Mendoza-Alcasar v. USA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT ASHLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-75-DLB
CUAHUTEMOC MENDOZA-ALCASAR 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	MEMORANDUM ORDER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	DEFENDANT
*** *** *** ***
Proceeding without counsel, federal inmate Cuahutemoc Mendoza-Alcasar filed a
complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging that prison officials failed to
provide him with necessary medical equipment. (Doc. # 1). The United States responded
to Mendoza-Alcasar’s complaint by filing a motion to dismiss, which is now fully briefed.
(Doc. # 9, 11, 12).
The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and will dismiss Mendoza-
Alcasar’s FTCA claim because he failed to satisfy the mandatory administrative claim
requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Like the pro se prisoner in a similar case arising out
of this district, Mendoza-Alcasar “failed to meet the administrative requirement because
he did not wait for the claim[ ] to have been finally denied by the agency before filing suit
in district court.” Brooks v. Silva, No. 13-6539, 2015 WL 12762112, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 6,
2015). “Before a claimant may bring an action against the United States under the FTCA,
‘the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and
his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or
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registered mail.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added)). Mendoza-Alcasar
did not follow this rule.
To be sure, Mendoza-Alcasar did file an administrative tort claim with the
appropriate agency on November 20, 2025, satisfying the presentment requirement.
(See Doc. # 9-1 at 10); see also 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (explaining that a claim is presented
when the agency receives it). The agency then acknowledged receipt of Mendoza-
Alcasar’s administrative tort claim and informed him that it “ha[d] six months from the date
of receipt to review, consider, and adjudicate your claim.” 	(Doc. # 19-1 at 16). 	So, the
agency had until May 20, 2026, to adjudicate Mendoza-Alcasar’s claim. 	But Mendoza-
Alcasar did not wait for the agency to resolve his claim; instead, he went ahead and filed
his complaint in this Court on May 11, 2026—before the agency ultimately denied his
claim on May 14, 2026. (See Doc. # 19-1 at 18).
In short, Mendoza-Alcasar plainly violated § 2675(a), and this warrants dismissal
of his FTCA claim. 	See Brooks, 2015 WL 12762112, at *2 (holding that FTCA claims
were properly dismissed because the pro se prisoner “filed both his original and amended
complaints well in advance of his claims being finally denied—either through a formal
written response or the running of the six-month response period afforded the agency”);
Watts v. United States, No. 7:19-cv-113-REW, 2020 WL 3270382, at *2-3 (E.D. Ky. June
17, 2020) (dismissing the plaintiff’s FTCA claims because she filed her civil action too
early, in violation of § 2675(a)). And the fact that the agency eventually denied Mendoza-
Alcasar’s administrative tort claim during the pendency of this action does not justify a
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different result. 1 See Bray v. Bon Secours Mercy Health, Inc., 97 F.4th 403, 417 (6th Cir.
2024) (refusing to carve out an exception to § 2675(a) where the FTCA claim is exhausted
during litigation); Watts, 2020 WL 3270382, at *3 (“Nor can the fact that the United States
has now finally denied the claim . . . retroactively cure the premature filing defect.”).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. 	The United States’ motion (Doc. # 9) is GRANTED to the extent Mendoza-
Alcasar’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Although his initial filing
was premature, Mendoza-Alcasar may refile his complaint, if timely, with this
Court pursuant to § 2675(a), as the DOJ issued its final denial on May 14, 2026,
exhausting his administrative remedies. Mendoza-Alcasar should be attentive
to timing requirements under the FTCA.
2. 	The Court will enter a corresponding Judgment.
This 8th day of October, 2026.
G:\Judge-DLB\DATA\ORDERS\PSO Orders\Mendoza-Alcasar 0-26-75 Dismissal.docx
1 Since the Court is dismissing Mendoza-Alcasar’s FTCA claim due to his failure to comply with §
2675(a), it need not address the Government’s arguments regarding the timeliness of his
administrative tort claim.
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