Johnson v. Matney et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RAJEL JOHNSON 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NUMBER: 24-2510
CASSANDRA MATNEY, ET AL. 	SECTION: “H” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)1 is the Motion to Dismiss (rec. doc.
16) filed by Defendants Nurse Cassandra Matney and Captain Barry Pittman (collectively,
“Defendants”). 	Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the motion. 	Having reviewed the
pleadings and the case law, the Court rules as follows.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff, 	Rajel 	Johnson, 	brings 	this 	lawsuit 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	against
Defendants, 	Cassandra 	Matney 	and 	Barry 	Pittman, 	alleging 	they 	were 	deliberately
indifference to his medical needs and his living conditions while he was incarcerated at
Rayburn Correctional Center (“RCC”). 	Plaintiff alleges that on December 15, 2023, he
injured his hand while operating the prison deli slicer. 	(Rec. doc. 5 at 4). 	He informed
prison kitchen security staff about the incident and was instructed to go to the infirmary
for medical treatment. 	(Id.). 	Nurse Matney gave him a tetanus shot, two Tylenols, and
wrapped his hand with gauze. 	(Id.). 	Matney instructed Plaintiff that his bandage would
need to be changed every two hours and issued Plaintiff a seven-day no-work duty status.
(Id.).
Johnson called his family to report his pain. (Id. at 5). His family then began to call
RCC, which resulted in Plaintiff being sent to the infirmary later that same day at 3:00 p.m.
1 The parties consented to proceed before the undersigned. (Rec. doc. 18).
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 1 of 20

2
to have his hand re-wrapped. (Id.). Matney informed Plaintiff that he could return to the
infirmary at 8:00 p.m. for a bandage change. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff asked to be seen by another
nurse, who directed that Matney send Plaintiff to the emergency room. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff
further alleges that Matney never notified her supervisor of Plaintiff’s injury. (Id.).
Five days after the incident, Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by Defendant, Captain
Barry Pittman, who asked Plaintiff to sign a statement stating that he had been trained and
given the meat-slicing safety test, though he alleges that he had never taken the safety test.
(Id.). Further, Plaintiff alleges that he should never have been assigned to the meat slicing
job because his “medical conditions deems him incapable to do so because of limited use of
right arm/no weight bearing, medical duty status.” (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff now alleges
that the blade protector/finger guard was missing from the deli slicer, and no kitchen
security was present while he was operating the slicer. (Id.).2
Plaintiff makes no prayer for relief in his Complaint. (Rec. doc. 1). However, when
Plaintiff filed his ARP, which he referenced in his Complaint, he asked for “no retaliation
behind this ARP,” “that his injury be taken more serious then [sic] as is from this day
forward until it is healed,” and “justice due to the pain, suffering, mental anguish and all
damages.” (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 31).
Johnson filed his ARP on January 7, 2024, which he references in his Complaint. (Id.
at 30-31). The First Step Response to Plaintiff’s ARP, issued on February 14, 2024, which
Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to his Complaint, denied Plaintiff’s request for relief, finding
no merit to his claim. (Rec. doc. 1-2 at 1). The response detailed the following:
In a statement by Nurse Cassandra Matney, she states that she cleaned the
wound and applied a pressure dressing per orders. 	The on-call Healthcare
2 Plaintiff did not allege this fact in his Request for Administrative Remedy (“ARP”). (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 30-31).
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 2 of 20

3
Provider was notified and orders were received to monitor bleeding and
circulation. 	You were given a seven day duty status until you could be re-
evaluated by the facility physician. 	You were also administered a tetanus
shot and Tylenol. 	You returned for bandage and circulation checks as
instructed with no changes until approximately 4:30 p.m. when an increase
in bleeding was noted. The on-call Health Care Provider was notified and an
order was received to send you to Our Lady of the Angels for evaluation and
treatment. 	At the hospital, a pressure dressing was applied and antibiotics
and Naproxen were prescribed and you were discharged back to RCC. Upon
returning to the facility, it is noted in your medical record that you were
oriented, vitals were stable and you had no complaints. 	You were given
instructions to return to the infirmary nightly for wound care and twice daily
for antibiotics. You were issued a voucher for Naproxen and scheduled for a
follow-up visit with the Healthcare Provider. 	You received appropriate
medical 	treatment. 	Medical 	opinion 	is 	controlling. 	According 	to 	our
documentation, you were properly trained to use the meat slicer on October
16, 2023, two months prior to the injury. 	You signed and dated an
Acknowledgement of Safety Training for that specific piece of equipment.
(Id.). 	The Second Step Response to Plaintiff’s ARP, which was issued on April 22, 2024,
denied Plaintiff’s request for relief and stated the following:
Your request for an Administrative review of ARP #RCC-2024-34 had been
received and remanded for further review. 	We are now in receipt of the
institution’s 	additional 	documentation. 	Your 	allegations 	have 	been
considered as well as your medical record. A review of your medical record
and the documentation forwarded by RCC staff was conducted. 	Based on
these documents, it was found that when the unfortunate event occurred,
security staff immediately reacted and you were promptly brought to the
medical unit. You received appropriate medical care in accordance with the
DOC Health Care Policy. Medical opinion is controlling. It is with regret that
you received an injury; however, as indicated above, security staff was
present and you received appropriate medical care in a timely manner.
Lastly, the documentation forwarded by RCC staff included a copy of the
“acknowledgement of Safety Training” for the machinery you were using
when you received the injury in question. 	You have failed to provide any
evidence to substantiate your allegations or that would cause us to believe
otherwise. 	As such, this office finds no further investigation is warranted.
Your request for relief is denied.
(Id. at 3).
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 3 of 20

4
On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit under Section 1983 against Matney
and Pittman. (Rec. doc. 1)3. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims appear to arise under the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution, more specifically, his claims of deliberate indifference to
his medical care and possible allegations of unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
II. 	Standard on a Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under both Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 	A court must consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional
attack before addressing any attack on the merits, considering that a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss first “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case
with prejudice.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286-87
(5th Cir. 2012); Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). 	Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, and, without jurisdiction conferred by statute, federal courts
lack the power to adjudicate claims. FEMA, 668 F.3d at 286-87. Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is “properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” the
claim. 	Id.
“The standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is
similar to that applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)” except that the Rule
12(b)(1) 	standard 	permits 	the 	Court 	to 	consider a 	broader range 	of 	materials 	in
considering its subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in the suit. Thomas v. City of New
Orleans, 883 F. Supp. 2d 669, 676 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2012) (citing Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d
360, 364-65 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008)). When considering a 12(b)(1) motion, however, “the court
3 His Original Complaint was marked “Deficient” by the Clerk’s office. He corrected the deficiency and his
Complaint was filed in the record on November 4, 2024. (Rec. doc. 5).
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 4 of 20

5
is permitted to look at evidence in the record beyond those facts alleged in the complaint
and its proper attachments.” 	Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.
2009); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that a court
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion may evaluate “(1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint
supplemented 	by 	undisputed 	facts 	evidenced 	in 	the 	record, 	or 	(3) 	the 	complaint
supplemented 	by 	undisputed 	facts 	plus 	the 	court's 	resolution 	of 	disputed 	facts.”).
Otherwise, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is analyzed under the same standard
as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as outlined below. Benton v. United States, 960
F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction shall
be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in
support of his claims entitling him to relief. 	Wagstaff v. United States Dep't of Educ., 509
F.3d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 2007).
“The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting
jurisdiction.” 	Celestine v. TransWood, Inc., 467 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2012).
“Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact
exist.” Id. A pleading stating a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of
the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]” Id. In federal question cases, such as here, the
party must demonstrate a non-frivolous claim based on federal law. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S.
66, 72 (1939). 	When a district court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its
determination is not on the merits of the case and does not bar the plaintiff from pursuing
the claim in a proper jurisdiction. 	Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir.
1977).
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 5 of 20

6
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court “must accept all well-pleaded facts as true
and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Schlesinger v. ES & H, Inc.,
No. 11-cv-294, 2011 WL 3900577, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2011) (citing True v. Robles, 571
F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)); Napoleon v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P., No. CV 20-1775,
2021 WL 5630895, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2021). 	A plaintiff must plead enough facts, if
taken as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007). A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not meet
this pleading standard. Id. at 555. Plausibility does not require a showing of probability as
a well-pleaded complaint can proceed even if “actual proof of those facts is improbable, and
that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556. However, legal conclusions are not
entitled to a presumption of truth for the purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Napoleon, 2021 WL 5630895, at *4; Pitts v. LeBlanc, No. CV 22-
1983, 2023 WL 7166169, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-30811,
2024 WL 2150325 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2024).
III. 	Law and Analysis
A. 	Claims Against Matney and Pittman in Their Official Capacities
Plaintiff does not specify whether he sues Matney and Pittman in their official or
individual capacities. To the extent that he sues them in their official capacities, his claims
fail. 	It is well-established law that neither a State, nor its officials acting in their official
capacities, are “persons” capable of being sued under Section 1983. 	Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).4 The State, its agencies, and its officers in their official
4 This holding is an offshoot of the sovereign immunity afforded states, their agencies, and their officials
under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66-67 (“This does not mean, as petitioner suggests, that
we think that the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of § 1983 are not separate issues.
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 6 of 20

7
capacity are not considered “persons” for purposes of Section 1983. Archie v. LeBlanc, No.
08-CV-1381, 2010 WL 33522296, at *4 (W.D. La. Jul. 29, 2010), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 08-CV-1381, 2010 WL 3522293 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2010), aff’d, 447 F. App’x.
591 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1322 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1981). As the
Fifth Circuit stated in Fairley v. Stalder, “‘neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.’ As § 1983 only provides a remedy against a
‘person,’ the dismissal of Fairley’s § 1983 claims was indisputably proper.” 	294 F. App’x.
805, 808-09, 2008 WL 3244022, at *3 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71). Thus,
“long and clearly established Supreme Court precedent on this matter,” indicates that all
claims for equitable or monetary relief under Section 1983 against Defendants in their
official capacities lack an arguable legal basis and are therefore dismissed. See Fairley, 294
F. App’x. at 808.
B. 	Claims Against Matney and Pittman in Their Individual Capacities
1. 	Inadequate Medical Care
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation regarding inadequate medical care,
Plaintiff must prove that Defendants’ conduct demonstrates deliberate indifference to a
prisoner’s serious medical needs, constituting an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with
deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety “only if he knows that [the] inmate[ ]
face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
Certainly they are. 	But in deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983, the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a reading of § 1983 that disregards it.”).
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 7 of 20

8
Although the Eighth Amendment “does not, by its precise words, mandate a certain
level of medical care for prisoners[,]” Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1999),
the Supreme Court has interpreted it as imposing a duty on prison officials to ensure that
inmates receive “adequate” medical care. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. In the context of Section
1983 lawsuits, a showing of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs “requires the
inmate to allege that prison officials ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly
evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” 	Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d
764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th
Cir. 2001)). The delay of medical care “can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation
if there has been deliberate indifference, which results in substantial harm.” 	Mendoza v.
Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). “Mere negligence or failure to act reasonably is
not enough.” 	Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 626 (5th Cir. 2003). 	Even “gross
negligence” does not establish deliberate indifference. Hernandez ex. Rel. Hernandez v. Tex.
Dep’t. of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Conner v.
Travis Cnty., 209 F.3d 79, 796 (5th Cir. 2000)). 	Rather, “[an] officer must have the
subjective intent to cause harm.” Mace, 333 F.3d at 626 (citing Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d
316, 324 (5th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court has affirmed that “deliberate indifference is
a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or
obvious consequence of his action.” 	Bd. of the Cnty. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). 	The “deliberate indifference” standard permits courts to
separate omissions that “amount to an intentional choice” from those that are merely
“unintentionally negligent oversights.” Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. School Dist., 996 F.2d 745,
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 8 of 20

9
756 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)
(alteration omitted).
“Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not
constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement with his medical
treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” 	Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th
Cir. 2006). “Deliberate indifference is not established when ‘medical records indicate that
the plaintiff was afforded extensive medical care by prison officials.’” Brauner v. Coody, 793
F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir.
1997)) (alterations omitted).
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Matney 	“had 	actual 	knowledge 	of 	the 	objectively 	cruel
conditions that is a serious medical need, when she treated Rajel Johnson[‘s] wounded left
hand that had Plaintiff in server [sic] pain and (2) did not respond reasonably to the risk,
by not informing her supervisors the extent of Plaintiff injury to avoid sending Plaintiff to
the Hospital.” 	(Rec. doc. 5 at 6). 	However, a review of Plaintiff’s ARP shows that, on
December 15, 2023, the date Plaintiff sustained his injury, he was seen a total of five times
in the RCC infirmary by both Matney and other healthcare providers for wound care,
bleeding assessment, wound dressing changes, medication and a tetanus shot, with a
follow-up visit scheduled for three days later. 	(Rec. doc. 16-2 at 7-13). 	He was also
transported to Our Lady of the Angels Hospital that same day when his bleeding continued.
(Id. at 15). 	The record also reveals that the decision to send Plaintiff to Our Lady of the
Angels had nothing to do with Plaintiff’s family calling. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff himself admits in
his Complaint that he was seen in the infirmary multiple times on the date of the incident,
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 9 of 20

10
was instructed that his bandage would need changing every two hours, and was given a
seven-day no-duty status as a result of his injuries. (Rec. doc. 5 at 4-5).
In Stewart v. Murphy, the Fifth Circuit held that prison officials did not act with
deliberate indifference when the officials cleansed and treated the inmate’s bedsores and
transferred the inmate to another hospital for examination when the inmate’s sores did not
significantly improve. 174 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 1999). Similarly, in Raspberry v. Johnson, the
Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff-inmate who sustained a hand injury and bruised head
had failed to allege either a serious medical condition or deliberate indifference to a serious
medical condition when the injuries healed on their own, he did not suffer any broken
bones in his hand, and he was examined by medical personnel for his injuries. 	No. 00-
40591, 281 F.3d 1279, 2001 WL 1692494, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 2001).
Similar to the complaints in Stewart and Raspberry, the facts and allegations in
Plaintiff’s Complaint are insufficient to satisfy the stringent “deliberate indifference”
standard. 	Plaintiff alleges no further pain and/or suffering at the time that he filed his
Complaint and alleges no permanent damage. 	There are certainly no allegations in his
Complaint that would evince a wanton disregard for any of Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs. 	Therefore, Plaintiff has not carried his burden of alleging an Eighth Amendment
violation based on deliberate indifference to his medical needs, and his claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
2. 	Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff also asserts a claim regarding his conditions of confinement at RCC. 	This
claim appears to be levelled at Captain Barry Pittman who, according to Plaintiff, is the
supervisor of the kitchen where Plaintiff injured his hand on the meat slicer. (Rec. doc. 5 at
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 10 of 20

11
5). 	As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that “no protection was around the blade of the deli
slicer, neither was officers present when the machine was in use, even with the plaintiff
suffering medical condition.” (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
It is well established that an employer has an obligation to provide his
employees with a working place and conditions which are reasonably safe
considering the nature of work.
However, in the instant civil action Plaintiff was placed in danger due
to the machinery being unsafe to perform task. The deli slicer was designed
to be operated with a blade protector and finger guard when the equiptment
[sic] is in use, Also the deli slicer is suppose to be operation under the
supervision of kitchen security. 	Whereas kitchen security had known idea
the finger guard existed. 	Had Captin Barry Pittman ben ServSafe certified,
Plaintiff would not have been assigned that job because of his medical
conditions deems him incapable to do so because of limited use of right
arm/no weight bearing, medical duty status.
(Rec. doc. 5 at 6) (quoted verbatim). Plaintiff further alleges that he had never taken the
meat-slicing safety test. 	(Id. at 5). 	This allegation is, however, belied by the documents
attached to his Complaint and his ARP referenced in his Complaint. (Rec. docs. 5-2 at 1, 16-
2 at 2, 4-5). Plaintiff’s ARP indicates that Plaintiff had received safety training for “Buffalo
Slicer Safety,” and Plaintiff signed an Acknowledgement of Safety Training form on October
16, 2023, well before the subject incident. (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 4-5).
“In order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of
confinement, an inmate must establish: first, that the deprivation alleged was sufficiently
serious (i.e., an official’s act or omission must have resulted in the denial of the ‘minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities’) and second, that the prison official possessed a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). 	“In prison-conditions cases, that state of mind is one of
‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-303 (1991). 	“The second requirement follows from the
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 11 of 20

12
principle that ‘only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth
Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).
“To meet the first requirement, the prisoner must show that the conditions, either
alone or in combination, constitute an ‘unquestioned and serious deprivation’ of his ‘basic
human needs’ such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions.”
Hope v. Harris, 861 F. App’x 571, 582 (5th Cir. 2021). “Extreme deprivations are required
to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” 	Patin v. LeBlanc, No. 11-3071, 2012 WL
3109402, at *12 (E.D. La. May 18, 2012) (citing Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992))
(alterations omitted). 	“As to the second requirement, the prisoner must show that the
defendant acted with more than mere negligence.” 	Id. at 583 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at
835). As the Supreme Court stated in Farmer:
We hold instead that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless
the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference. 	This approach comports best with the text of the
Amendment as our cases have interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does
not outlaw cruel and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual
“punishments.”
511 U.S. at 837.
“In general, the state has a responsibility to protect the safety of its prisoners.”
Sampson v. King, 693 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d
1178, 	1182 	(5th 	Cir. 	1980)). 	“In 	operating 	a 	prison, 	however, 	the 	state 	is 	not
constitutionally required to observe all the safety and health standards applicable to
private industry.” Id. “Nor is it bound by the standards set by the safety codes of private
organizations.” Id. “In certain circumstances, prison work conditions may amount to cruel
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 12 of 20

13
and unusual punishment.” 	Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1245 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that working conditions, in and of themselves, did not violate the Eighth Amendment, when
plaintiff claimed that shoveling un-shucked corn in the summer heat, in contradiction to
medical doctors’ advice that he stay out of the sun due to his syphilis diagnosis, without a
mask caused nose bleeds, hair loss, and facial sores). However, “this is the case only when
prison officials knowingly compel convicts to perform physical labor which is beyond their
strength or which constitutes a danger to their lives or health, or which is unduly painful.”
Howard, 707 F.2d at 220. 	“[I]f prison officials assign an inmate to work detail and they
know that such an assignment could exacerbate a serious physical ailment, then such a
decision could constitute deliberate indifference.” Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 194
(5th Cir. 1993). 	“[T]he constitutionality of a particular working condition must be
evaluated in light of the particular medical conditions of the complaining prisoner.”
Jackson, 864 F.2d at 1246.
Despite Plaintiff’s claim that his medical conditions rendered him incapable of
performing his job in the kitchen, Plaintiff’s Offender Duty Status, which was issued to him
on December 13, 2023, did not state that Plaintiff was unable to perform his kitchen duties.
(Rec. doc. 5-1 at 1). Specifically, Plaintiff’s duty status provided that Plaintiff “may do any
work assignment not specifically prohibited on the medical duty status form” and
“prohibited [Plaintiff] from participating in contact sports.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s duty status did
not prohibit him from working his kitchen assignment, nor did his duty status prohibit him
from operating equipment. (Id.). The ARP referenced in Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals that
Plaintiff was both trained to use the deli slicer, (rec. docs. 5-2 at 1, 16-2 at 5), and was able
to do so within the bounds of his duty status. 	(Rec. doc. 5-1 at 1). 	As such, Plaintiff’s
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 13 of 20

14
allegation that his kitchen job exceeded his duty status is a conclusory statement supported
by neither his Complaint nor his ARP. See Jett v. Keith, No. 15-CV-215, 2015 WL 4395042,
at *4 (W.D. La. Jul. 16, 2015) (holding that inmate’s claim that his kitchen job exceeded his
duty 	status 	was 	conclusory 	when 	inmate 	failed 	to 	provide 	facts 	indicating
when/where/how/who required him to perform labor beyond his duty status limitations,
and what he was required to do that exceeded the limitations), aff’d, 667 F. App’x. 465 (5th
Cir. 2016). 	This conclusory allegation does not rise to the requisite level to show that
Pittman acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights in assigning him to the kitchen.
Plaintiff also asserts liability under Section 1983 due to the “machinery being unsafe
to perform task” because of the missing blade protector/finger guard. 	(Rec. doc. 5 at 6).
Federal courts in Louisiana and in other jurisdictions have addressed cases in which
inmates have alleged Eighth Amendment violations in the context of prison safety
equipment and defective prison equipment. For example, in Bowie v. Procunier, the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that prison officials did not violate the Eighth
Amendment when the inmate lost sight in one eye when not provided safety goggles while
chopping wood, as the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
“is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official . . . .” 808 F.2d 1142, 1142 (5th Cir.
1987) (emphasis in original).
As another example, in Nevers v. Holiday, the plaintiff-inmate was injured while
working in the kitchen when a nozzle “jumped off” and he sustained second and third
degree burns to his hands. 	No. 08-1316, 2010 WL 1795202, at *1 (W.D. La. Apr. 1, 2010),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 08-1316, 2010 WL 1812763 (W.D. La. Apr. 30,
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 14 of 20

15
2010). He claimed that no one had tested the pot before he used it. Id. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held that the facts alleged in the
plaintiff’s complaint did not support a finding that the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently
harmful enough to deprive him of life’s basic necessities (Id. at *2). The plaintiff did not
allege that the defendants knew the pot and/or nozzles were defective, nor did the plaintiff
allege any facts indicating that the defendants knowingly and unnecessarily placed him in a
dangerous environment to the extent that his constitutional rights were violated.1 Id.
And, in Osolinski v. Kane, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
prison officials did not violate the Eighth Amendment in failing to repair a malfunctioning
oven door, which fell off and burned the plaintiff’s arm. 	92 F.3d 934, 936. 939 (9th Cir.
1996). 	The Ninth Circuit held that “[n]ot every deviation from ideally safe conditions
amounts to a constitutional violation.” Id. at 938. The court further noted that the plaintiff
had failed to allege any exacerbating safety hazards, like insufficient lighting, nor had the
plaintiff “pled any conditions which rendered him unable to provide for his own safety in
the sense that they precluded him from avoiding the faulty oven door or rendered him
unable to perceive its defective condition.” Id.
Plaintiff is unable to meet either of the aforementioned requirements to establish an
Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of confinement. 	Even taking Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, Plaintiff has failed to establish that his assignment to the kitchen staff or
his operation of the deli slicer, which allegedly lacked protective equipment, rises to the
level of an “unquestioned and serious deprivation of his basic human needs such as food,
clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions,” Hope v. Harris, 861 F. App’x
571, 582 (5th Cir. 2021), or establish that Pittman “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 15 of 20

16
excessive risk to [his] health or safety . . . .” 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 	First, the record
reveals that Plaintiff had, in fact, received safety training in operating the deli slicer prior to
the subject incident. (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 4-5). 	Second, Pittman did not act with deliberate
indifference in assigning Plaintiff to the kitchen in violation of his medical condition, as
Plaintiff’s duty status did not prohibit him from operating the deli slicer. (Rec. doc. 5-1 at
5). Third, the facts alleged by Plaintiff regarding the lack of a finger guard on the deli slicer
do not rise to such a level that would constitute a “serious deprivation of his basic human
needs,” Hope, 861 F. App’x at 582), and support a finding of a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment rights. In short, Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the requisite level to show
that Pittman acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, nor has Plaintiff alleged a “sufficiently serious” deprivation.
3. 	Injunctive Relief
While Plaintiff fails to specifically ask for injunctive relief in his Complaint, in his
ARP he asked for “no retaliation behind this ARP” and “that his injury be taken more
serious then [sic] as is from this day forward until it is healed.” (Rec. doc. 16-2 at 31).
With regard to any claim against Matney and Pittman in their official capacities,
under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a state official in his or her official capacity may be sued
for prospective relief to stop an ongoing violation of the Constitution or federal law. 209
U.S. 123 (1908). 	To determine whether Young applies, “a court need only conduct a
‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” 	Verizon Md., Inc., v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (additional citation omitted)). Here, this Court has found
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 16 of 20

17
no violation of federal law as Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
constitutional rights. Accordingly, any injunctive relief against Matney or Pittman in their
official capacities would be inappropriate.
And to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert a retaliation claim against
Defendants in their individual capacities, he has no viable claim as he has only made
conclusory allegations. 	With respect to such retaliation claims, the Fifth Circuit has held:
“To prevail on a claim of retaliation, a prisoner must establish (1) a specific constitutional
right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of
that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d
225, 231 (5th Cir. 1995). Individual capacity claims “must be pleaded with ‘factual detail
and particularity,’ not mere conclusory allegations.” 	Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710 (5th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir. 1995)). 	“Allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. 	Overall, “[p]ersonal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of
action.” Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). In his Complaint, Plaintiff
makes no allegations that Matney or Pittman took any retaliatory adverse action against
him for having filed his ARP or this Complaint. Such a lack of factual support is fatal to his
claim of retaliation.
4. 	Leave to Amend
“When the dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate, it should generally be done
without prejudice in order to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended
complaint.” 	Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 2017).
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 17 of 20

18
“However, a district court may dismiss with prejudice if the plaintiff has been given
adequate opportunity to cure the inadequacies in his pleading or if the pleadings
‘demonstrate that the plaintiff has pleaded his best case.’” Id. (first quoting Jacquez v.
Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal with prejudice for
failure to state a claim when plaintiff did not file a supplemental complaint but did file an
extensive response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, alleging facts that suggested
negligence but not deliberate indifference in a Section 1983 action) and then citing
Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of
Section 1983 action brought by an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis who had
no opportunity to amend his complaint but who was given a questionnaire to bring his
claims into focus)).
This Court will “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a), but leave to amend “is by no means automatic.” Halbert v. City of Sherman, Tex., 33
F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In exercising its discretion, this Court may
consider such factors as “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of the
amendment.” 	Nolan v. M/V SANTE FE, 25 F.3d 1043 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Gregory v.
Mitchell, 635 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981)). 	“An amendment is futile if it would fail to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751
F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 	Applying those factors here, the Court
finds that any amendment regarding Plaintiff's claims would be futile, Gilchrease v. D.R.
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 18 of 20

19
Horton, Inc. - Gulf Coast, No. CV 24-358, 2024 WL 3223918, at *1 (E.D. La. May 16, 2024),
because Plaintiff has pleaded his best case under the circumstances.
With regard to any official capacity claims against Defendants, no amendment can
cure a finding that they are not “persons” under Section 1983. 	And with regard to any
individual capacity claims against them, Plaintiff has pleaded his best-case scenario. He has
alleged all the facts that occurred during and after his incident, and these facts still cannot
rise to the level necessary to plead justiciable claims under the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff filed no opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss in order to clarify or enlarge
any glaring deficiencies as pointed out in Defendants’ motion. 	Neither has he moved for
any type of discovery since Defendants appeared in this lawsuit in August of this year to
further bolster any underlying facts. In short, he has done nothing to advance his claims or
prove to this Court that he has alleged plausible claims under the Eighth Amendment. For
these reasons, the Court finds that no amendment can render Plaintiff’s claims viable under
the Eighth Amendment.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Motion to Dismiss (rec. doc. 16) filed by Defendants Nurse
Cassandra Matney and Captain Barry Pittman is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 19 of 20

20
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 	day of 	, 2025.
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
December
Case 2:24-cv-02510-MBN Document 19 Filed 12/10/25 Page 20 of 20