Complete Logistical Services, LLC v. Yaeger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
COMPLETE LOGISTICAL 	CIVIL ACTION
SERVICES, LLC
VERSUS 	NO. 24-826
PAUL YAEGER 	SECTION: “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 10). For
the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Complete Logistical Services, LLC brings this action seeking to
obtain a declaratory judgment holding that it is not liable to Defendant Paul
Yaeger for additional maintenance and cure payments. Plaintiff, a temporary
staffing company based in Louisiana, employed Defendant as a Captain on
various occasions after he applied to work with Plaintiff in January 2020. On
October 25, 2021, while working for Plaintiff aboard the M/V GO AMERICA,
Defendant had an asthma attack and required medical treatment. Defendant
was 	diagnosed 	with 	pneumonia, 	and 	Plaintiff 	provided 	Defendant 	with
maintenance and cure benefits. Defendant returned to work on January 17,
2022 without restrictions, and in April 2022, the United States Coast Guard
(“USCG”) certified that he was medically fit for duty. Defendant continued to
periodically work for Plaintiff until April 2023. On June 9, 2023, Defendant
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notified Plaintiff that he needed a lung transplant and requested additional
maintenance and cure benefits, claiming his 2021 bout of pneumonia caused
the damage to his lung.
Plaintiff 	then 	filed 	this 	action 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Court’s 	maritime
jurisdiction on April 2, 2024. Defendant was served on June 10, 2024 at his
residence in Texas, but failed to make an appearance. At Plaintiff’s request,
the Clerk of Court entered default against Defendant on December 6, 2024.
Plaintiff now moves for the entry of default judgment against Defendant
declaring that it owes him no additional maintenance and cure.1
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes the clerk to make an
entry of default against defendants who fail to answer or otherwise defend a
plaintiff’s complaint within the required time period.2 An entry of default
results in a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations being deemed admitted.3
Nevertheless, a defendant against whom a default has been entered “is not
held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.”4
Following the entry of default, a plaintiff may move for default judgment
against the defendant in default.5 “[A] defendant’s default does not in itself
warrant the court in entering a default judgment” as “[t]here must be a
1 As the instant Motion did not address the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Defendant, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a supplemental briefing on the issue by
February 27, 2026. Doc. 12. Pursuant to that Order, Plaintiff timely filed its Memorandum
Regarding the Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendant, Paul Yaeger. Doc. 13.
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 55.
3 Meyer v. Bayles, 559 F. App’x 312, 313 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Nishimatsu Const. Co. v.
Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).
4 Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206.
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
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sufficient 	basis 	in 	the 	pleadings 	for 	the 	judgment 	entered.”6 	Although
judgments by default are “generally disfavored,”7 the decision to enter default
judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court.8
The Court is entitled to consider several factors when determining
whether to enter a default judgment, including, “whether material issues of
fact are at issue, whether there has been substantial prejudice, whether the
grounds for default are clearly established, whether the default was caused by
a good faith mistake or excusable neglect, the harshness of a default judgment,
and whether the court would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the
defendant’s motion.”9
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff requests a default judgment against Defendant, claiming that
he has failed to answer in the proper time and has not requested an extension
as required by Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant
has failed to file responsive pleadings or appear in this case, and default has
been entered against him.10
I. 	Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court must first examine its jurisdiction over this subject matter
and the parties before proceeding to the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default
Judgment.11
6 Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206.
7 Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000).
8 Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345
(5th Cir. 1977)).
9 Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).
10 Doc. 7.
11 See Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V VIKTOR KURNATOVSKIY, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th
Cir. 2001).
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A. 	Subject matter jurisdiction
This action arises under the general maritime law of the United States,
and 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	is 	premised 	upon 	this 	Court’s 	maritime
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333.12
B. 	Personal jurisdiction
Next, the Court must consider personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
Defendant is alleged to be a resident of Mississippi.13 In admiralty cases,
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is thus proper when “(1) the forum
state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and
(2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”14 In the instant case, “these two inquiries
merge into one because Louisiana's long-arm statute permits service of process
coterminous with the scope of the due process clause.”15
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
corporation, as it does an individual, against being made subject to the binding
judgments of a forum with which it has established no meaningful ‘contacts,
ties, or relations.’”16 A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of
the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing “minimum
contacts” with the forum state; and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the
12 Defendant is a seaman claiming maintenance and cure benefits for injuries he allegedly
sustained while serving aboard the M/V GO AMERICA in the navigable waters of the
United States.
13 Doc. 1 at 1.
14 Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 343, (5th Cir. 2004).
15 Asarco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 	786 (5th Cir. 1990); see also LA. REV. S TAT.
§ 13:3201.
16 Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GMBH & Co. KG, 688 F.2d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
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defendant does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”17
1. 	Minimum contacts
“Minimum contacts” can be established through specific jurisdiction or
general jurisdiction.18 Specific personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant
has purposely directed its activities, or availed itself of the privileges of
conducting its activities, toward the forum state and the controversy arises out
of or is related to those activities.19 General personal jurisdiction exists when
the defendant has engaged in continuous and systematic activities in the forum
state, regardless of whether such activity is related to the plaintiff’s cause of
action.20
As Defendant is an individual and a non-resident, the Court does not
have general personal jurisdiction over him.21 To establish specific personal
jurisdiction, Plaintiff must prove that: “(1) there are sufficient (i.e., not ‘random
fortuitous or attenuated’) pre-litigation connections between the non-resident
defendant and the forum; (2) the connection has been purposefully established
by the defendant; and (3) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or is related
to the defendant's forum contacts.”22 If Plaintiff meets its burden, Defendant
“can then defeat the exercise of specific jurisdiction by showing (4) that it would
17 Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
316).
18 Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000).
19 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 262, 472 (1985).
20 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
21 Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358–59 (2021) (“In what we have
called the “paradigm” case, an individual is subject to general jurisdiction in her place of
domicile.”).
22 Pervasive Software, 688 F.3d at 221.
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fail the fairness test, i.e., that the balance of interest factors show that the
exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.”23
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant: lived in Louisiana at the time he
contracted 	with 	Plaintiff; 	contracted 	with 	Plaintiff, 	a 	Louisiana-based
employer; “accepted 15 jobs for companies based in, and or/operating out of
Louisiana,” during his employment with Plaintiff; joined or launched vessels
out of Louisiana cities during his employment; and communicated regularly
with 	Plaintiff’s 	Louisiana-based 	employees 	regarding 	his 	employment.24
Defendant also “sought and received pre-employment medical evaluations in
Louisiana.”25 Plaintiff avers that Defendant’s purposeful availment is evinced
by the nature of their relationship in that Defendant sought employment with
Plaintiff 	in 	Louisiana 	and 	that 	Defendant 	could 	decline 	to 	work 	on
Louisiana-based 	jobs 	without 	repercussion. 	Further, 	the 	duty 	to 	pay
maintenance and cure benefits arises out of Defendant’s employment-based
contacts with Louisiana.26 Accordingly, Plaintiff has met his burden to show
that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
2. 	Fairness
As Defendant has not appeared, the Court will review whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant would be unreasonable or
unfair. 	“If 	a 	nonresident 	defendant 	has 	sufficient 	related 	or 	unrelated
minimum 	contacts 	with 	the 	forum, 	we 	must 	then 	consider 	whether 	the
23 Id. at 221–22.
24 Doc. 13 at 8.
25 Doc. 13 at 16.
26 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938) (“The duty [to pay maintenance and
cure] . . . arises from the contract of employment.”).
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‘fairness’ prong of the jurisdictional inquiry is satisfied.”27 The fairness inquiry
is 	determined 	by 	analyzing 	several 	factors: 	(1) 	the 	burden 	upon 	the
nonresident defendant of litigating in the forum state; (2) the interests of the
forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in securing relief; (4) the judicial
system’s interest in obtaining an efficient resolution of controversies; and (5)
the shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.28 Given Defendant’s substantial employment-based contacts with
Louisiana and the fact that Defendant currently resides in Texas, the task of
litigating 	this 	matter 	in 	Louisiana 	would 	not 	be 	unduly 	burdensome.29
Further, Plaintiff is a local employer and has a legitimate interest in litigating
labor disputes with its employees working in the state.30 Thus, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Defendant would not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the Court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over Defendant.
C. 	Venue
Likewise, the Court must determine that the action was brought in an
appropriate venue. A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this judicial district. Plaintiff is Defendant’s
employer, is based within this district, and the dispute arises from Defendant’s
employment 	in 	this 	district. 	Further, 	Defendant 	completed 	his 	pre-
27 Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987)).
28 Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
29 Gulf Offshore Logistics, LLC v. Norris, No. 16-8247, 2016 WL 7097383, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec.
5, 2016) (holding the exercise of personal jurisdiction was reasonable “particularly given
that [the defendants] enjoyed being in the employ of a Louisiana-based company for
multiple years”).
30 Id.
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employment medical evaluation in this district. Therefore, this is a proper
venue for this action.
II. 	Availability of Declaratory Relief
As this Court has jurisdiction, the Court must now decide whether
declaratory relief is appropriate. The Fifth Circuit has established a three-step
inquiry for determining whether it is appropriate to exercise jurisdiction over
a declaratory action. A court must consider: “(1) justiciability . . . (2) authority
(i.e., whether issuing a declaration will be tantamount to enjoining an ongoing
state-court proceeding, in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act, which triggers
‘mandatory’ abstention); and, if the case survives the first two steps, (3)
discretion.”
A. 	Justiciability
Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the text of the Declaratory
Judgment Act forbid federal courts from “issu[ing] a declaratory judgment
unless there exists an ‘actual controversy.’”31 “As a general rule, an actual
controversy exists where ‘a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy
and 	reality 	[exists] 	between 	parties 	having 	adverse 	legal 	interests.’”32
“Whether particular facts are sufficiently immediate to establish an actual
controversy is a question that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”33
“The Fifth Circuit has held that a complaint raising the issue of whether an
employer 	is 	legally 	obligated 	to 	continue 	to 	provide 	an 	employee 	with
maintenance 	and 	cure 	benefits 	is 	a 	justiciable 	controversy, 	even 	if 	the
31 Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 1998).
32 Orix Credit All., Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (citing Middle South Energy, Inc. v. City
of New Orleans, 800 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1986)).
33 Id.
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employee has not made formal demand for such payments.”34 Thus, the Court
finds that this matter is justiciable.
B. 	Authority to grant declaratory judgment
Next, the Court must determine whether it has the authority to grant
the declaratory relief sought.35 The Fifth Circuit has held that “when a state
lawsuit is pending, more often than not, issuing a declaratory judgment will be
tantamount to issuing an injunction—providing the declaratory plaintiff an
end run around the requirements of the Anti–Injunction Act.”36 Accordingly, a
court does not have authority to consider a declaratory action “when: (1) the
declaratory defendant previously filed a cause of action in state court; (2) the
state case involved the same issues as those in the federal court; and (3) the
district court is prohibited from enjoining the state proceedings under [the
Anti-Injunction Act].”37 The Fifth Circuit has further held that “the absence of
any of the three factors defeats mandatory abstention, and the district court
has broad discretion over whether to grant declaratory relief.”38 None of the
34 Diamond B. Indus., LLC, v. Bancroft-Brownlee, No. 6:17-cv-1169, 2018 WL 3469747, at *3
(W.D. La. June 29, 2018) (citing Rowan Co., Inc. v. Griffin, 876 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1989)),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:17-cv-1169, 2018 WL 3469596 (W.D. La. July
18, 2018).
35 Orix, 212 F.3d at 895.
36 Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bureau Fed., Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
Texas Emps.’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)). 	The
Anti-Injunction Act provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
37 Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Tom’s Welding, Inc., No. 11-3101, 2012 WL 2064451, at *5 (E.D. La. June
7, 2012) (citing Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cnty., 343 F.3d 383, 388 n.1 (5th Cir.
2003)).
38 Sealed v. Sealed, No. 94-30148, 1994 WL 487245, at *2 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Torch, Inc. v.
LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193, 194 (5th Cir. 1991)).
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factors are relevant here, meaning that this Court has the authority to
adjudicate this matter.
C. 	Discretion
As “Federal courts have great discretion to entertain, stay, or dismiss a
declaratory judgment action,” the Court “must consider whether to exercise its
discretion to grant declaratory judgment.”39 In Brillhart v. Excess Insurance
Co. of America, the United States Supreme Court identified several factors to
determine if abstention is appropriate under the Declaratory Judgment Act.40
In St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Trejo, the Fifth Circuit distilled these factors into
a nonexclusive list:
1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the
matters in controversy may be fully litigated, 2) whether the
plaintiff 	filed 	suit 	in 	anticipation 	of 	a 	lawsuit 	filed 	by 	the
defendant, 3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in
bringing the suit, 4) whether possible inequities in allowing the
declaratory plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to change forums
exist, 5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the
parties and witnesses, 6) whether retaining the lawsuit in federal
court would serve the purposes of judicial economy, and, [7)]
whether the federal court is being called on to construe a state
judicial decree involving the same parties and entered by the court
before whom the parallel state suit between the same parties is
pending.41
The Fifth Circuit has noted that the Trejo factors may be reduced to three
aspects of analysis: federalism, fairness, and efficiency.42
39 RSDC Holdings, LLC v. Steinberg, No. 16-9381, 2017 WL 117314, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 12,
2017) (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282–83 (1995)).
40 Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
41 St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590–91 (1994).
42 Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 391.
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Here, Plaintiff asserts that there is no pending state action regarding
Defendant’s demand for maintenance and cure, and the Court has no reason
to believe otherwise. Thus, there are no federalism concerns.
As to fairness, there is no indication that this action is anticipatory in
nature, was brought in this district for the purposes of forum shopping, or that
Plaintiff “is attempting to gain precedence in time or to change forums.”43
Plaintiff was simply “filing a declaratory judgment action in a federal court
with jurisdiction to hear it,” which is not improper anticipatory litigation or
abusive forum shopping.44 Additionally, the applicable law for Defendant’s
maintenance and cure claim would be the same whether in federal or state
court.45
Regarding efficiency, the Court must consider whether the federal court
is a convenient forum for parties and witnesses and whether retaining the
lawsuit would serve purposes of judicial economy.46 While there may be
alternative forums where this matter could have been brought, Defendant is
not 	unduly 	burdened 	by 	defending 	this 	action 	in 	this 	forum 	as 	he 	had
substantial employment-related contacts with this state, was a former resident
of this state, and now resides in an adjacent state. Further, Plaintiff is located
here, and Defendant obtained his pre-employment physical in this district,
meaning relevant witnesses are also located here.47
43 Bridgfield Cas. Ins. Co. v. River Oaks Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-1665, 2015 WL 137248, at *2
(E.D. La. Jan. 9, 2015) (citing Trejo, 39 F.3d at 591).
44 Sherwin Williams, 343 F.3d at 391.
45 See River Oaks Mgmt, 2015 WL 137248 (stating that since Louisiana law applied to the
policy regardless of whether it was litigated in federal or state court, the court was not
inclined to find that the plaintiff was forum shopping).
46 Trejo, 39 F.3d at 591.
47 Doc. 10-2.
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The Trejo factors all weigh in favor of the Court exercising jurisdiction.
Thus, this matter is justiciable, this Court has authority, and it shall use its
discretion to exercise jurisdiction over this action for declaratory judgment.
III. 	Default Judgment
Having established that this Court may grant Plaintiff declaratory relief,
the Court turns to whether Plaintiff has set forth a sufficient basis to support
default 	judgment.48 Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	argues 	that 	the 	McCorpen 	defense
absolves it from its maintenance and cure obligations because Defendant failed
to disclose his history of asthma. Plaintiff further argues that, in any event, it
owes no maintenance and cure to Defendant because his injuries did not
manifest while he was in service to a vessel. Because the Court holds that
Plaintiff’s 	McCorpen 	defense 	provides 	a 	sufficient 	basis 	to 	enter 	default
judgment against Defendant, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s alternative
argument.
“An employer owes damages for maintenance and cure to any seaman
who suffers injury during his employment on a vessel, regardless of fault.”49 “A
seaman’s employer may, however, rely on certain legal defenses, such as the
‘McCorpen defense,’ to deny claims for maintenance and cure.”50 In McCorpen,
the Fifth Circuit held that an employer is relieved of the obligation to pay
maintenance and cure when the seaman conceals or misrepresents the facts of
a prior condition or injury in connection with an application for employment.51
48 As the Clerk has entered default against Defendant, Plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations are deemed admitted. Bayles, 559 F. App’x at 313.
49 Foret v. St. June, LLC, No. 13–5111, 2014 WL 4539090, at *2 (citing Johnson v. Cenac
Towing, Inc., 544 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2008)).
50 Dauzat v. Weeks Marine, Inc., No. 14-3008, 2016 WL 3167662, at *2 (E.D. La. June 7,
2016).
51 McCorpen, 396 F.2d at 549; see also Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corp., 410 F.3d 166,
170–71, 173 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting McCorpen, 396 F.2d at 549 (“[W]here the [employer]
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To prevail on this defense, “an employer must show that (1) the claimant
intentionally misrepresented or concealed medical facts; (2) the non-disclosed
facts were material to the employer’s decision to hire the claimant; and (3) a
connection exists between the withheld information and the injury complained
of in the lawsuit.” This Court will address each element in turn.
A. 	Intentional concealment
To satisfy the “intentional concealment” prong of the McCorpen defense,
the Court need not make a finding of subjective intent.52 “[A] prospective
employee’s 	‘[f]ailure 	to 	disclose 	medical 	information 	in 	an 	interview 	or
questionnaire that is obviously designed to elicit such information . . . satisfies
the 	intentional 	concealment 	requirement.’”53 	Here, 	Plaintiff 	attaches
Defendant’s USCG Application for Medical Certificate (“USCG Application”)
and pre-assignment questionnaire.54 On the USCG Application, Defendant
denied presently or ever having or requiring treatment for a lung disease of
any type, including asthma.55 Likewise, Defendant denied having any medical
conditions 	on 	his 	pre-assignment 	questionnaire.56 	However, 	Defendant’s
medical records indicate that he has a history of asthma dating back to his
childhood 	and 	uses 	an 	albuterol 	inhaler.57 	Notably, 	Defendant’s 	medical
requires a seaman to submit to a pre-hiring medical examination or interview and the
seaman intentionally misrepresents or conceals material medical facts, the disclosure of
which is plainly desired, then he is not entitled to an award of maintenance and cure.”)).
52 Brown, 410 F.3d at 174.
53 Martinez v. Crosby Dredging, LLC, 686 F. Supp. 3d 479, 485 (E.D. La. 2023) (citing Brown,
410 F.3d at 174 (quoting Vitcovich v. Ocean Rover O.N., No. 94-35047, 1997 WL 21205, at
*3 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1997))).
54 Doc. 10-2 at 5–16.
55 Id. at 8. Defendant filled out the USCG Application as part of his pre-employment physical.
Id. at 1.
56 Id. at 16.
57 Doc. 10-3 at 3, 5.
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records indicate that four days before he boarded the M/V GO AMERICA he
sought medical care for the exact same symptoms he experienced while aboard
that vessel.58 Because Defendant failed to disclose his history of asthma on his
USCG Application and pre-employment questionnaire, Plaintiff has met its
burden to show that Defendant intentionally concealed medical information.
B. 	Materiality
For the McCorpen defense to apply, the concealed or nondisclosed facts
of a plaintiff’s medical history must be material to the employer’s decision to
hire the seaman.59 “The fact that an employer asks a specific medical question
on an application, and that the inquiry is rationally related to the applicant’s
physical ability to perform his job duties, renders the information material for
the purpose of this analysis.”60 Failing to disclose respiratory conditions, such
as asthma, is material where a seaman was asked to disclose his history of
breathing conditions pre-employment.61
Here, Plaintiff provides the Court with the declaration of Spencer Sens
(“Sens”), Plaintiff’s Chief Executive Officer. Sens states that “[k]nowledge of
Yaeger’s history of asthma would have been material to [Plaintiff’s] decision to
hire him as a contract worker because he would be expected to work offshore
58 Doc. 10-4 at 2 (documenting Defendant’s recent “asthma exacerbation,” wheezing
symptoms, and history of asthma).
59 See Brown, 410 F.3d at 171.
60 Id. at 175.
61 Bergeron v. B & J Martin, Inc., No. 04-3190, 2005 WL 3542898, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 17,
2005) (“[T]he omission of any reference to his breathing problems from any of the forms
required in the hiring process is a misrepresentation that was material to the hiring
decision.”); Kidd v. Candy Fleet, LLC, No. 16-71, 2016 WL 6892886, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov.
23, 2016) (holding that questions regarding a seaman’s history of chest, lung, and
respiratory conditions were material to the employer’s decision to hire a seaman with a
history of breathing problems).
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and away from easy access to medical attention as a captain.”62 According to
Sens, “[i]f Yaeger had disclosed his history of asthma, [he] would have required
additional 	medical 	information, 	including 	medical 	records 	and 	further
evaluation of his ability to perform his duties before deciding to hire him as a
contract worker.”63 Sens also attests that “[k]nowledge of Yaeger’s asthma
history and current complaints of wheezing and a need for an inhaler would
have been relevant to [Plaintiff’s] decision to hire him for this job” aboard the
M/V GO AMERICA.64 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s failure to
disclose his breathing difficulties were material to Plaintiff’s decision to hire
him.
C. 	Connection Between Injuries
Finally, Plaintiff must show a connection between the non-disclosed
injuries and the injuries complained of here. To present a successful McCorpen
defense, a party “need not submit any proof that the [seaman’s] omission
caused the injury.”65 The party need only “prove that the old injury and the
new injury affected the same body part.”66 Here, Defendant’s pre-existing
asthma 	affected 	his 	lungs 	and 	respiratory 	system. 	The 	pneumonia 	he
contracted after his asthma attack aboard the M/V GO AMERICA and the
subsequent lung damage also affected Defendant’s lungs. Thus, there is a
connection between the non-disclosed condition and the injuries claimed.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has demonstrated a sufficient basis to enter declaratory
judgment against Defendant precluding his recovery of further maintenance
62 Doc. 10-2 at 2.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Johnson v. Cenac Towing, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d 721, 728 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2009) (citing
Brown 410 F.3d at 176).
66 Id.
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and cure payments based on Plaintiff’s successful McCorpen defense.67 Having
determined that Plaintiff has successfully presented its McCorpen defense, the
Court finds that default judgment is warranted given Defendant’s lengthy
failure to appear.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is
GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered against Paul Yaeger declaring that
Complete Logistical Services, LLC is not liable for additional maintenance and
cure benefits, with each party to bear its own costs.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 4th day of March 2026.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
67 Plaintiff’s Complaint prays for attorney’s fees and costs. Despite Plaintiff’s entitlement to
declaratory judgment, Plaintiff cannot recover attorney’s fees and costs. See Ingram Barge
Co. LLC v. Caillou Island Towing Co. Inc., 622 F. Supp. 3d 240, 246–55. (E.D. La. 2022); see
also Dolmo v. Galliano Tugs, Inc., No. 09-3976, 2011 WL 6817824 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 2011).
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