Guidry v. Hooper

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
EUGENE LAMOND GUIDRY CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-231
TIM HOOPER SECTION “H” (2)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Eugene Lamond Guidry filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (ECF No. 1) which was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct hearings,
including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and
recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and, as applicable,
Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.1 Upon review of the entire record, I have
determined that a federal evidentiary hearing is unnecessary.2
For the following reasons, I recommend that the petition for habeas corpus relief be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time barred.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Guidry is a convicted inmate incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola,
Louisiana.3 Guidry was charged with second degree murder, felon in possession of a firearm,
1 Guidry detailed the basis for his habeas claim on a form for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. The District
Judge found the petition was more appropriately construed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 21. By order dated
September 26, 2025, Guidry was given notice pursuant to Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), of the Court’s
intent to construe his petition as one filed pursuant to § 2254. ECF No. 22. Guidry had until October 31, 2025, to
withdraw the petition or amend it to include any and all § 2254 claims. Id. at 2. Guidry was warned that “[f]ailure to
respond to this Order will result in the Court construing the petition as an initial petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.” Id. To date, Guidry has not responded to the order.
2 A district court may hold an evidentiary hearing only when the petitioner shows either the claim relies on a new,
retroactive rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable (28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i)) or the claim relies
on a factual basis that could not have been previously discovered by exercise of due diligence (id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii))
and the facts underlying the claim show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no
reasonable jury would have convicted the petitioner. Id. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
3 ECF No. 1 at 1.
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obstruction of justice, and possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance (cocaine).4
Guidry pleaded not guilty.5
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal summarized the facts established at trial as
follows in relevant part:
Late in the evening on May 9, 2013, Eugene Guidry (defendant) decided to
purchase some crack cocaine. Joseph Montgomery and a woman identified only as
“Deborah” picked up defendant from his girlfriend’s residence on South Spruce
Street in Hammond. Montgomery, Deborah, and defendant drove to nearby
Washington Avenue, where they picked up Jerrell Bird (the victim), whom they
knew to sell drugs. After Bird entered the vehicle, defendant gave him $10.00 in
cash in exchange for a rock of crack cocaine. Defendant looked at the rock, stated
he did not want it, and attempted to return it to Bird in exchange for the cash he had
paid. Bird accused defendant of having “popped” the rock, or breaking part of it to
keep for himself. This accusation caused a heated argument between Bird and
defendant. The argument ended when Montgomery dropped defendant back off at
his girlfriend’s house on South Spruce Street. When defendant exited the car, Bird
had possession of both the cash and the drugs. Montgomery and Deborah brought
Bird to Stanley Street, where he exited the vehicle.
After returning to his girlfriend’s residence, defendant placed a call to
Earnest “Cookie” James, asking James to bring “that tool,” which James described
as a handgun. Defendant’s girlfriend, Juanita Doakes, confirmed that defendant
placed a call to James and also related that defendant went inside the home to
change into black clothing. When James arrived at the South Spruce Street
residence, Doakes witnessed that defendant retrieved an object from the trunk of
James’s vehicle. James testified that defendant took a gun from the car and left the
area on foot.
Shortly thereafter, both Doakes and James heard multiple gunshots.
Defendant returned to Doakes’s home, either walking quickly or running. He gave
the gun to James, who took it back to his own residence and hid it in a sock he
placed underneath his home. Defendant went inside Doakes’s home, changed his
clothes, and lay in bed. After initially denying his involvement to the police, James
later disclosed where he had hidden the weapon.
Gerard Thomas, Bird’s older brother, testified that he saw Bird exit a
vehicle on West Stanley Street prior to the shooting. Thomas briefly spoke with
Bird, but he eventually walked away from the area because of his knowledge that
4 The State electronically filed the record at ECF No. 10. ECF No. 10 at 15, Bill of Indictment, 8/8/13; ECF No. 10-1
at 42, Amended Bill of Indictment (with handwritten additions), undated; ECF No. 10-8 at 5, Bill of Information,
6/2/15.
5 ECF No. 10 at 1, Min. Entry, 9/5/13.
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Bird was engaged in selling drugs. As Thomas walked down Washington Avenue,
he saw a tall man wearing black clothing exit a dark-colored vehicle. He watched
as this man approached Bird and began to argue heatedly with him. Thomas heard
at least part of the argument where “ten dollars” was mentioned. Believing Bird
could handle the issue himself, Thomas continued to walk away from the area until
he heard multiple gunshots. At that time, he asked someone on the street to go check
on his brother. After the shooting, Thomas saw someone who appeared to be the
same tall individual as before. This person was running down Newman Street
toward Mary’s Alley. Thomas could not positively identify the tall man in black
clothing as defendant.
Angela Clemmons was living in a residence on the corner of Washington
Avenue and East Stanley Street on the night of the shooting. When she heard the
initial gunshots after midnight on May 10, 2013, she looked out her window and
saw two silhouettes running through a field across from her house. She observed
that the silhouette in front was that of a shorter man wearing a white t-shirt, a
description consistent with that of the victim, Bird. The rear silhouette was a taller
man she could not identify. Clemmons observed that the shorter man’s silhouette
disappeared from view, but the taller man continued to run in the direction of
Washington Avenue. Soon thereafter, a neighbor knocked on Clemmons’s door and
asked for her help. Clemmons went outside and saw Bird lying on the ground in the
area where she had seen the shorter man’s silhouette disappear. Clemmons called
911 and later gave statements to the police.
Ballistics testing matched three casings recovered at the crime scene and a
bullet retrieved from the victim’s body as having been fired from the gun found
beneath James’s home. An autopsy indicated that the victim died at the scene of
multiple gunshot wounds with perforating injuries to the heart, lungs, and liver.
Regarding count 2 (felon in possession of a weapon), at trial, the state
presented evidence that defendant had a 1997 felony conviction for unauthorized
entry of an inhabited dwelling, as well as a 2007 conviction for aggravated battery.
Defendant’s fingerprints were used to prove his connection to these prior offenses.
Defendant did not testify at trial. The state played for the jury a recorded
statement that defendant gave to the police on the day following the incident.
Defendant confirmed the events leading up to the shooting—including his attempt
to buy crack cocaine from the victim and the resulting argument. However, he
stated that he was at his girlfriend’s home when he heard the gunshots, and he
explained that James had come over only to discuss the argument defendant had
with the victim. Defendant denied that James supplied him with a weapon and that
he shot Bird. The state also introduced a written statement that defendant sent to
the court prior to trial. In this statement, defendant wrote, “Defendant was at 5115
Noah James Dr. in Hammond[,] Louisiana sleep [sic] at the time of question May
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10, 2013. Miles away, in an entirely different neighborhood.” The jury returned
verdicts of guilty as charged for each alleged offense.6
Guidry was tried by a jury on September 29, 2015, through October 2, 2015.7 The jury
found Guidry guilty as charged.8 On October 21, 2015, the trial court denied Guidry’s post-trial
motions and sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor as to count one, twenty years as to
count two, forty years as to count three, and five years as to count four.9 Each sentence was to be
served consecutively and at hard labor, and the sentences as to counts one, two and three were to
be served without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.10 The trial court
denied Guidry’s motion for reconsideration of sentence.11
On direct appeal to the Louisiana First Circuit, Guidry’s appointed attorney asserted the
following claims: (1) the State improperly exercised peremptory challenges against prospective
jurors on the basis of race; and (2) the trial court erred in denying Guidry’s motion for a mistrial.12
On October 31, 2016, the Louisiana First Circuit affirmed Guidry’s convictions and
sentences on counts one, two and four, but amended the sentence on count three to delete the
restrictions on parole, probation, and suspension of sentence.13 On September 22, 2017, the
Louisiana Supreme Court denied Guidry’s related writ application without assigning reasons.14
6 State v. Guidry, 2016-KA-0465, 2016 WL 6427768, at *1-3 (La. App. 1st Cir. Oct. 31, 2016) (footnote omitted);
ECF No. 10-7 at 27-30, 1st Cir. Opinion, 2016-KA-0465, 10/31/16.
7 ECF No. 10 at 5-6, Trial Mins., 9/29/15; id. at 6-8, Trial Mins, 9/30/15; id. at 8-9, Trial Mins., 10/1/15; id. at 9, Trial
Mins., 10/2/15.
8 ECF No. 10 at 9, Trial Mins. 10/2/15.
9 Id. at 10, Sentencing Mins., 10/21/15; ECF No. 10-5 at 196, Sentencing Mins., 10/21/15; id. at 165, Uniform
Commitment Order, 10/27/15; id. at 149, Motion for Post Verdict Judgement of Acquittal, 10/9/15; id. at 150, Order,
10/21/15; id. at 151, Motion for New Trial, 10/9/15; id. at 152, Order, 10/21/15.
10 ECF No. 10-5 at 162-63, Hearing Tr., 10/21/15; ECF No. 10-5 at 196, Sentencing Mins., 10/21/15; id. at 165,
Uniform Commitment Order, 10/27/15.
11 ECF No. 10 at 10, Min. Entry, 11/17/15; ECF No. 10-5 at 169-73; Hearing Tr., 11/17/15; id. at 166-67, Motion to
Reconsider Sentence, 11/2/15.
12 ECF No. 10-7 at 12, Appeal Brief, 2016-KA-0465, 7/2016 (undated as to day filed).
13 Guidry, 2016 WL 6427768, at *3-8; ECF No. 10-7 at 30-40, 1st Cir. Opinion 2016-KA-0465, 10/31/16.
14 State v. Guidry, 227 So. 3d 824 (La. 9/22/2017); ECF No. 10-5 at 203, La. S. Ct. Order, 2016-KO-2209, 9/22/17.
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On September 3, 2019, Guidry filed an application for post-conviction relief raising the
following claims for relief:15
(1) prosecutorial misconduct;
(2) ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a motion to quash the charges
and advising Guidry not to testify;
(3) the trial court abused its discretion when it compelled Guidry to submit to
fingerprinting in the jury’s presence;
(4) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to pursue certain issues on
appeal;16
The State filed procedural objections pursuant to LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 927 and
930.4(C).17 On January 8, 2020, the trial court sustained the State’s procedural objections and
dismissed Guidry’s application.18 Guidry did not seek review of the trial court’s decision by the
Louisiana First Circuit or the Louisiana Supreme Court.
II. FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION
Guidry filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief on January 23, 2025.19 Guidry
appears to claim he was falsely arrested based upon the claims of Frankie Dokes, who did not
testify at trial, and contests the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial.20
15 ECF No. 10-5 at 206-35, Uniform Application for Postconviction Relief, 9/5/19 (signed 9/3/19); ECF No. 10-6 at
1-154, Uniform Application for Postconviction Relief (continued), 9/5/19 (signed 9/3/19).
16 Although not presented as claims, Petitioner also asserted the following as issues and questions: (1) procedural
deficiencies in the institution of non-capital offenses in felon in possession of a firearm, possession of a Schedule II
controlled substance, and obstruction of justice; (2) procedural deficiencies in the institution of prosecution for those
charges by amendments to the bill of indictment; (3) prosecutorial vindictiveness; (4) denial of due process for lack
of a preliminary examination on the additional charges of felon in possession of a firearm, possession of cocaine, and
obstruction of justice; (5) open-court fingerprinting violates due process; (6) open-court fingerprinting is testimonial;
and (7) open-court fingerprinting caused undue prejudice. ECF No. 10-5 at 220, Uniform Application for
Postconviction Relief, 9/5/19 (signed 9/3/19).
17 ECF No. 10-6 at 160-65, State’s Procedural Objections to Defendant’s Application for Post Conviction Relief,
11/15/19.
18 Id. at 171, Order, 1/2/20 (filed 1/8/20).
19 ECF No. 1 at 9; see infra note 25..
20 Id. at 2, 6-8.
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The State filed a response in opposition to Guidry’s petition and asserted that the petition
was not timely filed and that his claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.21
Alternatively, the State asserts that Guidry’s claims are incoherent and meritless.22 Guidry filed a
reply memorandum in which he claims he is factually innocent.23
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, comprehensively revised federal habeas corpus legislation, including 28
U.S.C. § 2254. The AEDPA went into effect on April 24, 1996,24 and applies to habeas petitions
filed after that date.25 Guidry’s petition is deemed filed on January 23, 2025.26
A. Preliminary Considerations
The two threshold questions in habeas review under AEDPA are (1) whether the petition
is timely and (2) whether petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court. In other
words, has the petitioner exhausted state court remedies and is the petitioner in “procedural
default” on a claim.27 The State asserts that Guidry’s federal habeas petition was not timely filed
under the AEDPA. For the reasons that follow, the State’s limitations defense is supported by the
record and requires dismissal of Guidry’s petition.
21 ECF No. 11.
22 Id. at 7-8.
23 ECF No. 12.
24 The AEDPA was signed into law on that date and did not specify an effective date for its non-capital habeas corpus
amendments. Absent legislative intent to the contrary, statutes become effective at the moment they are signed into
law. United States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d 1501, 1505 (5th Cir. 1992).
25 Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)).
26 The Fifth Circuit has recognized the “mailbox rule” applies to pleadings, including habeas corpus petitions filed
after the effective date of the AEDPA, submitted to federal courts by prisoners acting pro se. Under this rule, the date
when prison officials receive the pleading from the inmate for delivery to the court is considered the time of filing for
limitations purposes. Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1999); Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 378
(5th Cir. 1998); Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1995). Guidry declared under penalty of perjury that
he placed his petition in the prison mail system on January 23, 2025. ECF No. 3 at 9.
27 Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)).
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B. AEDPA Statute of Limitations
Section 2244(d)(1) of the AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of limitations for the filing
of a federal habeas petition. Under § 2254(d)(1)(A), a petition must ordinarily be filed within one
year of the date the conviction became final under federal law.28 The one-year limitations period
does not run from completion of state post-conviction review, but instead runs from the finality of
the petitioner’s conviction.29 The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Guidry’s writ application
without stated reasons on September 22, 2017.30 Guidry’s conviction became final ninety (90)
days later, on December 21, 2017, when the time expired for him to file a petition for writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.31
Applying § 2244(d)(1)(A) literally, Guidry had until December 24, 2018, to file his federal
habeas corpus petition.32 He did not file his federal habeas corpus petition within this one-year
period. Accordingly, his petition must be dismissed as untimely, unless the one-year statute of
28 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179-80 (2001). The statute provides for four triggering
events, only one of which applies here:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –
A. the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time
for seeking such review;
B. the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State
action;
C. the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or
D. the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.
29 Flanagan, 154 F.3d at 199 n.1.
30 Guidry, 227 So. 3d at 824; ECF No. 10-5, La. S. Ct. Order, 2016-KO-2209, 9/25/17.
31 Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Flanagan v. Johnson, 154
F.3d 196, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1998)); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A)); U.S. Sup.Ct. R. 13(1).
32 The final day fell on Saturday, December 22, 2018, causing the deadline to expire on the next business day, Monday,
December 24, 2018. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C) (“if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period
continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”).
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limitations was suspended or otherwise tolled under one of the following two recognized bases for
tolling.
1. Statutory Tolling
The AEDPA provides for suspension of its one-year limitations period: “The time during
which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.”33 The Supreme Court has described this provision as a tolling statute.34
The plain language of this provision does not create a new, full, one-year term within which
a federal habeas petition may be filed at the conclusion of state court post-conviction
proceedings.35 Rather, as the United States Fifth Circuit and other federal courts have held, because
this statute is a tolling provision, the time during which state court post-conviction proceedings
are pending must merely be subtracted from the one-year limitations period:
[Section] 2244(d)(2) provides that the period during which a properly filed state
habeas application is pending must be excluded when calculating the one[-]year
period. Under the plain language of the statute, any time that passed between the
time that [petitioner’s] conviction became final and the time that his state
application for habeas corpus was properly filed must be counted against the one
year period of limitation.36
For a post-conviction application to be considered “properly filed” within the meaning of
§ 2244(d)(2), the applicant must “‘conform with a state’s applicable procedural filing
requirements,’” such as timeliness and location of filing.37 The timeliness consideration in
33 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added).
34 Duncan, 533 U.S. at 175-78.
35 Flanagan, 154 F.3d at 199 n.1.
36 Id.; Brisbane v. Beshears, 161 F.3d 1, 1998 WL 609926, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 1998); Gray v. Waters, 26 F. Supp.
2d 771, 771-72 (D. Md. 1998).
37 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a postconviction application is untimely under state law,
‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)”); Williams v. Cain, 217 F.3d 303, 306-307 n.4 (5th Cir.
2000) (quoting Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1999)); Smith v. Ward, 209 F.3d 383, 384-85 (5th Cir.
2000).
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Louisiana, for purposes of the AEDPA, requires application of a prison mailbox rule to state
pleadings filed pro se by a prisoner.38 Applying this standard to the petitioner’s state court
pleadings delineated in the procedural history results in a finding that this matter is not timely.
A matter is “pending” for § 2244(d)(2) purposes “as long as the ordinary state collateral
review process is ‘in continuance.’”39 The phrase “other collateral review” in the statute refers to
state court proceedings challenging the pertinent judgment subsequently challenged in the federal
habeas petition.40 A “pertinent judgment or claim” requires that the state court filings for which
tolling is sought must have challenged the same conviction being challenged in the federal habeas
corpus petition and must have addressed the same substantive claims being raised in the federal
habeas corpus petition.41
As calculated above, Guidry’s conviction was final under federal law on December 21,
2017. The AEDPA limitations period began to run the next day, December 22, 2017, and continued
to do so for one year without interruption through December 24, 2018, when it expired. During
that period, Guidry had no properly filed state post-conviction or other collateral review pending
in any state court to suspend the running of the AEDPA one-year filing period. Although Guidry
later filed for state post-conviction relief on September 3, 2019,42 the application was filed after
the AEDPA limitations period had expired; thus, that filing does not afford him any tolling benefit
nor does it revive the expired limitations period.43
38 Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 604-05 (5th Cir. 2006).
39 Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002); Williams, 217 F.3d at 310 (a matter is “pending” for § 2244(d)(2)
purposes until “‘further appellate review [is] unavailable under [Louisiana’s] procedures.’”)
40 Dillworth v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 2000) (state habeas petition challenging a prior conviction in one
county was other collateral review even though filed as a challenge to a second conviction in a different county); Nara
v. Frank, No. 99-3364, 2001 WL 995164, at *5 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2001) (motion to withdraw a guilty plea is “other
collateral review”).
41 Godfrey v. Dretke, 396 F.3d 681, 686-88 (5th Cir. 2005).
42 ECF No. 10-5 at 206, Application for Postconviction Relief, 9/3/19.
43 See Madden v. Thaler, 521 F. App’x 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2013); Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000);
Magee v. Cain, No. 99-3867, 2000 WL 1023423, at *4 (E.D. La. Jul. 24, 2000) (citing Williams v. Cain, No. 00-536,
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2. No Equitable Tolling Warranted
The United States Supreme Court has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations
period in § 2244(d)(1) may be equitably tolled only when the petitioner has pursued his rights
diligently and rare or extraordinary circumstances exist that prevented timely filing.44 Those who
“sleep on their rights” are not entitled to equitable tolling.45 Thus, equitable tolling is warranted
only in situations during which a petitioner acted diligently, but otherwise was actively misled or
prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.46
Guidry has asserted no reason that might constitute rare or exceptional circumstances why
the one-year statute of limitations period should be considered equitably tolled in this case, and I
can find none. Thus, the record does not establish any circumstances that might fit the restrictive
boundaries of “exceptional circumstances” described in binding precedent to warrant equitable
tolling in this case.47 Guidry, therefore, is not entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year AEDPA
filing period.
2000 WL 863132, at *2 (E.D. La. Jun. 27, 2000)), aff'd, 253 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2001).
44 Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Jones v. Lumpkin, 22 F.4th 486, 490 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (citing Davis v. Johnson, 158
F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1998)); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999); Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d
295, 299 (5th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1998).
45 Fisher, 174 F.3d at 715 (quoting Covey v. Ark. R. Co., 865 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 1989)).
46 Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19; Cousin, 310 F.3d at 848.
47 See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-54 (2010) (equitable tolling warranted when attorney was grossly
negligent and failed to meet professional standards of care when he ignored client’s requests to timely file a federal
petition and failed for years to respond to client's letters or communicate with client); Hardy v. Quarterman, 577 F.3d
596, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2009) (equitable tolling warranted for significant state-created delay when, for almost one year,
state appeals court failed in its duty under Texas law to inform petitioner his state habeas petition was denied despite
his persistent requests, and petitioner diligently pursued federal habeas relief); United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226
(5th Cir. 2002) (tolling warranted when defendant was deceived by attorney into believing that timely motion to vacate
was filed); Coleman, 184 F.3d at 402 (“A garden variety claim of excusable neglect does not support equitable
tolling.”); Fisher, 174 F.3d at 715 (tolling not justified during petitioner’s 17-days in psychiatric ward where he was
confined, medicated, separated from his glasses and rendered legally blind, and denied meaningful access to the
courts); Cantu-Tzin, 162 F.3d at 300 (State’s alleged failure to appoint competent habeas counsel did not justify
tolling); Davis, 158 F.3d at 808 n.2 (assuming without deciding that equitable tolling was warranted when federal
district court thrice extended deadline to file habeas corpus petition beyond expiration of the AEDPA grace period).
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C. Actual Innocence
The Supreme Court in McQuiggin v. Perkins recognized that a petitioner may meet a
“gateway exception” to avoid an already expired limitations period if he submits new, reliable
evidence of his actual innocence with his § 2254 application.48 “The Supreme Court has made clear
that the term ‘actual innocence’ means factual, ... [thus,] ‘actual’ innocence, as the Court stated in
McCleskey, means that the person did not commit the crime.”49 The Court allows this exception to
prevent a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”50 However, the Court cautions that “tenable actual
innocence gateways are rare: ‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he
persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would
have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”51
As the United States Supreme Court has explained: “To be credible, such a claim requires
petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence – whether it
be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence
– that was not presented at trial. Because such evidence is unavailable in the vast majority of cases,
claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.”52 In fact, “in virtually every case, the allegation
of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.”53
In this case and under these standards, Guidry has not referenced or presented any evidence,
let alone new evidence, of his factual innocence. Without such evidence, he cannot meet even “the
threshold requirement” for McQuiggin to apply, namely, a showing that “‘in light of the new
evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
48 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-16 (1995).
49 Johnson v. Hargett, 978 F.2d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1992) (footnotes omitted).
50 McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 392.
51 Id. at 386 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329).
52 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
53 Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (citation omitted).
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doubt.’”54 Accordingly, McQuiggin does not aid him despite his unsupported assertion of actual
innocence.
CONCLUSION
The one-year AEDPA limitations period expired on December 24, 2018, long before
Guidry filed this federal petition on January 23, 2025. Guidry has not established any basis for
statutory tolling of the one-year AEDPA limitation period. Further, he has not set forth any basis
to find rare of exceptional circumstances necessary to equitably toll the one-year statute of
limitations period, nor can I find any in the record. In short, the record does not establish any
circumstances that might fit within the restrictive boundaries of “exceptional circumstances”
described in binding precedent to warrant equitable tolling in this case.55 Moreover, Guidry has
not established any other recognized exception to the expiration of the AEDPA limitations period
or provided any evidence whatsoever to support his assertion of actual innocence.
With no basis for tolling or any other recognized exception to the AEDPA limitation
period, Guidry’s federal petition deemed filed on January 23, 2025, is not timely filed. It must
therefore be dismissed with prejudice for that reason.
54 McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329).
55 See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-54 (2010) (equitable tolling warranted when attorney was grossly
negligent and failed to meet professional standards of care when he ignored client’s requests to timely file a federal
petition and failed for years to respond to client’s letters or communicate with client); Hardy v. Quarterman, 577 F.3d
596, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2009) (equitable tolling warranted for significant state-created delay when, for almost one year,
state appeals court failed in its duty under Texas law to inform petitioner his state habeas petition was denied despite
his persistent requests, and petitioner diligently pursued federal habeas relief); United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226
(5th Cir. 2002) (tolling warranted when defendant was deceived by attorney into believing that timely motion to vacate
was filed); Coleman, 184 F.3d at 402 (“A garden variety claim of excusable neglect does not support equitable
tolling.”); Fisher, 174 F.3d at 715 (tolling not justified during petitioner’s 17-days in psychiatric ward where he was
confined, medicated, separated from his glasses and rendered legally blind, and denied meaningful access to the
courts); Cantu-Tzin, 162 F.3d at 300 (State’s alleged failure to appoint competent habeas counsel did not justify
tolling); Davis, 158 F.3d at 808 n.2 (assuming without deciding that equitable tolling was warranted when federal
district court thrice extended deadline to file habeas corpus petition beyond expiration of the AEDPA grace period).
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RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Eugene Lamond Guidry’s habeas corpus petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object.56
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _18th_ day of February, 2026.
____________________________________
DONNA PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
56 Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).
Douglass referred to the previously applicable ten-day period for filing of objections, which was extended to fourteen
days by amendment effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1).
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