Young v. St. John the Baptist Sheriff's Office et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DEVIN YOUNG 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-2458
MIKE TREGRE, in his 	Section “H”
individual capacity as Sheriff
for St. John the Baptist Parish, ET AL
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14)
and Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion to Defer or Deny Summary Judgment and for
Limited Discovery (Doc. 33). For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is
GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of a tragic tasing incident involving Plaintiff
Devin Young, a largely non-verbal, intellectually disabled man who often
communicates through pictures on his phone, and various St. John the Baptist
Sheriff Deputies. Plaintiff brings suit under § 1983 against Mike Tregre in his
individual capacity as the Sheriff for St. John the Baptist Parish and Stevie
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Anthony, Devin Billiot, Benjamin Teetell, Ryan Adams, and the Estate of
Shaquille Guerin in their individual capacities as Deputy Sheriffs, alleging
violations 	of 	his 	4th 	and 	14th 	Amendment 	rights 	against 	unreasonable
searches and seizures, unlawful detainment, and excessive force as well as
bystander 	claims 	against 	Deputies 	Billiot, 	Teetell, 	Adams, 	and 	Guerin.
Plaintiff also alleges Monell claims, Canton claims, and negligent supervision
and retention claims.
On July 20, 2025, Deputy Anthony was sitting in his patrol vehicle when
Plaintiff 	approached 	his 	window. 	While 	at 	his 	window, 	Plaintiff 	showed
Deputy Anthony a picture of a five-year old girl. The parties disagree whether,
at that point, Plaintiff told Deputy Anthony he “rubbed her on the booty.”1
Regardless, Deputy Anthony exited his vehicle and, after Plaintiff began
walking away, demanded that he “stand right there for me.”2 Plaintiff ran
instead. 	In 	response, 	Deputy 	Anthony 	drove 	after 	Plaintiff 	and 	further
commanded him to stop, warning him that he would be tased if he continued
to run. Plaintiff stopped and Deputy Anthony exited his vehicle to physically
detain him. After roughly twenty seconds of struggle, however, Plaintiff broke
free and ran off again, prompting Deputy Anthony to tase him as he fled. As a
result, Plaintiff fell and Deputy Anthony approached and stood over him until
Deputy Billiot arrived roughly a minute later. Over the next few minutes, the
two detectives attempted to handcuff Plaintiff while he pinned his left arm
under his body and refused to be subdued. Within a minute or two, Deputies
Teetell, Adams, and Guerin arrived, and Plaintiff was successfully handcuffed.
1 Doc. 31-2 ¶6; Doc. 22-10 at ¶5.
2 Defs.’ Ex. 2 at 11:38:03–11:38:44.
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When the Deputies attempted to move Plaintiff into a police vehicle over the
next few minutes, he went limp and had to be carried into the vehicle. Plaintiff
was then transported to the hospital. During the entire ordeal, however,
Plaintiff was not punched, kicked, slammed, or struck in any manner other
than the initial taser application.
As a result of the incident, Plaintiff was booked for resisting an officer
under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:108 and a search warrant was issued
to search his phone for evidence of felony sexual battery under § 14:43.1.
Plaintiff was never charged for sexual battery, and the resisting arrest charge
was dropped.
On April 28, 2026, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of
Plaintiffs claims.3 In Opposition, based on a private agreement between the
parties, Plaintiff opposed dismissal of his excessive force, unlawful detainment,
and bystander claims but did not oppose dismissal of the other claims.4 In their
Reply, Defendants “recognized the agreement and d[id] not disclaim it,” but
still moved this Court to rule on the non-immunity claims as unopposed.5 In
response, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a Surreply,6 which was
granted on September 15, 2026,7 and a Rule 56(d) Motion to Defer or Deny
Summary Judgment and for Limited Discovery.8
3 Doc. 14-1.
4 Doc. 22. At the time of his Opposition, this agreement was not reflected in any Court
Order. However, the Defendants recognized such an agreement in their Reply. Doc. 31 at 11.
5 Doc. 31 at 11–12.
6 Doc. 32.
7 Doc. 35.
8 Doc. 33.
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The 	Rule 	56(d) 	Motion 	seeks 	to 	defer, 	or 	deny 	without 	prejudice,
consideration of the non-immunity claims in Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, including the official-capacity and Monell claims, and the negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision claims. The Motion also seeks to permit
limited discovery into Deputy Anthony’s taser training before ruling on his
immunity claim; and to allow limited identification discovery of Deputies
Teetell, Adams, and Guerin regarding their involvement in placing Plaintiff in
the police vehicle, dependent upon a finding that this Court cannot resolve
their qualified immunity defense without such discovery. On September 23,
2026, the Court held an in-person status conference to address Plaintiff’s Rule
56(d) Motion insofar as it concerned ruling on non-qualified immunity issues
in Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.9 The parties agreed that the
Court’s ruling on this Motion would only address qualified immunity.10
Accordingly, the Court’s ruling on this Motion will only address Deputy
Anthony’s qualified immunity defense from Plaintiff’s unlawful detainment
and excessive force claims as well as Deputies Billiot, Teetell, Adams, and
Guerin’s 	qualified 	immunity 	defense 	from 	Plaintiff’s 	excessive 	force 	and
bystander liability claims. Plaintiff opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. 	Summary Judgment
Summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	“if 	the 	pleadings, 	depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
9 Doc. 39.
10 Id.
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any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”11 A genuine issue
of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”12
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor.13 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”14 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”15 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the non-
movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”16 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
11 Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).
12 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
13 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997).
14 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
15 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
16 John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
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necessary facts.” 17 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual
dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”18
II. 	Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” 19 Plaintiff has the burden of rebutting “the officers’
qualified-immunity defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether
the officers’ allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.”20
“In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment,
courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.”21 The first prong asks, “whether the
facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show
the 	officer’s 	conduct 	violated 	a 	federal 	right.” 22 The 	second 	prong 	asks,
“whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
violation.”23 A law is “clearly established” when, “at the time of the challenged
conduct, ‘the contours of a right are sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”24 The
Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit do not require “a case directly on point” for a
17 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
18 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
19 Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted).
20 Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 2011).
21 Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655 (2014).
22 Id. at 655–656 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
23 Id. at 656 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).
24 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S., 640 (1987) (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (emphasis added).
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court to find that a law is clearly established.25 However, “existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”26
Thus, Plaintiff “must point this court to a legislative directive or case precedent
that is sufficiently clear such that every reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates the law.”27
In sum, once a public official has made a good-faith invocation of
qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden:
(1) to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact and to show
“that a jury could return a verdict entitling the plaintiff to relief
for a constitutional [or statutory] injury,” and (2) to show that the
allegedly violated right was clearly established by “identify[ing] a
case—usually, a body of relevant case law—in which an officer
acting under similar circumstances ... was held to have violated
the Constitution.”28
Courts have discretion to decide which prong to consider first.29
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendant’s Motion argues that Deputy Anthony is entitled to qualified
immunity against Plaintiff’s excessive force and unlawful detainment claims
because he had reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiff and used reasonable force
when tasing him. Defendant also argues that the remaining Deputies are
25 Id. (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
26 Id. (emphasis added).
27 Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566
U.S. 658, 664 (2012)) (emphasis added).
28 Hankins v. Wheeler, No. CV 21-1129, 2023 WL 5751131, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 6,
2023), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 109 F.4th 839 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Joseph ex rel. Est.
of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329 (5th Cir. 2019)).
29 Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
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entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s excessive force and bystander
claims because those Deputies used reasonable force when detaining Plaintiff
and, therefore, had no duty to intervene. Plaintiff argues, however, that none
of the Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity because they violated his
clearly 	established 	rights 	to 	be 	free 	from 	excessive 	force 	and 	unlawful
detainment.
The Court will begin by analyzing Deputy Anthony’s qualified immunity
as to Plaintiff’s unlawful detainment claim. Then the Court will consider
qualified immunity regarding Plaintiff’s excessive force claims first against
Deputy Anthony and then against the remaining Deputies. From there, the
Court will consider Plaintiff’s bystander liability claims against the Deputies
before ruling on Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion.30
I. 	Unlawful Detainment Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Anthony unlawfully detained him without
reasonable suspicion, thereby 	violating his 	Fourth Amendment 	rights. A
person is “seized” under the Fourth Amendment “only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.”31 “Warrantless searches and seizures
30 Plaintiff also brought an unreasonable search and seizure claim, alleging that the
“Defendant Officers unlawfully seized [his] cell phone … then proceeded to search the cell
phone without consent of Plaintiff or a search warrant.” Doc. 1 at 5. However, this claim is
clearly controverted by evidence in the record. Defendants submitted the search warrant
authorizing the cell phone search. Doc. 14-6. This warrant was signed by Judge J. Sterling
Snowdy of the 40th JDC pursuant to an affidavit signed by Detective Javonna Cardona. Id.
Plaintiff did not respond to this evidence in his Opposition. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s unreasonable search and seizure claim is meritless.
31 Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 170 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
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are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”32 Relevant here, an
exception to the warrant requirement is that “police officers may stop and
briefly 	detain 	an 	individual 	for 	investigative 	purposes 	if 	they
have reasonable suspicion that 	criminal 	activity 	is 	afoot.” 33 	Reasonable
suspicion is “a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.”34 However, the
officer still must be able to “point to specific and articulable facts that lead him
to reasonably suspect that a particular person is committing, or is about to
commit, a crime.”35 “[R]easonable-suspicion determinations … must look at the
‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer
has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”36
“[A]n officer's mistake of fact may support probable cause or reasonable
suspicion ... provided the officer's mistake of fact was objectively reasonable.”37
Defendants argue that Deputy Anthony had reasonable suspicion to stop
Plaintiff. Defendants support this argument by pointing out that Plaintiff
approached Deputy Anthony’s patrol vehicle and showed him a picture of a
five-year-old-girl. 38 While it is genuinely disputed, in his sworn affidavit
32 Hankins v. Wheeler, 109 F.4th 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v.
Hill, 752 F.3d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 2014)).
33 Id. (quoting Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000)).
34 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citation omitted).
35 Hankins, 109 F.4th at 845–846 (quoting Hill, 752 F.3d at 1033).
36 U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 266 (2002).
37 U.S. Karam, 496 F.3d 1157, 1164 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); United States
v. Salazar, No. 16-CR-072, 2017 WL 1281131, at *7 (N.D. Tex. April 6, 2017) (“an officer's
reasonable mistake of fact can still give rise to reasonable suspicion”) (citing United States
v. Cotton, 782 F.3d 392, 395–96 (8th Cir. 2015)).
38 Doc. 32-3 at ¶1.
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Deputy Anthony claims that he heard Plaintiff repeatedly say he “rubbed her
on the booty.”39 Deputy Anthony’s body cam footage then started recording
audio a few seconds later and shows him stepping out of his vehicle, saying to
Plaintiff, “what you got going on, brah? That’s a five-year-old,” to which
Plaintiff responded, “yea.”40 After hearing this, Deputy Anthony told Plaintiff
to “come stand right in front of me” and “stand right there for me.” 41 Plaintiff
ran instead. Defendants contend that, taken in totality, these circumstances
gave Deputy Anthony reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Plaintiff
had committed indecent behavior with juveniles under La. R.S. 14:81, which is
a felony offense. Defendants bolsters this argument by pointing out that later
in the video Deputy Anthony stated to Plaintiff, “you just showed me a picture
of a five-year-old girl and said you touched her on the booty.”42 Deputy Anthony
repeated this accusation later to his sergeant at the scene and in his report
that afternoon.43
In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the factual predicate for Detective
Anthony’s stop is genuinely disputed. Plaintiff contends that there is a genuine
dispute over whether he said he “rubbed” the five-year-old-girl on the booty.
Once 	this 	contested 	statement 	is 	removed, 	Plaintiff 	argues, 	all 	Deputy
Anthony had to base his reasonable suspicion on was “that a man voluntarily
39 Doc. 31-2 ¶6. Deputy Anthony’s bodycam footage began recording audio after this
alleged statement from Plaintiff. There is no recording where Plaintiff states he “rubbed her
on the booty” and Plaintiff’s sworn affidavit refutes ever saying such a thing. Doc. 22-10 at
¶5. However, Plaintiff does not deny showing Deput Anthony pictures of a child. See id.
40 Defs.’ Ex. 2 at 11:38:32–11:38:40.
41 Id. at 11:38:37–11:38:45.
42 Id. at 11:40:42–11:40:48.
43 Id. at 11:45:30–11:45:45; Doc. 22-3 at 2.
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approached a marked unit, show[ed] him a photograph of a child, answered
‘yea’ to ‘that’s a five year old?,’ and left when told to stand still.”44 Plaintiff
further says that Deputy Anthony’s subsequent corroborating statements
establish 	consistency, 	not 	truth, 	and 	no 	recording 	captures 	Plaintiff’s
statement. Plaintiff says these “facts do not establish particularized suspicion
of any offense as a matter of law.”45 This Court disagrees.
The Court finds that, even without Plaintiff’s disputed statement, there
is no genuine issue whether Deputy Anthony had reasonable suspicion to
investigate if Plaintiff committed criminal behavior with a minor.46 Based on
the evidence in the record, Plaintiff approached Deputy Anthony’s vehicle and
showed him a picture of a five-year-old child. When questioned about this and
told to “stand right there,” Plaintiff took off running. The Court acknowledges
that flight alone cannot supply reasonable suspicion, but “[h]eadlong flight—
wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”47 Moreover,
the Court is mindful that “the determination of reasonable suspicion must be
based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”48
Commonsense dictates that approaching a police vehicle, showing the officer a
picture of a child unsolicited, and taking off running when questioned about it
are enough “specific and particularized facts” that would lead a reasonable
officer to suspect legal wrongdoing. Accordingly, the Court finds that Deputy
44 Doc. 32-2 at 8.
45 Id.
46 Plaintiff acknowledges that “no precise offense need be identified” for reasonable
suspicion of criminal behavior and “that flight counts for something.” Id. at 7.
47 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
48 Id. at 125.
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Anthony 	had 	reasonable 	suspicion 	to 	detain 	Plaintiff 	and 	is 	entitled 	to
qualified 	immunity 	because 	he 	did 	not 	violate 	Plaintiff’s 	constitutional
rights.49
II. 	Excessive Force Claims
Next, 	the 	Court 	considers 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	of 	excessive 	force 	first
against 	Deputy 	Anthony 	then 	against 	the 	remaining 	Deputies. 	In 	cases
involving allegations of excessive force during an investigation or arrest, “the
federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizures.” 50 To 	prevail 	on 	a 	claim 	for 	excessive 	force 	under 	the 	Fourth
Amendment, Plaintiff must show: “(1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and
only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and that (3) the force
used was objectively unreasonable.”51 “Excessive force claims are necessarily
fact-intensive; whether the force used is ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ depends
on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” 52 Under the well-
known Graham factors, relevant facts and circumstances to consider are: (1)
the 	“severity 	of 	the 	crime 	at 	issue,” 	(2) 	“whether 	the 	suspect 	poses 	an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” (3) and “whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”53 A court must
review these considerations “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
49 Because the Court has found that Deputy Anthony did not violate Plaintiff’s rights,
it does not, and need not, address whether Deputy Anthony’s behavior violated clearly
established law.
50 Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)).
51 Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
52 Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at
396). 53 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
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scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”54 Because injury is not
at issue here, the Court will analyze whether any of the force used against
Plaintiff was objectively unreasonable under the Graham factors.
A. Deputy Anthony
Plaintiff claims that Deputy Anthony used excessive force when he tased
him. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that it was objectively unreasonable for
Deputy Anthony to “fire four Taser cartridges in two and one-half seconds at
the back of an unarmed, intellectually disabled man running away across an
empty stadium parking lot, and then to let that cycle run on after he fell.”55
Plaintiff contends that the first two Graham factors “favor him decisively.”56
He 	says, 	at 	worst, 	the 	crime 	Deputy 	Anthony 	suspected 	him 	of 	was 	a
misdemeanor and that he was unarmed while running away when tased.57
Plaintiff also acknowledges, however, that the third Graham factor—evasion
or active resistance—favors Defendants. But he argues that the tasing did not
stop when Plaintiff stopped fleeing; instead, Deputy Anthony allowed the
energization cycle to continue for roughly three seconds after he fell, making
what may have been proportional force in one moment disproportional in the
next. Plaintiff says there is a genuine issue as to whether “each successive
54 Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 332 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)).
55 Doc. 22 at 1.
56 Id. at 10.
57 Plaintiff says that his alleged conduct was, at worst, the misdemeanor of sexual
battery under Louisiana Revised Statues § 14:43.1.1 because that crime involves the touching
of “the breast or buttocks” while felony sexual battery under § 14:43.1(A)—the charge on the
search warrant issued for Plaintiff’s phone—involves touching of the “anus or genitals.”
However, Plaintiff goes on to acknowledge that “reasonable suspicion does not require that
an officer correctly identify the statute, and a jury could find Deputy Anthony suspected some
sexual offense without pinning down its grade.” Id. at 12.
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trigger pull” and the “roughly three seconds of energization that continued
after [Plaintiff’s] fall” were “grossly disproportionate to any need.”58
Defendants contend, however, that Deputy Anthony used force that was
objectively 	reasonable 	considering 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances.
Defendants point out that, regardless of whether it was a misdemeanor or
felony, Deputy Anthony reasonably suspected Plaintiff of a sexual offense
against a child. Defendants say the threat Deputy Anthony faced was that a
suspect, who already fled twice, would “escape into a residential neighborhood
before he could be identified and investigated.”59 Finally, Defendants point out
that Plaintiff already concedes active resistance and that Deputy Anthony’s
force was “measured and proportional.”60 Taken together, Defendants say, the
Graham factors do not support a finding of excessive force. This Court agrees.
The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Deputy Anthony’s actions were objectively reasonable.61 Aside from
Plaintiff’s statement to Deputy Anthony, the facts are largely undisputed.
Plaintiff ran away from Deputy Anthony after twice being told to “stand right
there for me.”62 Deputy Anthony drove after Plaintiff and again commanded
him to stop, warning him not to run and that he would be tased if he did not
58 Id. at 14–15.
59 Doc. 31 at 7.
60 Id.
61 The Court notes that the first Graham factor—severity of the crime—does not
depend on whether it is classified as a misdemeanor or a felony. See Anderson v. Estrada,
140 F.4th 634, 643 (5th Cir. 2025) (finding that the “crime at issue,” a DUI, was a serious
crime) (citations omitted). Here, the crime at issue was a sexual offense against a minor. The
Court does not view the first Graham factor as inconclusive; rather, it finds this factor favors
Defendants because it views such a crime to be serious, regardless of whether it was a felony
or a misdemeanor.
62 Defs.’ Ex. 2 at 11:38:39–11:38:44.
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listen.63 When Deputy Anthony attempted to physically detain plaintiff, he
again commanded him to “stop” and warned “don’t get tased” while Plaintiff
actively struggled to break free.64 Once Plaintiff broke free, he fled.65 Only
then did Deputy Anthony tase him, resulting in 6.444 seconds of energization
total—roughly two of which occurred while Plaintiff was on the ground.66 The
entirety of Deputy Anthony’s taser application—three trigger pulls, each
launching a probe to create a completed circuit, and a fourth trigger pull
restarting 	the 	automatic 	five 	second 	energization 	cycle 	upon 	circuit
completion—occurred while Plaintiff was upright and running. 67 In other
words, Deputy Anthony did not initiate a single energization cycle after
Plaintiff had fallen; rather, he simply let the automatic cycle run for two or
three seconds as he closed the distance between he and Plaintiff.68 Over the
next several minutes, Deputy Anthony and the other Deputies commanded
Plaintiff to stop resisting while he physically struggled against being placed in
handcuffs.69
63 Id. at 11:38:44–11:39:40.
64 Id. at 11:39:40–11:40:05.
65 Id. at 11:40:02–11:40:05.
66 Id. at 11:40:09–11:40:11; Doc. 22-2.
67 Id. at 11:40:05–11:40:11; Doc. 22-2. The Taser 10 fires a single probe per trigger pull
and needs at least two probes to connect in order to form a completed circuit to deliver energy.
Once a circuit is complete, an automatic five-second energization cycle runs unless the
operator ends it early by moving the selector switch to the (SAFE) position. Doc. 22-11.
Plaintiff admits that “every trigger pull occurred while [Plaintiff] was upright and running
and that Deputy Anthony pulled no trigger and deployed no additional cartridge after
[Plaintiff] fell.” Doc. 32-3 at ¶11 (internal references omitted).
68 Defs.’ Ex. 2 at 11:40:08–11:40:11.
69 Video footage shows Plaintiff pinning his left arm under his body and screaming
several times to “call my momma.” Id. at 11:40:08–11:43:36. Only after several minutes of
struggle were the Deputies able to place Plaintiff in two sets of handcuffs. Id.
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At the outset, Plaintiff concedes that he actively resisted and fled being
detained by Deputy Anthony. Indeed, “[o]ur cases on police use of tasers have
paid particular attention to whether officers faced active resistance when they
resorted to a taser. Where, as here, the severity of crime and immediate safety
threat are relatively inconclusive, a suspect's active resistance to arrest may
justify this degree of force.”70 Here, Plaintiff was tased mid-flight only after he
actively resisted being detained. Moreover, Deputy Anthony did not tase
Plaintiff “as the first method to gain … compliance.”71 Rather, Deputy Anthony
gave Plaintiff several commands over the course of several minutes, further
warning him twice that he would be tased if he continued to actively resist.
70 Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding that an officer did not use
excessive force by tasing the plaintiff when he actively resisted arrest by refusing to listen to
commands and turning around while being handcuffed). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit places
significant emphasis on whether the Plaintiff was actively resisting or fleeing when analyzing
whether force was objectively unreasonable. See e.g., Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879
F.3d 613, 619–20 (5th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that flight is a key fact in the reasonableness
of initial tasings); Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 343 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding that it was
“objectively unreasonable for several officers to tackle an individual who was not fleeing, not
violent, not aggressive, and only resisted by pulling his arm away from an officer's grasp”);
Joseph, 981 F.3d at 342 (declaring that “[o]fficers engage in excessive force when they
physically strike a suspect who is not resisting arrest”); Williams v. City of Cleveland, 736
F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that in previous taser cases rejecting qualified
immunity—Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 380 (5th Cir. 2013); Newman v. Guedry, 703
F.3d 757, 764 (5th Cir. 2012); and Massey v. Wharton, 477 Fed.Appx. 256, 263 (5th Cir.
2012)—“the person tased was not attempting to flee”)); see also Mumpuku v. Neal, No. 18-
CV-00785, 2019 WL 6465315, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2019) (noting that the Fifth Circuit
distinguishes single-taser application cases based on whether the plaintiff was “actively
fleeing or actively resisting arrest” by comparing Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008);
Newman, 703 F.3d 757; Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2016), with Zimmerman v.
Cutler, 657 Fed.Appx. 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2016)); Henderson v. Harris County, 51 F.4th 125,
134–135 (5th Cir. 2022) (distinguishing Newman, 703 F.3d at 763 and Darden v. City of Fort
Worth, 880 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 2018) as “radically different” because, in part, “neither involved
a suspect fleeing from police”)).
71 Cloud, 993 F.3d at 385 (emphasis in original) (citing Pratt v. Harris Cnty., 822 F.3d
174, 182 (5th Cir. 2016)).
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Only after these attempts failed, did Deputy Anthony resort to tasing Plaintiff
as he fled. The Court finds that, as is constitutionally required, Deputy
Anthony 	used 	“measured 	and 	ascending 	actions 	that 	corresponded 	to
[Plaintiff’s] escalating verbal and physical resistance,” making the force he
used objectively reasonable. 72 Accordingly, Deputy Anthony’s initial tasing
was not excessive.
Further, Plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue as to whether the
roughly two seconds of post-fall tasing were objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff
contends 	that 	whether 	a 	reasonable 	officer 	would 	have 	stopped 	the
energization cycle by placing the weapon on SAFE immediately after Plaintiff
fell is a question of material fact precluding summary judgment. Plaintiff
contends there is a material question of fact as to whether his post-fall actions
conveyed 	active 	resistance, 	“rather 	than 	the 	effect 	of 	the 	pulses,” 	to 	a
reasonable officer.73 This Court disagrees.
While Plaintiff is correct that “an exercise of force that is reasonable at
one moment can become unreasonable in the next if the justification for the use
of force has ceased,” Deputy Anthony’s justification did not cease the instant
72 Anderson, 140 F.4th at 643; see also Trabucco v. Rivera, 141 F.4th 720 (5th Cir.
2025) (finding it significant that an officer did not “abruptly resort to overwhelming physical
force rather than continuing verbal negotiations”); Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th 577, 583–84
(5th Cir. 2022) (reasoning that force was not excessive because it was “measured and
ascending,” with the plaintiff only being tased once and not as a “first resort”); Cloud, 993
F.3d at 385 (finding that evidence of “measured and ascending” action is demonstrated by a
taser not being used “as the first method to gain … compliance”) (emphasis in original);
Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332–33 (declaring that constitutional use of force must be “measured and
ascending,” corresponding to a suspect’s “escalating verbal and physical resistance” and that
a suspect engaged in “active resistance,” as opposed to “passive resistance,” may make force
more justified) (quoting Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 2012) and
citing cases).
73 Doc. 32-2 at 3.
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Plaintiff fell to the ground.74 Not only must sufficient time elapse “for [an]
officer to perceive new information indicating the threat [has] passed” for
reasonable force to become unreasonable—here, two seconds—but Plaintiff did
not stop resisting after falling.75 According to Anderson v. Estrada, “[r]epeated
attempts to withdraw from an officer or declining to follow an officer's orders
constitute active resistance.” 76 The Court finds that two seconds was not
enough time for Deputy Anthony to perceive a change in circumstances and,
even if it were, Plaintiff continued to actively resist while on the ground by
disobeying multiple commands and pinning his arms beneath his body. Thus,
there is no genuine issue whether the two seconds of post-fall tasing were
objectively unreasonable. As a result, Deputy Anthony is entitled to qualified
immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.77
The Court does not take lightly the tragedy of this situation. Plaintiff is
a thirty-five-year-old intellectually disabled man who is largely non-verbal,
often communicating through pictures on his phone. Throughout this upsetting
encounter, 	Plaintiff 	pleaded 	with 	officers 	to 	“call 	my 	momma,” 	likely
demonstrating his lack of understanding of the situation. Indeed, this incident
has left a lasting impact on Plaintiff as he no longer wishes to leave the home
74 Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 277 (5th Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted and emphasis added); see Peña, 879 F.3d at 620 (“once an arrestee stops
resisting, the degree of force an officer can employ is reduced”) (quoting Cooper, 844 F.3d at
524). 75 Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted in citation).
76 140 F.4th at 646 (Betts, 22 F.4th at 584).
77 Because the Court has concluded that Deputy Anthony’s use of force was not
excessive, it does not, and need not, address whether his actions violated clearly established
law.
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by himself and becomes upset when he sees a marked police vehicle.78 While
the Court is sympathetic to the tragedy of these events, it is mindful of its
obligation to apply the law as it is, which requires that it analyze Deputy
Anthony’s actions “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 79 Though the details of
Plaintiff’s disabilities are clear today, they were not clear at the time of the
tasing incident. All Deputy Anthony knew before he tased Plaintiff was that a
man approached his vehicle, showed him a picture of a child unsolicited, said,
from what he understood, that he “rubbed her on the booty,” disobeyed multiple
commands to stand still, and 	fled 	twice. Therefore, 	the Court dismisses
Plaintiff’s claims against Deputy Anthony.
B. Remaining Deputies
For the first time in his Surreply, Plaintiff argues that Deputies Billiot,
Teetell, Adams, and Guerin used excessive force. Plaintiff points out that
Deputy Billiot restrained him and handed Deputy Anthony the baton used as
leverage 	to 	free 	Plaintiff’s 	arm 	and 	eventually 	handcuffed 	him. 	Plaintiff
further 	points 	out 	that 	Deputies 	Teetell, 	Adams, 	and 	Guerin 	assisted
completion of the handcuffing and “lift[ed] him by the arms while he was cuffed
and bent forward.”80 Plaintiff argues that while “ordinary handcuffing after
flight is [not] categorically unlawful … the recorded restraint and lifting must
be measured against his contemporaneous conduct, including the competing
78 Doc. 22-8 at ¶10.
79 Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)). The Court also notes
that “the legal significance of an officer’s awareness of a suspect’s mental health is murky.”
ibid. at 334.
80 Doc. 32-2 at 9.
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inference that his movements reflected pain and confusion rather than active
resistance.”81 The Court is not entirely sure what exactly Plaintiff’s point is,
but has no trouble finding that, based on evidence in the record, none of the
Deputies used excessive force even if Plaintiff’s actions are characterized as
passive resistance.
While the Court is aware that, in the usual case, each officer’s actions
should be analyzed independently to determine if he is entitled to qualified
immunity, the Court finds that doing so here is unnecessary.82 Plaintiff admits
that he “was not struck, punched, kicked, or slammed, and that the force used
included hands-on control, the baton lever, linked handcuffs, and lifting and
carrying.”83 He further admits that he “went limp, did not stand, and was
carried” into the police vehicle.84 Whether Plaintiff’s actions stemmed from
confusion or pain is immaterial. An officer’s use of force is an objective inquiry
and “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with
it the right to use some degree of physical coercion.”85 Moreover, the Fifth
Circuit has already stated that it “it is reasonable for an officer to attempt to
grab a noncompliant suspect’s arm in an attempt to handcuff the suspect.”86
81 Id.
82 Newman, 703 F.3d at 762 (“We examine each officer's actions independently to
determine whether he is entitled to qualified immunity.”) (citing Meadours v. Ermel, 483
F.3d 417, 421–22 (5th Cir.2007)).
83 Doc. 32-3 at ¶15.
84 Id. at ¶14.
85 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97 (the “‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case
is an objective one,” allowing “for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation”) (citations omitted).
86 Trammell, 868 F.3d at 343 n.9 (holding that qualified immunity was appropriate
against the plaintiff’s claim against an Officer who’s “only involvement in the altercation was
apparently an attempt to grab [the plaintiff’s] arm”).
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Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to whether any
of the other Deputies used force that was objectively unreasonable. Thus, they
are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claims.
III. 	Bystander Liability Claims
Finally, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	Deputies 	Billiot, 	Teetell, 	Adams, 	and
Guerin are liable as bystanders for failing to intervene while his constitutional
rights were violated. “An officer is liable for failure to intervene when that
officer: (1) knew a fellow officer was violating an individual's constitutional
rights, (2) was present at the scene of the constitutional violation, (3) had a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm but nevertheless, (4) chose not to
act.”87 A claim for bystander liability requires “more than mere presence in the
vicinity of the violation.”88 The officer must have “acquiesced in the alleged
constitutional violation.”89
Because the Court has already found that there was no violation of
Plaintiff’s 	constitutional 	rights, 	the 	bystander 	claims 	against 	the 	other
Deputies fail as a matter of law.90 Accordingly, they are dismissed.
IV. 	Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion
Plaintiff has also moved this Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(d) to defer or deny ruling on his non-immunity claims. In addition, he
requested additional discovery regarding Deputy Anthony’s training on the
Taser 10’s selector switch as well as limited identification discovery regarding
87 Joseph, 981 F.3d at 343 (citing Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013)).
88 Id. (quoting Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotations
omitted).
89 Id. (citing Whitley, 726 F.3d at 647) (internal quotations omitted).
90 See Anderson, 140 F.4th at 648 (ruling that bystander liability could not apply after
finding no constitutional violation).
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Deputies 	Teetell, 	Adams, 	and 	Guerin’s 	role 	in 	handcuffing 	and 	moving
Plaintiff into the police vehicle, dependent upon a finding that the Court
cannot resolve a Deputies qualified immunity without first clarifying their role
in the arrest.
Rule 	56(d) 	provides 	that 	“[i]f 	a 	nonmovant 	shows 	by 	affidavit 	or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition,” the court may defer consideration of the motion or allow
the nonmovant additional time for discovery.91 “To justify a continuance, the
Rule 56(d) motion must demonstrate (1) why the movant needs additional
discovery; and (2) how the additional discovery will likely create a genuine
issue of material fact.”92 The Rule 56(d) movant “must set forth a plausible
basis for believing 	that specified facts, susceptible of collection within a
reasonable time frame, probably exist and indicate how the emergent facts, if
adduced, 	will 	influence 	the 	outcome 	of 	the 	pending 	summary 	judgment
motion.”93
Here, the parties agreed at an in-person status conference that the
Court’s 	ruling 	on 	this 	Motion 	would 	only 	address 	qualified 	immunity. 94
Accordingly, insofar as the Motion seeks denial or deferral of non-qualified
immunity issues, it is denied as moot. In addition, the Court finds that Deputy
Anthony’s training on the Taser 10, as well as the reason he did not put the
weapon on safe after Plaintiff fell, is not material to whether he is entitled to
qualified immunity. The Court has already concluded that two seconds was not
91 Weaver v. Harris, 486 F. App’x 503, 505 (5th Cir. 2012).
92 Id.
93 McKay v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 700 (5th Cir. 2014).
94 Doc. 39.
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enough time for Deputy Anthony to perceive a change in circumstances, and
even if it were, Plaintiff continued to resist while on the ground. Thus, insofar
as the Motion seeks discovery regarding Deputy Anthony, it is denied. Finally,
because the Court has already found that none of Deputies Teetell, Adams, and
Guerin used excessive force, the Motion is denied insofar as it seeks discovery
regarding those Deputies’ role in this matter.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s excessive force, unreasonable search and seizure,
unlawful 	detainment, 	and 	bystander 	claims 	are 	DISMISSED 	WITH
PREJUDICE. In addition, Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 13th day of October, 2026.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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