Hickles v. Bell et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
KARENA DAWN HICKLES, on behalf of Adarah
Zionne & Co. Charitable Trust,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN A. BELL, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-1245-JWB-BGS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
FOR DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Karena Dawn Hicks, acting on behalf of the Adarah Zionne & Company Charitable
Trust, filed this action pro se1 . In conjunction with her federal court complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff
filed a motion to proceed without prepayment of fees, which is a motion requesting leave for
Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Doc. 3. After review of Plaintiff’s complaint, however,
the Court recommends to the District Court that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. 	Standard of Review for IFP Complaints
When a Plaintiff proceeds IFP, the Court may screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). The Court “shall dismiss” an in forma pauperis case “at any time if the Court determines
that… the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). “When a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, a court has a duty to review
1 Plaintiff proceeds pro se. The Court construes her filings liberally and holds her to a less stringent standard
than trained lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991). But the Court does not assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant. Id., at 1110.
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the complaint to ensure a proper balance between these competing interests.” Mitchell v. Desert
Health Care Facility, No. 13-1360-RDR-KKG, 2013 WL 5797609, at *1 (D. Kan, Sept. 30, 2013).
The purpose of § 1915(e) is “the prevention of abusive or capricious litigation.” Harris v. Campbell,
804 F. Supp. 153, 155 (D. Kan. 1992) (internal citation omitted) (discussing similar language
contained in § 1915(d), prior to the 1996 amendment). Sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(d) may be
appropriate when “on the face of the complaint it clearly appears that the action is frivolous or
malicious.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Henriksen v. Bently, 644 F.2d
852, 854 (10th Cir. 1981)).
In determining whether dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a plaintiff’s
complaint will be analyzed by the Court under the same sufficiency standard as a Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir.
2007). In conducting this analysis, the Court will accept as true all well-pleaded facts and draw all
reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of a plaintiff. See Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036,
1039 (10th Cir. 2006).
Because the Court will liberally construe the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff, the Court should
“reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail… despite
the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor
syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall, 935 F.2d at
1110. The Court cannot, however, become an advocate for the pro se plaintiff. Id.
A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must still “set forth the grounds of plaintiff’s entitlement to
relief through more than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements to a cause of
action.” Fisher v Lynch, 531 F.Supp.2d 1253,1260 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L. Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110
(holding that a plaintiff need not precisely state each element, but must plead minimal factual
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allegations on those material elements that must be prove)). “In other words, plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to state a claim which is plausible – rather than merely conceivable – on its face.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). See also Bemis, 500 F.3d at 1218 (stating that
factual allegations in the complaint must establish “above the speculative level” that plaintiff is
entitled to relief).
The Court’s relaxed scrutiny of the pro se plaintiff’s pleadings “does not relieve [her] of the
burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall, 935 F.2d
at 1110. A pro se plaintiff’s pleading conclusory statements is insufficient to state a claim because no
special legal training is required to “recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury[.]” Id. See also
Olson v. Carmack, 641 Fed. App’x. 822, 826-27 (10th Cir. 2016). If this Court finds, after construing
the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, the Court is compelled to recommend that the action be dismissed.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Claims and Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Karena Dawn Hickles asserts claims on behalf of a charitable trust: The “Adarah
Zionne & Co. Charitable Trust.”2 See generally Doc. 1. The complaint names five Defendants: John
Bell, April Kecece, Sarah Guy, HOA Management Services, and Ascension Via Christi St. Joseph
Emergency Department. The complaint centers around what Plaintiff alleges is a campaign of
harassment, surveillance, and false reports. Attached to the complaint is an exhibit which contains a
“master chronological timeline” of events. The Court has reviewed both the complaint and attached
exhibit.
Plaintiff lives at home with her minor child. From July 2025 to October 2025, she was
involved in numerous squabbles with her neighbors, landlord, and property management.
2 Plaintiff consistently refers to herself as the “trustee” of the charitable trust. The Court will address issues
with this in the analysis, but for sake of clarity, the Court will simply refer to Karena Hickles acting on behalf
of the charitable trust as “Plaintiff.”
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According to her attached exhibit, she began recording her interactions with neighbors and
documenting allegedly unsafe conditions on the premises. On July 31, 2025, she recorded a video
showing what she claimed was an “unsafe condition” in a carport that was scheduled for demolition
and repair.
Shortly thereafter, an incident occurred involving Defendants April Kecece and Sarah Guy,
both of whom work in HOA management services. The complaint does not clarify whether
Defendants Guy and Kecece are direct HOA employees or work for a third-party management
company, but they are authorized to act on the HOA’s behalf. Defendant Kecece is also Plaintiff’s
neighbor.
On August 11, 2025, Defendant Kecece asked Plaintiff to move her car—a request Plaintiff
ignored. Later that day, Defendant Guy came to Plaintiff’s unit to speak to her, apparently to no
avail. Plaintiff’s landlord, Defendant John Bell, texted her stating that her car was in the wrong
carport and needed to be moved. Plaintiff responded that she had family visiting and would move
the car later. Additionally, she informed Defendant Bell that she was being harassed by Defendants
Guy and Kecece, ostensibly for instructing her to move her car and coming to her unit.
The next day, on August 12, 2025, Defendant Kecece informed Defendant Bell that
Plaintiff’s child struck her car. Defendant Bell called Plaintiff and relayed the allegation. Plaintiff
then began “monitoring” individuals gathered outside her unit. That night, Defendant Kecece
allegedly called the police to report the incident with her vehicle. The following day, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Guy, acting on behalf of the HOA, arranged to have her truck towed. However,
Plaintiff had moved her car into her assigned space before the tow truck arrived. According to the
complaint, the tow truck left without towing the vehicle.
Plaintiff continued to document and photograph any activity near her unit. She alleges that
at one point, Defendant Bell entered her home, without notice or consent, and left a copy of the
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lease agreement inside the premise. For reasons not entirely clear in the complaint, the lease
contained the signature of the minor child’s father. Plaintiff assets that neither she nor the child’s
father signed the lease agreement. Plaintiff brought this dispute to the HOA’s attention. Thereafter,
on August 26, 2025, Plaintiff alleges she received a “retaliatory rent increase letter” for reporting that
Defendant Bell entered her home without permission and forged a signature on the lease agreement.
In September 2025, police officers removed Plaintiff’s child from the home. Plaintiff alleges
that due to false reports by Defendant Kecece, her child was removed and transported to Ascension
Via Christi St. Joseph hospital, another Defendant in the case. Plaintiff alleges that the hospital
performed a number of medical procedures on Plaintiff’s child without her consent. The complaint
does not explicitly state this, but it appears Plaintiff was arrested or detained in close proximity to
her child’s removal from the home. She states that “[d]uring her detention, a September 23, 2025,
hearing in prior small claims action proceeded in her absence, producing a default judgment
unsupported by witness evidence.” Doc. 1, at 4.
Plaintiff goes on to state that from October 18 to October 21, 2025, she was “concealed
from family and friends, who were falsely informed that no patient by her name existed, preventing
lawful contact.” Id. It is unclear if she was incarcerated during this time or was under the care of a
hospital. It is also unclear how long this period of “detention” or hospitalization lasted.
Plaintiff brings six claims:
1. 	Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.;
2. 	Deprivation of rights under color of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
3. 	Forgery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
4. 	Due process violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments;
5. 	Retaliation/denial of access to the courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
6. 	Defamation.
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Plaintiff seeks several remedies: (1) declaratory judgment declaring all acts unlawful; (2) an
order compelling production of the original lease document; (3) an injunction against the
Defendants; (4) compensatory damages; (5) punitive damages; and (6) attorneys’ fees. After careful
review of the factual allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge
recommends that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed.
III. 	Analysis
The Court will first address a broader issue with Plaintiff’s purported posture as a trustee of
a charitable trust and her use of collective allegations. It will then analyze the specific claims against
the Defendants.
a. 	Plaintiff’s “Trustee” Allegations
The named Plaintiff in this case is Karena Dawn Hicks, acting on behalf of the Adarah
Zionne & Company Charitable Trust. Karena Hickles repeatedly refers to herself as a “trustee” of
the “Adarah Zionne & Co. Charitable Trust.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, an individual may “conduct
their own case [] personally” in federal court. But an artificial entity may appear in federal court only
through licensed counsel. Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S.
194, 201-02 (1993). “Trusts are artificial entities that exist independently of their trustees.” In re
Wilson, 860 F. App'x 147, 150 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Conagra Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics, LLC,
776 F.3d 1175, 1176 (10th Cir. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S.
378 (2016)).
In this case, the “Adarah Zionne & Co. Charitable Trust” appears without counsel, acting
through Karena Dawn Hickles. But Ms. Hickles cannot represent the trust’s interests in federal
court—a licensed attorney must do so. See id.; see also United States v. Lain, 773 F. App'x 476, 477
(10th Cir. 2019) (dismissing appeal because pro individual sough to represent the trust, not his own
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interests); DeWilde v. Att'y Gen. of United States, No. 23-8054, 2024 WL 1550708, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr.
10, 2024) (“[Trustee] is not the trust, and as a non-licensed pro se party, he cannot prosecute his
case on behalf of the trust”).
Because counsel is required to represent the trust and Plaintiff is not a licensed attorney, the
Court recommends to the District Judge that, should any part of the case survive this Report and
Recommendation, counsel enter an appearance on behalf of the Plaintiff. Or in the alternative, the
undersigned recommends that Ms. Hickles be required that she bring suit in her personal capacity,
rather than that of a trustee.
b. 	Plaintiff Makes Allegations Against the Defendants Collectively
Although courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, courts “will not supply additional factual
allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint.” Whitney v. State of N.M., 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74
(10th Cir. 1997). When suing an individual under § 1983 in his or her individual capacity, “the
complaint [must] make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom … as distinguished
from collective allegations.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Kansas
Penn Gaming, L.L.C. v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011)). Further, Rule 8(a) requires
three minimal pieces of information to provide such notice to the defendant: (1) the pleading should
contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; (2) a short
and plain statement of the grounds upon which the Court's jurisdiction depends; and (3) the relief
requested. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Where a complaint attributes all actions to the “Defendants” or a
collection of individuals without specifying what actions are attributable to each individual
defendant, a claim fails to meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242,
1250 (10th Cir. 2008).
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For the most part, Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify which causes of action are
attributable to which Defendant, nor does it clearly identify which Defendant engaged in which
alleged conduct. These deficiencies alone are grounds for dismissal.
Defendant Ascension Via Christi St. Joseph Emergency is barely mentioned in the
complaint. Plaintiff’s only allegation concerning this Defendant is that her child was transported to
the hospital where medical procedures were performed. The complaint does not indicate which
claim applies to this Defendant, or, for that matter, to any of the other Defendants. The Court
cannot determine whether Plaintiff asserts all six counts against each Defendant or only certain
counts against particular Defendants. 	The complaint fails to clearly specify what conduct each
Defendant engaged in and how that conduct gives rise to each cause of action. This falls short of
the Rule 8 pleading standard.
These types of collective allegations run afoul of Rule 8 and the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that the complaint be dismissed on that basis. However, the complaint also
substantively falls short for the reasons stated below.
c. 	Fair Housing Act claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (Count I)
Plaintiff asserts Defendants interfered with her housing rights by filing false reports,
harassing her, and illegally entering her unit. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on
account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of
this title.
In order to state a claim under § 3617, Plaintiff's complaint must allege: (1) Plaintiff is a
member of a protected class under the Fair Housing Act; (2) Plaintiff exercised or enjoyed a right
protected by §§ 3603-3606, or aided or encouraged others in exercising or enjoying such rights; (3)
intentional discrimination at least partially motivated Defendants' conduct; and (4) Defendants'
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conduct constituted coercion, intimidation, threat, or interference on account of having exercised, or
aided or encouraged others in exercising, a right protected under §§ 3603-3606. Zhu v. Countrywide
Realty Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1233 (D. Kan. 2001). The cross-referenced sections prohibit
discrimination in the sale of rental of housing (§§ 3603, 3604), in specified residential real estate-
related transactions (§ 3605), and in the provision of brokerage services (§ 3606).
Here, Plaintiff fails to meet the mark on any of the elements of a Fair Housing Act claim
under § 3617. Although Plaintiff alleges intimidation, her claims concern neighborhood disputes
between her neighbors, the HOA, and her landlord. They do not involve discrimination in the sale
or rental of housing, the real estate-related transactions covered by § 3605, or the provision of
brokerage services. She therefore does not allege coercion and intimidation “in the exercise or
enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed ... any right granted or protected by section
3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606.” § 3617 (emphasis added). Because the plain language of § 3617 requires
her to connect the alleged coercion and intimidation with the rights protected under the cross-
referenced sections, her § 3617 claim cannot proceed. See Sandy v. Baca Grande Prop. Owners Ass'n,
No. 20-1413, 2021 WL 4164064, at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 14, 2021) (affirming district court’s judgment
on similar grounds). The undersigned, therefore, recommends that the District Judge dismiss her
Fair Housing Act claim (Count I).
d. 	Due Process and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims (Counts II-V)
Plaintiff brings three § 1983 claims and one due process claim under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The § 1983 claims are for deprivation of rights under color of law,
forgery, and retaliation/denial of access to the courts.
First, forgery is not a cause of action that is prosecutable under § 1983. In a § 1983 action,
the complaint must specify “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and ... that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color or state
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law.” Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3rd 1021, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2007). “[A] violation of state law alone
does not give rise to a federal cause of action under § 1983.” Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d 1013, 1016
(10th Cir. 1994). Here, the Court is unaware of any constitutional provision that protects an
individual from being a victim of forgery. Thus, a forgery claim is not prosecutable under § 1983.
Urrutia v. Welch, No. 23-3010-JWL, 2023 WL 2043202, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 16, 2023) (making same
determination). 3
Second, the remaining § 1983 claims do not hold water because the complaint does not
allege the Defendants are state actors or were acting under color of state law. As discussed above, §
1983 claims provide a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state
law, deprives another of her federal rights. Blythe v. Sw. Airlines Co., 383 F. App'x 766, 768 (10th Cir.
2010). Here, Plaintiff has sued her landlord (Defendant John Bell), two employees of her HOA
(Defendants Kecece and Guy), HOA management services, and Via Christi hospital. None of these
Defendants appear to be state actors, but rather private individuals or companies. Further, the
complaint is devoid of any allegations which suggest any Defendant was acting under color of law.
Thus, it fails to state any plausible § 1983 claim. See id. (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims when
the complaint included no allegations that the defendant acted under color of law).
Third, Plaintiff’s due process claim fails for similar reasons. Due process violations under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require a defendant to be a state actor. Smith v. Kitchen, 156
F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that due process claims under the Fifth Amendment do not
apply to private actors); Gray v. Univ. of Colorado Hosp. Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 927-28 (10th Cir. 2012)
3 The Court is aware that various federal statues may address forgery in the criminal context. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. 471. However, criminal statutes do not provide for a private right of action and are unenforceable
through a civil action. Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076-77 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of
plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging violations of various criminal statutes). To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to
enforce criminal statutes, the undersigned recommends those claims be dismissed because they do not
provide a civil cause of action. Id.
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(stating same as to Fourteenth Amendment). The Fifth Amendment applies to actions by the
federal government, while the Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by state governments.
Private conduct, regardless of its nature, is not subject to constitutional due process requirements
unless the private actor can be deemed a state actor. See id. Thus, a private individual falls within
the scope of our Constitution's due process guarantees only when the private actor may “be fairly
said to be a state actor.” Smith, 156 F.3d at 1028. Here, the complaint does not allege any facts
suggesting the Defendants are state actors. See Gilmore v. Salt Lake Community Action Program, 710
F.2d 632, 635–36 (10th Cir.1983) (applying the state action tests under the Fourteenth Amendment
to a claim under the Fifth Amendment, to find no federal action in a local community action
program regulated and funded in part by the federal government). Therefore, Plaintiff’s due process
claims fail.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s § 1983 and due process claims
(Counts II-V) be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
e. 	Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim (Count VI)
Plaintiff’s final remaining count is for defamation. Defamation is a state law cause of action,
and the Court will apply the law of the state where the wrong occurred. Atchison Casting Corp. v.
Dofasco, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 1445, 1455 (D. Kan. 1995). Under Kansas law, the elements of
defamation are: (1) false and defamatory words, (2) communicated to a third person, and (3) results
in harm to the person defamed. Marcus v. Swanson, 317 Kan. 752, 755-756, 539 P.3d 605, 609 (Kan.
2023). “[A] defamation complaint cannot couch allegations of falsity in vague, conclusory terms.”
Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017). See also
Vazirani v. Heitz, No. 09-1311-MLB, 2011 WL 915377, at *4 (D. Kan. 2011). To sufficiently plead a
defamation claim, a complaint must allege the defamatory words, the communicator of those words,
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the persons to whom those words were published and the time and place of publication. Fisher v.
Lynch, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1271–72 (D. Kan. 2008).
Here, Plaintiff merely concludes “[f]alse and injurious statements were conveyed by Sarah
Guy to John A. Bell.” Doc. 1, at 3. Such vague and conclusory allegations of falsehood fail to give
rise to a defamation claim. See, e.g., Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1105; Vazirani v. Heitz, No. 09-1311-
MLB, 2011 WL 915377, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 15, 2011) (“Plaintiffs' allegations concerning
defamation and trade libel are nothing more than conclusory allegations that are insufficient to raise
a right to relief.”). Plaintiff does not say what was conveyed, the nature of the defamatory
communication, or how it damaged her reputation. Thus, Plaintiff's complaint fails to give the
Court the necessary facts to establish a claim based on false statements or a publication by any
named Defendant. As such, the undersigned recommends dismissal of her defamation claim
(Count VI).
For the reasons explained above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) because Plaintiff’s complaint does not
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In the event any claim survives this Report and
Recommendation, the undersigned alternatively recommends that counsel enter an appearance on
behalf of the Plaintiff or that Ms. Hickles be required to bring suit in her personal capacity, rather
than that of a trustee.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED to the District Court that Plaintiff’s complaint
(Doc. 1) be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that a copy of the recommendation shall be sent to Plaintiff via certified
mail. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed R. Civ. P. 72, and D. Kan, Rule 72.1.4, Plaintiff shall
have fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of these proposed findings and recommendations to
serve and file with the U.S. District Judge assigned to the case, any written objections to the findings
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of fact, conclusions of law, or recommendations of the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s
failure to file such written, specific objections within the 14-day period will bar appellate review of
the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the recommended disposition. See Moore v.
United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Dated December 17, 2025, at Wichita, Kansas.
/s/ B ROOKS S EVERSON
Brooks G. Severson
United States Magistrate Judge
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