Aaebo-Akhan v. Akhan et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
AKOSUA AAEBO-AKHAN.,
Plaintiff,
v.
KWESI AKHAN, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-2500-JWB-ADM
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Akosua Aaebo-Akhan (“plaintiff”) brings this action against defendants Kwesi
Akhan, Internal Revenue Service, Canaan Worship Center, Journey Church International, and
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (collectively, “defendants”). The
court previously granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), but directed the U.S.
Marshals Service to withhold service of process until the court screened the complaint for merit
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (ECF 6.) As discussed in further detail below, upon screening,
the court now recommends that the district judge dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.
I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
The first six pages of Plaintiff’s complaint are the court’s form civil complaint, but these
pages generally direct the reader to “see attached” handwritten portion for her statement of claim,
relief sought, amounts claimed and reasons she is entitled to recover money damages. (ECF 1.)
The attached handwritten portion is 44 pages total, with the first 13 pages appearing to be part of
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her current complaint and pages 14-44 appearing to be a filing she made in D.C. Superior Court,
some of which contains very small print that is difficult to decipher.1 (ECF 1-2.)
The handwritten portion of plaintiff’s complaint begins with the alleged jurisdictional basis
for her claims—alleging facts she contends support diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and
the defendants, as well as a list of questions that plaintiff contends satisfy the “federal questions
requirement.” (ECF 1-2, at 1-5.) Plaintiff then goes on to allege that “she is a lifelong victim of
sex [and] human trafficking having been human trafficked at birth due to meeting specific
indigenous Akan American genetic criteria by sex and human traffickers who refer to themselves
as the white jewish mafia,2 and some including Cherokee Indians.” (Id. at 5.) Next, plaintiff
requests that the court issue a “merit based ruling” that plaintiff “was involuntarily impregnated
via in vitro fertilization using the proffered sperm of defendant Kwesi Akhan” because they both
have “documented genetic DNA royal ancestry.” (Id. at 5-6.) She further alleges that the “sex
and human traffickers planned to sell [and] lease” her and Kwesi Akhan’s children for a premium
as ‘niche’ market indigenous Akan American creations.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also alleges that she
and her children fathered by Kwesi Akhan have unsuccessfully attempted to escape sex and human
trafficking. According to her complaint, plaintiff’s attempts included “drafting and attempting to
file paternity and child support suits against Kwesi Akhan” in Kansas, Missouri, Georgia, and the
1 The court encourages plaintiff to type any further filings or at least take care to write as
legibly as possible if plaintiff does not have access to a computer or typewriter.
2 Plaintiff alleges that Roger Golubski, former Kansas City, Kansas police officer, is one
of the white jewish mafia’s “renowned members.” (ECF 1-2, at 7.) Plaintiff also specifically
identifies Esther Jean Ross, whom she claims is fraudulently listed as her mother on her birth
certificate, despite her evidence that this woman is not related to her in any way. (Id. at 5.) But
she does not name either Golubski or Ross as a defendant.
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District of Columbia, but these attempts were rejected by the courts. (Id.) She also alleges that
Kwesi Akhan refused to talk or open his door to plaintiff and her children when they “showed up
at his doorstep unannounced in September 2018 desperate for help escaping human trafficking”
because he “continues to be deceived by human traffickers” seeking to ensure that she and her
children “never escape” them. (Id. at 7-8.)
Plaintiff goes on to allege that Kwesi Akhan has “relentlessly defamed her as a mentally
ill stalker” and has maliciously prosecuted her, resulting in her “wrongful criminal prosecution,
detainment, conviction, probation, mental health misdiagnosis of incompetency [and] disorder,
mental health institution committal, [and] one year civil commitment, poverty, homelessness, etc.”
(Id. at 8.) She claims that the “sex and human traffickers forced her to agree to the Anti-Stalking
Order in D.C. Superior Court.” (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff further alleges that Kwesi Akhan owes
$637,000 in child support arrears for the children he fathered with her, $637,000 in monetary
restitution for defamation and malicious prosecution due to previous court rulings that she was
“not legally entitled to child support” for her children fathered by him, and $400,000 in punitive
damages “because said defamation [and] malicious prosecution caused [her] to be subjected to
unspeakable traumas [and] the aforementioned legal [and] mental health injustices.” (Id. at 9-10.)
As for the other defendants, plaintiff alleges defendants Canann Worship Center and
Journey Church International owe her “a full refund” of all “forced donations to their
organizations” because “the pastors and first ladies of both institutions were/are sex [and] human
traffickers” that raped, sodomized, and leased her “for both money [and] their personal pleasure.”
(Id. at 10-11.) She is also seeking “monetary restitution for intellectual property . . . exclusively
created by her while she was a victim of sex [and] human trafficking.” (Id. at 11.)
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With respect to defendant Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), plaintiff alleges she does not
owe taxes on any income she earned “because she has only earned income on her forced labor
throughout the course of her life, income that was solely controlled by sex [and] human traffickers
in every instance.” She wants a “full refund, plus interest, of all local, state, [and] federal taxes”
assessed on her forced labor from 1992 to 2025. (Id. at 11-12.)
Lastly, plaintiff alleges that defendant United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) “refused to process [her] countless attempts to appeal . . . the cancellation
of her Section 8 application voucher status,” which she blames on her sex and human traffickers
“preventing her from submitting her final required verification documents by the scheduled
deadline,” thereby thwarting her effort to escape the sex and human trafficking with her children.
(Id. at 12.) Plaintiff seeks “$1M in monetary restitution [and] punitive damages for negligence
[and] discrimination” by HUD, as well as “reinstatement of her final approved Section 8
application voucher status.” (Id.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
When a plaintiff proceeds IFP, the court may screen the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The court must dismiss the complaint if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The purpose of
§ 1915(e)(2) is to “discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon,
baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate.” Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 1157,
1161 (10th Cir. 2012).
Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes her pleadings liberally and holds
them “to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.” Johnson v. Johnson, 466 F.3d
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1213, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006). In so doing, however, the court does not “assume the role of advocate
for the pro se litigant.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff still bears
“the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Dismissal Is Appropriate Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
Dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same
standard that applies to motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). To withstand dismissal, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court liberally construes the factual allegations. See
Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992). However, a pro se plaintiff’s
pleadings are judged by the same legal standards that apply to all litigants and a pro se plaintiff
must abide by the applicable rules of court. Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th
Cir. 1994). The court is not obligated to craft legal theories for the plaintiff or to supply factual
allegations to support the plaintiff’s claims. Nor may the court assume the role of advocate for the
pro se litigant. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Plaintiff’s complaint does not meet the court’s pleading standard because her complaint
does not make clear what causes of action she is asserting against the named defendants or provide
sufficient factual allegations to support her claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring a pleading to
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
“The policy behind Rule 8 is to give the defendant fair notice of what the Plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Meyer v. City of Marion, KS, 2025 WL 949 122, Case No. 24-
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2122-DDC-GEB (D. Kan. 2025) (citing Schupper v. Edie, 193 App’x 744, 745-46 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Leatherman v. Terrant Co. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113
S. Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993))). Here, plaintiff’s narrative begins with multiple pages of
rhetorical questions instead of stating the factual and legal bases for her claims. When plaintiff’s
complaint finally addresses her claims against defendants, the allegations are rambling, disjointed
and unclear—as are the legal theories ostensibly providing the basis for her claims. Her factual
allegations generally relate to harm she has suffered as a victim of sex and human trafficking, but
she is not suing the alleged perpetrators (the alleged “white jewish mafia”), whom she alleges
forced her into a life of sex and human trafficking. Instead, plaintiff’s complaint names five
defendants who allegedly have wronged her in other ways throughout her life.
First, plaintiff names Kwesi Akhan, the alleged father of her children, as a defendant. But
her allegations and claims against him appear to be related to one or more state court cases that
have already been decided against her. (See ECF 1-2, at 6 (acknowledging that plaintiff has filed
paternity and child support lawsuits against Kwesi Akhan in Kansas, Missouri, Georgia, and the
District of Columbia, but each court rejected her filings).) Because plaintiff’s claims relate to prior
court proceedings, the court does not have jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.3
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal review of state court judgments “where (1) the
plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the state-court judgment caused the plaintiff’s injuries, (3) the state
3 See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a bar to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Market
v. City of Garden City, 723 F. App’x 571, 575 (10th Cir. 2017) (directing district court to vacate
portion of district court’s opinion dismissing for failure to state a claim where the district court
lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman).
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court rendered judgment before the federal claim was filed, and (4) the plaintiff is asking the
district court to review and reject the state judgment.” Market, 723 F. App’x at 572–73 (citing
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Applicability of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is determined by the relief sought. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603
F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Additionally, our recent Rooker-Feldman jurisprudence has
emphasized the relief sought by federal-court plaintiffs.” (citing Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441
F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006))).
Here, plaintiff seeks $637,000 in “child support arrears” from Kwesi Akhan, as well as
$637,000 in “monetary restitution for defamation and malicious prosecution,” but the complaint
admits that she seeks these remedies because “previous courts” found she “was not legally entitled
to child support” from him. (ECF 1-2, at 9.) Because plaintiff’s claims against Kwesi Akhan
relate to prior unsuccessful state court proceedings for which she seeks review, the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Even if the court were to have subject matter jurisdiction over the tort claims, those claims
should still be dismissed because the complaint fails to state a claim for either defamation or
malicious prosecution. Plaintiff admits she lost in state court —specifically acknowledging that
she agreed to an Anti-Stalking Order sought by Kwesi Akhan in a case in D.C. Superior Court and
that “previous courts” found she “was not legally entitled to child support” from Kwesi Akhan.
(ECF 1-2, at 8-9.) Therefore, her malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed. See Swender v.
Lamfers, No. 23-4073-DDC-BGS, 2024 WL 3552421, at *3 (D. Kan. July 26, 2024) (dismissing
plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim for failure to state a claim because the litigation didn’t
terminate in plaintiff’s favor, which is an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim).
Plaintiff also fails to state a defamation claim against Kwesi Akhan. The elements of defamation
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are: (1) false and defamatory words, (2) communicated to a third person, and (3) results in a harm
to the person defamed. Marcus v. Swanson, 539 P.3d 605, 609 (Kan. 2023). Plaintiff alleges that
Kwesi Akhan defamed her by calling her “a mentally ill stalker,” but she cannot establish the first
element because Kwesi Akahn’s statement is not false. Plaintiff’s complaint acknowledges that
she agreed to an Anti-Stalking Order in D.C. Superior Court (though she claims she was under
duress from her sex and human traffickers) and further acknowledges that she was committed to a
mental health institution in Washington D.C. for one year (though she claims this one-year
commitment was “wrongful”). (ECF 1-2, at 8-9.) Plaintiff’s complaint therefore fails to state a
defamation claim. For these reasons, the court recommends that plaintiff’s claims against Kwesi
Akhan be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim.
As for plaintiff’s complaint against defendants Canaan Worship Center and Journey
Church International, plaintiff alleges that these two defendants are fraudulently soliciting funds
for alleged religious beliefs based on fictional characters and misappropriated “intellectual
property” created by plaintiff. (ECF 1-2, at 11.) The complaint, however, does not identify the
“intellectual property” at issue or when the alleged misappropriation occurred. The complaint also
does not allege with the necessary specificity the statements made by these defendants in their
alleged fraudulent solicitations or the actions plaintiff took in reliance on those statements.
Moreover, by virtue of this claim, plaintiff appears to be asking the court to scrutinize the validity
of the religious beliefs promoted by Canaan Worship Center and Journey Church International.
Plaintiff’s request is beyond this court’s judicial function. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (cautioning that a determination of what is a
religious belief or practice is “not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or
practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible
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to others in order to merit First Amendment protection”); see also U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87
(1944) (noting the intent of the “fathers of the Constitution” to provide for the “the widest possible
toleration of conflicting views” and protection of religious beliefs, even those deemed incredible
or preposterous by most people). Because a statement’s falsity is an essential element of a fraud
claim, adjudicating plaintiff’s claims against Canaan Worship Center and Journey Church
International would require the court to do exactly what the Supreme Court has forbidden—
evaluate the truth or falsity of these defendants’ religious beliefs. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-87. For
these reasons, the court recommends that plaintiff’s claims against Canaan Worship Center and
Journey Church International be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
As for plaintiff’s complaint against the IRS, plaintiff does not appear to allege a specific
claim against the IRS or any facts in support of a claim—only a demand for a “full refund, plus
interest, of all local, state, [and] federal taxes” assessed on her forced labor from 1992 to 2025.
(ECF 1-2, at 11-12.) The complaint does not explain what specific work she performed from 1992
to 2025 that qualifies as nontaxable, as opposed to what work she performed during those years
that is taxable. Likewise, for her claim against HUD, plaintiff simply states that HUD has “refused
to process [her] countless attempts to appeal . . . the cancellation of her Section 8 application
voucher status.” (ECF 1-2, at 12.) Plaintiff does not provide any facts surrounding these events,
such as the dates of her appeals or why she contends HUD’s actions are unlawful. For these
reasons, the court recommends that plaintiff’s claims against the IRS and HUD be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
In sum, plaintiff’s complaint does not provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that pleader is entitled to relief,” as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Thus, she has not given
defendants “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550
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U.S. at 555 (internal quotation and citation omitted). And, because of plaintiff’s lengthy and
verbose narrative, the court is unable to separate out the extent to which she is seeking any relief
in this case that is distinguishable from her state court cases—let alone decipher the extent to which
plaintiff is asserting claims in this case that are or were not already encompassed by her other
litigation. Finally, as noted above, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against any
defendant.
Consequently, the court recommends that the district judge dismiss plaintiff’s claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim.
B. Dismissal Is Appropriate Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)
Plaintiff’s claims against the IRS and HUD should be dismissed for an additional reason—
namely, plaintiff “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief” and
the court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. The IRS and HUD are
federal agencies, so the United States of America is the real party in interest. See Ghandi v. Police
Dep’t, 747 F.2d 338, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (recognizing United States as real
party in interest in case against federal agencies). Because sovereign immunity generally shields
the United States and its agencies from suit, plaintiffs bringing claims against the United States or
its agencies must “point to a specific waiver of immunity in order to establish jurisdiction.” See
Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 554 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir.
2009) (citations omitted). Plaintiff points to no statute that waives sovereign immunity for the
claims she alleges against the IRS and HUD.
The Tucker Act provides the only possible basis for jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims
against the IRS and HUD, as it permits money damages based on statute or contract. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346, 1491. “The Tucker Act, of course, is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create
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any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages. The Court of
Claims has recognized that the Act merely confers jurisdiction upon it whenever the substantive
right exists.” U.S. v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) (citation omitted). Thus, “to invoke
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must point to a substantive right to money damages
against the United States.” Hamlet v. United States, 63 F.3d 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing
Testan, 424 U.S. at 398). A plaintiff may satisfy this burden by “identify[ing] a constitutional
provision, statute, regulation, or contract that independently creates a substantive right to money
damages.” Fleming v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 2d 503, 505 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Plaintiff does not
meet this burden, as her complaint does not cite or identify any such constitutional provision,
statute, regulation, or contract.4 Therefore, plaintiff’s claims against the IRS and HUD should be
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because she “seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.”
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the court recommends that the district judge dismiss this
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted and/or because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The
court further recommends that the district judge dismiss this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
4 Even if plaintiff could identify a “statute, regulation, or contract that independently
creates a substantive right to money damages,” id. at 505, jurisdiction would not lie with this court.
“The Tucker Act ‘vests exclusive jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims for claims against
the United States founded upon the Constitution, Acts of Congress, executive regulations, or
contracts and seeking amounts greater than $10,000.’” Normandy Apartments, 554 F.3d at
1295 (quoting Burkins v. United States, 112 F.3d 444, 449 (10th Cir.1997)). Because plaintiff
seeks over $10,000, jurisdiction would lie exclusively with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) with respect to defendants IRS and HUD because plaintiff “seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
* * * * *
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2), and D. KAN. RULE 72.1.4(b),
plaintiff may file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen days after
being served with a copy. If plaintiff fails to file objections within the fourteen-day period, no
appellate review of the factual and legal determinations in this Report and Recommendation will
be allowed by any court. See In re Key Energy Res. Inc., 230 F.3d 1197, 1199-1200 (10th Cir.
2000).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for the
reasons set forth above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk’s office mail a copy of this Report and
Recommendation to plaintiff via regular mail and certified mail, return receipt requested.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated December 16, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Angel D. Mitchell
Angel D. Mitchell
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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