Mount v. Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DELORA MOUNT 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1377
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER
THROUGH THE BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA
STATE UNIVERSITY AND
AGRICULTURAL AND
MECHANICAL COLLEGE, AND
LOUISIANA CHILDREN’S MEDICAL
CENTER (D/B/A CHILDREN’S
HOSPITAL NEW
ORLEANS/MANNING FAMILY
CHILDREN’S)
SECTION “R” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants Louisiana State University Health
Sciences Center, through the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University 	and 	Agricultural 	and 	Mechanical 	College 	(“LSUHSC”), 	and
Louisiana Children’s Medical Center, doing business as Children’s Hospital
New Orleans/Manning Family Children’s (“LCMC”), partial motions to
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dismiss. 1 Plaintiff Dr. Delora Mount opposes the motions. 2 For the following
reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motions.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Dr. Delora Mount brings this case against LSUHSC and LCMC for
alleged 	discriminatory 	actions 	and 	other 	wrongs 	during 	her 	brief
employment. Dr. Mount alleges that, in 2021, LCMC recruited her to work
at Children’s Hospital New Orleans (“Children’s”), serving as Section Chief
of Pediatric Surgery at Children’s and as a surgeon with faculty duties at
LSUHSC. 3 	She alleges that her employment was routed through LSUHSC,
but that LCMC recruited her, communicated with her regarding her hiring,
paid for her recruitment, negotiated and paid her signing bonus, and was the
primary decision-maker in her hiring. 4 	She further alleges that LCMC
controlled many aspects of her job day-to-day, and that LSUHSC provided
no office space, administrative support, nursing support, or day-to-day
oversight of her job. 5
1 	R. Docs. 8, 11.
2 	R. Doc. 13.
3 	R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 2.
4 	Id. at ¶¶ 36-54.
5 	Id.
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Dr. Mount states that she began this job in the summer of 2022. 6 	A
year later, in the summer of 2023, she alleges that she injured her hand and
wrist during a fall caused by an underlying spinal condition. 7 	She further
alleges that the wrist injury required surgery, and that the spinal condition
required surgery and medical leave. 8 She alleges that defendants were aware
of her medical condition throughout the summer of 2023. 9 	She further
alleges that in November of 2023, they were aware that she would need
spinal surgery and medical leave, and that she provided formal notice of this
need on December 1, 2023. 10 	She alleges that defendants approved her for
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave on January 5, 2024, so she
could undergo surgery. 11 	On January 8, 2024, she allegedly received a
“dismissal letter” during a meeting with LSUHSC employees, providing July
9, 2024 as her last day. 12 	The letter allegedly stated “you are hereby given
notice that your appointment will not be renewed.” 13 	Nonetheless, Dr.
Mount states that she updated defendants regarding her medical clearance
6 	Id. at ¶ 2.
7 	Id. at ¶¶ 6, 76.
8 	Id. at ¶ 6.
9 	Id. at ¶ 82.
10 	Id. at ¶¶ 82, 87.
11 	Id. at ¶ 7.
12 	Id. at ¶¶ 7, 91-93.
13 	Id. at ¶ 7.
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in March 2024, informing them that she could return to work in April of that
year. 14 She alleges that defendants informed her via email that she was being
placed on administrative leave with no return to work before the July 9
contract end date. 15 	She further alleges that the rationale defendants
provided for this was that they “wanted to give [her] enough recovery time.” 16
Plaintiff additionally alleges that a key aspect of her recruitment was
defendants’ desire for Dr. Mount to mentor Dr. Masoumy, a surgeon who
had recently completed his clinical fellowship. 17 	Dr. Mount alleges that
despite this, she was paid less than he was paid. 18 	She additionally alleges
that defendants promoted him over her, despite her qualification for and
expressed interest in the position. 19
Dr. Mount also alleges that prior to being dismissed and placed on
administrative leave, she reported and opposed discrimination on the basis
of sex.20 	Specifically, she alleges that she reported inappropriate behavior,
including comments regarding a colleague taking maternity leave during a
July 2023 performance review of a subordinate, and that she reported
14 	Id. at ¶ 8.
15 	Id.
16 	Id.
17 	Id. at ¶ 4.
18 	Id. at ¶¶ 5, 158-163.
19 	Id. at ¶¶ 66-71.
20 	Id. at ¶¶ 152-157.
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another surgeon’s experience with sexism/harassment from a male surgery
colleague. 21 Plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against her for these
actions. 22
On July 3, 2025, plaintiff filed this suit against LCMC and LSUHSC. 23
Plaintiff brings claims for violations of: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; 	the 	Equal 	Pay 	Act; 	the 	Americans 	with 	Disabilities 	Act; 	the
Rehabilitation Act; the Louisiana Human Rights Act; the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act; the Family and Medical Leave Act; and Louisiana
Employment Discrimination Law. 24 Plaintiff additionally brings a claim for
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 25
Defendants LCMC and LSUHSC now move to dismiss portions of
plaintiff’s complaint. 26 	Plaintiff responded to the motions to dismiss,
withdrawing some claims and opposing the dismissal of others.27
The Court considers the parties’ arguments below.
21 	Id.
22 	Id.
23 	R. Doc. 1.
24 	See generally id.
25 	See generally id.
26 	R. Docs. 8, 11.
27 	R. Doc. 13.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007)), and “that, if true, ‘raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.’” 	Franklin v. Regions Bank, 976 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir.
2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	A claim is facially plausible
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true
and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 	Lormand
v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court
is 	not 	bound 	to 	accept 	as 	true 	legal 	conclusions 	couched 	as 	factual
allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Retaliation Under Title VII
Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee who
has opposed an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). 	To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must
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show that: “(1) [she] engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) [she]
suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a causal connection exists
between the protected activity and the adverse action.” 	Hudson v. Lincare,
Inc., 58 F.4th 222, 231 (5th Cir. 2023). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, but
she “must plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements to make her
case plausible.” 	Jenkins v. La. Workforce Comm’n, 713 F. App’x 242, 244
(5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Chhim v. Univ. of Texas, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir.
2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
An employee has engaged in protected activity if she has either “(1)
‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ by Title VII
[the 	opposition 	clause] 	or 	(2) 	‘made 	a 	charge, 	testified, 	assisted, 	or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under
Title VII [the participation clause].” 	Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300,
304 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). 	The opposition clause
does not require that the complained-of employment practice be unlawful so
long as the employee “demonstrate[s] that she had at least a ‘reasonable
belief’ that the practices she opposed were unlawful.” Id. (quoting Payne v.
McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Thus, internally complaining about an employment practice may constitute
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protected activity, so long as the complainant “reasonably believed the
employment practice to be unlawful.” 	EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819
F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2016).
In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that she reported inappropriate
behavior, including comments regarding a colleague’s taking maternity
leave, during a July 2023 performance review of a subordinate, 28 and that
she reported another surgeon’s experience with sexism and harassment from
a male surgery colleague. 29 	This is sufficient to allege that she engaged in
protected activity. 	See, e.g., Foster v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 160 F.
App’x 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that an employee engaged in
protected activity when the employee reported sex discrimination to human
resources).
As to the second element, in the retaliation context, an adverse
employment action includes “discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation,
or in the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment” but “does not
permit liability for de minimis workplace trifles.” Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty.,
79 F.4th 494, 502-05 (5th Cir. 2023). 	Here, plaintiff’s allegations include
that she was denied the opportunity for a promotion, that she was ultimately
28 	R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 155.
29 	Id. at ¶ 156.
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terminated, and that she was placed on leave.30 	These actions go beyond
“workplace trifles.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff’s complaint therefore adequately alleges
that she suffered a materially adverse action. 	See Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006) (termination is an “adverse
employment action” under Title VII); Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d
605, 612 (5th Cir. 2007) (denial of promotion is an “adverse employment
action” under Title VII).
Finally, to sufficiently plead a causal link between her conduct and the
alleged retaliation, plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly suggest that “the
employment 	decision 	and 	[her] 	protected 	activity 	were 	not 	wholly
unrelated.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001)
(cleaned up). Temporal proximity is one way to plausibly show the link, but
not the only way. See Paul v. Elayn Hunt Corr. Ctr., 666 F. App’x 342, 348
(5th 	Cir. 	2016). 	Moreover, 	to 	establish 	a 	causal 	link, 	plaintiff 	must
“demonstrate that the decision maker had knowledge of the protected
activity.” Tureaud v. Grambling State Univ., 294 F. App’x 909, 914 (5th Cir.
2008) (citing Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff does not sufficiently connect the adverse actions to the
protected activity. Plaintiff provides no information regarding when and to
30 	Id. at ¶ 152.
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whom she reported her colleague’s experience with sexism and harassment.
Plaintiff additionally provides no specifics regarding to whom she reported
the other inappropriate behavior in July 2023. 	Plaintiff’s complaint lacks
necessary information to plausibly “demonstrate that the decision maker had
knowledge of the protected activity.” Id.
Moreover, the events alleged are not sufficiently close in time to
plausibly allege a causal link by timing alone. Plaintiff was not passed over
for promotion until November 2023, four months after this event. She was
not “dismissed” 31 until January 2024, more than five months after she
allegedly reported the inappropriate behavior. And plaintiff was not placed
on administrative leave until after she was terminated. 	This too was more
than five months removed from the performance review. The events are not
close 	enough 	in 	time 	to, 	without 	more, 	plausibly 	show 	causation 	for
retaliation purposes. 	See Everett v. Cent. Miss., Inc. Head Start Program,
444 F. App’x 38, 47 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that a five-month period “is not
the 	kind 	of 	‘very 	close’ 	temporal 	proximity” 	recognized 	to 	establish
causality); cf. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 578 (5th Cir.
2020) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has previously held that a period of two-
31 	Plaintiff equates termination with the non-renewal of her contract. See
R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 7.
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and-a-half months, a period of two months, and a period of six-and-a-half
weeks between the protected act and adverse employment action “are close
enough to show a causal connection” in holding that such events “must be
very close in time to establish causation by timing alone”). 	Four and six-
month lapses are too long to establish a causal connection when plaintiff
relies on timing alone.
Accordingly, the Court grants defendants’ motions to dismiss as to this
claim without prejudice.
B. Breach 	of 	Implied 	Covenant 	of 	Good 	Faith 	and 	Fair
Dealing
Under 	Louisiana 	law, 	good 	faith 	performance 	is 	considered 	an
“implied requirement of every contract.” 	Grisaffi v. Dillard Dep’t Stores,
Inc., 43 F.3d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing La. Civ. Code art. 1983). This
necessarily requires there be a contract between the parties. 	Here, LCMC
argues that no contract exists between it and plaintiff. 	In her complaint,
plaintiff invokes the joint/dual employer doctrine and the borrowed servant
doctrine. Plaintiff also argues that there was an oral agreement between her
and LCMC, but this allegation is absent from her complaint.
Under the borrowed servant doctrine, “[o]ne may be in the general
service of another, and, nevertheless, with respect to particular work, may be
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transferred, with his own consent or acquiescence, to the service of a third
person, so that he becomes the servant of that person with all the legal
consequences of the new relation.” 	Total Marine Servs., Inc. v. Director,
Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 87 F.3d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 220 (1909)) (emphasis
omitted). 	The doctrine was created to hold a borrowing employer liable
under 	respondeat superior 	for the negligence of any employee it had
borrowed over which it had control. Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S.
215 (1909). 	The doctrine has also been applied to shield the borrowing
employer from tort liability. Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351, 359 (5th
Cir. 1977).
Under 	the 	“joint 	employer” 	doctrine, 	an 	individual 	may 	be 	the
employer of two different employers at the same time. 	“Joint employer
status is generally found in an ‘arrangement between employers to share an
employee’s services.’” La. Prac. Employment Law §18:1 (Nov. 2024) (citing
29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (1993)).
Plaintiff’s theory is that although her employment contract was with
LSUHSC, the circumstances of her employment satisfies one of the above
outlined doctrines to find that LCMC was also her employer. 	Additionally,
plaintiff now argues that she had an oral agreement with LCMC, but this does
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not appear in her complaint. Plaintiff appears to believe that satisfaction of
either the joint/dual employer or borrowed servant doctrines is enough to
allege a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing as to LCMC. However,
plaintiff points to no cases where an implied contractual duty is imposed
under either of these doctrines, and the Court has found no cases supporting
this theory. Because plaintiff has not alleged an employment contract with
LCMC, and has provided no support for the notion that either the joint/dual
employer or borrowed servant doctrines provide a basis for imposing liability
for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Court
must dismiss this claim.
C. Withdrawn Claims
Plaintiff has withdrawn her claims under the Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law as to both defendants. Plaintiff has also withdrawn her
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Louisiana Human
Rights Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act as to defendant LSUHSC.
Plaintiff has additionally withdrawn her claim for breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing as to defendant LSUHSC. 	Accordingly, the
Court dismisses defendants’ motions to dismiss these claims as moot.
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D. 	Diversity Jurisdiction
Defendant LSUHSC additionally argues that diversity jurisdiction is
unavailable in this matter because the LSUHSC Board of Supervisors is
considered an arm of the State of Louisiana, and a state is not a citizen under
28 U.S.C. § 1332.32 	But the Court’s original jurisdiction over claims in this
case was not based solely on diversity; plaintiff’s federal claims provide
federal question jurisdiction. 	Because the Court has original jurisdiction
over plaintiff’s federal law claims, this Court may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims if they “are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 	This typically means that each
separate claim “must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact[s]” and
be such that a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try them in one
judicial proceeding.” 	United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966). All of plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same series of events and
are such that one “would ordinarily . . . expect[] to try them in one judicial
proceeding.” 	Id. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	will 	exercise 	supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. As the Court is satisfied it has
federal question and supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, the
32 	R. Doc. 8-1 at 7-8.
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Court will not address LSUHSC’s arguments regarding the diversity of the
parties.
E. 	Punitive Damages against LSUHSC
LSUHSC argues that plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against
the Board of Supervisors. This is true. See Muslow v. Bd. of Supervisors of
Louisiana State Univ., & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 2024 WL 5246605, at *8 (E.D.
La. Dec. 30, 2024) (“exception of government entities from Title VII punitive
damages applies to state universities, like LSU”); Aucoin v. Kennedy, 355 F.
Supp. 2d 830, 841 (E.D. La. 2004) (“the EPA authorizes an award of
liquidated damages . . . [but] contains no other provision authorizing a
punitive award”); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (“punitive damages
may not be awarded . . . in suits brought under § 202 of the ADA and § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act”). 	Plaintiff does not dispute this. 	Therefore, the
Court grants LSUHSC’s motion as to punitive damages.
F. 	Leave to Amend
District courts must dismiss with leave to amend “unless the defect is
simply incurable, or the plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity after
being afforded repeated opportunities to do so.” Young v. U.S. Postal Serv.
ex rel. Donahoe, 620 F. App’x 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hart v. Bayer
Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000)). The presumption is that courts
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should dismiss a complaint only after “affording every opportunity” to the
plaintiff to state a claim unless it would be futile. 	Hitt v. City of Pasadena,
561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curium); Briggs v. Miss., 331 F.3d 499,
508 (5th Cir. 2003). An amendment is futile if “it would fail to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.” Marucci Sports, LLC v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751
F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014).
This is plaintiff’s first complaint, and the defects in it may be curable.
See Young, 620 F. App’x at 245. Under the presumption that leave to amend
“should be freely granted,” the Court grants plaintiff’s request for leave to
amend. Marucci Sports, LLC, 751 F.3d at 378.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to
dismiss as to plaintiff’s claim for retaliation in violation of Title VII against
both defendants and plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing against LCMC.
The Court DISMISSES plaintiff’s claim for retaliation in violation of
Title 	VII 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE 	and 	with 	LEAVE 	TO 	AMEND 	the
complaint within fourteen days of this order.
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The Court DISMISSES plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing against LCMC WITHOUT PREJUDICE and
with LEAVE TO AMEND the complaint within fourteen days of this order.
The Court DISMISSES defendants’ motions as to plaintiff’s withdrawn
claims (plaintiff’s LEDL claim against both defendants; and plaintiff’s ADA,
LHRA, FMLA, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claims against LSUHSC) AS MOOT.
The Court GRANTS LSUHSC’s motion as to punitive damages and
DISMISSES plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against LSUHSC WITH
PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of December, 2025.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19th
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