did not object to the fees Schultz incurred preparing the Individual Fee
Application or those estimated would be incurred attending the hearing thereon, I note that these
services are not supported by any time entries as required by the provisions of MLBR 2016-
1(a)(1)(C). It is well established in this district that deficient fee applications are filed at the
applicant’s peril. For this reason alone, I will disallow fees in the amount of $1,375 for services32
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I note that in the absence of detailed time entries, it is unclear whether the Individual33
Fee Application was prepared before or after the re-conversion of Anctil’s case to Chapter 7.
14
rendered preparing the Individual Fee Application and attending the hearing thereon.33
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, I will enter an order:
1. Sustaining the Trustee’s objections;
2. Approving the Corporate Fee Application in part and allowing an interim award of
compensation in the amount of $100,150 and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of
$3,885.71; and
3. Approving the Individual Fee Application in part and allowing an interim award of
compensation in the amount of $5,522.50 and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $438.54.
_______________________________
William C. Hillman
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Dated: March 10, 2009
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Appendix I
Individual Fee Application
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The Corporate Fee Application
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

EASTERN DIVISION
IN RE
ANCTIL PLUMBING & MECHANICAL Chapter 7
CONTRACTORS, INC., Case No. 05-17495-WCH
DEBTOR
IN RE
ANCTIL LEASING, LLP, Chapter 7
DEBTOR Case No. 05-21832-WCH
IN RE
ROBERT ANCTIL, Chapter 7
DEBTOR Case No. 05-21817-WCH

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION

The matters before the Court are the Application of Schultz & Company For Allowance of
Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Counsel to the Chapter 11 Debtor Robert Anctil
(the “Individual Fee Application”), the Application of Schultz & Company For Allowance of
Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses as Counsel to the Chapter 11 Anctil Plumbing &
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (the “Corporate Fee Application”) filed by Gordon N. Schultz and
Schultz & Company (collectively, “Schultz’”), and the objections thereto filed by Donald R.
Lassman, the Chapter 7 trustee of the estates of Anctil Plumbing & Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (the

“Corporation’’), Anctil Leasing, LLP (“Leasing”), and Robert Anctil (“Anctil’’) (collectively, the

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

I note, however, that the first Billing Statement contains at least one balance adjustment1
that I cannot link to any service performed. See Docket No. 354, Ex. 1 at 5 ("Previous Balance . .
. $49").
The corrected figures are attached to this decision as Appendix I.2
2
“Debtors”), (the “Trustee”). Through his objections, the Trustee asserts that the fees incurred
preparing the Corporate Fee Application are excessive and unreasonable and that fees incurred
during the pendency of Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case prior to its conversion to Chapter 11 are non-
recoverable where he was not employed by the Trustee. For the reasons set forth below, I will
sustain the objections and approve the Individual Fee Application and the Corporate Fee Application
in part.
From the outset, I note that both fee applications are replete with mathematical errors. The
spreadsheets attached to the Corporate Fee Application (the “Spreadsheets”) contain numerous
errors. Although the billing statements attached to the Individual Fee Application (the “Billing
Statements”) were produced using billing software, I am only able to reconcile the services and
expenses listed with each statement’s total and not the running “Balance Due.” The fee applications1
themselves fall victim to miscalculations generated from the time entries, and are also riddled with
clerical and scrivener’s errors. Despite spending over 50 hours preparing both the Corporate Fee
Application and Individual Fee Application, the end result was sloppy and required a considerable
expenditure of the Court’s resources to review and correct. For purposes of this decision, I will
reference only the corrected values as the errors are too pervasive to identify individually.2
II. BACKGROUND
On August 19, 2005, the Corporation filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition. The Corporation
was in the business of providing plumbing and mechanical services to commercial construction
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Anctil originally sought to convert his case to one under Chapter 13, but the Trustee3
objected on the grounds that he exceeded the debt limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) and
was thus ineligible for Chapter 13 relief.
Although the Debtors did not object to the United States Trustee's Motion to Convert, I4
note that a hearing on the matter was continued numerous times over the course of a year to give
the Debtors an opportunity to file a Chapter 11 plan and disclosure statement.
3
projects. Leasing filed its Chapter 11 case on October 11, 2005. On November 8, 2005, I granted
a motion to substantively consolidate the two cases. Anctil’s individual case was filed under Chapter
7 on October 13, 2005. In January, 2006, Anctil moved to convert his case to Chapter 11 and to
jointly administer his case with the Corporation’s and Leasing’s cases. The motion was granted on3
January 20, 2006, and his case has been treated in parallel to the other two cases. On March 20,
2008, the consolidated case, as well as Anctil’s jointly administered case, was converted to Chapter
7 upon an uncontested motion filed by the United States Trustee.4
Schultz filed each case on behalf of the Debtors. He was subsequently employed as counsel
for the Corporation on September 19, 2005, and as counsel to Anctil on April 4, 2006. A Disclosure
of Compensation Paid to Schultz was attached to each application for employment. The disclosure
attached to the application for employment in the Corporation’s case (the “Corporate 2016(b)
Disclosure”) indicated that Schultz received a pre-petition retainer of $20,000 (the “Pre-Petition
Retainer”), from which $3,500 had been withdrawn for pre-petition services and $893 for the filing
fee. Similarly, the disclosure attached to the application for employment in Anctil’s case (the
“Individual 2016(b) Disclosure”) revealed that Schultz had received $1,509 prior to the petition date,
and that Anctil agreed to pay a retainer of $8,400 for services to be rendered in connection with the
Chapter 11 proceeding, $3,400 of which he had already paid. On May 9, 2008, Schultz amended the
Individual 2016(b) Disclosure to reflect that $5,000 was inadvertently paid to Schultz from the
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Presumably, this $5,000 was the unpaid balance of the pre-petition retainer that Schultz5
received post-petition. As no further disclosures were filed, it is unclear whether Schultz ever
received the full amount promised.
Both were filed in the Corporation’s case. See Docket Nos. 256 and 257.6
See Lassman v. Schultz, Adv. P. No. 08-1131.7
Lamie v. United States, 540 U.S. 526 (2004).8
4
Corporation’s funds and were remitted to the Trustee. Presently, the balance of either retainer is5
unclear.
On February 19, 2008, four days after the United States Trustee filed her Amended Motion
to Convert, the Corporation paid Schultz $2,500 by a check drawn from the Corporation’s
debtor-in-possession account (the “Chapter 7 Retainer”). Schultz subsequently filed two statements
disclosing that the Corporation paid $2,500 to Schultz as a “flat fee retainer,” and that Anctil agreed
to a fee of $2,500, of which nothing was paid. On May 21, 2008, the Trustee filed an adversary6
proceeding seeking turnover under 11 U.S.C. § 542 or recovery of the Chapter 7 Retainer as an
unauthorized post-petition transfer under 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550, asserting that Schultz was not
entitled to be paid from estate funds under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) because he was not employed by
the Trustee. He also sought to surcharge the fees and costs of that proceeding against the balance7
of the Pre-Petition Retainer paid to Schultz or, in the alternative, to surcharge those amounts against
fees to be paid to Schultz in the principal case.
Schultz moved to dismiss the Trustee’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, arguing that the Chapter 7 Retainer was appropriately paid under the “flat fee
retainer exception” recognized by Lamie v. United States and the subsequent decision by Judge8
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Morse v. Ropes & Gray (In re CK Liquidation Corp.), 343 B.R. 376 (D. Mass. 2006).9
11 U.S.C. § 541(a).10
Lassman v. Schultz (In re Anctil Plumbing & Mech. Contractors, Inc.), 394 B.R. 1, 711
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (footnotes omitted).
Because the facts were not in dispute, I treated the motion to dismiss and the Trustee’s12
opposition thereto as cross-motions for summary judgment.
5
Gorton of this District in In re CK Liquidation Corp. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, I9
took the matter under advisement. On September 15, 2008, I issued a Memorandum of Decision in
which I stated:
[T]he Chapter 7 Retainer was, with a quiet nod to Lamie, denominated as a flat fee
retainer. This, however, is an inadequate invocation of the exception as the Chapter
7 Retainer had been paid not only pre-conversion, but post-filing, and that makes all
of the difference. When the petition is filed, property of the estate comes into
being. Lamie expressly states that 11 U.S.C. “§ 330(a)(1) does not authorize10
compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds unless they are
employed as authorized by § 327.” While perhaps a bit confusing on its face, this
statement is completely consistent with the previously quoted dicta on which Schultz
relies. The Supreme Court’s conclusion that “[s]ection 330(a)(1) does not prevent
a debtor from engaging counsel before a chapter 7 conversion and paying reasonable
compensation in advance to ensure that the filing is in order,” simply does not mean
that 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) specifically authorizes such a payment from property of
the estate. Rather, it implicitly recognizes that individual debtors may have “property
of the debtor” made up of exempt assets form which they could pay counsel for legal
services performed in advance of a conversion to Chapter 7 while a bankruptcy case
is pending under another chapter.11
Finding Schultz’s position meritless, I denied the motion to dismiss and entered judgment for the
Trustee. Moreover, having found that surcharging the Trustee’s legal fees against the Pre-12
Petitioner Retainer was appropriate, I approved the Trustee’s application for interim fees in the
amount of $4,987.50 on November 4, 2008.
Schultz filed the Corporate Fee Application and Individual Fee Application on November
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See Docket No. 353, Ex. 1-P.13
Docket No. 353 at ¶ 83.14
Docket No. 353, Ex. 1-P.15
Docket No. 353, Ex. 2.16
6
24, 2008. Attached to each were copies of time entries, counsels’ biographies, the Corporation’s and
Anctil’s fee agreements, and the orders approving Schultz’s employment in each Chapter 11 case.
Additionally, the Individual Fee Application attached monthly Billing Statements as detailed time
entries, while the Corporate Fee Application relied on the Spreadsheets organized by project
categories.
Through the Corporate Fee Application, Schultz requests allowance of fees in the amount
of $109,060 and reimbursement of expenses of $4,778.71. As part of the fees requested, Schultz
seeks payment of $8,910 for 48.4 hours spent between November 9, 2008, and November 24, 2008,
preparing the Corporate Fee Application. In support of these fees, Schultz explained that these13
services included “time spent by both attorneys and staff to manually segregate and allocate to the
required Project Category and Narrative Sections, using an Excel Spreadsheet, each of the individual
fee charges from each of the Statements regularly sent to the Debtor over the three-year (3) period
of the engagement, and then the actual drafting[,] ECF filing, and service on the Debtor of the Fee
Application.” The attached Spreadsheet relating to these fees provides only a daily breakdown of14
each person’s time and does not describe any discrete tasks performed. Schultz also requests15
reimbursement of the $893 Chapter 11 filing fee despite his prior disclosure that it was paid from
the Pre-Petition Retainer.16
In the Individual Fee Application, Schultz seeks allowance of fees in the amount of
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Although the final Billing Statement reflects a closing date of February 29, 2008, the17
last charge listed was on the November 15, 2007, Billing Statement.
Docket No. 354 at ¶ 4.18
The Trustee also objected to the reimbursement of costs in the amount of $1,298.28 on19
the basis that these expenses were already included in the running balance reflected in the Billing
Statements. Having thoroughly reviewed the Billing Statements and recalculated the figures
therein, the Trustee is correct that the amount requested is miscalculated, but the reason for the
error is unclear. As such, I will sustain the Trustee’s objection.
7
$13,972.50 and reimbursement of expenses of $1,278.28 for services rendered in this case from
November 3, 2005, to February 29, 2008. Although not included in the Billing Statements, he17
explained that the total fees requested were increased by $1,375 to include the 3 hours spent
preparing the Individual Fee Application and the estimated 2 hours for the hearing thereon.18
On December 12, 2008, the Trustee filed objections to both fee applications. In his objection
to the Corporate Fee Application, the Trustee asserted that Schultz failed to disclose the exact
balance of the Pre-Petition Retainer, that the Chapter 11 filing fee was already paid from the Pre-
Petition Retainer, and that the fees charged to prepare the Corporate Fee Application are excessive
and unreasonable. With respect to the Individual Fee Application, the Trustee objected to the
recovery of any fees for legal services rendered in Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case. Two days later,19
Schultz filed a single response to both objections conceding an error regarding the Chapter 11 filing
fee, but arguing that the fees incurred in preparing the Corporate Fee Application were reasonable
under the circumstances and that the fees incurred in Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case are recoverable
as “pre-petition services.”
I conducted a hearing on the fee applications and objections thereto on December 17, 2008.
At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Schultz would file an affidavit itemizing receipts and
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8
disbursements with respect to the Pre-Petitioner Retainer account. At the conclusion of oral
argument, I took the matters under advisement.
III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Trustee
First, the Trustee contends that 26.4 hours of attorney time and 22 hours of paralegal time,
resulting in $8,910 in fees, to prepare a fee application in a small Chapter 11 case is unreasonable
and excessive under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3). He asserts that despite using computerized billing
software, which the Trustee contends automatically categorizes time and expense charges, Schultz
essentially created a new bill from his prior billing statements, namely, the Spreadsheets, to attach
to the Corporate Fee Application. The Trustee argues that preparation of a bill is simply part of the
overhead of practicing law and therefore not compensable. Asserting that a reasonable charge to
review billing worksheets and prepare a fee application in this case should not exceed $1,500, the
Trustee states that he has no objection to allowing Schultz fees in that amount for this task.
Second, the Trustee argues that Schultz’s request for fees incurred in Anctil’s original
Chapter 7 case is barred by Lamie and my prior decision in Lassman v. Schultz. Relying on those
cases, he states that Schultz was not retained by the Trustee and therefore is not entitled to
compensation from the estate for services rendered in the original Chapter 7 case. Moreover, the
Trustee argues that it is irrelevant that the services rendered related to the conversion to Chapter 11
because only those employed under 11 U.S.C. § 327 are entitled to compensation from the estate.
Subject to the condition that Schultz file the stipulated affidavit regarding the Pre-Petition
Retainer, the Trustee does not object to the balance of the fees in either fee application.
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Paragraph two of the [Corporation]’s Application for Authority to Employ Counsel20
Under General Retainer provides in relevant part:
Prior to the commencement of this proceeding, the Debtor engaged Counsel with
respect to certain legal matters, including an assessment of the advisability and
feasibility of restructuring of the Debtor’s financial affairs. The Debtor wishes to
retain Counsel to represent it in these proceedings.
9
Schultz
In support of his fees incurred preparing the Corporate Fee Application, Schultz states that
the individual time entries previously entered into his computerized billing system could no longer
be accessed, and therefore categorized, when the Corporate Fee Application was prepared. As such,
he was forced to re-enter and categorize them in a separate spreadsheet in addition to simply drafting
the Corporate Fee Application. Under these circumstances, Schultz argues that approximately three
days to prepare the Corporate Fee Application is not unreasonable. Moreover, even had the
computerized entries been available, he contends that considerably more than $1,500 worth of time
would have been spent reviewing those entries and preparing the Corporate Fee Application given
the number of entries.
With respect to the fees incurred in Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case, Schultz argues that
Lamie is inapposite because no retainer is involved and the services were rendered in contemplation
of conversion to Chapter 11. Schultz contends that these “pre-petition services” related to eligibility
and other pre-filing considerations are within the proper scope of what is accomplished before a
Chapter 11 case is filed and therefore should be compensable. Further, he asserts such services are
evaluated under a reasonableness test rather than a benefit to the estate test. Additionally, Schultz
notes that these services were referenced in the application for employment filed in the Corporation’s
case.20
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Docket No. 362, Ex. 2.
In re Tundra Corp., 243 B.R. 575, 581 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (citing Boston & Maine21
v. Moore, 776 F.2d 2 (1st Cir. 1985); In re Smuggler's Beach Properties, Inc., 149 B.R. 740
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re Bank of New England Corp., 134 B.R. 450 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991), aff'd, 142 B.R. 584 (D. Mass. 1992)) (textual citations omitted); see also In re McMullen,
Case No. 00-10151-WCH, 2009 WL 530296 (Bankr. D. Mass. Feb. 18, 2009) (thoroughly
reviewing a fee application filed by Schultz in a Chapter 13 case).
10
IV. DISCUSSION
“The standards for allowance of fees for actual and necessary services and reimbursement
of expenses are well known to practitioners before this Court, and are set forth not only in numerous
decisions in this circuit . . . but in 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(A) as well. These standards will not be
repeated here.”21
A. Fees Incurred During the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases
Despite the Debtors’ conversion to Chapter 7, which resulted from the Corporation’s failure
to secure continued workers’ compensation insurance, Schultz’s services rendered during their
Chapter 11 cases were necessary and beneficial to their estates. Due to his efforts, the Corporation
continued operations as a debtor in possession and generated regular income for Anctil from August,
2005, to March, 2008. With Schultz’s assistance, the Corporation concluded a cash collateral
stipulation with its secured lender, arranged the continuation of credit with the its various suppliers,
and recovered a substantial portion of its outstanding accounts receivable. Schultz also negotiated
settlements of two substantial litigations with Bowdoin Construction Corporation that resulted in the
release of all claims against the Debtors and a $50,000 payment to the Corporation. Additionally,
he expended considerable time negotiating and drafting a combined disclosure statement and plan
of reorganization. I further note that the Trustee does not object to any fees incurred during the
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$12,971.25 (Category A) + $11,895 (Category C) + $19,686.25 (Category D) +22
$7,492.50 (Category E) + $2,427.50 (Category G) + $5,801.25 (Category I) +$14,510 (Category
J) + $19,838.75 (Category L) + $5,527.50 (Category M) = $100,150.
Because Schultz conceded that the Chapter 11 filing fee was included in error, I will23
subtract $893 from the total expenses incurred during the Corporation’s Chapter 11 case.
($4,778.71 - $893 = $3,885.71).
Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538.24
11
Debtors’ Chapter 11 cases. As such, I will allow fees in the amount of $100,150 and22
reimbursement of expenses of $3,885.71 with respect to the Corporate Fee Application for services23
rendered between August, 2005, and March 20, 2008. Similarly, I will allow fees in the amount of
$5,522.50 and reimbursement of expenses of $438.54 with respect to the Individual Fee Application
for services incurred between January 20, 2006, and March 20, 2008.
B. Fees Incurred During Anctil’s Original Chapter 7 Case
Whether fees incurred during Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case prior to its conversion to
Chapter 11 are compensable is merely a variation on the same issue I previously ruled on in the
related adversary proceeding Lassman v. Schultz. As stated in that case, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’
attorneys from estate funds unless they are employed under 11 U.S.C. § 327. Schultz disputes the24
applicability of Lamie, and without citing any authority, contends that services rendered pre-
conversion are compensable as “pre-filing services.” This argument is flawed for a number of
reasons.
First, Lamie’s holding is unequivocal. There is no basis to conclude that the language of 11
U.S.C. § 330(a)(1), which the Supreme Court found unambiguous, ceases to apply when debtor’s
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Id. at 534.25
Id.26
11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (“Conversion . . . does not effect a change in the date of the filing of27
the petition”).
In addition to expenses incurred during Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case, I further28
reduced the expenses by $780 as Schultz’s Billing Statements reflect that a filing fee of $780 was
paid from Client funds on February 18, 2006.
12
counsel renders services in contemplation of conversion. To the contrary, Lamie expressly states25
that “[u]nless the applicant for compensation is in one of the named classes of persons in the first
part [of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)], the kind of service rendered is irrelevant.” Second, Lamie’s26
holding is not restricted to retainers or post-conversion services. Again, the language of 11 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(1) extends to all Chapter 7 cases, regardless of if, or when, the case is converted. Third,
Schultz’s argument ignores the fact that conversion of a case from one chapter to another does not
affect the petition date so as to render the conversion a new filing. Although pre-conversion27
services in many cases may be analogous to those performed pre-petition in contemplation of a new
filing, the former are subject to the rules and restrictions imposed by an already pending bankruptcy
case.
Here, it is undisputed that Schultz was not employed in Anctil’s original Chapter 7 case and
therefore, he is not entitled to fees for services rendered during that period. Accordingly, I will
disallow fees in the amount of $7,075 and reimbursement of expenses of $859 for services rendered28
prior to January 20, 2006.
C. Fees Incurred Preparing the Fee Applications
While the Trustee asserts that the $8,910 Schultz incurred preparing the Corporate Fee
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Exhibit 1-P reflects that the Corporate Fee Application was prepared between29
November 9, 2008, and November 24, 2008, over seven months after the Corporation’s case was
converted to Chapter 7. See Docket No. 353, Ex. 1-P. Though not relevant to the outcome, I
further note that Exhibit 1-P does not conform to the Massachusetts Local Bankruptcy Rules
2016-1(a)(1)(C) as each time entry does not identify specific task performed.
See In re CK Liquidation Corp., 343 B.R. at 385.30
Because Schultz is not entitled to compensation for post-conversion services, I need not31
address the issue of whether fees incurred reconstructing billing invoices to conform with the
local rule is compensable or whether the time spent in the present case was excessive and
unreasonable.
See, e.g., In re Bank of New England Corp., 134 B.R. at 467-468; In re Smuggler's32
Beach Properties, Inc., 149 B.R. at 743; In re McMullen, 2009 WL 530296 *28.
13
Application is excessive and unreasonable, he does not consider that the Corporate Fee Application
was prepared after the Debtors’ cases converted to Chapter 7. In effect, Schultz once again seeks29
compensation from the estate for services rendered in a Chapter 7 case in which he was not
employed under 11 U.S.C. § 327. Even though the preparation of the Corporate Fee Application
relates to the prior Chapter 11 case for which Schultz had been duly employed, his employment
under 11 U.S.C. § 327 was terminated on March 20, 2008. As such, for the same reasons stated30
above, I will disallow fees in the amount $8,910 for preparing the Corporate Fee Application.31
Although the Trustee did not object to the fees Schultz incurred preparing the Individual Fee
Application or those estimated would be incurred attending the hearing thereon, I note that these
services are not supported by any time entries as required by the provisions of MLBR 2016-
1(a)(1)(C). It is well established in this district that deficient fee applications are filed at the
applicant’s peril. For this reason alone, I will disallow fees in the amount of $1,375 for services32
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I note that in the absence of detailed time entries, it is unclear whether the Individual33
Fee Application was prepared before or after the re-conversion of Anctil’s case to Chapter 7.
14
rendered preparing the Individual Fee Application and attending the hearing thereon.33
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, I will enter an order:
1. Sustaining the Trustee’s objections;
2. Approving the Corporate Fee Application in part and allowing an interim award of
compensation in the amount of $100,150 and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of
$3,885.71; and
3. Approving the Individual Fee Application in part and allowing an interim award of
compensation in the amount of $5,522.50 and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $438.54.
_______________________________
William C. Hillman
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Dated: March 10, 2009
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15
Appendix I
Individual Fee Application
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Case 05-17495 Doc 393 Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main Document Page 16 of 30
EGC
0.5
$175.00
$87.50
12/29/2005
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
EGC
0.4
$175.00
$70.00
1/3/2006
GNS
2
$275.00
$550.00
1/4/2006
GNS
0.1
$275.00
$27.50
GNS
0.6
$275.00
$165.00
EGC
1.3
$175.00
$227.50
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
1/5/2005
EGC
1.8
$175.00
$315.00
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
EGC
0.8
$175.00
$140.00
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
EGC
0.4
$175.00
$70.00
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
EGC
0.5
$175.00
$87.50
1/6/2006
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
1/10/2006
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
1/11/2006
GNS
0.3
$275.00
$82.50
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
1/12/2006
EGC
1.3
$175.00
$227.50
1/17/2006
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
1/18/2006
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
1/19/2006
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
Subtotal of Pre-Conversion Services:
$7,075.00
1/27/2006
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
1/30/2006
EGC
1.1
$175.00
$192.50
16

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2/6/2006
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
2/20/2006
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
2/21/2006
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
2/22/2006
GNS
2.5
$275.00
$687.50
2/24/2006
EGC
0.3
$175.00
$52.50
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
2/28/2006
EGC
0.4
$175.00
$70.00
3/2/2006
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
3/10/2006
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
3/20/2006
EGC
0.5
$175.00
$87.50
3/24/2006
EGC
1.6
$175.00
$280.00
3/28/2006
EGC
0.6
$175.00
$105.00
3/30/2006
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
5/4/2006
PARA
0.1
$75.00
$7.50
PARA
0.1
$75.00
$7.50
5/8/2006
PARA
0.1
$75.00
$7.50
6/6/2006
EGC
0.4
$175.00
$70.00
6/20/2006
EGC
0.5
$175.00
$87.50
7/7/2006
GNS
0.3
$275.00
$82.50
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
8/10/2006
EGC
0.9
$175.00
$157.50
8/18/2006
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
8/21/2006
EGC
0.8
$175.00
$140.00
8/25/2006
PARA
1
$75.00
$75.00
EGC
0.5
$175.00
$87.50
8/28/2006
GNS
1
$275.00
$275.00
8/29/2006
EGC
2.1
$175.00
$367.50
8/31/2006
EGC
0.4
$175.00
$70.00
9/5/2006
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
17

Case 05-17495 Doc 393 Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main Document Page 18 of 30
9/7/2006
EGC
1.3
$175.00
$227.50
9/8/2006
EGC
0.4
$175.00
$70.00
9/11/2006
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
9/12/2006
EGC
0.4
$175.00
$70.00
9/14/2006
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
9/18/2006
EGC
0.6
$175.00
$105.00
9/25/2006
EGC
0.9
$175.00
$157.50
9/26/2006
EGC
0.2
$175.00
$35.00
10/1/2006
PARA
1.5
$75.00
$112.50
10/3/2006
EGC
0.4
$175.00
$70.00
10/5/2006
EGC
0.1
$175.00
$17.50
10/6/2006
PARA
0.2
$75.00
$15.00
PARA
0.3
$75.00
$22.50
11/20/2006
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
11/21/2006
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
GNS
0.3
$275.00
$82.50
11/22/2006
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
GNS
0.5
$275.00
$137.50
11/27/2006
GNS
0.5
$275.00
$137.50
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
GNS
0.2
$275.00
$55.00
11/28/2006
GNS
1
$275.00
$275.00
Subtotal of Chapter 11 Services:
$5,522.50
Unknown
GNS
3
$275.00
$825.00
GNS
2
$275.00
$550.00
Subtotal of Post-Conversion Services:
$1,375.00
Total Fees Requested:
$13,972.50
Fee Application Total:
$14,539.78
Error (Fee Application - Total Request):
$567.28
18

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main
Document Page 19 of 30

Reduction for Pre-Conversion Services: $7,075.00
Reduction for Past-Corversion Sennces: $1,375.00

Total Fee Reduction: $8,450.00

Total Fees Allowed: $5,

an
in
re
te
in
S

Expenses
$35.00 *
$3.00 *
$5.00 *
£15.50|*
$5.00)*
$780.00)*
$1.50
$16.00
$6.10
$16.24 *
$21.75
$11.12
$9.50
$2.85
$6.36
$23.75
$22.62
$1.00
$50.75
bo.49
$234.25
$21.50
$9.00

Total Expenses Requested: $1,298.28

Reduction for Pre-Conversion Expensi $a. 74

Total Allowed Expenses: $438.54

19

20
The Corporate Fee Application
Case 05-17495 Doc 393 Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main
Document Page 20 of 30

Document

Exlubit 1-D

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main
Page 21 of 30

Professional Time Rate Total

GMS 5.5 $2i5.00 $1,512.50
EGC 0.1 $175.00 $17.50
PARA 0 £FS.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-D Total: $1,430.00

Exhibit 1-E

Tmitial Time Rate Total
GMS 25.85 $275.00 $7,108.75
EGC 427 $175.00 $7,472.50
PARA 8.1 £FS..00 $607 40
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-F Total: $15,188.75

Exhibit 1-F

Tnitial Time Rate Total
GMS 0.6 $75.00 $1645.00
EGC 0.6 $175.00 $105.00
PARA 14 75.00 $112.40
JEP iN) $175.00 $00
Exhibit 1-F Total: $382.50

Exlubit 1-G

Professional Time Rate Total
GMS 13 $275.00 $3,575.00
EGC 3 $175.00 $525.00

PARA 0.2 £75.00 $14.00
JEP 0 £175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-G Total $4,115.00

21

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main

Document Page 22 of 30
Exlubit 1-H
Initial Time Rate Total
ols 1 $275.00 $275.00
EGO 0 $175.00 $0.00
PARA 0 $75.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-H Total $275.00
Exlubit 1-I
Professional Time Rate Total
OMS 0.1 $275.00 fe? 50
EGC 1.6 $1745.00 $280.00
PARA 0 $75.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-I Total: $307 50
Exlabit 1-J
Professional Time Rate Total
Gh 13.5 $275.00 $3,822.50
EGC 1.6 $175.00 $280.00
PARA 14 $75.00 $112.50
JEP 0 $1745.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-J Total: $4,215.00
Exlubit 1-E
Professional Time Rate Total
ols 1 $275.00 $275.00
EGC pet $175.00 $1,347.50
PARA 0 $75.00 $0.00
JEP 0 £175.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-E Total: $1,622.50

22

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main
Document Page 23 of 30

Exlabit 1-L
Professional Time Rate Total
ols 3.9 $275.00 $1,072.50
EGO 0 $175.00 $O.00
PARA 0 $74.00 £o.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-L Total: $1,072.50
Exlabit 1-M
Initial Time Rate Total
OMS 1 $275.00 $275.00
EGC 0 $1745.00 £o.00
PARA 0 $745.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-M Total: $275.00
Exlabit 1-N
Professional Time Rate Total
Gh 22 $2745.00 $605.00
EGC 3.1 $175.00 $542 50
PARA 0 £75.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $1745.00 £o.00
Exlubit 1-N Total: $1,147.50
Exlubit 1-0
Professional Time Rate Total
ols 0.6 $275.00 $165.00
EGC 4g $175.00 $840.00
PARA 0 $74.00 £o.00
JEP 0 £175.00 £0.00
Exhibit 1-O Total: $1,005.00

23

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main

Document Page 24 of 30
Exluabit 1-P
Professional Time Rate Total
ols 26.4 $275.00 $7,260.00
EGO 0 $175.00 $0.00
PARA 2a $75.00 $1,650.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-P Total: $8,910.00
Exhibit 1-Q
Professional Time Rate Total
OMS 16.45 $275.00 $5,073.75
EGC 1.4 $1745.00 $262 50
PARA o4 $745.00 $30.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-Q Total: $5 366.25
Exlubit 1-R
Professional Time Rate Total
Gh 1.4 $2745.00 $412.50
EGC 0 $175.00 $0.00
PARA O35 $75.00 $22.50
JEP 0 $1745.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-R Total: $435.00
Exlubit 1-5
Professional Time Rate Total
ols 44 55 $275.00 $12,251.25
EGC 0 $175.00 $0.00
PARA 1 $74.00 $75.00
JEP 0 £175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-5 Total: $12,326.24

24

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main
Document Page 25 of 30

Exlabit 1-T
Professional Time Rate Total
ols 3.55 $275.00 $76. 25
EGO 2.5 $175.00 $490 00
PARA 0 $74.00 £o.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-T Total: $1,466.25
Exlubit 1-U
Professional Time Rate Total
OMS 1.6 $275.00 $440.00
EGC 0 $1745.00 £o.00
PARA 0 $745.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-U Total: $440.00
Exlubit 1-V
Professional Time Rate Total
Gh o4 $2745.00 $110.00
EGC oe $175.00 $35.00
PARA 0 £75.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $1745.00 £o.00
Exlubit 1-V Total: $145.00
Exlhabit 1-W
Professional Time Rate Total
ols oe $275.00 $455.00
EGC O.1 $175.00 $17.50
PARA 0.8 $74.00 $60.00
JEP 0 £175.00 £0.00
Exhibit 1-W Total: $132.50

25

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main

Document Page 26 of 30
Exlubit 1-X
Professional Time Rate Total
ols 51 $275.00 $14,025.00
EGO 1.6 $175.00 $315.00
PARA 43 $74.00 $315.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-X Total: $14,655.00
Exlabit 1-Y
Professional Time Rate Total
OMS 22 $275.00 $605.00
EGC 0 $1745.00 $0.00
PARA 0 $745.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-Y Total: $605.00
Exlhabit 1-7
Professional Time Rate Total
Gh o4 $2745.00 $110.00
EGC 0 $175.00 $0.00
PARA 0 $75.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $1745.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-7 Total: $110.00
Exlubit -AA
Professional Time Rate Total
ols 15.55 $275.00 $4,276.25
EGC Te $175.00 $192.50
PARA 0 $74.00 $0.00
JEP 0 £175.00 $0.00
Exlubit 1-AA Total: $4 468.75

26

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main
Document Page 27 of 30

Exlubit 1-BB

Professional Time Rate Total
NS 5.05 $275.00 $1,388.75
EGC ee $175.00) $1,295.00

PARA 0.3 $75.00 $22.50
JEP 0) $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-BB Total: $2,706.25

Exhubit 1-CC

Professional Time Rate Total
NS OF5 $275.00 feo. 25
Bee 0) $175.00 $0.00

PARA 0) $75.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-CC Total: $206.25

Exlubit 1-DD

Professional Time Rate Total
GMS 0) $275.00 $0.00
EGC 2.6 $175.00 $455.00

PARA 0 $75.00 $0.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-DD Total: $455.00

Exlubit 1-FE

Professional Time Rate Total
ONS 2. $275.00 $742.50
EGO 0 $175.00 $0.00

PARA 0) $75.00 $0.00
JEP 0) $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-FEF Total: $742.50

27

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main
Document Page 28 of 30

Exhibit 1-FF
Professional Time Rate Total
GNS 5.1] $275.00] $1,402.50
EGC 0 $175.00 $0.00
PARA 02) $75.00) $15.00
JEP 0 $175.00 $0.00
Exhibit 1-FF Total: $1,417.50|

28

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main

Total Fees Requeste cd: $109,060.00]

29

Document Page 29 of 30
Exhibit Totals Category Totals
Exhibt 1-A $1,366.25
Exhibt 1-B $11,605.00 A $21,970.00
Exhibit 1-C $10,365.00
Exhibit 1-D $1,530.00 es $16,718.75
Exhibt 1-E $15,188.75 D $4,772.50
Exhibt 1-F £382.50 E $7,492.50
Exhibt 1-G $4,115.00
Exhibit 1-H $275.00 G $11,062.50
Exhibit 1-1 $307.50 H $5,366.25
Exhibt 1-J $4,215.00 I $12,761.25
Exhibt 1-E $1,622.50 J $16,838.75
Exhibt 1-L $1,072.50
Exshibt 1-M $275.00 L $7,890.00
Exhibit 1-M $1,147.50 M $2,821.25
Exhibt 1-0 $1,005.00
Exhibt 1-P $8,910.00
Exhibt 1-Q $5,366.25
Exhibit 1-R $435.00
Exhibit 1-8 $12,326.25
Exshibt 1-T $1,466.25
Exhibt 1-U £440.00
Exhibt 1-¥ $145.00
Exhibit 1-Wr $132.50
Exhibit 1-3¢ $14,655.00
Exhibt 1-¥ £605.00
Exhibt 1-Z $110.00
Exhibt 1-AA $4,468.75
Exhibt 1-BB $2,706.25
Exhibit 1-CC $206.25
Exhibit 1-DD £455.00
Exhibt 1-EE $742.50
Exhibt 1-FF $1,417.50

Case 05-17495 Doc393_ Filed 03/10/09 Entered 03/10/09 15:47:38 Desc Main
Document Page 30 of 30

Reduction for Corporate Fee Application: $8,910.00

Total Allowed Fees: $100,150.00

Facsimile Photocopy Postage Long Distance Filmg Fees PACER Fed Fx

$2.00 $23.25 £6.32 $6.49 $893.00 4.08 $52.47
$102.50 $17.00 $1.66 $13.03 £5.00
$642.50 $23.25 $3.14 $4.89 $12.88
$327.50 $46.75 $2.28 $7.91 $18.98
$2.00 $23.25 $4.37 $6.24 $26. 35
$3.00 $134.25 $35.67 $4.19 $37.25
$10.00 $142.25 876.73 $5.51 $12.25
$1.00 $420.75 £3.37 $2.28
$5.00 $43.50 $5.35 $15.38
£27.00 $35.50 $117.98 $3.19
$21.00 $543.50 £8.43 $3.11

£98, 00 $21.75 $4.46
$35.50 $493.75 £3.39
$7.50 $14.25 $0.58
$1.50 $17.00
$14.50
$1,286.00 $2,014.50 $343.73 pees $893.00 $116.79 $52.47

Total Expenses Requested:) $4,778.71

Total Reductions: $893.00

Total Allowed Expenses: $3,885.71

30

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