Lalin v. ESN Property, LLC, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ELBIN LALIN 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-2335
ESN PROPERTY, LLC, ET AL. 	SECTION: D(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants ESN
Property, LLC, Ravi Doddamani, and Vidya Doddamani (collectively, “Defendants”).1
Plaintiff Elbin Lalin (“Lalin”) filed a Response in Opposition2, and Defendants have
filed a Reply.3 After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, and
the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case involves alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-209.4 For more than three years, Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a laborer
attending to various residential properties that Defendants own in New Orleans.5
Plaintiff alleges that “[d]uring the past three years (and beyond), Defendants paid
the Plaintiff a regular hourly rate for all hours worked” but failed to pay him overtime
1 R. Doc. 37.
2 R. Doc. 44.
3 R. Doc. 55
4 R. Doc. 23 at ¶ 1. The Court draws the factual allegations from the Defendants’ Statement of
Uncontested Facts, which the Court accepts as true, except for ¶ 4, 5, and 9. L.R. 56.2 (“All material
facts in the moving party’s statement will be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless
controverted in the opponent’s statement.”). The Court also supplements Defendants’ Statement of
Uncontested Facts and Plaintiff’s Objection to Statement of Material Facts with allegations from
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. R. Doc. 23. The Court uses those facts for context and does not afford
them the benefit of the truth.
5 R. Doc. 37-3 at ¶ 2; R. Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 10-11.
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in violation of the FLSA.6 	On November 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court
against Defendants and thereafter filed his First Amended Complaint.7
On December 30, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367, arguing that Plaintiff
failed to plead facts necessary to establish either individual or enterprise coverage
under the FLSA.8 The Court agreed, finding that Plaintiff failed to plead individual
coverage because the duties he was alleged to have performed were purely local in
nature.9 	The Court further found that Plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to
establish enterprise coverage because Plaintiff failed to plead that he and a second
employee handled, sold, or otherwise worked on goods or materials that had been
moved in or produced for commerce.10 	The Court granted Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 but
afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to amend.11
Plaintiff timely filed his Second Amended Complaint, alleging facts to cure the
Court’s noted deficiency as to enterprise coverage and naming Zydeco Ownings, LLC,
Shoban Pattam, The Trustee of the Anil S. and Maricel L. Paramesh Revocable Trust,
4213-15 Dryades, LLC, and 4323-25 Loyola, LLC as additional defendants.12 Plaintiff
did not amend his allegations as to individual coverage.
6 R. Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 5, 7. Plaintiff does not re-urge violations of “relevant state law” in his Amended
Complaint. See R. Doc. 11.
7 R. Doc. 37-3 at ¶ 1; R. Docs. 1 and 5.
8 R. Doc. 13.
9 R. Doc. 22 at 5-6.
10 Id. at 6.
11 Id. at 7-8.
12 R. Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 4-8. Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint for
Failure to State a Claim, which the Court denied (R. Docs. 26 and 30). Defendants added in the Second
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On July 3, 2025, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment,
arguing that Plaintiff cannot establish individual or enterprise coverage under the
FLSA.13 	Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s own description of his duties preclude a
finding of individual coverage and that Plaintiff cannot establish enterprise coverage
because Plaintiff was Defendants’ only employee during the relevant period.14
Defendants set the Motion for submission on July 22, 2025, making Plaintiff’s
opposition due on July 14, 2025.15 	Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Tardy
Opposition16 in addition to an untimely Response in Opposition17 to the present
Motion. In a telephone status conference, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave and also permitted Defendants to file a Reply.18
In opposition to the Motion, Plaintiff avers that he can establish that the
Defendants had more than one employee besides Lalin, namely, Wester Esauc
Sanchez Cruz and William Barrios.19 Plaintiff relies solely on the Affidavits of Cruz
and Barrios to prove that those individuals were employees of the Defendants. In
Reply, 	Defendants 	contend 	that 	Plaintiffs 	have 	not 	met 	the 	burden 	to 	prove
enterprise coverage, that Cruz and Barrios are not employees of any defendant under
Amended Complaint, Zydeco Ownings, LLC, Shoban Pattam, The Trustee of the Anil S. and Maricel
L. Paramesh Revocable Trust, 4213-15 Dryades, LLC, and 4323-25 Loyola, LLC, have appeared. (R.
Docs. 38 and 39).
13 R. Doc. 37-2 at 5.
14 Id.
15 R. Doc. 37-1.
16 R. Doc. 42.
17 R. Doc. 44.
18 R. Doc. 52.
19 R. Doc. 44 at pp. 2, 9.
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the economic realities test, and that evidence relied upon by Plaintiff is inauthentic
and thus cannot be relied upon for the purposes of defeating summary judgment.20
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”21 A dispute is “genuine” if it is
“real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.”22 Further,
a fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.”23 	When assessing whether a genuine dispute regarding any material fact
exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from
making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”24 While all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat
summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or “only
a scintilla of evidence.”25 Instead, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable
jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.26
If the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive
issue, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the
20 R. Doc. 55. The Court does not address the issues raised concerning Plaintiff’s inauthentic evidence
in this Order and reasons.
21 FED. R. C IV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
22 Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilkinson v. Powell,
149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945)).
23 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
24 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribus. Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation
modified).
25 Id. (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)) (citation modified).
26 Id. at 399 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
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evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s claim.27 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must
go beyond the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.’”28
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for alleged violations of the FLSA.
“The FLSA guarantees overtime pay to employees engaged ‘in the production of goods
for commerce’ (‘individual coverage’) or ‘employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce’ (‘enterprise coverage’).”29
“Either individual or enterprise coverage is enough to invoke FLSA protection.”30
Individual 	coverage 	applies 	to 	plaintiffs 	engaged 	in 	commerce 	or 	the
production of goods for commerce.31 	“Work that is purely local in nature does not
meet the FLSA’s requirements, but ‘any regular contact with commerce, no matter
how small, will result in coverage.’”32 Enterprise coverage, on the other hand, applies
to plaintiffs employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce.33 This is defined as an enterprise that:
(A)(i) has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise
27 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
28 Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. C IV. P. 56(e)).
29 Martin v. Bedell, 955 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)).
30 Id. (citation modified).
31 Mejia v. Bros. Petro., LLC, No. 12-CV-2842, 2015 WL 3619894, at *5 (E.D. La. June 9, 2015) (citation
modified).
32 Id. (citation modified).
33 Mejia, 2015 WL 3619894, at *5.
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working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for
commerce by any person; and
(ii) is an enterprise who annual gross volume of sales made or business
done is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail
level that are separately stated) . . .34
To satisfy the first prong under subsection (A)(i), a plaintiff must establish that more
than 	one 	of 	the 	organization’s 	employees 	engaged 	in 	interstate 	commerce.35
“Alternatively, a plaintiff may allege that at least two of the organization’s employees
handle, sell, or otherwise work on goods or materials that have moved in interstate
commerce.”36
A. Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege Individual Coverage
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the standard for individual
coverage 	under 	the 	FLSA. 	Defendants 	contend 	that 	individual 	coverage 	is
inapplicable because Plaintiff’s activities were purely local in nature and that
Plaintiff cannot invoke enterprise coverage because Plaintiff was Defendants’ only
employee.37 Plaintiff seemingly concedes that he is not alleging individual coverage
under the FLSA as his opposition only argues enterprise coverage.38 As the Court
noted in its March 7, 2025 Order and Reasons, the duties Plaintiff alleges he
performed for Defendants were “purely local and . . . therefore insufficient to state a
claim for individual coverage under the FLSA.”39 	Plaintiff did not supplement his
34 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).
35 Badon v. Reliable PCA and SIL Agency, LLC, No. 19-CV-12503, 2020 WL 3605916, at *4 (E.D. La.
July 2, 2020).
36 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i)).
37 R. Doc. 37-2 at 5.
38 R. Doc. 44.
39 R. Doc. 22 at 6.
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allegations as to individual coverage in his Second Amended Complaint, nor has he
pointed to any summary judgment evidence in his Response showing that he was in
regular contact with commerce. As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed
to satisfy the standard for individual coverage.
B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege Enterprise Coverage
Plaintiff has likewise failed to establish enterprise coverage.40 “Enterprise
coverage requires the court to find that an employer had multiple employees
‘handling, selling, or otherwise working on’ goods that have moved in interstate
commerce.”41 In support of his argument, Plaintiff contends that ESN employed more
employees that Lalin, namely Wester Esauc Sanchez Cruz and William Barrios, and
that these employees handled goods that flowed through interstate commerce.42 	If
either Cruz or Barrios were found to be employees that handled such goods,
enterprise coverage under the FLSA would attach. In support of his argument,
Plaintiff solely relies on the affidavits of Cruz and Barrios to establish that they were
employees of Defendants. Defendants counter that these two workers are not
“employees” under the FLSA and that enterprise coverage, as a result, does not attach
to Defendants.43
40 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong of enterprise coverage under
the FLSA, it need not address the second prong, whether Defendants’ business is “an enterprise who
annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes
at the retail level that are separately stated).” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i).
41 Mendoza v. Detail Sols., LLC, 911 F.Supp.2d 433, 441 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
203(s)(1)(A)(i)).
42 R. Doc. 44 at p. 2.
43 R. Doc. 55 at p. 2.
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The definition of “employee” under the FLSA is broad and “stretches the
meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a
strict application of traditional agency law principles.”44 The test to determine
whether a worker qualifies as an “employee” under the FLSA, as opposed to an
independent contractor, is “whether, as a matter of economic reality, the worker is
economically dependent upon the alleged employer or is instead in business for
himself.”45 To determine whether a worker is “economically dependent,” the Fifth
Circuit has elucidated five non-exhaustive factors to be considered: (1) the degree of
control exercised by the alleged employer; (2) the extent of the relative investments
of the worker and the alleged employer; (3) the degree to which the worker's
opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the alleged employer; (4) the skill and
initiative 	required 	in 	performing 	the 	job; 	and 	(5) 	the 	permanency 	of 	the
relationship.46 In this analysis, “[n]o single factor is determinative.”47 The issue of
whether an individual worker is considered to be an “employee” under the Fair Labor
Standards Act is a matter of law, even though the issue contains associated factual
inquiries under the economic reality test.48
In its Response, Plaintiff Lalin discusses six factors named by the Department
of Labor in the Code of Federal Regulations to determine whether a worker is
economically dependent on the employer; the Court will consider his argument but
44 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 1350, 117 L. Ed. 2d 581
(1992).
45 Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008).
46 Herman v. Express Sixty–Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1998).
47 Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343.
48 Klick v. Cenikor Found., 94 F.4th 362, 369 (5th Cir. 2024).
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applied in the context of the Fifth Circuit’s framework for whether a worker
constitutes an employee under the FLSA.
1. 	Degree of Control Exercised by the Alleged Employer
The Fifth Circuit has held that control as a FLSA factor “is only significant
when it shows an individual exerts such a control over a meaningful part of the
business that [he] stands as a separate economic entity.”49 A court must “consider
whether the purported employee could exert independent control over meaningful
aspects of his business life.”50 Plaintiff asserts that Ravi Doddamani, the alleged
employer, asserted control by controlling whether employees could take time off and
by managing the projects and their safety.51 Defendants respond that Cruz’s and
Barrios’s affidavits only state that each was only present at the job sites “on
numerous occasions” and that general contractors would typically exert minimal
control over subcontractors, like Cruz and Barrios.52 Defendants argue that Plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate that Cruz and Barrios were present “on any regular basis”
to indicate “control sufficient” to make them employees of Defendants.53 While the
affidavits suggest that Defendant Ravi Doddamani controlled safety protocols at the
project sites and gave permission to Cruz and Barrios to take time off, these facts
alone do not suggest that Cruz and Barrios lacked the degree of control over their
businesses as subcontractors such that they were not separate economic entities. The
49 Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir. 1987).
50 Eberline v. Media Net, L.L.C., 636 F. App’x 225, 227 (5th Cir. 2016).
51 R. Doc. 44 at pp. 7-8.
52 R. Doc. 55 at p. 3.
53 Id.
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Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden, and, as a result, this factor tilts in favor of
independent contractor status for Cruz and Barrios.
2. 	Extent of the Relative Investments of the Worker and Alleged
Employer
When applying the relative investments factor of the economic realities test,
courts 	“compare 	each 	worker's 	individual 	investment 	to 	that 	of 	the 	alleged
employer.”54 Plaintiff asserts that the affidavits of Cruz and Barrios do not indicate
that they invested any amount of capital into their work for Defendants.55 Defendants
respond that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden on summary judgment to provide
evidence that Cruz and Barrios have not individually invested into their work.56 The
Court agrees that Plaintiff has not met his burden to provide evidence on summary
judgment demonstrating that Cruz and Barrios did not make individual investments
into their work. The second factor weighs in favor of independent contractor status.
3. 	Degree 	to 	which 	Worker’s 	Opportunity 	for 	Profit 	or 	Loss 	is
Determined by Alleged Employer
Turning to the third factor, the Court must consider the degree to which the
worker’s opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the alleged employer. To
evaluate this factor, courts look to how much a worker’s profits depend on their ability
to control their own costs.57 The more control a worker has, the more likely they are
to be considered an independent contractor under the FLSA.58 The Fifth Circuit has
54 Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 344 (5th Cir. 2008).
55 R. Doc. 44 at p. 6.
56 R. Doc. 55 at pp. 3-4.
57 Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 384 (5th Cir. 2019).
58 Shaw v. Alpha Air Heating & Air Conditioning LLC, 702 F. Supp. 3d 453, 461 (E.D. La. 2023) (Vitter,
J.).
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also considered “whether the putative employer's control over the worker's schedule
and pay had the effect of limiting the worker's opportunity, as an independent
contractor, for profit or loss.”59 Plaintiff argues that Cruz’s and Barrios’s affidavits
demonstrate that Defendants had control over their schedules and that their control
effectively made them economically dependent on Defendants.60 Defendant makes
the argument that the requests from the workers for time off and Defendants’
provision of a safe working site are not enough to demonstrate that they were
employees. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the requests for time off demonstrate
some control over the worker’s schedule at that job site; however, that fact alone does
not indicate that Defendants fully controlled Cruz and Barrios’s opportunity for profit
and loss. The third factor is neutral regarding employee status under the FLSA.
4. 	Skill and Initiative Required in Performing the Job
In assessing the fourth factor, courts will examine whether the worker
possesses a unique skill set or takes initiative at work.61 The presence of either
typically indicates independent-contractor status.62 	Plaintiff argues that it is more
likely than not that the workers were not skilled because if they were skilled, they
would likely have had additional opportunities.63 Defendants correctly point out that
such statements are mere speculation and are not sufficient to establish that the
fourth factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. Both Cruz’s and Barrios’s affidavits are silent
59 Hobbs v. Petroplex Pipe & Constr., Inc., 946 F.3d 824, 832 (5th Cir. 2020).
60 R. Doc. 44 at pp. 4-5.
61 See Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 345.
62 Shaw, 702 F. Supp. 3d at 462.
63 R. Doc. 44 at p. 9.
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as to their level of skill.64 Because Plaintiff bears the burden of trial, it is enough for
Defendants to identify that the affidavits do not establish that Cruz and Barrios lack
a unique skill set. Because Plaintiff has not met this burden and instead provided
only an unsubstantiated assertion, this factor is neutral or weighs in favor
of independent contractor status.
5. Permanency of the Relationship
The final factor in the economic realities test is the permanency of the
relationship between the worker and the alleged employer. Courts are more likely to
find employee status under the FLSA when an individual worker works exclusively
for an entity on a permanent basis.”65 Plaintiff contends that Cruz and Barrios’s long
working relationship with Defendants, namely, a six-year relationship, suggests
employee status under the FLSA. However, “the inferences gained from the length of
time of the relationship depend on the surrounding circumstances.”66 Defendants
point out that the affidavits only concern the times when Cruz and Barrios worked
with Plaintiff and do not detail their entire working history in relation to the
Defendants.67 The Court agrees that the affidavits are silent as to Cruz’s and
Barrios’s working history with Defendants. Indeed, each Affidavit only advises that
“I have worked (as a sub-contractor) regularly at various project sites managed by
Ravi Doddamani over the past six years.”68 The Affidavits do not speak further as to
64 R. Doc. 44-3 and 44-4.
65 Shaw, 702 F. Supp. 3d at 462 (citing Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 345–46).
66 Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 387 (5th Cir. 2019).
67 R. Doc. 55 at p. 4.
68 R. Doc. 44-3 and 44-4.
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the longevity or permanency of the relationship. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has
held that when a worker works “project-by-project basis,” he is generally considered
to be an independent contractor for purposes of the FLSA.69 While the use of the word
“project” in the affidavits suggests that Cruz and Barrios likely worked for the
Defendants on a project-by-project basis, the Court is aware that that fact alone is
insufficient to determine employee/independent contractor status.70 Taking into
consideration the vague evidence relied on by Plaintiff as to this factor, this factor
weighs in favor of independent contractor status for Cruz and Barrios under the
FLSA.
Because the factors of the economic reality test are non-exhaustive, the Court
can look to other factors to determine the economic reality of the relationship between
the worker and the putative employer.71 Plaintiff also asks this court to consider
whether the work performed by the workers, Cruz and Barrios, were an integral part
of the putative employer’s business.72 This factor is used by courts in sister circuits
as a sixth factor in the economic realities test.73 These courts have held that the more
integral the worker’s labor is to the business as a whole, the more likely that the
worker is an employee.74 Plaintiff argues that the work of Cruz and Barrios who aid
in the construction and repair of properties is integral to Defendants’ business
69 Id.
70 R. Doc. 44-3 (“I have worked…regularly at various project sites”); R. Doc. 44-4.
71 See Hobbs v. Petroplex Pipe & Constr., Inc., 946 F.3d 824, 836 (5th Cir. 2020).
72 R. Doc. 44 at p. 8.
73 Hobbs, 946 F.3d at 836 (citing Acosta v. Off Duty Police Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir.
2019); Baker v. Flint Eng'g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 1998)).
74 Id.
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because without it, the business “cannot operate.”75 There is not, however, evidence
in the record to demonstrate how much of Defendants’ business is the construction
and repair of properties, leaving Plaintiff’s assertion unsubstantiated. The Court
considers finds that this additional factor raised by Plaintiff is neutral or tilts towards
independent contractor status for Cruz and Barrios.
After evaluating each of the factors of the economic reality test and considering
the totality of the relationship between the workers and the putative employer, the
Court finds that, as a matter of economic reality, Plaintiff has failed to carry his
burden of showing that Cruz and Barrios were employees of Defendants.76 Thus,
Plaintiff has failed to establish enterprise coverage under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.77 	Because 	Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	meet 	his 	burden 	to 	provide 	evidence
demonstrating specific genuine issues of material fact, the Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.78
IV. 	CONCLUSION
A plaintiff suing for violations of the FLSA must establish coverage, whether
individual or enterprise, and Plaintiff has failed to point to any summary judgment
evidence showing either type of coverage.79 Accordingly, there are no genuine issues
75 R. Doc. 44 at p. 8. Each of the factors in the present case is either neutral or weighs in favor of
independent contractor status for Cruz and Barrios. None of the factors weight in favor of employee
status for Cruz and Barrios under the FLSA.
76 See Parrish, 917 F.3d at 379.
77 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).
78 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
79 See Mendoza v. Detail Solutions, LLC., 911 F.Supp.2d 433, 439 (N.D.Tex.2012) (citing D.A. Schulte,
Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 120, 66 S.Ct. 925, 90 L.Ed. 1114 (1946)) (“To establish that his employer
is subject to the requirements of the FLSA, the plaintiff employee has the burden to show that there
is coverage, whether individual or enterprise.”).
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of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s FLSA claims, and Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT 	IS 	ORDERED 	that 	the 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment80 	filed 	by
Defendants 	ESN 	Property, 	LLC, 	Ravi 	Doddamani, 	and 	Vidya 	Doddamani 	is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Elbin Lalin’s claims against
Defendants 	ESN 	Property, 	LLC, 	Ravi 	Doddamani, 	and 	Vidya 	Doddamani 	are
DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s claims against Zydeco Ownings, LLC,
Shoban Pattam, Anil S. and Maricel Paramesh Revocable Trust, 4213-15 Dryades,
LLC, and 4323-25 Loyola, LLC remain pending.
New Orleans, Louisiana, November 4, 2025.
_____________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
80 R. Doc. 37.
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