Amacker v. New Orleans Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL ACTION
NO: 	25-1491
ANJELE AMACKER
VERSUS
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPT., ET AL SECTION: “D” (4)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing,
including 	an 	Evidentiary 	Hearing, 	if 	necessary, 	and 	to 	submit 	proposed 	findings 	and
recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), § 1915(e)(2), and
§ 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) and (2). Upon review of the entire record,
the Court has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing.
I. 	Factual Summary
The litigation arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).
The Plaintiff, Adele Amacker (“Amacker”), pro se filed this lawsuit against the New
Orleans Police Department, Dannye Jones, and Brooks Grocery & Deli, LLC (“Brooks Grocery
& Deli”). On June 28, 2025, Amacker claims she attempted to report a crime at the Fifth District
Station of the New Orleans Police Department. R. Doc. 1 at 5. Amacker claims she was denied
entry and that the officer on duty at the front desk hid from her to avoid taking an incident report.
Id. Amacker alleges the officer then shouted at her, “I am not helping you.” Id.
Amacker next alleges that the police department through the Fifth District aided her
neighbors and Dannye Jones, her landlord, to “stalk and target” her by refusing to investigate
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 1 of 10

2
crimes she reported. R. Doc. 1 at 6. Notably, Amacker does not make any allegations about the
specific crimes she reported. Id.
On March 23, 2025, Amacker claims “the department” made false statements to the
Children’s Hospital Emergency Room doctor regarding her toddler. R. Doc. 1 at 6. She complains
that based on the department’s statements her child was taken from her, and they both suffered
emotional distress. Id. Amacker also claims the department’s actions led to her being hospitalized
and caused her to fail the courses she was taking. Id. She complains that the department’s conduct
violated her Fourth Amendment right from unreasonable searches like mail tampering. Id. She
complains that the “department” also violated her First Amendment right to free speech and
freedom from retaliation. Id.
Additionally, Amacker alleges that Dannye Jones, her landlord, failed to complete repairs
to her apartment and failed to ensure her safety ignoring “disability accommodations.” R. Doc. 1
at 6. She complains that Dannye Jones colluded with the other Defendants to unlawfully enter her
unit, tamper with her electrical meter, and cause her bill to increase. Id. She further complains that
the Defendants disclosed her private child welfare information to the downstairs tenant (Lelia
Richards) which allegedly resulted in her and her toddler being harassed and threatened by
Richards. Id.
Amacker contends that Dannye Jones then decided to evict her, enter her unit and search
her property without her consent, wrote threatening messages in her diary, and made false
allegations on notices. R. Doc. 1 at 6. The complaint again alleges Jones conspired with the New
Orleans Police Department Fifth District and the manager of Brooks Grocery & Deli to obtain a
mutual agenda of retaliation and an abuse of power. Id.
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 2 of 10

3
Amacker next alleges that on April 14, 2025, Dannye Jones allegedly assisted with planting
stolen store keys from the Brooks Grocery inside her home. R. Doc. 1 at 7. She complains that
Dannye Jones made subtle statements to the police department to ruin her reputation and to
provoke her arrest. Id. Amacker contends that she placed the keys inside her mailbox to protect
herself from the malicious schemes and arrests. Id. Amacker alleges these events too were the
result of a criminal conspiracy by the defendants. Id. She likewise complains that the grocery store
manager refused to engage her when she went there to report stalking. Id. at 8.
Finally, Amacker complains that she and her toddler were not treated fairly when she went
to purchase food from Brooks Grocery & Deli. R. Doc. 1 at 8. She complains that she sustained
injuries that violated her mental well-being. Id.
Amacker seeks a declaratory judgment that the Defendants conduct violated her rights,
$19,000 for her Medicaid bill statement, $3,000 for loss of education and academic disruption,
pain and suffering, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. R. Doc. 1 at 8-9. Amacker
also seeks a permanent injunction against Dannye Jones from participating in federally funded
housing and further requests that the Court refer this matter for a criminal investigation. Id. at 9.
II. 	Standard of Review
“[A] District Court may dismiss without prejudice a pro se litigant's complaint if it is
frivolous or malicious.” Harris v. United States Dept. of Justice, 680 F.2d 1109, 1111 (5th Cir.
1982) (citing Mitchell v. Beaubouef, 581 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1978)). As the Fifth Circuit in
Harris explained:
The two stage procedure that has been adopted in this Circuit for processing
prisoner pro se complaints filed in forma pauperis has full application in the present
context for it gives adequate protection to those not represented by attorneys and
comports with the explicit provisions of 28 U.S.C. [§] 1915. The District Court first
decides whether the litigant meets the economic requirements to proceed in forma
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 3 of 10

4
pauperis. Then, pursuant to [§] 1915[(e)(2)], the Court may dismiss the complaint
if, upon giving it the liberal reading traditionally granted pro se complaints, it
determines that it is unmeritorious, frivolous or malicious.
680 F.2d at 1111 (internal citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Phillips v.
City of Dallas, 2015 WL 233336, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2015) (noting that “a district court may
summarily dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes that the action” is frivolous,
malicious or fails to state a claim).
The Court has broad discretion in determining the frivolous nature of the complaint. See
Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds, Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d
114 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the Court may not sua sponte dismiss an action merely because of
questionable legal theories or unlikely factual allegations in the complaint.
Under this statute, a claim is frivolous only when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact. 	Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.
1998). 	A claim lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.
Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999). It lacks an arguable factual basis only if
the facts alleged are “clearly baseless,” a category encompassing fanciful, fantastic, and delusional
allegations. 	Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28.
Therefore, the Court must determine whether the plaintiff’s claims are based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual allegations. Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176
(5th Cir. 1994); see Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1995); Moore v. Mabus, 976
F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1992).
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 4 of 10

5
III. 	Analysis
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
i. 	New Orleans Police Department – Fifth District
Amacker first alleges that the New Orleans Police Department-Fifth District (“NOPD”)
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for refusing to accept her complaint of a crime by Dannye Jones, her
landlord, who allegedly entered her apartment without her permission to plant stolen evidence. R.
Doc. 1 at 5. Amacker complains the NOPD instead aided her neighbors and Dannye Jones, her
landlord, to “stalk and target” her. Id. at 6. The complaint further alleges the NOPD conspired with
her landlord and the manager of Brooks Grocery & Deli to obtain a mutual agenda of retaliation
and an abuse of power. Id.
To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify both the constitutional violation and the
responsible person acting under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
156 (1978); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
However, the New Orleans Police Department is not a person for purposes of suit under §
1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of St. Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There
is no law that attributes personality to the NOPD, and Courts in this District have consistently held
that the NOPD lacks juridical capacity. See, e.g., Winn v. New Orleans City, 919 F. Supp. 2d 743,
750 (E.D. La. 2013); Cook v. New Orleans Police Dep’t, No. 13-6324, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60649, at *3 (E.D. La. May 1, 2014). Therefore, Amacker’s claim against the NOPD- Fifth District
should be dismissed as frivolous.
ii. 	Dannye Jones and Brooks Grocery & Deli
Amacker also asserts that Dannye Jones and Brooks Grocery & Deli acted under the color
of the law when they conspired with the New Orleans Police Department to unlawfully enter her
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 5 of 10

6
unit to plant stolen evidence, which the complaint defines as store keys from Brooks Grocery,
inside her home. R. Doc. 1 at 7. Amacker complains that Defendants’ conduct violates her civil
rights and caused her and her child emotional distress as a result of this alleged criminal
conspiracy. Id.
In order for a private person’s conduct to make him a state actor under Section 1983, that
conduct must be fairly attributed to the state. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct.
2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982); Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345,
352 (5 th Cir. 2003). One example is if the private person is performing a public function that is
exclusively reserved to the state. See Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 158.
Another example is when the state exerts coercive power over the private person or
provides significant encouragement. Cornish v. Correctional Services Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549-
50 (5th Cir. 2005); Cornish v. Correctional Services Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549-50(5th Cir. 2005);
Webb v. Police Juror of Claiborne Parish, No. 19-1252, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227181, at *6
(W.D. La. Oct. 4, 2019). Lastly, state action by the private person can be found if the state has
inserted itself into a position of interdependence with the private person such that it was a joint
participant in the action. See id.
In this case, Dannye Jones and Brooks Grocery & Deli are private actors, so their conduct
would have to attributable to the State based on the three bases listed above. However, the Court
needs not to delve into any basis in this context because Amacker has failed to identity a proper
state actor. As noted previously, the Court established that the NOPD-Fifth District is not the
proper party here, so Amacker cannot establish any State interdependence with Jones and Brooks
Grocery & Deli. For these reasons, Amacker’s § 1983 claims against Jones and Brooks Grocery
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 6 of 10

7
& Deli should be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for which relief can be
granted.
B. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
Amacker also asserts a claim under the Violence Against Women Act pursuant to 34 U.S.C.
§ 12471. It is unclear which Defendant she purports to assert the claim against based on the
complaint and the basis for her claim. Nevertheless, the Violence Against Women Act confers no
private right of action. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 146 L.
Ed. 2d 658 (2000). Therefore, it is recommended that Amacker’s VAWA claim be dismissed as
frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
C. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act
Next, Amacker asserts that Dannye Jones, her landlord, violated Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). R. Doc. 1 at 6.
Amacker generally claims that Dannye Jones ignored her disability accommodations. Id. The
complaint does not identity any disability Amacker suffers from as well as explain what reasonable
accommodations she was seeking due to this ability.
The Rehabilitation Act, in pertinent part, states that “no otherwise qualified individual with
a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability… be denied the
benefits of…any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
On the other hand, the ADA provides that “[n]o qualified individual with a disability shall by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12132.
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 7 of 10

8
The ADA and the RA are judged and evaluated under the same legal standards, and the
same remedies are available under both. Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2010). The
ADA and the RA permits claims only against departments, agencies, and/or instrumentalities of a
State and does not confer liability on private individuals. See Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609
(5th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Hood, 900 F.3d 180, 184 n.6 (5th Cir. 2018).
To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, the plaintiff must prove (1) she is a qualified
individual with a disability, (2) the disability is known by the defendant; and (3) the defendant
failed to make reasonable accommodations. Providence Behavioral Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util.
Dist., 902 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2018).
First, the ADA and RA require that a person seeking relief under such provisions provide
that they are a “qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Here, Amacker fails to assert a disability at all and generally alleges that her landlord ignored her
accommodations. Amacker also fails to specify what accommodations she was seeking and how
such requests were denied. Further, Amacker seeks to assert the claims against her landlord, whom
is a private individual, which is not permitted by the ADA or RA. Therefore, Amacker’s claims
under the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act are also frivolous and should be
dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
D. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
Amacker lastly identifies a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act against Brooks
Grocery & Deli. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq; R. Doc. 1 at 8. Amacker claims Brooks Grocery &
Deli violated her civil rights when they denied services to her while benefiting from federal funds
like SNAP/EBT. Id. It is unclear the nature of the relief Amacker seeks against Brooks. In the
broadest sense, Amacker is seeking a declaratory judgment.
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 8 of 10

9
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq. forbids any person or institution which receives federal
funds to discriminate on the basis of race, color or national origin. 	Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1961, 60 L. Ed. 2d. 560, 579 (1979). “The purpose of
Title VI is twofold: 1) to avoid the use of federal funds to support discriminatory practices and 2)
to provide individual citizens effective protection against these practices.” Drayden v. Needville
Indep. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1981).
In reviewing the allegations set forth by Amacker, she generally alleges that she and her
toddler were “often” treated unfairly compared to other customers when she tried to purchase
items. She provides no further explanation regarding the unfair treatment that she labelled
discriminatory. Without more, these allegations fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted
and is therefore frivolous. It is therefore recommended that the Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq
claim against Brooks Grocery & Deli, LLC should be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. 	Recommendation
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Amacker’s § 1983 claims against Defendants the New
Orleans Police Department, Dannye B. Jones, and Brooks Grocery & Deli, LLC be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915e, § 1915(A), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Amacker’s claim under the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) against Defendants the New Orleans Police Department, Dannye B. Jones,
and Brooks Grocery & Deli, LLC be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915e, § 1915(A),
and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 9 of 10

10
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED Amacker’s claim under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act against Defendant Dannye Jones be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915e, § 1915(A), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Amacker’s §2000(d) claim against Defendant
Brooks Grocery & Deli, LLC be DISMISSED as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915e, § 1915(A), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir.
1996).1
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of January 2026.
HONORABLE KAREN WELLS ROBY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1 Douglass referenced the previously applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective
December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended to extend the period to fourteen days.
Case 2:25-cv-01491-WBV Document 6 Filed 01/07/26 Page 10 of 10