In the Matter of Aries Marine Corporation et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN THE MATTER OF ARIES
MARINE CORPORATION, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 19-10850 c/w NO. 19-13138
SECTION “O”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion1 filed by Fluid Crane & Construction, Inc. (“Fluid
Crane”) and American Longshore Mutual Association, Ltd. (“ALMA”) for
reconsideration of this Court’s Order2 denying Fluid Crane and ALMA’s motion to
reopen this case. Aries Marine Corporation opposes.3 For the reasons that follow, the
Court DENIES the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
As this Court has previously explained—including in the Court’s prior Order
denying Fluid Crane and ALMA’s motion to reopen—this matter arises from a 2018
incident in which the liftboat RAM XVIII capsized in the Gulf of Mexico. Thereafter,
numerous parties sought to assert or to disclaim liability against one another for
damages relating to the incident. Some of those claims were resolved through motions
for summary judgment.4 Some of those parties settled.5
1 ECF No. 620.
2 ECF No. 619.
3 ECF No. 621.
4 See, e.g., ECF No. 241; ECF No. 312; see also In re Aries Marine Corp., 2024 WL 1461945, at
*1 (5th Cir. Apr. 4, 2024) (per curiam); In re Aries Marine Corp., 166 F.4th 521, 523 (5th Cir. 2026).
5 ECF No. 605.
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Based on the settlement, the Court cancelled the trial and entered a
conditional order of dismissal.6 In that order, the Court directed “any party that
contends that it has a live claim requiring further litigation must file a limited motion
to reopen as to that purportedly live claim only.”7 Fluid Crane and ALMA moved the
Court to reopen this case to allow them to litigate two sets of purportedly live claims
against Aries Marine: (1) general-maritime-law negligence claims under Federal
Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969); and (2) Fluid
Crane’s “independent right of subrogation.”8
This Court denied the motion to reopen.9 It found that those claims were not
properly before the Court because Fluid Crane and ALMA did not timely and properly
plead a Burnside negligence cause of action or an independent right of subrogation
on the part of Fluid Crane. Nor did they timely and properly amend their original
limitation claim to assert those causes of action. The Court also found that the parties
did not properly incorporate those claims into the final pretrial order. And even if
they had incorporated those claims into the pretrial order, the Court nevertheless
would have denied Fluid Crane and ALMA leave to amend their limitation claim to
assert those new causes of action at this late stage of this six-year-old case.10
6 ECF No. 606 at 1.
7 Id. at 2.
8 ECF No. 607; id. at 6.
9 ECF No. 619. Because the Court held that Fluid Crane and ALMA’s purportedly live claims
are not properly before the Court, the Court did not reach Aries Marine’s argument that those
purportedly live claims fail on the merits based on the MSC’s waiver of subrogation. ECF No. 610 at
1–7. Accordingly, the Court need not consider Aries Marine’s same argument in opposition to the
motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 621 at 3–10.
10 See generally ECF No. 619.
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Fluid Crane and ALMA now move under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) for
reconsideration of this Court’s order denying their motion to reopen.11 In short, Fluid
Crane and ALMA contend the Court erred in finding that they did not adequately
plead a Burnside negligence claim or independent right of subrogation of Fluid Crane
against Aries Marine under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Fluid Crane and ALMA also assert the
Court erred in finding that their claims were not incorporated into the pretrial order.
In response, Aries Marine argues that Fluid Crane and ALMA neither present
new evidence nor identify a manifest error of law or fact as required under Rule 59(e).
Rather, they simply rehash the arguments presented in their motion to reopen or
bring arguments that were available but not invoked before the motion was decided.12
The Court considers the motion below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to “alter or amend a judgment[.]”
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). The motion “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry
of the judgment.” Id. Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry “is ‘an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.’” Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8
F.4th 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479
(5th Cir. 2004)).
Although “[t]he text of Rule 59(e) does not specify the available grounds for
obtaining such relief,” id., the Fifth Circuit has identified three grounds for a Rule
59(e) motion: “(1) to correct a manifest error of law or fact, (2) where the movant
11 ECF No. 620.
12 ECF No. 610.
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presents newly discovered evidence that was previously unavailable, or (3) where
there has been an intervening change in the controlling law.” Jennings v. Towers
Watson, 11 F.4th 335, 345 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). “A manifest error is one
that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the
controlling law.” Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 922 F.3d 285, 293 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Rule 59(e) motions thus serve only a “narrow purpose.” Waltman v. Int’l Paper
Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989). “[S]uch a motion is not the proper vehicle for
rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or
raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (citing Simon v. United
States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
III. ANALYSIS
Applying that standard here, the Court finds that Fluid Crane and ALMA have
not shown that they are entitled to the “extraordinary remedy” of Rule 59(e) relief.
Rollins, 8 F.4th at 396 (citation omitted). They have not identified “a manifest error
of law or fact,” “present[ed] newly discovery evidence that was previously
unavailable,” or identified “an intervening change in the controlling law.” Jennings,
11 F.4th at 345.
Fluid Crane and ALMA contend the Court incorrectly applied the Rule 8
standard when it found they had failed to properly plead the Burnside claim and the
independent right of subrogation of Fluid Crane. They disagree with the Court’s
finding that they did not adequately plead facts necessary to bring those claims in
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their timely filed limitation claim. In support, they now point to facts pled in support
of their affirmative defenses—which they did not do in their initial motion to reopen.13
They further assert—also for the first time—that an LHWCA claim does not
encompass reimbursement for all types of expenses sought in their limitation claim.
Therefore, they argue, the very act of seeking reimbursement for certain expenses
independently suffices to plead a Burnside claim alongside an LHWCA claim.
The Court finds that much of Fluid Crane and ALMA’s motion is devoted to
simply rehashing the same previously rejected arguments regarding the adequacy of
their pleadings. This Court has already found that the parties did not sufficiently
plead a Burnside claim or an independent right of subrogation in their limitation
claim. Fluid Crane and ALMA’s attempt to distinguish Doucet v. R. & R. Boats, Inc.,
2020 WL 6533216, at *2 (M.D. La. Nov. 5, 2020) is unpersuasive and does not rise to
the level of “manifest error of law.” Matter of Life Partner Holdings, Inc., 926 F.3d
103, 128 (5th Cir. 2019).
Further, their eleventh-hour gesture to particular affirmative defenses and to
allegations regarding certain types of expenses also fails. Fluid Crane and ALMA
could have raised these arguments in their original motion. A Rule 59(e) motion
“‘cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before
the judgment issued’” or “‘to argue a case under a new legal theory.’” Pender v. Barron
Builders & Mgmt. Co., 298 F. App’x 298, 299 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ross v.
Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763 (5th Cir.2005)). In any event, passing allegations in the
13 Compare ECF No. 607 with ECF No. 619.
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limitation claim regarding seeking reimbursement for certain types of expenses, and
the assertion of certain affirmative defenses, are each insufficient to provide Aries
Marine with fair notice of these purported claims against them. See Homoki v.
Conversion Servs., Inc., 717 F.3d 388, 402 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The plaintiff is required
to give fair notice in the pleadings of all claims brought against the defendant.”). Fluid
Crane and ALMA may disagree with the Court’s Order, but they have failed to
establish their entitlement to the “extraordinary remedy” of reconsideration under
Rule 59(e). Templet, 367 F.3d at 479.
Fluid Crane and ALMA also contend the Court incorrectly found the Burnside
negligence and independent right of subrogation causes of action were not properly
incorporated into the final pretrial order. They disagree with the Court that their
failure to describe those claims in section 3 of the proposed pretrial order—which
required a description of “the claims” at issue—precluded the claims’ incorporation
into the order. They contend that Aries Marine was sufficiently on notice of Fluid
Crane and ALMA’s pending claims because they included a description of the claims
in the “material facts” section of the proposed order.
Once again, Fluid Crane and ALMA have already advanced these arguments—
or at least, strikingly similar ones—in their motion to reopen. After a thorough
consideration, this Court rejected those arguments and ultimately denied the motion
to reopen. Fluid Crane and ALMA’s “recitation of duplicative and meritless
arguments that have already been exhaustively considered does not entitle [them] to
a second bite at the apple” under Rule 59(e). Vesoulis v. Reshape Lifesciences, Inc.,
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No. 19-1795, 2021 WL 2267676, at *1 (E.D. La. June 3, 2021). Fluid Crane and ALMA
have failed to identify new evidence, an intervening change in controlling law, or a
manifest error of law or fact that would “‘call[] into question the correctness of [the]
judgment.’” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (citation omitted).
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion14 for reconsideration is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of March, 2026.
BRANDON S. LONG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14 ECF No. 620.
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