Davis v. Trege et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TYRONE JAMES DAVIS, III 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-463
MICHAEL TREGRE, ET AL. 	SECTION AP@ (5)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to FRCP
12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim and FRCP 12(b)(1) for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction (rec. doc. 7) filed by Defendants Mike Tregre, Sheriff of St. John the Baptist
Parish; Deputy Lionel Luchion; and Deputy Daniel Reed and the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant
to FRCP 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim (rec. doc. 14) filed by Defendant, Deputy Bobby
Bradberry (collectively, “Defendants”).1 Because both motions argue the same grounds for
dismissal, they are analyzed together below. 	Plaintiff opposes only the second motion to
dismiss. (Rec. doc. 15). 	Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court
recommends as follows.
I. 	Background
On March 10, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Tyrone James Davis III filed this lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, claiming to have suffered injuries during a traffic stop
initiated by the Deputy Defendants on March 14, 2025. 	(Rec. doc. 1). 	Specifically, Davis
claims he was subject to excessive force, unlawful search, and wrongful arrest during a
1 The motions were referred to the undersigned on October 14, 2025. (Rec. doc. 20).
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pretextual and illegitimate traffic stop for violations related to tinted windows and failure to
use a turn signal. 	(Id.). 	He alleges that Defendants acted without probable cause,
justification, or lawful authority, violating his right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures and arbitrary deprivation of liberty when he was threatened with a taser,
forcibly removed from his vehicle, and slammed to the ground. (Id.). Davis claims the traffic
stop was illegitimate because he was parked at the time it occurred. (Id.). Davis attached a
video recording of a portion of the traffic stop as a manual attachment in support of his
Complaint. (Rec. doc. 1-7).
When repeatedly asked to produce his driver’s license during the traffic stop, Davis
declared that he was a “secure party” and refused to allow Bradberry to “use [his] name.”
(Id., timestamp 00:42 through 00:52). Bradberry told Davis that he was being investigated
pursuant to a lawful traffic stop and that he needed to identify himself. (Id., timestamp 00:52
through 1:00). Davis refused, instead telling Bradberry that he was going to be “subject to a
tort claim” worth up to “half a million dollars” if Bradberry used Davis’s name “without [his]
consent.” 	(Id., 	timestamp 	1:10 	through 	1:29). 	Bradberry 	acknowledged 	Davis’s
representation and again asked him to produce his driver’s license, registration, and proof
of insurance. (Id., timestamp 1:23 through 1:29). Despite having already been provided with
a basis for the traffic stop, Davis stated, in response to Bradberry’s repeated request for
identification, “Yeah, but you still gotta give me a reason why you stopped me.” 	(Id.
timestamp 1:27 through 1:33). Davis then began disputing the basis for the traffic stop, all
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the while repeatedly being ordered to provide his documentation. 	(Id., timestamp 1:35
through 2:14). Despite showing his driver’s license to his cell phone’s camera at the 2:30
mark, Davis waited another 46 seconds to put his driver’s license in view of Bradberry. (Id.,
timestamp 2:30 through 3:16). In response to Bradberry’s insistence that Davis give him the
driver’s license, Davis told Bradberry, “I’m not handing it over to you, I’m just showing you
my identification . . . . I don’t have to give it to you.” 	(Id., timestamp 3:17 through 3:30).
Plaintiff’s cell phone video ends shortly thereafter.
Given Davis’s recalcitrance, Bradberry, Luchion, and Reed2 forcibly removed Davis
from his vehicle and placed him on the ground, allegedly pinning him down with a knee on
his neck. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 4). Due to injuries sustained during the arrest – a contusion to the
right eyebrow and abrasions on his right hand and wrist – Davis was treated by paramedics
at the scene and was thereafter detained for four days from March 14, 2024 to March 18,
2024. (Id.; rec. doc. 1-7 at 5-6).
On March 10, 2025, Davis filed this lawsuit under Section 1983, alleging that the
excessive force used by Defendants against him caused severe physical injuries, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and financial harm, including loss of employment. (Rec. doc.
1-1). 	Davis sues the Deputy Defendants – Luchion, Reed, and Bradberry – in both their
official and individual capacities and Tregre in his official capacity as Sheriff of St. John the
2 Luchion and Reed were present from the beginning of the incident, although it appears that Bradberry
conducted the questioning of Davis. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 3).
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Baptist Parish. (Id. at 2). Davis seeks compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief,
and attorney’s fees and costs. (Rec. doc 1-1 at 9-11).
II. 	Standard on Motion to Dismiss
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and, without jurisdiction conferred
by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods.
Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286–87 (5th Cir. 2012); Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th
Cir. 1998). “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions,
the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any
attack on the merits.” See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977)). “On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the
party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction has the burden [of proof].” Boudreaux v. La. State
Bar Ass'n, 3 F.4th 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2021). 	The district court should only grant a Rule
12(b)(1) motion “if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. In the
Fifth Circuit, the standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)
resembles the standard of review for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), but also allows
the Court to consider a broader range of materials. Mansa Musa El v. United States, No. 21-
cv-968, 2021 WL 4148118, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2021) (citing Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d
360, 364-65 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008)).
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Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Such a motion is viewed with disfavor and is therefore rarely granted. See
Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] all well-pleaded facts as
true and view[s] all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” See Thompson v. City of
Waco, Tex., 764 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch.
Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). 	But in deciding whether
dismissal is warranted, the Court will not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as
true. Id. at 502-03 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
To survive dismissal, “‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
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sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”). This is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at
679. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability,
it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at
678 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 	“[A] plaintiff's
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief,’” thus, “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Finally, “[w]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court ‘must consider the
complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources ordinarily examined when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631
F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
322 (2007)). If the Court considers materials outside of the pleadings, the motion to dismiss
must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. 	See Causey v. Sewell
Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004); Phoenix on behalf of S.W. v.
Lafourche Par. Gov't, No. CV 19-13004, 2021 WL 184909, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2021); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Moreover, where video recordings are included in the pleadings, as is the case here,
“the video depictions of events, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, should be
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adopted over the factual allegations in the complaint if the video ‘blatantly contradict[s]’
those allegations.” Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1158, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)) (alteration in original). When a party “referenced
the video in their complaint and brief” and “included several screenshots from the video in
their complaint,” “caselaw supports our consideration of the video.” Winder v. Gallardo, 118
F.4th 638, 643-44 (5th Cir. 2024) (per curiam). 	In this case, because Davis referenced
cellphone footage taken by Davis in his Complaint and included screenshots from it, the
Court considers the video.
III. 	Law and Analysis
A. 	The Deputy Defendants: Official Capacity
As a threshold matter, Bradberry, Luchion, and Reed cannot be sued in their official
capacities. 	Official-capacity suits may be brought only against an official acting as a
policymaker, such that his decisions represent the official policy of the local government unit.
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). The Court looks to state law when
making that determination. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (plurality
opinion). In Louisiana, the sheriff is the final policymaker. 	See La. Const. art. 5, § 27 (“[The
sheriff] shall be the chief law enforcement officer in the parish.”); La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5539
(“Each sheriff . . . shall preserve the peace and apprehend public offenders.”); see also Craig
v. St. Martin Par. Sheriff, 861 F. Supp. 1290, 1300 (W.D. La. 1994). Accordingly, any official
capacity claims against Bradberry, Luchion, and Reed should be dismissed.
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B. 	Excessive Force
Plaintiff brings a claim for excessive force against Bradberry, Luchion, and Reed
under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 6-7). No Defendant briefs
this claim under the Fourth Amendment in either motion to dismiss.3 Accordingly, this
claim against the Deputy Defendants in their individual capacities under the Fourth
Amendment should survive.
C. 	False Arrest
While Davis does not explicitly state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth
Amendment, he does mention it numerous time throughout his Complaint. 	(Rec. doc. 1).
Accordingly, to the extent that he does state such a claim, the Court addresses it here. Davis
essentially contends that, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, Bradberry, Luchion,
and Reed wrongfully arrested him without probable cause. 	(Rec. doc. 1). 	Further, Davis
argues that because all charges against him from the arrest have been dismissed, that is all
the evidence needed to prove that the Deputy Defendants’ actions were unlawful, and that
Plaintiff suffered injury for no reason at all. (Id.).
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 	U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. 	Arrests are seizures of persons, and, therefore, must be reasonable under
circumstances to comply with the Fourth Amendment. See Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
3 As will be outlined below, the Deputy Defendants address Davis’s excessive force claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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U.S. 48, 56 (2018) (citation omitted). “[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment [when] there is probable cause to believe that a criminal
offense has been or is being committed.” 	Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004).
“Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from
the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Id. To prevail on a Fourth
Amendment claim for “false arrest” brought under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that
officers could not have reasonably believed that they had probable cause to arrest the
plaintiff for any crime. Graham v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 288 F. Supp. 3d 711, 737 (N.D.
Tex. 2017). Thus, probable cause is a necessary component of Davis’s Fourth Amendment
claim for false arrest. Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010).
“Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police
officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to
conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” United States v.
McCowan, 469 F.3d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2006). “If an officer has probable cause to believe that
an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
Moreover, it is irrelevant to the justification of an arrest that the charges were later
dropped by a criminal court. See Spencer v. Rau, 542 F. Supp. 2d 583, 591 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
Instead, 	when 	reviewing 	the 	issue 	of 	probable 	cause, 	the 	Court 	determines 	the
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“reasonableness of the actions taken in light of the cause that existed at the time of arrest.”
Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original) (citing Hunter
v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)). It is the totality of the circumstances that matters. Id.
Practical common sense is used to determine whether a reasonable officer could have
believed there was a fair probability that the person arrested committed the crime. Id.
Here, Davis was arrested for three counts of resisting an officer with force or violence,
and one count of resisting arrest by failure to identify. Davis was certainly in the presence
of all three deputies when resisting arrest because he had been pulled over for traffic
violations. 	Confusingly, Plaintiff claims the traffic stop was illegitimate because he was
parked at the time when it occurred; however, Plaintiff does not deny that the violations
occurred or how the deputies could have initiated the traffic stop if his vehicle were not
parked and immobile. 	(Rec. doc. 1). 	At first, it was only Bradberry at the scene but as
tensions escalated, Bradberry requested more help which was provided by Luchion and
Reed. This is evident through Plaintiff’s submission of his cell phone footage which depicts
Davis’s failure to comply with the Deputy Defendants’ orders.
An officer effectuating a traffic stop is constitutionally permitted to request a driver's
license, insurance papers, and vehicle registration. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500,
507-08 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that asking such questions allows the officer to “efficiently
determine whether a traffic violation has taken place, and if so, whether a citation or warning
should be issued or an arrest made”). Further, Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:108(B)(1)(f)
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provides that a citizen commits the crime of resisting an officer when a citizen “[f]ail[s] to
provide or display the person’s state issued driver’s license or identification on the officer’s
request when the person is an operator of a motor vehicle, the person has been lawfully
detained for an alleged violation of a law, and the officer has exhausted all resources at his
disposal to verify the identity of the person.” When Plaintiff repeatedly refused to present
his driver's license to Bradberry, he immediately gave Bradberry probable cause to arrest
him for violating Section 14:108(B)(1)(f).
Plaintiff’s cell phone footage shows that Bradberry did not merely request that
Plaintiff display his driver’s license, but asked Plaintiff to physically provide it to him so he
could use it to complete his investigation of the traffic stop. Davis repeatedly refused to do
so and was consequently arrested. He also failed to comply with instructions from Bradberry
to exit his vehicle. 	Given Plaintiff’s documented violation of the aforementioned statute,
probable cause exited for his arrest. Thus, the Deputy Defendants reasonably believed that
they had probable cause to arrest Davis and no constitutional violation occurred. Even when
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undisputed evidence is insufficient to
establish a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim.4
D. 	Unlawful Search and Seizure
Davis also asserts a claim under the Fourth Amendment for unlawful search and
seizure. Davis claims that Bradberry, Luchion, and Reed conducted a warrantless and non-
4 Given this Court’s recommendation that Plaintiff be allowed 30 days within which to amend his Complaint,
the Court does not address the Deputy Defendants’ qualified immunity argument at this time.
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consensual search of Plaintiff’s vehicle. 	As previously stated, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits law enforcement officers from conducting searches or seizures without probable
cause, a warrant, or the individual’s consent. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Davis argues that his
rights were violated because the search incident to arrest was not supported by probable
cause or exigent circumstances, rendering it unlawful.
The automobile exception permits officers to search a vehicle “if they have probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” United States
v. Ned, 637 F.3d 562, 567 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154
(5th Cir. 1993)). Again, “[a] probable cause determination should be based on the totality of
the circumstances,” and “[t]he evidence in support of probable cause ‘must be viewed in light
of the observations, knowledge, and training of the law enforcement officers involved in the
warrantless search.’” 	Buchner, 7 F.3d at 1154 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983); United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1438 (5th Cir. 1990)).
The search of Davis's vehicle was a permissible search incident to arrest. A search
pursuant to this exception is “broad enough to include the interior of a vehicle if the arrestee
was a recent occupant of the vehicle and it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” United States v. Bass, 996 F.3d 729, 739 n.2
(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).
Here, Davis was arrested and handcuffed outside of his vehicle. Plaintiff was pulled
over for a traffic violation which escalated into an arrest for failure to identify and resisting
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an officer with force or violence. Due to the traffic violation and arrest, Bradberry needed to
complete his investigation. 	He was unable to locate registration on the vehicle and
specifically observed the vehicle did not have an inspection sticker.
However, after being arrested, Davis advised the Deputy Defendants that he had cash
inside his vehicle inside a hidden compartment (i.e., in an air-condition vent above the radio)
and that the cash was in a paper bag. (Rec. doc. 1-7). There is no indication in the record as
to how the money was obtained but one of the Deputy Defendants must have retrieved the
money from inside the vehicle because that would be the only way to access the space above
the air vent. Bradberry then had the money counted at SJPSO Patrol Headquarters which
equaled $3,700.00 in U.S. currency. (Id.). Further, the money was then released to Plaintiff’s
property, and he agreed on the amount being correct. (Id.). There is no suggestion that any
other areas of the car were searched, or any other items were retrieved. In light of being
informed by Plaintiff himself about this money, it was not unreasonable for the Deputy
Defendants to confiscate Plaintiff’s property from his vehicle.
Regardless, the money was found incident to arrest, and the specific location of the
money was provided to the Deputy Defendants by Davis. 	Further, Bradberry reasonably
could have felt concern for his safety at the time of the arrest due to the driver’s failure to
comply and Bradberry’s not knowing if any weapons were inside the vehicle. Therefore, he
had reason to believe there may have been evidence in the car relevant to the crime for
arrest. Lastly, the facts do not suggest that Bradberry used coercive techniques to retrieve
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the money or did so in bad faith. For these reasons, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated.
E. 	Substantive Due Process
Davis also advances a claim against Bradberry, Luchion, and Reed under the
Fourteenth Amendment for a violation of his substantive due process rights when they used
excessive force, wrongfully arrested him, and disregarded his rights. 	Claims of excessive
force “in the course of an arrest” are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Tyson v. Sabine,
42 F.4th 508, 515 (5th Cir. 2022). The substantive due process component of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to excessive force alleged to have occurred after all incidents of arrest
are complete. Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1449 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397-398 (2015) (“the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial
detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment”) (citation omitted).
When alleged incidents of excessive force are based on events before booking the
arrestee into a jail, they are covered by the Fourth, rather than Fourteenth, Amendment. See
McFarland v. Lee Co. Adult Detention Ctr., No. 20-64, 2023 WL 2576398, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Mar.
20, 2023) (finding that excessive force claim based on events occurring before plaintiff was
booked into jail not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment “as the plaintiff was not a
pretrial detainee”) (citing Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A
plaintiff becomes a ‘pretrial detainee, protected against excessive force by the Due Process
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Clause’ of the Fourteenth Amendment once he is arrested, booked, and detained in a jail
cell.”)). 	Here, Davis alleges that any use of force occurred during the course of his arrest,
and he alleges his arrest was not supported by probable cause. 	Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment controls Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, and any substantive due process claim
should be dismissed.5
F. 	Monell Liability
Next, Davis alleges that St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff Mike Tregre failed to
adequately train and supervise his deputies on constitutional protections, including proper
use-of-force techniques, de-escalation tactics, and lawful search and seizure protocols under
the Fourth Amendment. Davis only sues Tregre in his official capacity. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 2).
“Official capacity suits generally represent another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.” Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th
Cir. 1999). Accordingly, an official capacity claim against the Sheriff would, in reality, be a
claim against the local governmental entity itself. 	Passerrello v. Sumner, Civ. A. No. 3:09-
1916, 2013 WL 4590618 at *2 (W.D. La. Aug. 8, 2013) (citing Glasper v. Guzman, Civ. A. No.
06-2040, 2009 WL 1507568 at *6 (E.D. La. May 27, 2009)).
a. 	Deficient Policies
Davis contends that Tregre’s use-of force, traffic stop, and search-and-seizure policies
are deficient. Specifically, Davis asserts Section 1983 liability under Monell v. Department of
5 Defendants need not address the substantive due process claim as it relates to Davis’s claim of false arrest as
this Court has already recommended dismissal of that claim under the Fourth Amendment.
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Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Supreme Court held that local government
entities and their policymakers can be held liable for constitutional violations caused by
official polices, custom, or failures in training or supervision. Id. at 694. A Monell claim has
three elements: “a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights
whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567,
578 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 	Monell liability does not arise via
respondeat superior. 	Id. 	Consequently, the unconstitutional conduct must be directly
attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated
unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability. Bennett
v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409,
415 (5th Cir. 1989).
To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint's “description of a policy or
custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violate . . . cannot be conclusory;
it must contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th
Cir. 1997). “A general allegation of a policy is not sufficient.” Peña v. City of Rio Grande City,
879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167 (rejecting as vague a
conclusory claim by the plaintiff that her arrest without probable cause stemmed from the
police department’s general policy of disregarding the rights of African American citizens).
Nor is mere “speculation that any particular policymaker . . . knew about the alleged custom.”
Peña, 879 F.3d at 623.
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An “official policy” may be either a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking officers
or a persistent, widespread practice . . . which, although not authorized by an officially
adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents a municipal policy.” Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th
Cir. 1992) (citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984)). “Isolated acts”
generally cannot establish the existence of a custom or practice. Burge v. St. Tammany Par.,
336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003). A custom is equivalent to official policy when it is “so
common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.”
Webster, 735 F.2d at 841.
When prior incidents are used to prove a custom, they “must have occurred for so
long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the governing
body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice . . . ”. Id.
at 842. 	This standard requires similarity and specificity, as “[p]rior indications cannot
simply be for any and all ‘bad’ or unwise acts but rather must point to the specific violation
in question.” Est. of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th
Cir. 2005). An action asserting municipal liability under Section 1983 cannot “proceed past
the pleadings stage” if the complaint does not provide a non-conclusory description of a
policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation. Peña, 879
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F.3d 613 at 622 (citing Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167). 	A custom also requires “sufficiently
numerous prior incidents.” McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989).
Here, Davis has failed to satisfy the most basic requirements relative to pleading an
official capacity claim under Section 1983. Davis does not identify an officially-promulgated
policy that instructed deputies to engage in the alleged unconstitutional activities at issue
here. Consequently, Davis necessarily relies “on a custom or practice so common and well
settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy, and [a]ctual or
constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the policymaker.” Armstrong
v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 276 (5th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). However, the only alleged acts of
excessive force that Davis describes are his own and an alleged October 12, 2024 excessive
force incident involving a Deputy Bordelon. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 5). And while Davis cites to a
lawsuit involving an officer-involved shooting death of Barbara Fobb Lassere, a review of the
court docket in that matter shows that all of the federal claims against all of the defendants
were dismissed with prejudice at the conclusion of a jury trial in the matter, and that only a
state-law claim for negligence survived. See Lassere v. Carroll, E.D. La., Civ. A. No. 2:13-cv-
05430, Rec. doc. 65. Further, two alleged incidents do not constitute a ”widespread” practice
sufficient to show the existence of a policy, practice, or custom, as discussed below.
Although Davis attempts to identify deficiencies in Tregre’s “use-of-force policy,”
“traffic stop policy,” “search-and-seizure policy,” the only allegedly unconstitutional traffic
stop or search and seizure that Davis describes is his own. Bizarrely, Davis references the
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Louisiana state court matter of State v. Joseph to prove the existence of an unconstitutional
traffic stop/search and seizure policy. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 5). However, Davis must not have
read his submission on Joseph, as the portion he cites clearly states that “it was determined
the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the [traffic] stop.” (Id.).
Davis has failed to allege sufficiently numerous prior incidents of unconstitutional
traffic stops, searches, seizures, or uses of force to particularly identify a custom or practice
of such acts on the part of the SJBPSO. Again, in terms of allegedly unconstitutional uses of
force, two prior incidents are not sufficient for establishing a widespread practice or custom
claim under Section 1983. 	A pattern requires “sufficiently numerous prior incidents” as
opposed to “isolated instances.” 	McConney, 863 F.2d at 1184. 	The Fifth Circuit has
previously held that 27 incidents of police excessive force complaints between 2002 and
2005 did not establish a pattern or practice such that a Monell claim could survive dismissal.
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has
also held that 11 alleged incidents of unconstitutional searches were insufficient for
establishing a pattern or practice of that activity. Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 329
(5th Cir. 2002). Here, there are not enough applicable incidents alleged by Davis to survive
dismissal.
Moreover, 	the 	issue 	of 	whether 	a 	municipality 	condoned 	the 	allegedly
unconstitutional behavior must be considered. Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851. Here, Davis points
to the fact that the deputy who allegedly used excessive force in October 2024 was fired and
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arrested for simple battery. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 5). This leaves exactly one act of excessive force
in support of his (allegedly) de facto policy claim – his own. The same reasoning applies to
Davis’s claim of an unconstitutional traffic stop and/or search and seizure. 	This is
insufficient for the purpose of supporting the alleged existence of “a pattern so common and
well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Peterson, 291
F.3d at 850 (internal quotation marks omitted).
b. 	Failure to Train
Plaintiff alleges that Tregre failed to “provide constitutional training” in the areas of
use of force and lawful search and seizure protocols, in addition to a failure to supervise and
discipline SJBPSO employees. (Rec. doc. 1). “A claim for failure to train must allege sufficient
facts to show that (1) the municipality adopted inadequate training policy procedures, (2)
acted with deliberate indifference in doing so, and (3) the inadequate training policy directly
caused the plaintiff's injury.” Speck v. Wiginton, 606 F. App'x 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing
Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010)).
As for the first element, “[d]efects in a particular training program must be
specifically alleged.” Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Roberts v.
City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2005)). 	Of course, courts only require
“minimal factual allegations” about the training programs at the pleading stage, as “it is
exceedingly rare that a plaintiff will have access to (or personal knowledge of) specific details
regarding the existence or absence of internal policies or training procedures prior to
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discovery.” Thomas v. City of Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 842-43 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Still, a
plaintiff cannot state a failure-to-train claim by making a “conclusory allegation that it is
‘apparent from the facts of [the] case’ that [ ] excessive force training . . . was insufficient.”
Speck, 606 F. App'x at 736.
“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” 	Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). 	Thus, when city
policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training
program causes city employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights, the city may be
deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program. Id. at 407.
A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is “ordinarily
necessary” to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Id. at 409.
Policymakers' “continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has
failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for
the consequences of their action – the ‘deliberate indifference’ – necessary to trigger
municipal liability.” 	Id. at 407. 	Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a
particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training
program that will cause violations of constitutional rights. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
61 (2011).
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In this case, Davis has made the conclusory allegation that Tregre failed to train,
discipline, and supervise without identifying how the SJBPSO’s training program is deficient.
Davis has not alleged facts to show that Tregre acted with deliberate indifference in his
training of any SJBPSO employee in any area. 	Davis has failed to allege specific facts to
establish a pre-existing pattern of bad acts that would satisfy the bar for surviving dismissal
of his official capacity claims. 	Davis has not alleged a sufficient pattern of pre-existing
violations on the part of any member of the SJBPSO to put Tregre on notice of the need for
additional training, supervision, or disciplinary action. Therefore, no alleged policy, practice,
custom or lack of training, supervision, or discipline attributed to Tregre can be described as
the moving force behind any alleged Constitutional violations.
G. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Lastly, Davis asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against all
Defendants. 	(Rec. doc. 1-1 at 9). 	Defendants do not address this state-law claim in their
motions, and it should therefore survive.
H. 	Injunctive Relief
Davis seeks an order from this Court requiring Tregre to implement “comprehensive
training for all deputies on constitutional protections and proper use-of-force techniques,”
the establishment of an independent oversight body to investigate complaints of misconduct
and excessive force, and the institution of immediate disciplinary measures for deputies
found to have violated unspecified constitutional rights. (Rec. doc. 1-1 at 10-11). However,
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Davis has alleged no facts to show that he is entitled to injunctive relief as he lacks standing
to seek such relief.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by
statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d
144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). It is well established that “the issue of standing is one of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Cobb v. Cent. States, 461 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2006). The doctrine of
standing addresses the question of who may properly bring suit in federal court, and “is an
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The doctrine of standing “involves both
constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its
exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). “Standing is determined as of the time
that suit is filed.” Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 297, 302 n.3 (5th Cir.
2005) (citing Pederson v. La. State Univ., 23 F.3d 858, 870 (5th Cir. 2000)). 	To establish
standing, a plaintiff must meet both constitutional and prudential requirements. See Procter
& Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 560 (5th Cir. 2001).
The issue of constitutional standing requires a litigant to establish three elements: (1)
injury-in-fact that is concrete and actual or imminent, not hypothetical; (2) a fairly traceable
causal link between the injury and the defendant's actions; and (3) that the injury will likely
be redressed by a favorable decision. 	See Little v. KPMG LLP, 575 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir.
2009). To obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must be “likely to suffer future injury.” City of
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L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show
a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974). The threat
of future injury to the plaintiff “must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Davis’s unlikely chances of a favorable decision in this matter aside, he has failed to
present any facts showing that he is likely to suffer a future injury, such that injunctive relief
is permitted here. Indeed, Davis is required to show that there is a future risk of his being
arrested by and subjected to excessive force by SJBPSO deputies at some future time, which
is too speculative and remote to support Article III standing. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105. A purely
speculative chain of events must occur for Davis to be subject to the same allegedly
unconstitutional actions that are the subject of this lawsuit. Other than the allegations that
he was allegedly injured in the past, there are no factual allegations pleaded which show a
nonspeculative, non-hypothetical, “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”
threat of being subjected to the same acts again in the future. Davis’s Complaint does not
satisfy his burden of establishing standing to seek injunctive relief at the outset of this
litigation. Therefore, Davis’s claims for prospective equitable relief should be dismissed for
lack of standing.
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I. 	Leave to Amend
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that leave to amend “shall be freely
given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 	However, leave to amend is “by no
means automatic.” Addington v. Farmer's Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.
1981). Instead, the decision to grant or deny leave is one left to the sound discretion of the
trial court. 	In deciding whether leave should be granted, the district court can consider
factors such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party . . . [and] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
“When the dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate, it should generally be done
without prejudice in order to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended
complaint.” 	Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 2017)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). “However, a district court may dismiss with prejudice
if the plaintiff has been given adequate opportunity to cure the inadequacies in his pleading
or if the pleadings ‘demonstrate that the plaintiff has pleaded his best case.’” Id. (first quoting
Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal with
prejudice for failure to state a claim when plaintiff did not file a supplemental complaint but
did file an extensive response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, alleging facts that
suggested negligence but not deliberate indifference in a § 1983 action); and then citing
Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of
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Section 1983 action brought by an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis who had
no opportunity to amend his complaint but who was given a questionnaire to bring his claims
into focus)).
Here, Davis was given no “opportunity to cure the inadequacies in his pleading.” Id.
Nor was he given a questionnaire to focus his claims. And the pleadings demonstrate that he
has not pleaded his best case; Davis has not been able to plead crucial elements of a plausible
claim because he lacked the necessary discovery. 	“With the benefit of more specific
allegations, [Davis] may be able to state a claim.” Id. at 423-24. Thus, “the general rule that
dismissal should be without prejudice applies.” Id. at 424. The Court therefore recommends
that Davis be allowed to amend his Complaint no later than 30 days from any dispositive
action by the District Judge.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to
FRCP 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim and FRCP 12(b)(1) for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction (rec. doc. 7) be GRANTED IN PART. Davis’s claims for false arrest and unlawful
search and seizure against Deputy Lionel Luchion and Deputy Daniel Reed and his claim for
Monell liability against Sheriff Mike Tregre should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
failure to state a claim, and Davis should be allowed 30 days within which to amend his
Complaint. 	Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief should be DISMISSED WITHOUT
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PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Davis’s claims against Lionel Luchion and
Daniel Reed in their official capacities and his claims against them under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion
should be DENIED IN PART as to Davis’s excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment
against Lionel Luchion and Daniel Reed and his state-law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against all Defendants.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP
12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim (rec. doc. 14) be GRANTED IN PART. Davis’s claims for
false arrest and unlawful search and seizure against Bobby Bradberry should be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, and Davis should be allowed 30 days
within which to amend his Complaint. 	Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief should be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s claims
against Bobby Bradberry in his official capacity and his due process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion should be
DENIED IN PART as to Davis’s excessive force claim against Bobby Bradberry under the
Fourth Amendment and his state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED That Defendants’ Motion for Plaintiff to Reply to
Defendants’ Answer Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) be DENIED AS PREMATURE pending the
filing of any amended Complaint.
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation contained in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error,
from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such
consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United States Auto. Ass’n, 79
F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).6
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 	day of 	, 2026.
________
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
6 Douglass referenced the previously-applicable 10-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December
1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) was amended to extend that period to 14 days.
January	5th
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