USA v. Neal et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL DOCKET
VERSUS 	NO: 07-425
BYRON NEAL 	SECTION: “J”
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) and First Step Act of 2018 (Rec. Doc. 397) filed by pro se Defendant,
Byron Neal (“Neal”). The United States of America (“the Government”) opposed
Neal’s Motion. (Rec. Doc. 399). Neal filed a reply. (Rec. Doc. 400). Having considered
the motion and memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that
Defendant’s motion should be DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A grand jury indicted Neal in 2009, charging him with five offenses: Counts 1
and 2, distribution of at least fifty grams of crack; Count 3, possession with intent to
distribute 	a 	quantity 	of 	crack; 	Count 	4, 	conspiracy 	to 	murder 	a 	confidential
informant; and Count 5, tampering with a witness or informant. (Rec. Doc. 52, at 1–
4). Neal pleaded guilty on all counts (Rec. Doc. 196, at 1), but moved to withdraw his
guilty plea (Rec. Doc. 204, at 1). The Court later denied Neal’s Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea. (Rec. Doc. 224, at 1). This Court sentenced Neal to 360 months for Counts
1, 2, 4, and 5 with a concurrent term of 240 months for Count 3. (Rec. Doc. 223).
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In 2013, the Fifth Circuit vacated Neal’s conviction as to Counts 4 and 5,
remanded the case to this Court for repleading on those dismissed counts, and
affirmed Neal’s conviction and 360-month sentence. (Rec. Doc. 249, at 17). Eight days
later, this Court dismissed Counts 4 and 5 without prejudice but did not adjust Neal’s
sentence. (Rec. Doc. 253, at 1).
Neal filed a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 2014, asserting
ineffective assistance of counsel and disproportionate sentencing. (Rec. Doc. 259, at
4). This Court denied Neal’s Motion to Vacate. (Rec. Doc. 266, at 14, at 6). In 2019,
Neal filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to the First Step Act (Rec. Doc. 317,
at 1), which this Court also denied (Rec. Doc. 327, at 6), and later in 2020, the Court
denied another Motion to Reduce Sentence (compassionate release) filed by Neal (Rec.
Doc. 332, at 2). Neal filed the instant Motion for Compassionate Release in July 2025.
(Rec. Doc. 397).
LEGAL STANDARD
“A court, on a motion by the [Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)] or by the defendant
after exhausting all BOP remedies, may reduce or modify a term of imprisonment,
probation, or supervised release after considering the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
if ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such reduction.’” United States v.
Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 692 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)).
To meet the exhaustion requirement, a defendant must submit a request to “the
warden 	of 	the 	defendant's 	facility” 	for 	the 	BOP 	“to 	bring 	a 	motion
[for compassionate release] on the defendant's behalf.” § 3582(c)(1)(A). If the request
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is denied, the defendant must pursue and exhaust “all administrative rights to
appeal.” Id. Alternatively, the requirement is considered satisfied after “30 days from
the receipt of such a request by the warden.” Id.
Once a defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court may
then reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment if it finds that extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This
reduction must be consistent with applicable policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission. Id. Section 	3582(c)(1)(A)(i)’s 	use 	of 	“extraordinary 	and 	compelling”
captures the truly exceptional cases that fall within no other statutory category and
sets “an exceptionally high standard for relief.” United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271,
287–88 (4th Cir. 2020). The defendant has the burden of demonstrating extraordinary
and compelling reasons supporting his release. See United States v. Washington, No.
CR 16-19, 2020 WL 4000862, at *3 (E.D. La. July 15, 2020). The U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines provide that a reduction should be granted only if “the defendant is not a
danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). If
the 	Court 	grants 	a 	sentence 	reduction, 	it 	may 	impose 	a 	term 	of
supervised release with conditions, including home confinement, “that does not
exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment.” § 3582(c)(1)(A).
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PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION
In his Motion for Compassionate Release and in compliance with the First Step
Act, Neal argues that he has exhausted all administrative remedies by (1) making a
request to the warden and (2) having that request denied. (Rec. Doc. 397, at 26). The
government does not dispute that Neal has exhausted the administrative remedies
required for compassionate release. (Rec. Doc. 400, at 2).
Neal then contends that he is serving an unusually long sentence, which
constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant his compassionate
release. (Rec. Doc. 397, at 28). Neal asserts that his sentence, when paired with the
change in law to the Sentencing Guidelines relating to drug offenses like his own,
creates a gross disparity between the sentence he is currently serving and the
sentence the Court would likely impose today. Id. at 27–28. Additionally, Neal
contends that even if an unusually long sentence is not considered an extraordinary
and compelling reason when applied to his case, he has medical vulnerabilities and
has made progress toward rehabilitation. (Rec. Doc. 400 at 10–11). As Neal contends,
both constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons sufficient for the Court to grant
his request for compassionate release. Id.
In opposition, the Government argues that a non-retroactive change to a
statutory provision cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a
sentence reduction, and that the Commission specifically precluded courts from using
compassionate release as a detour around limitations to retroactivity. (Rec. Doc. 14–
15). The Government claims that Congress has declined to disturb the 21 U.S.C. §
841(b) drug-offense penalties already imposed and has applied the adjustment only
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to future sentences. (Rec. Doc. 399, at 14). The Government suggests that any possible
disparity between the sentence the Court imposed when the jury convicted Neal and
the sentence the Court would impose today is the product of deliberate congressional
design. Id. at 15. Further, the Government contends that even if 18 U.S.C.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6) did apply retroactively to Neal’s sentence, the Court would not create
a gross disparity denying Neal’s motion, because his sentence range would be the
same today as when imposed by the Court. Id. at 18–19.
In United States v. Austin, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision and declined to grant compassionate release to the defendant. United States
v. Austin, 125 F.4th 688, 693 (5th Cir. 2025). The court sentenced the defendant to
twenty years’ imprisonment, the mandatory minimum at the time, for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Id.
at 691. The defendant argued that, under the change in the Sentencing Guidelines,
he should only face a sentence of fifteen years. Id. at 693. The court determined that,
despite 	the 	change, 	non-retroactive 	changes 	in 	law 	are 	not 	extraordinary 	or
compelling. Id. at 692. In Austin, the Fifth Circuit stated that, “Congress explicitly
made this change non-retroactive.” Id. at 691.
In the instant case, not only does the change in law to the Sentencing
Guidelines not apply retroactively, as noted in Austin, but also Neal has not provided
the Court with any factual support for his assertions. He has failed to supply the
Court with even a single case showing that the change of law applicable to his
sentence has been made retroactive or that his sentence is unusually long when
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compared to similarly situated defendants sentenced under today’s Sentencing
Guidelines. Additionally, Neal has failed to provide the Court with any medical
records, prison records, or specific anecdotes to support his assertion that he suffers
from other medical vulnerabilities or that he has been sufficiently rehabilitated. In
fact, Neal’s own language states that he has “made progress” toward rehabilitation,
not that he is, in fact, rehabilitated. (Rec. Doc. 400, at 11). Without an additional
extraordinary or compelling reason, supported by documentation, there is nothing to
warrant granting compassionate release.
Finally, the Government argues that if Neal demonstrated other extraordinary
and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release, his individual § 3553(a)
sentencing factors do not support a sentence reduction. (Rec. Doc. 399, at 19–21). The
Government asserts that Neal is a “career criminal” who has dealt drugs and
conspired to kill a witness, thus endangering the community. Id. at 20–21.
Here, the Government convincingly argues that Neal’s individual sentencing
factors weigh against compassionate release. Neal conspired to murder an informant
while in custody and awaiting trial and is a career offender with prior convictions for
firearms and drug distribution offenses. Neal has not offered any argument to
demonstrate that he is no longer a danger to others or the community. Thus, there is
nothing to warrant granting Neal’s motion.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Byron Neal’s Motion for Compassionate
Release (Rec. Doc. 397) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of November, 2025.
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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