Williams v. Lopinto et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOHNELL WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF
THE ESTATE OF JOHNELL WALKER CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 22-3971
JEFFERSON PARISH, ET AL. SECTION: “A” (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 91) filed
by defendant, Sherriff Joseph P. Lopinto, III (“Sheriff Lopinto”). The plaintiff, Johnell
Williams, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Johnell Walker, opposes the
motion. The motion, submitted for consideration on March 4, 2026, is before the Court
on the briefs without oral argument. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS
the motion.
I. Background
On October 22, 2021, Johnell Walker was housed in the Jefferson Parish
Correctional Center (“JPCC”) when he overdosed on narcotics that had been
smuggled into the prison by another inmate.1 Around the time of his death, the on-
duty deputy, Michael Molina, had abandoned his assigned post – in violation of JPCC
policy2 – to turn in paperwork on an unrelated fight that had taken place earlier that
day. However, according to the testimony of other officers present, Molina was back
1 See generally Rec. Doc. 91-2, Def.’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts.
2 Rec. Doc. 98-5, Depo. of Timothy Berrian, at 10:17-11:11.
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on his post when the incident occurred.3 Either way, he radioed central control and
indicated “inmate down.”4 Two deputies, Scholl and Stevens, arrived on the unit and
began administering CPR until EMS arrived.5 Unfortunately, Walker was
pronounced dead at the hospital and his death was eventually ruled an accidental
overdose.6
The Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”) requires that the Homicide
Division investigate inmate deaths.7 During the course of the investigation, JPSO
officers determined that another inmate, Don Raines, had secreted drugs in his
rectum and distributed them to the inmates on his housing pod, including to Walker.8
Although the JPCC undergoes extensive efforts to halt the introduction of contraband
into the facility, powdered narcotics, depending on where they are concealed on the
body, can be very difficult to detect during security screenings.9 While Plaintiff
emphasizes that the presence of drugs in the jail always indicates a breach of safety
(a fact which the defendants do not challenge), neither party disputes that JPCC had
policies and procedures in place with the purpose of prohibiting entry of contraband
into the facility, and that Walker self-ingested the drugs on his own volition.
3 Rec. Doc. 91-7, Depo. of Deputy Kurt Scholl.
4 Id.
Plaintiff contends that “Deputy Molina’s presence in the control booth at the time of the “man down”
call […] is genuinely in dispute.” Rec. Doc. 98-1 ¶ 2. The Court agrees with Defendant that “not a single
exhibit or deposition transcript contains a statement that Molina was away from his post” Rec. Doc.
101 at 1 n. 1. Ultimately, however, the issue is not material to the claims against Sheriff Lopinto.
5 Rec. Doc. 91-2, Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, ¶ 14, 17.
6 Id. ¶ 18-20.
7 Rec. Doc. 91-1, Memo. in Support of Mot. for Sum. Judg., at 5.
8 Id. at 6.
9 Id. at 2.
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The only claims remaining are against Sheriff Lopinto in his official capacity.
Plaintiff asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against him for failure to protect, failure to
supervise, failure to train, and a survival action and wrongful death claim under
Louisiana law. Sheriff Lopinto now seeks to dismiss these claims because there is no
underlying constitutional violation, which is an essential element of municipal
liability.10 And even if the Court were to find a constitutional violation, he argues
that Plaintiff has not shown that the municipality’s training or supervision was
inadequate, that any failure constituted a “deliberate indifference” towards Walker’s
constitutional rights, nor that any deficiency in training or supervision caused
Walker’s death.11
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” when
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact.” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th
Cir.2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986)). A
dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248). The court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Once the moving party has initially
shown “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's cause,”
10 Id. at 8.
11 Id. at 8-12.
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward
with “specific facts” showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences,
unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately
substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing SEC v. Recile,
10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir.1993)).
III. Discussion
A suit against a public servant in his official capacity, such as Sheriff Lopinto,
is treated as a suit against a public entity. A public entity may be liable pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to train, supervise, or discipline an employee only when
an official policy or custom is the cause of a plaintiff’s injuries. See, e.g., Watt v. City
of New Orleans, No. 22-3107, 2022 WL 17844624, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 2022)
(Africk, J.). A section 1983 claim against a municipality is governed by Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). To state a Monell claim, the
plaintiff must allege 1) that the municipality’s training, supervisory, or disciplinary
policies or practices were inadequate, 2) that the municipality was deliberately
indifferent in adopting the deficient policies, and 3) that the inadequate training,
supervisory, or disciplinary policies directly caused the violation in question. Id.
(citing Hankins v. Wheeler, No. 21-1129, 2022 WL 2208848, at *7 (E.D. La. June 21,
2022) (Fallon, J.); Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020)).
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As defendant correctly points out, the claims against Sheriff Lopinto fail
because there is no underlying constitutional violation. See Whitley v. Hanna, 726
F.3d 631 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 467 (5th
Cir. 2010)). The Fifth Circuit, along with other sister circuits, has held that “the
Eighth Amendment does not address injury caused by an inmate's voluntary acts
[…].” Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016); see e.g., Wronke v.
Champaign Cty. Sheriff's Office, 132 Fed.Appx. 58, 61 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
an inmate “cannot manufacture a constitutional claim by volunteering for a job when
he could have avoided the offending conditions by choosing to stay in his cell”). There
is no dispute that Walker willingly ingested the drugs that led to his overdose. He
cannot claim that the mere fact that drugs were smuggled into the prison somehow
incapacitated him from exercising “ordinary responsibility for his own welfare.” See
Legate, 822 F. 3d at 211.
Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the prison guards failed
to take reasonable measures to ensure prisoner safety, as required by the Eighth
Amendment. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–527 (1984). Plaintiff does not
raise any facts that Walker did not receive prompt medical attention, and a failure to
detect drugs smuggled into the prison does not itself violate a prisoner’s
constitutional rights. Finally, Molina stepping away from his post may be a violation
of JPCC’s policies and procedures, but his actions do not rise to the level of “deliberate
indifference” necessary to be liable under the Eighth Amendment. “Violations of
prison rules do not alone rise to the level of constitutional violations, and therefore,
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such claims are not actionable under § 1983.” Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154,
1158 (5th Cir. 1986).
Lastly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ survival action and wrongful death
claims should be dismissed because their viability is predicated upon the underlying
section 1983 claim. See Greene v. DeMoss, 3:20-CV-00578, 2020 WL 7755690, at *10
(W.D. La. Dec. 11, 2020) (Hayes, J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:20-
CV-00578, 2020 WL 7755655 (W.D. La. Dec. 29, 2020) (observing that the plaintiff's
assertion of a wrongful death and survival action merely represents a means or
vehicle for them to recover damages for injuries sustained). Defendant is also correct
that “[u]nder Louisiana law, law enforcement officials are not liable for injuries
attributable to [the prisoner’s] own willful act.’” Abshure v. Prator, 392 F. App’x 267
(5th Cir. 2010) (citing Barlow v. City of New Orleans, 257 La. 91, 241 So.2d 501, 504
(1970)).
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 91)
filed by Sheriff Joseph P. Lopinto, III is GRANTED. All remaining claims in this
matter are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
March 24, 2026
______________________________________
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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