Lightfoot et al v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHAD LIGHTFOOT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 26-434
PROGRESSIVE DIRECT
INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants
SECTION: “E” (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by Repwest
Insurance Company (“Repwest”).1 Plaintiffs Chad Lightfoot, Geralyn Hawkins, and their
minor children (“Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition.2 Repwest filed a response in support of
its motion.3
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a vehicle accident in Orleans Parish and the subsequent
investigation and criminal prosecution of Plaintiff Chad Lightfoot.4 Plaintiffs allege that,
on August 29, 2011, Lightfoot was involved in a vehicle accident in Orleans Parish and
filed an insurance claim. Plaintiffs allege the resulting insurance claim was not
“resolve[d]. . .to Mr. Lightfoot’s satisfaction” and, as a result, in 2012, he brought a
personal-injury lawsuit in Orleans Parish Civil District Court against multiple insurance
companies, and others involved in processing his claim (“the underlying civil action”).5
1 R. Doc. 69.
2 R. Doc. 77.
3 R. Doc. 83.
4 R. Doc. 60.
5 Id. at ¶¶ 87-88. Repwest was named as a defendant in the 2012 state court petition.
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Plaintiffs’ allegations in the present matter stem from several incidents in this underlying
civil action.
Regarding Repwest, Plaintiffs allege that its “claim data and claim materials were
used in connection with the LSP staged-accident investigation and in framing Mr.
Lightfoot as a ringleader while other similarly situated participants were treated more
favorably.”6 Plaintiffs also allege Repwest “participated in, supplied, or permitted use of
claim information in the broader insurance-fraud investigation that formed part of the
criminal narrative against Mr. Lightfoot.”7 Plaintiffs further allege that, during the
criminal proceedings, it was discovered there was no record of a $50,000 insurance
payout to Plaintiff but that, despite this lack of evidence, Mr. Lightfoot was still criminally
prosecuted.8 Plaintiffs allege the criminal charges against Mr. Lightfoot were dismissed
on October 15, 2024.9
Mr. Lightfoot and his spouse, Geralyn Hawkins, filed this suit pro se on October
20, 2025 in Orleans Parish Civil District Court.10 In their original petition, Lightfoot and
Hawkins brought a single claim against “unknown named Defendants” under La. R.S.
15:572.8, which provides compensation to persons wrongfully convicted and
imprisoned.11
On November 10, 2025, Lightfoot and Hawkins filed a First Amended Petition,
adding their minor children as named Plaintiffs and bringing eight counts against various
6 Id. at ¶ 58.
7 Id. at ¶ 59.
8 Id. at ¶ 136.
9 Id. at ¶ 142.
10 R. Doc. 1-2.
11 Id. at pp. 1-2.
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defendants for actions related to Mr. Lightfoot’s underlying civil action and resulting
criminal prosecution, including Repwest.12
On January 20, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Petition in state court.13
While this petition did not alter or amend any of the causes of action that Plaintiffs
attempted to plead in their First Amended petition, it removed Plaintiffs’ minor children
as parties.14
Defendants removed the matter to this Court on February 27, 2026.15 Following
removal, multiple defendants filed motions to dismiss, including Repwest.16 In its motion,
Repwest argued that Plaintiffs’ petition was devoid of any factual allegations that could
plausibly state a claim for relief.17
On April 15, 2026, in response to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs moved, pro se,
to file a First Amended Complaint in order to provide additional factual details, clarify
their claims for relief, and “narrow[] certain theories to address issues raised or
anticipated in Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions.”18 The Plaintiffs attached their
proposed amended complaint to their motion.19 On April 22, 2026, the Court granted
Plaintiffs’ leave to file an amended complaint, but ordered Plaintiffs to file a new restated
and amended complaint, as the Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint failed to address
the arguments Defendants made in their motions to dismiss.20 The Court ordered
12 R. Doc. 1-3 at p. 15.
13 R. Doc. 1-4.
14 See id. at pp. 1-2.
15 R. Doc. 1.
16 R. Doc. 50.
17 R. Doc. 50-1 at pp. 6-7.
18 R. Doc. 52 at p. 1.
19 R. Doc. 52-1.
20 R. Doc. 53 at p. 3.
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Plaintiffs to file their new amended complaint, addressing “fully and completely, all
arguments raised in the Defendants’ motions to dismiss,” on or before on May 6, 2026.21
On May 6, 2026, rather than file their amended complaint, Plaintiffs
simultaneously moved to enroll counsel of record and for an extension to file their
amended complaint.22 The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and ordered Plaintiffs to file
their amended complaint on or before June 8, 2026.23
On June 8, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint24—their fourth
petition/complaint filed in the course of this litigation.25 In Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs still bring claims against various Defendants associated with the
underlying civil action and Mr. Lightfoot’s criminal prosecution, including Repwest.
While Plaintiffs’ previous complaint only brought eight counts against these Defendants,
their Second Amended Complaint attempts to assert twenty counts against the same
Defendants for state law tort claims and constitutional violations.26
On June 19, 2026, Repwest again filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.27 In its motion, Repwest argues the Second Amended Complaint still contains
insufficient factual particulars to state a claim against Repwest, and that the only two
counts that appear to relate to Repwest have prescribed.28 Repwest argues the alleged
actions against Repwest could have taken place at the latest by 2015 and thus have long
prescribed.29
21 Id.
22 R. Doc. 56.
23 R. Doc. 59.
24 R. Doc. 60.
25 This includes the amended complaint Plaintiffs attempted to file on April 15, 2026.
26 In Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, they added Eric Cusimano, Jason Williams, and Sgt. Patrick
Bradley as Defendants.
27 R. Doc. 69.
28 R. Doc. 69-1 at pp. 8-10.
29 Id. at pp. 11, 14.
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Plaintiffs argue that Repwest’s own memorandum admits enough factual
information to defeat a motion to dismiss.30 Plaintiffs argue that prosecution-dependent
claims accrue upon favorable termination, and that there are enough factual questions
regarding Repwest’s role that preclude a finding of prescription on a motion to dismiss.31
Lastly, Plaintiffs request leave to amend should the Court conclude that additional facts
should be pleaded regarding Repwest.32
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”33 A complaint that does not meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading
standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.34 “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.”35 “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”36 “Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”37
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss
a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff
has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to
30 R. Doc. 77 at pp. 1-2, 4-5.
31 Id. at pp. 9-10.
32 Id. at p. 20.
33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
35 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)).
36 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
37 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
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relief.38 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”39 “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”40
The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory
statements, and “‘conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.’”41 Indeed, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements”42
or “naked assertion[s]”43 devoid of “further factual enhancement”44 are not sufficient.
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’”45 However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual allegations.”46 “Determining whether
a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”47 “Although
detailed factual allegations are not required,” “[d]ismissal is appropriate when the
complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’”48 Whether a plaintiff “will be able to offer
38 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007).
39 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
40 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
41 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).
42 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
43 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
44 Id.
45 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
46 Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 545.
47 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
48 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 Fed. Appx. 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion)
(citations omitted).
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sufficient proof to support [his or her] claims is more appropriate in the context of a
motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits” rather than in a motion to
dismiss.49 “‘[I]ntensive disputes of material fact . . . are usually more appropriate for
summary judgment . . . .’”50
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Repwest.
The Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Repwest. Plaintiffs fail to state a
claim against Repwest because they do not allege facts that provide the defendant with
notice of the grounds upon which Plaintiffs’ claims rest. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”51
Indeed, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements”52 or “naked assertion[s]”53 devoid of “further factual
enhancement”54 are not sufficient. The complaint must provide the defendants with “fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”55
Repwest argues the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it because
Plaintiffs do not allege facts or particulars to support the claim that Repwest improperly
provided claim information about Chad Lightfoot to the Louisiana State Police.56 Repwest
argues that across 55 pages and 338 paragraphs, the Complaint says “virtually nothing
49 Smith v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00492, 2019 WL 4565246, at *7 (W.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019).
50 Dong Phuong Bakery, Inc. v. Gemini Soc'y, LLC, No. CV 21-1109, 2022 WL 898750, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar.
28, 2022) (quoting Bilyeu v. Johanson Berenson LLP, 2010 WL 3896415, at *9 (W.D. La. Sep. 30, 2010)).
51 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
52 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
53 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
54 Id.
55 Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Mississippi, Puerto Rico Tchrs. Ret. Sys. v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 320
(5th Cir. 2014).
56 R. Doc. 69-1 at p. 8.
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about Repwest except for asserting a vague allegation that Repwest improperly supplied
unidentified claim data to an unidentified person at the Louisiana State Police at an
unidentified time and place.”57 Repwest further argues that the pleading does not supply
information sufficient for it to be able to evaluate and respond to Plaintiffs’ claim.58
Plaintiffs allege that RepWest claim data and claim materials were used in
connection with the Louisiana State Police investigation of Mr. Lightfoot and “in framing
Mr. Lightfoot as a ringleader while other similarly situated participants were treated more
favorably.”59 Plaintiffs argue they are suing Repwest “to the extent discovery confirms its
role in supplying, ratifying, benefiting from, or permitting use of that information.”60
Plaintiffs argue that at a minimum further discovery is warranted.61
The factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint fail to identify
with specificity the acts alleged to have been committed by Repwest. Plaintiffs mention
Repwest only in three paragraphs throughout the entire complaint. Plaintiffs first
reference Repwest is in the complaint’s listing of defendants, where Plaintiffs allege:
Defendant RepWest Insurance Company is an insurance
company authorized to conduct business in Louisiana.
Plaintiffs allege, on information and belief, that RepWest
claim data and claim materials were used in connection with
the LSP staged-accident investigation and in framing Mr.
Lightfoot as a ringleader while other similarly situated
participants were treated more favorably.62
Plaintiffs further allege in the next paragraph:
Plaintiffs further allege, on information and belief, that
RepWest participated in, supplied, or permitted use of claim
57 Id. at p.9.
58 Id.
59 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 58.
60 Id. at ¶ 59.
61 Id. at pp. 4-5.
62 Id. at ¶ 58.
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information in the broader insurance-fraud investigation that
formed part of the criminal narrative against Mr. Lightfoot.
RepWest is sued to the extent discovery confirms its role in
supplying, ratifying, benefiting from, or permitting the use of
that information.63
Plaintiffs mention Repwest only one other time in the entire complaint, briefly stating in
the factual allegations section:
Multiple insurance carriers were involved in claim handling
arising from the accident, including Progressive-related
entities, Liberty Mutual, RepWest, and other insurers or
related claim-data entities.64
Plaintiffs’ allegations do not provide notice to Repwest of the claims against it and
grounds on which Plaintiffs’ claims rest. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not allow the Court or
Defendant to discern what wrongful conduct Plaintiffs allege Repwest committed.
Plaintiffs do not include any allegations showing how Repwest perpetuated any false
narrative against Lightfoot, let alone what information Repwest allegedly provided to its
co-Defendants and allowed them to use. Plaintiffs allege the information from Repwest
was used “in framing Mr. Lightfoot as a ringleader,”65 but they do not allege what the
information was, who it was given to, how Repwest supplied or ratified this information,
or how this information was used to frame Mr. Lightfoot. Plaintiffs’ vague allegations fail
to identify acts of misconduct by Repwest and, as a result, do not provide notice of the
grounds on which their claims rest.66
Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Repwest because they do not bring
any claim specifically against Repwest. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure entitle “each
63 Id. at ¶ 59.
64 Id. at ¶ 87 (bolded emphasis added).
65 Id. at ¶ 58.
66 Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Mississippi, Puerto Rico Tchrs. Ret. Sys. v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 320
(5th Cir. 2014).
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defendant . . . to know what he or she did that is asserted to be wrongful.”67 Mere
“conclusory allegations against [d]efendants as a group” that “fail[ ] to allege the personal
involvement of any defendant” are insufficient to put Defendants on notice of their alleged
wrongdoing.68 A plaintiff must allege facts that “establish each individual [d]efendant’s
liability for the misconduct alleged.”69 When a number of defendants are named in a
complaint, a plaintiff cannot refer to all defendants “who occupied different positions and
presumably had distinct roles in the alleged misconduct” without specifying “which
defendants engaged in what wrongful conduct.”70 “While referring to a collective group of
defendants is not a fatal pleading deficiency, “[e]ach defendant is [still] entitled to know
what he or she did that is asserted to be wrongful.”71 The critical inquiry is whether the
complaint, with its group allegations, provides each defendant with adequate notice of the
plaintiff’s claims and the grounds upon which the claim rests.72 A complaint that contains
impermissibly vague group pleading will be dismissed.73 For example, in Cain v. City of
New Orleans, the plaintiffs brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the City of New
Orleans, the Sheriff, and various court officials for their involvement in the plaintiffs’
allegedly unconstitutional criminal prosecution.74 In their complaint, the plaintiffs
directed their allegations towards “‘defendants’ as a group” and failed to identify specific
67 Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 15-4479, 2016 WL 2849478, at *5 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016).
68 Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14-169, 2015 WL 3970297, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’
claims without prejudice for failure to provide each defendant with notice of its alleged participation in the
racketeering enterprise).
69 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (finding that a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution);
Aruanno v. Main, 467 F. App'x 134, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2012) (dismissal of § 1983 action was appropriate where
Defendants were collectively sued as “[government] personnel” and failed to allege the personal
involvement of the individual Defendants).
70 Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013).
71 Martinez v. City of N. Richland Hills, 846 F. App'x 238, 243 (5th Cir. 2021).
72 Valadez v. City of San Antonio, No. SA21CV0002JKPRBF, 2022 WL 1608016, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 20,
2022)
73 Id.
74 No. CV 15-4479, 2016 WL 2849478, at *3 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016).
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acts of misconduct by specific defendants.75 This district court found such allegations
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief because the allegations “largely prevent[ed]
the Court from discerning which defendants [were] allegedly responsible for which
allegedly unlawful actions.”76 Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that
“lump[ed] all defendants together and assert[ed] identical allegations as to each, without
distinction.”77
Defendants are entitled to factual pleadings that alert each of them of the wrongful
conduct they allegedly committed.78 Plaintiffs fail to specifically name Repwest in any of
their twenty counts. Instead, Plaintiffs direct their claims against groups of defendants,
for example,
“Defendants whose direct conduct or joint action caused Mr. Lightfoot’s arrest
without probable cause;”79
“Defendants whose direct conduct or joint action initiated or continued criminal
proceedings unsupported by probable cause;”80 and
“[S]tate actors and joint actors whose alleged unlawful conduct removed Mr.
Lightfoot from the family home and directly interfered with protected family
relationships.”81
In each count of Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, they refer to various defendants
as a group and fail to identify specific acts of misconduct by Repwest. Based on these
allegations, Repwest cannot discern what unlawful actions it allegedly committed. Such
vague, collective allegations do not state a plausible claim for relief.82
75 Id. at *5.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 R. Doc. 60 at p. 36 (Count I).
80 Id. at p. 37 (Count II).
81 Id. at p. 41 (Count VI).
82 See Cain, 2016 WL 2849478, at *5.
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II. The majority of Plaintiffs’ claims arising under federal law—Counts I,
II (Wrongful Detention), V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX—have prescribed.
Section I, supra, details why the claims against Repwest will be dismissed due to
failure to state sufficient factual allegations and impermissible group pleading. Those
reasons are sufficient in themselves. Nonetheless, an additional standalone barrier exists
as to Plaintiffs’ claims: prescription. The majority of Plaintiffs’ claims under both federal
and state law are prescribed. While it is difficult to ascertain under what causes of action
Plaintiff sues Repwest, if any, the Court will analyze prescription for all possible causes of
action listed in the complaint for the sake of completeness. The Court will first examine
claims under federal law that have prescribed: Counts I, II (Wrongful Detention)83, V, VI,
VII, VIII, IX. The following section III, infra, discusses claims under Louisiana law that
have prescribed: Counts XII, XIII, XV, XVI, XVII.
A. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and
Malicious Detention Claims under Counts I and II are
prescribed.
For 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, federal courts in Louisiana apply the relevant
Louisiana prescription rules for delictual actions.84 Prior to July 1, 2024, delictual actions
in Louisiana were “subject to a liberative prescription of one year.”85 Liberative
prescription for actions prior to July 1, 2024 “commence[d] to run from the day that
83 The malicious prosecution component of Count II, unlike the wrongful detention component, has not
prescribed. Nonetheless, the malicious prosecution claim suffers from the same defects outlined in Section
I supra and will be dismissed.
84 See Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 515 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (E.D. La. 2007) (collecting
cases), aff'd, 265 F. App’x 363 (5th Cir. 2008).
85 Dowd v. Helena Emergency Physicians, PLLC, 2023-00132 p. 1 (La. 4/25/23), 359 So. 3d 969, 970-71.
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injury or damage is sustained.”86 “Jurisprudence has interpreted this rule to mean that
prescription commences on the date the injured party discovers or should have
discovered the facts upon which his cause of action is based.”87 For false arrest and false
imprisonment claims, prescription commences on the date of arrest (and not from the
date of release).88 In this case, Plaintiff’s alleged arrest date was on January 6, 2015.89
Accordingly, Count I alleging false arrest and false arrest is prescribed. Similarly, the
Count II claim alleging false detention90 also is prescribed.
B. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Selective Prosecution Claim under
Count V are prescribed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that selective
prosecution claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 are analogous to abuse of process claims and
that prescription commences on the date of arrest.91 Given that Louisiana prescription
rules for delictual actions imposed a one-year liberative prescription period, the selective
prosecution claim prescribed one year after January 6, 2015. Given that this action was
filed on October 20, 2025,92 over ten years later, Plaintiffs’ selective prosecution claim
under Count V is prescribed.
C. Plaintiffs’ 42. U.S.C. § 1983 familial integrity claim under Count
VI is prescribed.
For 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, federal courts in Louisiana apply the relevant
Louisiana prescription rules for delictual actions.93 The Louisiana Supreme Court has
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Eaglin v. Eunice Police Dep’t, 17-1875, p. 8 (La. 6/27/18); 319 So. 3d 225, 230.
89 R. Doc. 60 at ¶110.
90 Lieutenant Arcana does not argue that the part of Count II alleging malicious prosecution has prescribed.
R. Doc. 88 at p.2.
91 Aly v. City of Lake Jackson, 453 F. App’x 538, 540 (5th Cir. 2011).
92 See R. Doc. 87 at p.11.
93 See Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 515 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (E.D. La. 2007) (collecting
cases), aff'd, 265 F. App’x 363 (5th Cir. 2008).
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declared that a cause of action for loss of consortium (the Louisiana state law equivalent
of a familial integrity claim), does not accrue “until the party suffers the actual loss of
consortium, which has been held to occur at the time an injured party’s condition
deteriorates to such an extent that his family is actually deprived of his consortium.”94
Plaintiff’s state custody ended in 2018,95 and thus prescription accrued one year later in
2019.96 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ familial integrity claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
prescribed.
D. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim for race discrimination under
Count VII is prescribed.
For 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims, federal courts in Louisiana apply the relevant
Louisiana prescription rules for delictual actions.97 Prior to July 1, 2024, delictual actions
in Louisiana were “subject to a liberative prescription of one year.”98 A § 1981 claim
accrues “when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the discriminatory act
has occurred.”99 In this case, Plaintiff Mr. Lightfoot filed several complaints with the
Louisiana State Police in 2018 regarding the Louisiana State Police’s handling of the
investigation in Lightfoot’s case file.100 Repwest is being sued to the extent RepWest
provided information or participated in that investigation.101 Since Plaintiff filed a
complaint in 2018 indicating his knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing in the
investigation, prescription accrued one year later in 2019. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1981
94 Landry v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 03-0719, p. 4 (La. 12/3/03); 864 So. 2d 117, 122 (collecting cases).
95 R. Doc. 17-4 at p. 6.
96 La. Civ. Code art. 3492 (Repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, § 2, eff. July 1, 2024).
97 See Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 515 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (E.D. La. 2007) (collecting
cases), aff'd, 265 F. App’x 363 (5th Cir. 2008).
98 Dowd, 2023-00132 p. 1 (La. 4/25/23), 359 So. 3d 969, 970-71.
99 McWilliams v. Escambia Cty. Sch. Bd., 658 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
100 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 143-53.
101 Id. at ¶¶ 58-59.
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claim for race discrimination under Count VII is prescribed.
E. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 claims for Civil Rights
Conspiracy and Neglect to Prevent Civil Rights Conspiracy under
Counts VIII-IX is prescribed.
For 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims, federal courts in Louisiana apply the relevant
Louisiana prescription rules for delictual actions.102 For 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claims, Section
1986 specifically states that actions brought under that provision must be commenced
within one year of when the cause of action has accrued.103 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a cause of action for a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 civil
conspiracy claim accrues as soon as the plaintiff knows or should have known of the overt
acts involved in the alleged conspiracy.104 Again, Mr. Lightfoot filed several complaints
with the Louisiana State Police in 2018 regarding the Louisiana State Police’s handling of
Lightfoot’s case file.105 Accordingly, prescription accrued one year later in 2019. Plaintiffs’
42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim for race discrimination under Count VII is prescribed. Likewise,
Section 1986 provides for liability against third parties based on their knowledge of
Section 1985 violations. Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the alleged section 1986
violation around the same time they knew or should have known of the section 1985
violation. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim also is prescribed.
III. The majority of Plaintiffs’ Louisiana tort claims—Counts XII, XIII, XIV,
XV, XVI, and XVII are prescribed.
102 See Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 515 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (E.D. La. 2007) (collecting
cases), aff'd, 265 F. App’x 363 (5th Cir. 2008).
103 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (“But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not
commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.”).
104 Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1987).
105 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 143-53.
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Prior to July 1, 2024, delictual actions in Louisiana were “subject to a liberative
prescription of one year.”106 Liberative prescription for actions prior to July 1, 2024
“commence[d] to run from the day that injury or damage is sustained.”107 “Jurisprudence
has interpreted this rule to mean that prescription commences on the date the injured
party discovers or should have discovered the facts upon which his cause of action is
based.”108 The causes of action for the vast majority of Plaintiffs’ Louisiana tort claims109
accrued well before filing of the lawsuit in October 2025, and were prescribed long ago.
A. Louisiana case law establishes that Plaintiffs’ abuse of process
claim is prescribed.
Counts XII and XVII, both of which are based on the Louisiana tort of abuse of
process, name specifically only “private attorney” and “insurance” defendants.”110 Count
XII also is brought against “other Defendants who misused civil or criminal process for
ulterior purposes,” but this allegation is not sufficient to give Repwest notice of its alleged
wrongdoing.111 Nonetheless, to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to assert abuse of process
claims against Repwest, these claims are prescribed.
Louisiana recognizes abuse of process claims under La. Civ. Code art. 2315.112 To
state an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of an ulterior
purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular
prosecution of the proceeding.”113 Abuse of process is a tort claim that, at the time the
106 Dowd, 2023-00132 p. 1 (La. 4/25/23), 359 So. 3d 969, 970-71.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 With the exception of Count XI “Louisiana Malicious Prosecution.” R. Doc. 60 at 45-46.
110 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 291 and 324.
111 As explained in Section III, supra.
112 Waguespack, Seago & Carmichael (A PLC) v. Lincoln, 1999-2016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 768 So. 2d
287, 290.
113 Id. (citing Succession of Cutrer v. Curtis, 341 So.2d 1209, 1213-14 (La. App. 1 Cir.1976)).
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incidents alleged herein occurred, was governed by La. C.C. art. 3492, which provided a
prescriptive period of one year from the date of injury or damage.114 The Court must
determine whether the prescriptive period for this claim begins to run from the date a
defendant allegedly used the improper legal process or from the date the resulting
criminal proceeding was dismissed.
In Rieth v. Munguia, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit analyzed
whether an abuse of process claim was prescribed.115 In that case, the defendant filed a
reconventional demand alleging the plaintiff committed abuse of process by filing the
state court petition relating to a property dispute between the parties.116 The court found
the abuse of process claim was prescribed because the defendant filed the reconventional
demand making the abuse of process claim more than a year after the plaintiff filed the
state court petition that allegedly constituted abuse of process.117 Importantly, the
Louisiana appellate court held “the continuing tort doctrine does not apply to extend the
prescriptive date . . .” and that “[t]he act of filing the petition by [plaintiff] was a singular
act; any damages that occurred may have been continuing, but the allegedly tortious act
occurred when the petition was filed.”118 Similarly, in No Drama, LLC v. Caluda, the
Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit found the prescriptive period for an abuse
of process claim began to run on the date the defendant filed the petition the plaintiff
114 Morice v. Yorkshire Ct. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 23-118, p. 6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/23), 377 So.3d 848, 853
(stating that “claims for abuse of process raise delictual claims that are subject to a prescriptive period of
one year.”); Louisiana law regarding prescription was amended effective July 1, 2024 to extend the one-
year prescriptive period to a two-year prescriptive period for delictual actions. See La. C.C. art. 3493.1.
However, these changes apply prospectively only to delictual action arising after July 1, 2024. See 2024 La.
Acts, No. 423, §§ 1 and 2 (providing that the extended period “shall be given prospective application only
and shall apply to delictual actions arising after the effective date of this Act” and that “[t]his Act shall
become effective on July 1, 2024”).
115 Rieth v. Munguia, 23-0547, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/30/24), 391 So. 3d 39, 43-47.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 48.
118 Id.
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alleged constituted abuse of process.119 The court held that “[a]lthough plaintiff alleges to
have continuously sustained damages to its reputation and its finances until the dismissal
of the underlying suit, the operating cause, the filing of the lawsuit, is not a continuous
tort.”120 The prescriptive period for an abuse of process claim does not begin at a later
date even when the plaintiff alleges he has continuously sustained damage.121 Moreover,
the prescriptive period does not begin to run at later date just because the plaintiff
allegedly suffered damages from the abuse of process after the abuse of process
occurred.122
The prescriptive period for Plaintiffs’ abuse of process claims began when the
allegedly “willful act[s] in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of
the proceeding” occurred.123 It is clear that all of the potential acts of abuse of process by
Repwest could have occurred only well over a year prior to Plaintiffs filing the present
action. Plaintiffs allege: on January 23, 2015, “private attorney Defendants” obtained a
civil judgment against Mr. Lightfoot in the underling civil litigation;124 and on August 22,
2016 “attorney and insurance Defendants recorded or caused to be recorded” the
judgment in the underlying civil litigation as a judicial mortgage against Lightfoot’s
homestead.125 Mr. Lightfoot’s criminal prosecution was allegedly initiated by NOPD
Detective Frank Denton and LSP Lieutenant Alan Arcana.126 Even if the Court somehow
found that the initiation of Mr. Lightfoot’s criminal prosecution constituted abuse of
119 177 So.3d 747, 752, (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/14/15).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See Waguespack, Seago & Carmichael (A PLC) v. Lincoln, 1999-2016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 768 So.
2d 287, 290.
124 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 124.
125 Id. at ¶ 126.
126 Id. at ¶¶ 101, 116.
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process on the part of Repwest, Mr. Lightfoot was arrested in 2015, over a decade before
the present action was filed. Mr. Lightfoot’s state custody terminated in 2018,127 and the
last time any Louisiana State Police defendant in this suit testified regarding Mr.
Lightfoot’s arrest was the 2022 grand jury testimony by Lieutenant Arcana.128 These
events all occurred well over a year before the 2025 filing of this action.
B. All remaining Louisiana tort law claims are prescribed under the
1-year liberative prescription rule.
Count XIII Louisiana Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation, Count XIV Louisiana
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Count XV Louisiana Loss of Consortium,
Service, and Society, and Count XVI Louisiana Negligence/Gross Fault/Civil Fault also
are prescribed. These Louisiana tort claims, at the time the incidents alleged herein
occurred, were governed by La. C.C. art. 3492, which provided a prescriptive period of
one year from the date of injury or damage.129 While these counts suffer from the fatal
group pleading and fact-deficient defects outlined in Section I supra, and as such it is
difficult for the Court to determine with certainty the last alleged wrongdoing on behalf
of Repwest, the last conceivable dates appear are more than a year before 2025.
C. Plaintiffs have had multiple chances to amend their complaint
and will not be given another opportunity.
Plaintiffs ask the Court for leave to amend their complaint in the event the Court
“concludes additional Repwest-specific detail should be pleaded.”130 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be freely granted when justice so
127 R. Doc. 17-4 at p. 6.
128 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 121.
129 As discussed supra Section I, the Louisiana tort claims in count XI Louisiana Malicious Prosecution and
Count XIV Louisiana Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress are dismissed for failure to state a claim and
for impermissible group pleading.
130 R. Doc. 77 at p. 20.
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requires.” A “court must have a ‘substantial reason’ to deny a request for leave to amend”
and “may consider factors such as whether there has been ‘undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of
amendment.’”131 “The district court is entrusted with the discretion to grant or deny a
motion to amend.”132
The Court will not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. Plaintiffs have filed five
complaints/petitions during this litigation; they have already amended their complaint
four times—twice in state court and twice before this court.133 Plaintiffs attempted to file
an amended complaint in response to Repwest’s first motions to dismiss.134 However,
Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint failed to remedy the deficiencies raised in these
motions to dismiss. Despite this failure, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to file another
complaint on June 8, 2026 that did address the arguments raised in the Defendants’
motions to dismiss.135 Despite these ample opportunities, as discussed supra, Plaintiffs
have still failed to state plausible claims for relief against Repwest. The Court will not
provide Plaintiffs with unlimited opportunities to try to state a claim against the Repwest.
Based on Plaintiffs’ “repeated failure[s] to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed,”136 the Court finds further amendment is not warranted. Moreover, any
131 Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 566 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Jacobsen v.
Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1998)).
132 Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones
v. Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)).
133 R. Docs. 1-3; 1-4; 52-1, 60. This includes the amended complaint Plaintiffs attempted to file on April 15,
2026.
134 R. Doc. 50.
135 R. Doc. 53.
136 Herrmann Holdings Ltd., 302 F.3d at 566.
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amendment to Plaintiffs’ claims against Repwest would be futile, as such claims have
prescribed. As a result, the Court will not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by Repwest Insurance Company
is GRANTED.137
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ causes of action against Repwest
Insurance Company are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of October, 2026.
________ ______ _____________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
137 R. Doc. 69.
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