Sallaj v. Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, Secretary of et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
LISA SALLAJ,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED HEALTHCARE OF THE MIDWEST,
INC., ,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-1119-AWM-BGS
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND AND TO ADD ADDITIONAL PARTIES
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint” (Doc. 94)
and “Motion to Add Defendants Modivcare Solutions, LLC and Thrive Therapy of Kansas, LLC”
(Doc. 95). Briefing on the motions is complete.
In the former motion, Plaintiff argues that since her original Complaint was filed, she has
“obtained additional information regarding the proper corporate identities of the Defendants, the
scope of their contractual and legal obligations, and the specific factual circumstances underlying her
claims.” (Doc. 94, at 1.) She asserts that the proposed pleading “clarifies the identities of the
Defendants, adds a necessary party (Thrive Therapy of Kansas, LLC, hereinafter “Thrive”), removes
the claim against Laura Howard/KDADS in her official capacity, and refines the legal theories to
more accurately reflect the facts and applicable law.” (Id.) In the latter motion, Plaintiff seeks to
add previously-dismissed Defendant ModivCare Solutions, LLC (hereinafter “ModivCare”) and
Thrive as Defendants to “clarify [her] intent to include these parties, following the Court’s prior
orders regarding the dismissal of the original complaint and the status of these specific entities.”
(Doc. 95, at 1)
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As more fully discussed herein, the proposed amended Complaint submitted by Plaintiff
(Doc. 94-1) does not comply with the parameters and limitations Judge Crabtree set in allowing
Plaintiff leave to amend. (See generally Doc. 83.) Thus, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff’s Motions
and allow her proposed amended Complaint to be filed. Plaintiff’s motions are, therefore,
DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff shall be allowed one final opportunity to move to amend
her Complaint consistent with Judge Crabtree’s1 directives.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her federal court Complaint alleging an unfair denial of Medicaid services in
violation of federal statute(s) and her Constitutional rights. (Doc. 1.) Therein, Plaintiff named the
following Defendants: Laura Howard, Secretary of the Kansas Department of Aging and Disability
Services, in her official capacity, UnitedHealthcare of the Midwest, Inc.,2 and ModivCare. (Id.)
After screening Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the undersigned
Magistrate Judge granted in forma pauperis status to Plaintiff and authorized service on the named
Defendants. (Doc. 4.) The Complaint asserted numerous state and federal claims against the named
Defendants, including breach of contract, negligence, violation of the 14th Amendment, violation of
the ADA, a § 1983 claim, and a False Claims Act claim.
Motions to Dismiss were subsequently filed on behalf of Defendants Howard and UHC.
(Docs. 11, 33.) Judge Crabtree granted Defendant Howard’s dispositive motion and dismissed
Howard from the case. He granted Defendant UHC’s motion in part, dismissing all federal claims
and allowing only the state law breach of contract claim to survive. (See generally Doc. 52.)
Because the District Judge held that Plaintiff’s surviving claims against Defendant UHC did
not involve Defendant ModivCare, Defendant ModivCare was also dismissed from this lawsuit,
1 The case has since been reassigned to District Judge Anthony W. Mattivi. See (Doc. 108.)
2 Hereinafter, UnitedHealthcare will be referred to as “Defendant UHC” or “UHC.”
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without prejudice. 3 (Id., at 8, 18-19.) Subsequently, Defendant UHC – the only remaining
Defendant in this case – filed its Answer on February 10, 2026.4 (Doc. 60.)
Because the only surviving claim was a state-law cause of action, on March 11, 2026, Judge
Crabtree ordered Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should not decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over this remaining state law claim and thus dismiss the case. (See generally
Doc. 83.) Plaintiff timely responded, contending that (1) exceptional circumstances in this case
justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction and (2) diversity jurisdiction now exists. (Doc. 84.)
Judge Crabtree subsequently entered an Order on May 4, 2026, rejecting both of Plaintiff’s
show cause arguments. He held that while Plaintiff’s response demonstrated that the parties may be
diverse and that the amount in controversy may exceed $75,000, that information was not included
in the Complaint. Because the grounds for jurisdiction were not asserted in the Complaint, he
determined that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law
claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. (See generally Doc. 93.) However, because
Plaintiff’s response to the show cause order contained information that may be sufficient to
establish diversity jurisdiction, he gave her 14 days to file a motion for leave to amend the Complaint
to address the jurisdictional issue. (Id.)
On May 15, 2026, Plaintiff timely filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
and attached the proposed amended complaint to that Motion. (Docs. 94 and 94-1.) The Proposed
Amended Complaint is 40 pages long, attempts to add two Defendants, and includes numerous
3 The District Court noted that although ModivCare had not filed a responsive pleading at the time of its Order, “a
district court ‘may properly on its own motion dismiss an action’ against ‘defendants who have not moved to dismiss
where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants
are integrally related.’ ” (Doc. 52, at 18 (citing Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) and Sipple
v. Zevita, No. 23-cv-4038-HLT, 2023 WL 4706621, at *5 (D. Kan. July 24, 2023) (dismissing unserved defendant where
moving defendant’s arguments applied equally to unserved defendant).) The District Court also held that dismissal was
justified pursuant to Section 1915 of Title 28. Id.
4 This resulted in Plaintiff filing a motion to strike affirmative defenses from the Answer (Doc. 60), which was denied by
the undersigned Magistrate Judge on March 19, 2026 (Doc. 86).
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federal and state law claims, many of which were previously dismissed by Judge Crabtree. On May
18, 2026, Plaintiff filed a largely superfluous Motion to Add Defendants ModivCare Solutions, LLC,
and Thrive Therapy of Kansas, LLC. (Doc. 95.) Defendant UHC opposes both motions (Doc.
103), as discussed infra. ModivCare also filed a response opposing the motion. (Doc. 105.)
ANALYSIS
A. 	Legal Standards – Motion to Amend.
The standard for allowing a plaintiff to amend a complaint is well-established in this District.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), a party may amend a pleading as a matter of course either
before the responding party answers or within 21 days after service of a responsive pleading. In the
present situation, however, the time to amend as a matter of course has passed and Defendant
opposes the motion. As such, Plaintiff may amend her pleading only by leave of court per Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Rule 15(a)(2) provides leave shall be freely given when “justice so requires.” The decision of
whether to allow an amendment is within the Court’s sound discretion. See J. Vangel Elec., Inc. v.
Sugar Creek Packing Co., No. 11-2112-EFM, 2012 WL 5995283, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing
Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, 60 F.3d 1486, 1494 (10th Cir. 1995)). In deciding this issue, the Court is
to consider the timeliness of the motion, potential prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith on
behalf of the movant, and futility of amendment. Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1204
(10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
While exercising its discretion, the Court must be “mindful of the spirit of the federal rules
of civil procedure to encourage decisions on the merits rather than on mere technicalities.” Hinkle v.
Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 11-2652-JTM-KMH, 2012 WL 2581000, at *1 (D. Kan. July 3, 2012)
(citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has determined that Rule 15 is intended “to provide litigants
‘the maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural
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niceties.’ ” Carefusion 213, LLC v. Professional Disposables, Inc., No. 09-2616-KHV-DJW, 2010 WL
4004874, at *4 (citations omitted). This is true “[e]ven when a party has run afoul of the rules”
when there is no bad faith by that offending party and/or no prejudice to the non-moving party.
AK Steel Corp. v. PAC Operating Ltd. P’ship, No. 15-9260-CM-GEB, 2016 WL 6163832, at *4 (D. Kan.
Oct. 24, 2016).
Within the framework of these legal standards, the Court will evaluate Plaintiff’s request to
amend her Complaint and add new parties. That stated, the context and parameters of the Order
(Doc. 93) allowing Plaintiff to file a motion to amend also requires the Court to employ a somewhat
more specified approach consistent with Judge Crabtree’s directives and limitations regarding an
amended pleading. The Court notes there is long-standing authority in this District for Courts to
limit the scope an amendment when granting leave to amend. Murray v. Sevier, 149 F.R.D. 638, 644
(D. Kan. 1993) (allowing a plaintiff to file a fourth amended complaint setting forth a RICO claim
with specifically limited parameters and stating the court “will not permit any other RICO claim,
however.”).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and Add New Parties.
As discussed above, Judge Crabtree gave Plaintiff a 14-day deadline to move to amend her
Complaint to assert a jurisdictional basis for state law breach of contract claim against UHC – the
sole claim remaining in the lawsuit. (Id.)
Based on this context, the undersigned infers that Judge Crabtree intended for Plaintiff’s
amendment to address the jurisdictional issue only. There is nothing in the history of this case or
within the limited confines of Judge Crabtree’s prior Orders that would indicate he was inviting
Plaintiff to file a wholesale new Complaint in an attempt to bring back previously dismissed parties,
including ModivCare, or revive previously dismissed claims. As Defendant UHC argues, “[t]here’s
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no basis in the Jurisdiction Order for the addition of new claims, new allegations, and a new party at
this late date.” (Doc. 103, at 6.)
The Court agrees. Courts within the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, have
“routinely dismissed claims in amended complaints where the court granted leave to amend for a
limited purpose and the plaintiff filed an amended complaint exceeding the scope of the permission
granted.” Palm Beach Strategic Income, LP v. Salzman, 457 Fed. Appx. 40, 43 (2nd Cir. 2012) (internal
citations omitted). Other District Courts have followed suit. See Smith v. Charter Communs., No. 18-
80-MOC-DSC, 2019 WL 2751078, at *5 (W.D. N. C., July 1, 2019) (citing with approval Salzman,
supra); Wright v. Sutton, No. 08-1431, 2017 WL 2873049, at *4 (S.D. W. V., July 5, 2017) (citing, in
part, with approval Salzman, supra); FDIC v. Kooyomjian, 220 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2000) (no abuse of
discretion where district court struck new counts alleging new theories of recovery where court
granted leave to amend for the “limited purpose” of showing that existing claims were not barred);
Benton v. Baker Hughes, No. 12-07735 MMM, 2013 WL 3353636, *3 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2013)
(striking new claims where plaintiff had been given leave to amend only to address the deficiencies
in his existing causes of action as new claims exceed the scope of the leave to amend); DeLeon v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-1390-LHK, 2010 WL 4285006, *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010) (“In
cases like this one ... where leave to amend is given to cure deficiencies in certain specified claims,
courts have agreed that new claims alleged for the first time in the amended pleading should be
dismissed or stricken.”); Farac v. Sundown Energy, LP, No. 06-7147, 2009 WL 2241329, *3 (E.D. La.
Jul. 23, 2009) (granting motion to strike portions of amended complaint where the Court did not
grant leave for plaintiff “to expand the scope of the present lawsuit” in the proposed amended
pleading.); Williams v. Equity Holding Corp., 245 F.R.D. 240, 245 (E.D. Va. 2007) (granting defendants’
motion to strike where plaintiffs had “gone outside the scope given by this court to amend their
amended complaint”).
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Plaintiff’s motion to amend, therefore, DENIED without prejudice on this basis. See
Murray, 149 F.R.D., at 644 (setting specific, limited parameters for any proposed amended complaint
while indicating the court “will not permit any other … claim”). The proposed amended Complaint
submitted by Plaintiff (Doc. 94-1) does not comply with Judge Crabtree’s Order allowing Plaintiff
leave to amend. (See generally Doc. 83.) Further, Plaintiff’s second motion seeking leave to add
ModivCare and Thrive Therapy as Defendants is denied for the same reasons.
Because Plaintiff’s proposed amended Complaint intertwines the jurisdictional basis for the
remaining claim against UHC with other, impermissible content, the Court cannot sever that portion
and allow it to be filed alone. Accordingly, the undersigned will allow Plaintiff one final opportunity
to file a motion for leave to amend her Complaint. Any such motion, as well as the corresponding
proposed amended Complaint, shall be limited to resolving the diversity jurisdiction issue discussed
in Judge Crabtree’s Order (Doc. 93).
In other words, any attempts by Plaintiff to add new Defendants (such as Thrive Therapy),
reassert claims against previously dismissed Defendants (such as ModivCare), revive causes of action
previously dismissed (such as her prior ADA claim), and/or bring new causes of action, will result in
any such motion to amend being summarily denied without further discussion by the Court. If
Plaintiff elects to move to amend in accordance with this Order and Judge Crabtree’s prior Order,
she must comply with all governing procedural rules. See D. Kan. Rule 15.1; Fed R. Civ. P. 15. If
Plaintiff fails to file a motion for leave to amend on or before August 11, 2026, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge will recommend to the District Judge that judgment be entered against her and that
the case be closed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint” (Doc. 94) and “Motion to Add Defendants ModivCare Solutions, LLC and Thrive
Therapy of Kansas, LLC” (Docs. 94, 95) are DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may file one
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final motion for leave to amend her pleading on or before August 11, 2026. If Plaintiff fails to do
so, or the requested amendment does not comply with the parameters set forth herein, the
undersigned Magistrate Judge will recommend to the District Court that judgment be entered
against Plaintiff and that this case be closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated July 28, 2026, at Wichita, Kansas.
/S / BROOKS G. S EVERSON
Brooks G. Severson
United States Magistrate Judge
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