Chronicles v. Loyola University New Orleans

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOSHUA CHRONICLES 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 25-2211
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS 	SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion1 filed by pro se plaintiff Joshua Chronicles
(“plaintiff”) to require that all communications be made via CM/ECF only and for
reporting of any future off-record contact.
Plaintiff’s motion states that he has “received unsolicited direct outreach from
individuals asserting authority on behalf of Defendant” Loyola University New
Orleans 	(“defendant”) 	and 	that 	these 	communications 	come 	“[p]rior 	to 	formal
appearance 	of 	defense 	counsel.”2 	Plaintiff 	represents 	that 	“any 	off-docket
communications create: [r]isk of procedural confusion, [p]otential ethical concerns,
and [a]bsence of judicial recordkeeping for all case-related contact.”3 He asks the
Court to order that defendant and its representatives communicate with him
“exclusively via CM/ECF filings.”4 He also asks that the Court require “notification
to the Court should any future case-related contact occur outside CM/ECF.”5
1 See R. Doc. No. 41.
2 Id. at 1. The Court notes that defendant has still not yet been served in this matter,
and it has not yet entered an appearance.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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According to plaintiff, this will create “clear boundaries,” which will, in turn,
ensure “[e]qual access to justice, [p]rotection against pressure outside judicial
oversight, [and] [a] clean and permanent record of all communications.”6 Plaintiff
cites no caselaw or rule that supports his position and request.7
The Court declines to grant plaintiff’s request. Counsel in any given civil
matter will regularly be required to meet and communicate informally with one
another outside the purview of the Court. In fact, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
contemplate such out-of-court meetings and communications. See, e.g., F ED. R. CIV.
P. 26(f); F ED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1) (“On notice to other parties and all affected persons,
a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must
include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to
confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to
obtain it without court action.”).
Although counsel to a represented party is generally obliged to avoid direct
contact with an opposing party who is represented by counsel,8 defense counsel in
this case necessarily will communicate directly with plaintiff because he is proceeding
pro se. Cf. Carter v. H2R Rest. Holdings, LLC, No. 16-1554, 2016 WL 11664124, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2016) (“The Court will not penalize [the defendant] for complying
6 Id.
7 See generally id.
8 See M ODEL R ULES OF P RO. CONDUCT r. 4.2 (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall
not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order. (emphasis
added)).
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with its obligation to avoid contact with a party represented by counsel – although it
notes that [the defendant’s] counsel must now communicate with Plaintiff directly
since she is proceeding in the action pro se.” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that these alleged communications from
defendant’s representatives, which, notably, plaintiff has not provided to the Court,
are harassing or otherwise improper. Cf. Houghtaling v. Eaton, 559 F. Supp. 3d 164,
170 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Plaintiff is reminded that, as a result of his pro se status, he is
required to communicate with both the Court and defense counsel to ensure an orderly
and efficient disposition of his case, and defense counsel’s attempts to communicate
with him—at least those offered by Plaintiff and reviewed by the Court—do not
qualify as ‘harassment.’”); Tubwell v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 17-15,
2018 WL 11417595, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 21, 2018) (“Parties to litigation in this
court, by and through counsel or in their own behalf when proceeding pro se, routinely
communicate informally with one another by email, but this should not be construed
as a waiver of service of papers required to be served by the [Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure] in the manner required by the rules.”). The Court sees no reason at this
juncture to require that all communications between the parties be made exclusively
via the docket or that all such communications should be reported to the Court.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
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New Orleans, Louisiana, December 10, 2025.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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