Rinke v. Valley Floral Company, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JULIE RINKE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	CIVIL ACTION
)
v. 	) 	No. 25-1230-KHV
)
VALLEY FLORAL COMPANY, LLC, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
____________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Julie Rinke filed
suit pro se against Valley Floral Company, LLC, alleging discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. On October 1, 2025, the
Honorable Cristian M. Stevens of the Eastern District of Missouri transferred the case to the
District of Kansas. 	On February 2, 2026, the Court sustained defendant’s Motion To Dismiss
(Doc. #13) filed December 29, 2025 because plaintiff had not filed a response and for substantially
the reasons stated in defendant’s motion. 	See Memorandum And Order (Doc. #16) at 1. 	This
matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s letter (Doc. #18) filed February 13, 2026, which the Court
construes as a motion to reconsider, and plaintiff’s letter (Doc. #19) filed February 13, 2026, which
the Court construes as a supplement to the motion to reconsider. 	For reasons stated below, the
Court sustains plaintiff’s motion.
Legal Standards
The Court has discretion to reconsider a decision if the moving party can establish (1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that could not have
been obtained previously through the exercise of due diligence; or (3) the need to correct clear
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error or prevent manifest injustice. 	D. Kan. Rule 7.3; Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d
1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Such motions are not appropriate to ask the Court to revisit issues
already addressed or to hear new arguments or supporting facts that could have been presented
originally. See Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1209 n.2
(10th Cir. 2001). Reconsideration may be appropriate, however, if the Court has misapprehended
the facts, a party’s position or the controlling law. See Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.
Although the Court holds a pro se litigant’s filings to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by attorneys, a pro se party must follow the same rules of procedure as all other
litigants. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that she did not receive defendant’s motion to dismiss, and did not learn of
it until February of 2026, when she received the order of dismissal. Defendant does not dispute
that plaintiff did not receive a copy of its motion. Accordingly, in the interest of justice, the Court
should not have sustained the motion as uncontested.
As noted above, the Court also sustained defendant’s motion to dismiss for substantially
the reasons stated in the motion. 	See Memorandum And Order (Doc. #16) at 1. 	Specifically,
plaintiff failed to file suit under the ADEA within 90 days after she received a right-to-sue letter
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See id. at 1–2 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(e) and Determination And Notice Of Rights issued April 16, 2025, attached to Employment
Discrimination Complaint (Doc. #1) filed September 23, 2025).
Liberally construed, plaintiff’s motion to reconsider suggests that at the direction of an
employee at the Clerk’s Office for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, she submitted her complaint for filing by facsimile on July 15, 2025—some four days
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before the 90-day deadline. See Doc. #19 at 1. Plaintiff has not precisely described the nature of
her efforts to confirm that the Clerk timely received her complaint, but her allegations invoke the
doctrine of equitable tolling. 	See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)
(equitable tolling doctrine extended sparingly but allowed where claimant actively pursued judicial
remedies by filing defective pleading during statutory period); see Carlile v. S. Routt Sch. Dist.,
652 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 1981) (equitable tolling might be appropriate where plaintiff lulled
into inaction by past employer, government agency or courts). 	Defendant has not responded to
plaintiff’s allegation. 	To prevent manifest injustice, the Court vacates the prior order which
dismissed plaintiff’s complaint so that plaintiff can have an opportunity to state the precise factual
basis for her assertion of equitable tolling. 	On or before May 29, 2026, plaintiff may file an
amended complaint which alleges a factual basis for her claim of equitable tolling.1
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s letter (Doc. #18) filed February 13,
2026, which the Court construes as a motion to reconsider the Court’s Memorandum And Order
(Doc. #16) filed February 2, 2026, is SUSTAINED. 	The Memorandum And Order (Doc. #16)
and Judgment In A Civil Case (Doc. #17), both filed February 2, 2026, are VACATED. On or
before May 29, 2026, plaintiff may file an amended complaint which includes allegations of
equitable tolling.
Dated this 11th day of May, 2026 at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Kathryn H. Vratil
KATHRYN H. VRATIL
United States District Judge
1 	In doing so, plaintiff should note that the doctrine of equitable tolling ordinarily
applies only if she can plead facts which establish that she was “actively misled” or was in some
extraordinary way prevented from asserting her rights. Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 957–58
(10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 1984)).
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