USA v. Alford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-245
KERNELIUS ALFORD 	SECTION: D (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are three Motions to Suppress filed by Defendant Kernelius
Alford.1 The Government filed Responses in Opposition to each.2 Defendant has filed
Replies.3 The Court subsequently held a hearing on the Motions on September 23,
2025. After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, evidence
presented at the hearing, and the applicable law, the Motion to Suppress Evidence,
Fruits, and Statements on May 2, 2024, and the Motion the Suppress Statements on
November 21, 20244 are DENIED. The Motion to Suppress Evidence and Fruits
Seized on November 21, 2024,5 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The 	instant 	Motions 	to 	Suppress 	concern 	two 	encounters 	between 	law
enforcement and Defendant Kernelius Alford, one on May 2, 2024 and one on
November 21, 2024. The facts of each of these encounters with law enforcement will
be discussed in turn.
1 R. Docs. 36, 37, 38.
2 R. Docs. 43, 44, 45.
3 R. Docs. 47, 48.
4 R. Docs. 36, 37.
5 R. Doc. 38.
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A. The May 2, 2024 Encounter
Deputy Andrew Scott of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”) was on
patrol in Fat City, a neighborhood in Metairie, when he observed a gray Range Rover
with tinted windows and an obscured license plate.6 	From a prior meeting with a
concerned citizen and prior research, Scott believed the driver of this vehicle to be
Kernelius Alford.7 Based on the tinted windows and obscured license plate, Scott
attempted to initiate a traffic stop, but the driver began accelerating before he could
be stopped.8 Scott then began to pursue the vehicle.
While pursuing the vehicle, another police car drove past them with its police
lights on.9 Following this, Alford’s vehicle began driving faster in an attempt to escape
law enforcement.10 Alford’s vehicle then ran a stop sign and 	then crashed into
another car.11 Shortly after, Alford stopped his vehicle in the middle of the road and
began fleeing on foot.12 Deputy Scott then exited the police car and gave chase,
chasing Alford into a fenced backyard where the officer drew his service weapon,
causing Alford to surrender himself.13 The officer then instructed Alford to lay on his
stomach and arrested him.14 After apprehending Alford, the officer brought Alford
back to a JPSO patrol vehicle.15 The arresting officer then removed cash from Alford’s
6 R. Doc. 43-5 at p. 8.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 R. Doc. 43-1, Dashboard Camera Footage from the Arrest of Kernelius Alford on May 2, 2024 (“Alford
Arrest Dashcam”) at 0:35.
10 Id. at 0:38.
11 Id. at 0:50.
12 Id. at 1:00-1:01.
13 R. Doc. 43-1, Body Camera Footage of Arresting Officer of Kernelius Alford on May 2, 2024 (“Arresting
Officer’s Bodycam”) at 0:59-1:20.
14 Id. 1:35.
15 R. Doc. 43-1, Alford Arrest Dashcam at 2:43.
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front pocket and asked him if he had any identification on his person, to which Alford
responded he did not.16 Alford then stated that the “truck” (his vehicle) was in his
name and that there were two firearms in the vehicle, and the officer then placed
Alford into the backseat of the police cruiser.17 Scott then asked Alford if he was a
felon, and Alford nodded.18 The arresting officer then read Alford his Miranda rights
and placed the defendant under arrest. Alford declined to make a statement.19 The
encounter described above is recorded on dashcam and law enforcement body cam
video. 	Three 	law 	enforcement 	officers 	began 	searching 	Alford’s 	car 	shortly
thereafter.20
The police officers then discovered unsealed marijuana and a scale in a
backpack on the passenger seat.21 They then found two firearms and a sealed package
of marijuana within the same backpack.22 Continuing their search, the officers found
cash and a ski mask in the backseat.23 The searching police officers removed the
evidence from Alford’s vehicle and brought the evidence back to the police vehicle.24
Another officer also removed Alford’s cellphone from the driver’s seat cup holder and
returned to their vehicle with the phone.25
16 R. Doc. 43-1, Arresting Officer’s Bodycam at 3:25-3:29.
17 Id. at 3:30-3:37.
18 Id. at 3:40-50.
19 Id. at 4:00.
20 R. Doc. 43-1, Body Camera Footage of First Searching Officer of Kernelius Alford’s Vehicle on May
2, 2024 (“First Searching Officer’s Bodycam”) at 0:04.
21 Id. at 0:47.
22 R. Doc. 43-1, Body Camera Footage of Second Searching Officer of Kernelius Alford’s Vehicle on May
2, 2024 (“Second Searching Officer’s Bodycam”) at 0:47-0:52.
23 R. Doc. 43-1, First Searching Officer’s Bodycam at 1:18.
24 Id. at 1:03-1:11.
25 Id. at 2:00-2:13.
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1. 	Motion to Suppress Evidence, Fruits, and Statements on May 2,
2024
Alford 	filed 	a 	Motion 	to 	Suppress 	related 	to 	his 	encounter 	with 	law
enforcement on May 2, 2024, arguing violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights 	under 	the 	U.S. 	Constitution.26 	First, 	Alford 	alleges 	that 	the 	officer’s
interrogation of him did not adhere to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona
because the officer initiated an interrogation by inquiring if Alford was a felon
without advising Alford of his right to remain silent and right to counsel.
The 	Government 	argues 	that 	Deputy 	Scott 	had 	reasonable 	articulable
suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and probable cause to believe that Alford “had
committed multiple traffic and criminal offenses.”27 Under the plain view doctrine
and automobile exception, the Government avers that the officers had the authority
to search Alford’s vehicle. Additionally, the Government contends that Alford’s
statements to Deputy Scott were spontaneous and voluntary and that the deputy’s
questions following were merely follow-up questions posed “to clarify any ambiguity
in the spontaneous statements without broadening their scope.”28
B. The November 21, 2024 Encounter
In the intervening period between the two encounters with law enforcement,
Alford was indicted by a federal grand jury of the Eastern District of Louisiana on
November 15, 	2024, 	and 	an 	arrest 	warrant 	was 	issued.29 Homeland 	Security
26 R. Doc. 36.
27 R. Doc. 43 at p. 7.
28 Id. at p. 14.
29 See R. Doc. 1.
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Investigations (“HSI”) received information that Alford was residing in the Ramada
Inn on the I-10 Service Road in Metairie.30 	HSI contacted the JPSO to assist with
the execution of the arrest warrant and apprehension of Alford.31 On November 21,
2024, the JPSO obtained a search warrant signed by a state court judge to search
Room 315 of the Ramada Hotel, located at 3400 South I-10 Service Road, Metairie
Louisiana.32 The search warrant described the specific items that law enforcement
sought and recounted Alford’s criminal history, the indictment returned by a federal
grand jury against him, and the statements of the hotel manager that Alford and his
girlfriend regarding their living at the hotel.33 The warrant contained no other
connection between the hotel room and Alford other than the fact that he was
currently residing in Room 315 of that hotel and had been residing there since July
1, 2024.34 It also failed to specify what statutory violations were the target of the
search of the hotel room.35
JPSO and HSI executed the search warrant that afternoon. After knocking,
announcing themselves, and receiving no response, they used a key card to attempt
to enter the room.36 Officers were not able to enter due to the safety latch, and the
Government avers that Alford said, “Wait!” and walked toward the bathroom.37
Officers then rammed open the door, took Alford into custody, and led him out of the
30 R. Doc. 45 at p. 3.
31 Id.
32 R. Doc. 45-2.
33 Id. at pp. 1-2.
34 Id.
35 Id. at p. 1.
36 R. Doc. 44-3 at p. 5.
37 Id.
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room. The subsequent search of the hotel room revealed a clear plastic bag with 7.5
grams of methamphetamine and a clear plastic bag that contained 5.7 grams of
cocaine, a digital scale, 26 tramadol 50 mg. pills, a Glock, Model 27, .40 caliber pistol
with 13 live rounds, all inside of a backpack. The search also revealed 7 grams of
heroin in a clear plastic bag concealed between two coffee cups on a counter.38
Once Alford was taken out of the room, he was placed in handcuffs; there is no
video documentation of the intervening seventeen minutes between the time he was
arrested and the time when Sergeant Daniel Lassus activated his body-worn camera
(“BWC”).39 The Government avers that Alford was advised of his Miranda rights
during this intervening period; Alford disputes this, claiming that the police report
contains 	no 	mention 	of 	any 	advisement 	of 	right 	or 	questioning. 	During 	the
suppression hearing, Sgt. Lassus testified that he heard Detective Evans advise
Alford of his Miranda rights.40 Once Sgt. Lassus turned on his BWC, he approached
Alford, advised him of his Miranda rights, and performed a custodial interrogation
regarding who owned the drugs found during the search of the room.41
Alford filed two Motions to Suppress related to his encounter with law
enforcement on November 21, 2024, arguing violations of his Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights.
38 Id.
39 R. Doc. 44 at p. 2; R. Doc. 47 at p. 1.
40 Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (“Transcript”) at p. 43.
41 R. Doc. 44-3 at p. 6.; Transcript at pp. 49-50.
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1. 	Motion to Suppress Evidence and Fruits Seized on November 21,
2024
Alford moves to suppress all evidence obtained by law enforcement during and
because of the November 21, 2024, search of the hotel room at the Ramada Inn. Alford
argues that affidavit upon which the search warrant was based failed to establish
probable cause to search the hotel room and “laced even indicia of probably cause of
nexus” between the alleged criminal activity and the hotel room.42 The Government
argues that the search warrant “meets the constitutional requirement of probable
cause” because the affidavit established a nexus between the alleged criminal activity
and the hotel room that was searched.43 Even if there was not probable cause for the
warrant, the Government contends that evidence seized should not be suppressed
because of the good faith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984). Alford replies that the Government conflates probable cause to arrest and
probable cause to search and that the warrant only describes probable cause to
arrest.44 Additionally, Alford argues that the Government’s reliance on information
not contained in the affidavit in its Response is precluded by law and that, even if
considered, still fails to create probable cause to search.45
2. 	Motion to Suppress Statements on November 21, 2024
Alford 	additionally 	moves 	to 	suppress 	the 	statements 	obtained 	by 	law
enforcement in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and Miranda v. Arizona. He
42 R. Doc. 38-1 at p. 6.
43 R. Doc. 45 at pp. 6,8.
44 R. Doc. 48 at p. 1.
45 Id. at p. 8.
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asks this Court to suppress the statements made before being advised of his Miranda
rights as well as the statements made after being advised of his rights “because they
were the result of an illegal two-step interrogation process.”46 The Government
responds that there are no specific pre-Miranda warning inculpatory statements that
would give rise to an impermissible two-step interrogation process.47 In his reply,
Alford emphasizes that it is the Government’s burden to prove that its agents
complied with the requirements of Miranda and avers that the officers’ interview of
Alford had already begun before being advised of his rights.48
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”49
1. 	Search Warrants
“A valid search warrant may be issued only upon a finding of probable cause.”50
A court may not look outside the affidavit to find probable cause to issue a search
46 R. Doc. 37-1 at p. 5.
47 R. Doc. 44.
48 R. Doc. 47.
49 U.S. C ONST . amend. IV.
50 United States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d
1300, 1302 (5th Cir.1991)).
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warrant.51 The warrant “‘must establish a nexus between the house to be searched
and the evidence sought’—either by ‘direct observation or through normal inferences
as to where the articles sought would be located.’”52 Even if an affidavit for a warrant
were insufficient to establish probable cause, the evidence will not be suppressed if it
was “obtained by officers in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search
warrant.”53 	However, 	this 	exception 	“does 	not 	apply—and 	the 	evidence 	is
inadmissible—if the affidavit was ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’”54 Such “bare bones” affidavits
consist 	of 	“wholly 	conclusory 	statements” 	and 	do 	not 	provide 	the 	facts 	and
circumstances necessary to link the criminal activity to the place being searched.55
2. 	Warrantless Searches of Vehicles
“A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within an
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”56 One such exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is the automobile exception which
permits the “warrantless search of a readily mobile vehicle…when law enforcement
has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a
crime.”57 The scope of this exception is broad: “[w]hen there is probable cause to
51 Id. (“The information necessary to show probable cause must be contained within a written affidavit
given under oath.”).
52 United States v. Wilson, No. 25-30105, 2025 WL 2490719, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025) (quoting
United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2003)).
53 United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984)).
54 Wilson, 2025 WL 2490719, at *3 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984)).
55 Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 321; see also United States v. Brown, 567 F. App'x 272, 282 (5th Cir. 2014).
56 United States v. Guzman, 739 F.3d 241, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2014).
57 United States v. Clayton, 98 F.4th 256, 263 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Rountree v. Lopinto, 976 F.3d 606,
609 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2006); California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991)).
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search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers…to examine
packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each
one.”58
B. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “No person… shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself…”59 As part of this right, individuals
must be warned prior to any custodial interrogation that they have right to remain
silent, that anything said can be used against them in court, that they have a right
to counsel, and that counsel will be appointed if they cannot afford counsel.60 This
warning “must be administered prior to any ‘custodial interrogation.’”61 To determine
whether a person is “in custody” courts must inquire how a reasonable man in the
suspect's position would have understood his situation.”62 Thus, for the purposes of a
Miranda warning, a person is considered to be “in custody” “when placed under
formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have
understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree which the law associates with formal arrest.”63
In addition, law enforcement is not permitted to interrogate a suspect to obtain
an inculpatory statement before advising him of their rights, then advise the suspect
of his rights, and then obtain the inculpatory statement previously elicited.64 The
58 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1301, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999).
59 U.S. C ONST . amend. V.
60 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
61 United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted).
62 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 422, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3141, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984).
63 United States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted).
64 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2004).
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Fifth Circuit, following the test elicited by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence, has
held that “postwarning statements that are related to the substance of prewarning
statements 	must 	be 	excluded 	unless 	curative 	measures 	are 	taken 	before 	the
postwarning statement is made.”65
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Suppress Evidence, Fruits, and Statements on May 2, 2024
In meeting with a concerned citizen about alleged drug trafficking occurring in
the Fat City neighborhood of Metairie, Deputy Andrew Scott received a tip about a
black man driving a dark-colored Range Rover selling illegal narcotics.66 	Deputy
Scott testified that he located the vehicle at 3420 Edenborn Ave. in Metairie and ran
a vehicle inquiry, discovering that the vehicle was owned by Kernelius Alford.67 Scott
also testified that he ran a criminal history check of Alford, discovering prior arrests
for possession of illegal drugs and firearms.68 Less than a month later, on May 2,
2024, Scott attempted to stop Alford for traffic violation for speeding. Alford’s vehicle
attempted to evade the traffic stop, ultimately colliding with another vehicle as it
crossed West Esplanade Avenue. Alford then turned onto a side street before stopping
the vehicle, exiting, and fleeing on foot. He ran into the backyard of a home on the
65 United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court also looks to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
because “[i]t is well established that when we are confronted with a plurality opinion, we ‘look to that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”
Courtney, 463 F.3d at 338 (quoting Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel
of Tex., Inc. 343 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64
F.3d 184, 189 (5th Cir.1995))).
66 Transcript at p. 7.
67 Transcript at p. 8.
68 Id.
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side street at which point he was apprehended by Deputy Scott. Deputy Scott then
escorted Alford to a patrol car.
In the instant Motion, Alford argues that (1) Deputy Scott conducted an
unconstitutional interrogation as Alford was sitting in the patrol vehicle after being
apprehended 	and 	that 	(2) 	the 	search 	of 	Alford’s 	car 	after 	his 	arrest 	was
unconstitutional. The Government responded that the statements made by Alford to
Deputy Scott were voluntary in nature and that no interrogation occurred and that
(2) the search of the automobile was permissible under the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement or, alternatively, that the evidence is admissible due to the
inevitable discovery doctrine.
1. 	Statements
Alford argues that the conversation that took place outside of Scott’s car
amounted to a custodial interrogation and that, in accordance with Miranda, Alford’s
statements must be suppressed.69
At the beginning of the interaction between Scott and Alford, Scott patted
down Alford and then asked him for identification to which Alford responded that he
did not have any identification. Alford then stated that he had two guns in the car.
The requirements of Miranda mandate that evidence obtained as a result of custodial
interrogation may not be used against a defendant unless and until warning and
69 The Government does not contest the fact that Alford was in custody. (“Notably, while Alford sat
alone in custody in the back of Deputy Scott’s unit, he uttered out…” (R. Doc. 43 at p. 14)).
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waiver are demonstrated by the Government.70 Alford’s statement that he had two
guns in the car was not a result of custodial interrogation; they were voluntary
statements given by a suspect in custody and were not elicited via custodial
interrogation. Therefore, the strictures of Miranda do not apply to that statement.
Deputy Scott testified at the evidentiary hearing that prior to advising Alford
of his rights under Miranda, he asked Alford if he was a felon.71 The Court finds that
testimony credible. The Government characterizes this question as a routine booking
question and thus argues that it is excepted from the requirement that a suspect
receive a Miranda warning before any custodial interrogation.
The Government relies on Pennsylvania v. Muniz to argue that questions
regarding a suspect’s criminal history are part of the routine booking question
exception to Miranda.72 This reliance is misplaced. In Muniz, the questions found to
be part of the routine booking question exception were the suspect’s “name, address,
height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age.”73 A question regarding
criminal history is of a whole other character than the questions enumerated in the
Court’s opinion in Muniz. The Government fails to cite any Fifth Circuit precedent
that such exception applies to questions related to a suspect’s criminal history. To the
contrary, 	this 	Circuit 	has 	expressly 	held 	that 	“questions 	designed 	to 	elicit
incriminatory 	admissions 	are 	not 	covered 	under 	the 	routine 	booking 	question
70 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479 (1966) (“But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him.”).
71 Transcript at p. 19.
72 R. Doc. 43 at p. 14.
73 Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990).
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exception.”74 From Alford’s voluntary statement that he had guns in the car, the
Court finds that the question regarding Alford’s felon status was motivated by a
desire to determine if he had violated any state or federal laws regarding firearm
possession. Because such question was designed to elicit an incriminatory statement,
the pre-warning question about Alford’s felon status was unconstitutional.
The analysis does not end there. The Supreme Court has recognized the
independent source doctrine presents an exception to the exclusionary rule and has
described the purpose behind the doctrine:
[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public
interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly
balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they
would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred...When the
challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence
would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent
any error or violation...75
For a Court to find that the independent source to apply, the evidence obtained via
the independent source must be identical to the piece of evidence that had been
obtained unlawfully.76 In this case, Deputy Scott elucidated an independent source
while testifying during the evidentiary hearing; at his disposal, he had national
databases through which he could conduct a criminal inquiry to determine Alford’s
felon status.77 Suppressing the fact that Alford is a felon in spite of the independent
source available to investigating officer would put the police department in a worse
74 United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Arellano-Banuelos, 912 F.3d 862 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that Miranda was violated when officers
asked a suspect about his immigration status and prior deportations without advising him of his
rights).
75 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984).
76 United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 578 (5th Cir. 2008).
77 Transcript at p. 20.
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position than they would have been had the misconduct not occurred in this case. As
a result, suppression is not the appropriate remedy for this violation, and Alford’s
admission of his felon status is not suppressed.
2. 	Search of the Car
Alford does not challenge the propriety of the traffic stop in his Motion; instead,
Alford argues that the warrantless search of the car was unreasonable. The Court
finds that Deputy Scott had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Alford because
of his traffic violations. Traffic stops are analyzed under the test articulated in Terry
v. Ohio, in which courts must determine if the officer’s action was (1) “justified at its
inception”; and (2) “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.”78
To satisfy the first prong, “an officer must have an objectively reasonable
suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is
about to occur, before stopping the vehicle.”79 Here, Scott observed Alford commit
several traffic violations, including reckless driving, hit and run driving, and failure
to yield. Such traffic infractions form an objectively reasonable basis for Scott to stop
Alford’s car. To satisfy the second prong, “detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”80 Additionally, if the
officer develops reasonable articulable suspicion of additional criminal activity afoot,
“he may further detain its occupants for a reasonable time while appropriately
78 United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)).
79 Id.
80 United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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attempting to dispel this reasonable suspicion.”81 The stop and subsequent arrest of
Alford were not longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of citing him for
traffic violations and, once acquiring reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, arresting Alford for those offenses. For these reasons, the Court finds that
the traffic stop was proper.
A 	warrantless 	search 	is 	presumed 	to 	be 	unreasonable 	“unless 	the
circumstances 	fall 	under 	an 	exception 	to 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment's 	warrant
requirement.”82 One 	such 	exception 	is 	the 	automobile 	exception.83 Under 	this
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, “a warrantless search of
a readily mobile vehicle is permitted when law enforcement has probable cause to
believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.”84
Deputy Scott had probable cause to believe that Alford’s vehicle contained
contraband or evidence of a crime. Scott testified that he smelled “a strong odor of
marijuana” and that he observed a firearm in Alford’s vehicle in plain view prior to
initiating the search of the vehicle.85 The Court finds that Scott’s testimony was
credible. Taken together and when viewing the totality of the circumstances, the gun
in plain view, the strong odor of marijuana, and Scott’s knowledge of Alford’s criminal
history regarding drugs create probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained
81 United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 622 F.3d 383
(5th Cir. 2010).
82 United States v. Clayton, 98 F.4th 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2024).
83 United States v. Riojas, 139 F.4th 465, 474 (5th Cir. 2025).
84 Clayton, 98 F.4th at 263.
85 Transcript at p. 24.
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contraband and evidence of a crime.86 Because officers had probable cause to believe
that Alford’s vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime, the search of the
vehicle was proper under the automobile exception. As such, the Court denies the
Motion as it relates to the search of the vehicle.
B. Motion to Suppress Evidence and Fruits Seized on November 21, 2024
After Alford was indicted by a federal grand jury, a federal arrest warrant was
issued. JPSO and HSI learned that Alford was residing in Room 315 of the Ramada
Inn in Metairie, and on November 21, 2024, they sought and received a search
warrant from the 24th Judicial District Court in Jefferson Parish for the hotel room.
In the instant Motion, Alford challenges that warrant. He argues that the
affidavit in support of the warrant did contain any facts that suggested that Alford
had or was hiding illicit drugs or firearms in his hotel room and thus lacked a nexus
between the place to be searched and the items sought.87 He further contends that
the 	Government 	cannot 	meet 	the 	requirements 	of 	the 	good-faith 	exception
established in United States v. Leon, because the affidavit was so lacking in the
indicia of probable cause that reliance on it was unreasonable.88 The Government
responds that the facts in the affidavit were sufficient to establish probable cause and
establish a nexus between the suspected criminal activity and the hotel room.89 It
also avers that even if the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause to
86 See, e.g., United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the smell of
marijuana alone “may be ground enough for a finding of probable cause”); United States v. Young, 816
F. App'x 993, 996 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding that probable cause existed to extend a search after
considering, among other things, the suspect’s criminal history related to drugs).
87 R. Doc. 38-1 at p. 7.
88 Id.
89 R. Doc. 45 at pp. 7-8.
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search, the Leon good faith exception applies, and the evidence should not be
suppressed.90 In his Reply, Alford emphasizes the difference between probable cause
to arrest and probable cause to search and re-urges his argument that reliance on the
insufficient affidavit was unreasonable and that, as a result, the good-faith exception
does not apply and the evidence must be suppressed.91
A written affidavit made in support of the issuance of a search warrant must
contain “[t]he information necessary to show probable cause.”92 As part of that
showing of probable cause, facts contained in the affidavit “must establish a nexus
between the house to be searched and the evidence sought.”93 The Court finds that
the written affidavit provided to obtain the warrant does not contain the facts
necessary to establish a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence
sought. The affidavit details Alford’s criminal history, notes that Alford has been
indicted by a federal grand jury, discusses Alford’s phone that is registered to a
completely different address, explains how the officers know that Alford is living in
the room of the Ramada Inn, provides a brief mention that there has been some loud
noise emanating from the room, and contains a final conclusory statement that the
affiant “believes Alford may have weapons and illegal narcotics within his hotel room,
Room 315.”94 “Mere conclusory statements are insufficient to constitute probable
cause.”95
90 Id. at 10.
91 R. Doc. 48.
92 United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300, 1302 (5th Cir. 1991).
93 United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2003).
94 R. Doc. 38-2 at p. 3.
95 Brown, 941 F.2d at n. 3.
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Like the affidavit in Wilson, this affidavit offers nothing—no observations, no
inferences, no corroborated tips— linking” Alford’s alleged drug trafficking to Room
315 of the Ramada Inn.96 The affidavits also both contain a conclusory “belief”
statement regarding the likelihood that the evidence of a crime will be found at the
location to be searched. Relying on the binding precedent of the Fifth Circuit, this
Court finds that assertion inadequate to support a finding of probable cause.97
Even though the Government possessed a valid arrest warrant, the arrest
warrant 	concerns 	the 	person, 	a 	search 	warrant 	concerns 	the 	place. 	“And the
Constitution demands a factual bridge between the two.”98 Both the affidavit and the
Government’s briefing misunderstand this requirement. While Alford at the time was
a federal fugitive, Sgt. Lassus testified the officers were there to execute the search
warrant; the Court finds that testimony credible.99 The affidavit provides no evidence
that the search of the hotel room was in any way related to Alford’s fugitive status.
Probable cause to arrest is not probable cause to search. Because the affidavit on its
face did not elucidate probable cause to search, the warrant is invalid.
Suppression, however, for an improper search warrant is not mandated by the
Constitution.100 The 	exclusionary 	rule is 	“a 	judicially-created 	remedy” 	and “is
justified by the deterrent effect of suppressing evidence when it was obtained
96 United States v. Wilson, 153 F.4th 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2025).
97 See id. at 486-89 (reviewing relevant Fifth Circuit precedent).
98 Id. at 485.
99 Transcript p. 40 (“I was moving back and forth overseeing the search warrant…”); Transcript p. 41
(“At that point we watched him or he was watched by one of the detectives while we executed the
search warrant -- or cleared the room, I guess I should say, to make it safe.”).
100 United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2022).
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unlawfully.”101 As a result, constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence has
recognized a good-faith exception that allows the admission of “evidence obtained by
officers in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search warrant…even
though the warrant was unsupported by probable cause.”102 Such exception, however
does not apply to warrants based on so-called “bare-bones” affidavits, which are
affidavits that are “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable.”103 When affidavit is found to be “bare-bones,”
“the good-faith exception falls away and the exclusionary rule governs.”104
The present affidavit is skeletal. When compared to other affidavits for search
warrants that have been scrutinized by the Fifth Circuit, this affidavit is among the
barest. The affidavit at issue in United States v. Satterwhite specifically discussed the
criminal activity that occurred at the apartment for which the search warrant was
being issued.105 The affidavit in the present case does not detail any criminal activity
that allegedly occurred in Room 315 of the Ramada Inn.106 In United States v. Bell,
the Fifth Circuit held that the Leon exception did apply because the affidavit did
include facts that made the affidavit more than “bare bones,” such as “direct
observations that Bell travelled directly from the house to a drug sale” and a notation
of “the common tendency of drug traffickers to store contraband at home.”107 The
101 Id.
102 United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1311 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)).
103 Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
104 Wilson, 153 F.4th at 484 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Morton, 46 F.4th at 337-38.).
105 Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1992).
106 See R Doc. 38-2.
107 United States v. Bell, 832 F. App'x 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2020).
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affidavit in the present case contains neither of these types of information. Lastly,
and most factually analogous to this case, the Fifth Circuit Court held in United
States v. Brown that the Leon exception did not apply when the affidavit only
contained “a bare-bones assertion that it was believed that drugs would be found in
the residence.”108 The affidavit here, like the one in Brown, contained none of the
facts related to the federal investigation into Alford’s alleged drug trafficking
activities—which, apparently, law enforcement was aware of prior to the application
for the search warrant—and further failed to allege any connection between the
alleged activities and the hotel room to be searched. Like Wilson, “[t]he warrant here
rested on faith, not facts, and the good-faith exception cannot salvage such a bare-
bones showing.”109 Suppression is required.
Having found that the search was improper, the Court now turns to Alford’s
argument that the statements that he made about the items illegally seized should
be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. This doctrine provides that all evidence
seized as a result of an illegal search or seizure “must be suppressed, unless the
government shows that there was a break in the chain of events sufficient to refute
the inference that the evidence was a product of the Fourth Amendment violation.”110
Courts need not hold that all evidence is the fruit of the poisonous tree “simply
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.”111 The
Supreme Court urges Courts to examine whether, having found that the police acted
108 United States v. Brown, 567 F. App'x 272, 284 (5th Cir. 2014).
109 Wilson, No. 25-30105, 2025 WL 2490719, at *7 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025).
110 United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 658 (5th Cir. 2002).
111 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).
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unlawfully, the evidence to which the Defendant objects “has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint.”112
The Defendant has acknowledged that probable cause to arrest and probable
cause to search are “two distinct concepts.”113 Here, there was an outstanding federal
warrant for Alford’s arrest, and his arrest was, therefore lawful. Because the
statements were made during a lawful arrest, the taint of the illegal search does not
spread so far as to reach Alford’s post-arrest statements.114 The Court finds that the
statements made to the officers after his arrest at the Ramada Inn were not the fruit
of the poisonous tree and are not subject to the exclusionary rule, even though the
evidence and items seized during the search must be suppressed as a result of the
invalid search warrant.115
C. Motion to Suppress Statements on November 21, 2024
As part of their execution of the search warrant, JPSO officers detained and
then arrested Alford. During the detainment and arrest, these officers interrogated
him, and Alford answered their questions.
In 	the 	instant 	Motion, 	Alford 	separately 	challenges 	the 	constitutional
propriety of that interrogation under Miranda. He argues that the statements must
be suppressed because they were obtained prior to advising Alford of his rights under
112 Id.
113 R. Doc. 48 at p. 2.
114 Alford does not challenge the voluntariness of his statements in the written motion. To the extent
that his motion does, this Court finds that the statements were voluntary.
115 The Court finds Sgt. Lassus’s testimony during the hearing to be credible that Alford was advised
twice of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, as explained further below.
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Miranda and, 	furthermore, because the 	statements were made as part of an
unconstitutional two-step interrogation process, prohibited by the Supreme Court in
Missouri v. Seibert.116 The Government responds that the interrogation was not
violative of Seibert because Alford never identified any pre-warning inculpatory
statement, 	as 	is 	required 	by 	the 	two-step 	interrogation 	jurisprudence.117
Furthermore, the Government contends that the statements made after the on-
camera warning were not part of the same interrogation as the one before the on-
camera warning.118 Lastly, the Government argues that Alford was advised of his
Miranda rights prior to the on-camera warning. In his Reply, Alford takes issue with
the Government’s timeline, arguing that Alford did make a prewarning incriminating
statement and that the pre- and post-warning statements were part of the same
interrogation, implicating Seibert.
For the Government to use a custodial statement against a defendant, it must
show “that the defendant was warned of his right to remain silent and his right to
consult with an attorney.”119 The principal question raised by this motion is whether
Alford was informed of these rights prior to any custodial interrogation. Sergeant
Lassus testified at the evidentiary hearing that Alford did interact with Detective
Evans and that this interaction was not captured on body-worn camera (“BWC”).120
After he was arrested, Lassus testified that Alford began to make a statement to
116 R. Doc. 37-1 at pp. 3-4; 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Both Alford and the Government acknowledge that the
first portion of Alford’s interaction with officers occurred before officers’ body cameras were activated,
and, as a result, there is no recording of the interaction.
117 R. Doc. 44 at p. 5.
118 Id.
119 United States v. Anderson, 755 F.3d 782, 790 (5th Cir. 2014).
120 Transcript at p. 48.
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Evans and that Evans began to advise Alford of his rights.121 Sgt. Lassus further
stated that after he heard Detective Evans start to advise Alford of his Miranda
rights and that he stepped away to turn on his own BWC to capture Evans’s
interaction with Alford.122 This testimony differs from the Government’s Response to
Alford’s Motion to Suppress statements, in which the Government avers that Lassus
previously advised Alford of his Miranda rights off camera prior to any officers
interrogating Alford.123 The Court finds the testimony of Lassus credible regarding
Alford being Mirandized twice, once by Evans and once by Lassus, and finds that the
Government’s factual statement in its Response is inaccurate. Based on the testimony
adduced during the hearing that the Detective Evans advised Alford of his Miranda
rights prior to any interrogation, the Court finds that the Government has met its
burden to prove the admissibility of Alford’s statements because Alford was advised
of his Miranda rights.124 As a result, the Motion to Suppress Statements on
November 21, 2024 is denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Suppress Evidence, Fruits,
and Statements on May 2, 2024, and the Motion the Suppress Statements on
November 21, 2024125 are DENIED.
121 Transcript at p. 49.
122 Transcript at p. 49.
123 R. Doc. 44 at p. 3, n. 1.
124 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2262, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (“…the burden of
showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.”).
125 R. Docs. 36, 37.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Suppress Evidence and
Fruits Seized on November 21, 2024,126 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Motion is GRANTED as it applies to the evidence and fruits seized as part of
the search of Ramada Inn Room 315. It is in all other respects, including as it pertains
to the Defendant’s statements, DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the evidence and fruits of the search seized
in the execution of the search warrant for Ramada Inn Room 315 on November 21,
2022, are SUPPRESSED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, December 1, 2025.
_____________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
126 R. Doc. 38.
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