Lawson v. Bolton et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ANGELIINA LAWSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW BOLTON, in his individual and
official capacity as guardian ad litem, THE
BOLTON LAW FIRM, LLC, DARRELL
ROBINSON, individually and in his official
capacity, NEISHA MISER, individually and in
her official capacity, MALIQUE TALOR,
individually and in her official capacity,
JENNIFER AGREE, individually and in her
official capacity, DAN LIVINGSTON,
individually and in his official capacity,
LIVINGSTON CENTER, LLC, DR. RODNEY
MCNEAL, individually and in his official
capacity, BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF ANDERSON
COUNTY, KANSAS, by and through its
Chairman LES MCGHEE,
Defendants.
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Case No. 2:25-cv-02251-JWB-TJJ
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
FOR DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
NOTICE
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and
recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), Plaintiff may file
a written objection to this report and recommendation. A party must file any objections within the
fourteen-day period if that party wants to have appellate review of the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, or recommended disposition. If no objections are timely filed, no appellate
review will be allowed by any court.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Relevant Background Based Upon Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff Angeliina Lawson initiated this action pro se on May 6, 2025, on behalf of herself
and her minor child, D.L., by filing a Complaint naming ten defendants, including the court-
appointed guardian ad litem (“GAL”), therapists, and others involved in her state court
proceedings. Plaintiff brings her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I & II), 29 U.S.C. §
794 (Count III), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count IV), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count V), Titles II and III of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Count VI), and Kansas State law (Counts VII–XI).
Plaintiff’s Complaint generally alleges Defendants “engaged in a coordinated pattern of
obstructing [her] parental rights, retaliating against her ADA-protected activities, inflicting
psychological and emotional harm on [her child], and suppressing lawful accommodations” of her
disabilities.1 She requests a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ actions violated her
constitutional and statutory rights, an award of compensatory and punitive damages, restoration of
her “full and lawful custody of her minor child,” an order enjoining Defendants from “further
custodial interference, discrimination, and retaliation,” and mandating Defendants’ “compliance
with ADA Title II and III obligations in all future proceedings.”2
On May 15, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of
Fees, under the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), but withheld service of process
pending review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).3 After careful review of Plaintiff’s Complaint,
the undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes that none of Plaintiff’s purported federal claims are
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court should decline to exercise
1 Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1, at p. 3.
2 Id. at p. 5.
3 Order, ECF No. 7.
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jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s purported state law claims, and the case should be dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II. Applicable Legal Standards
When a party seeks to proceed without the prepayment of fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires
the court to screen the party’s complaint. The court must dismiss the complaint if it determines
the action (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.4 The purpose of § 1915(e)
is to “discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits
that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of
the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.”5
This Court reviews the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint under the same standards as
those used when considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).6 Plaintiff “must
allege sufficient facts to state a claim which is plausible—more than merely conceivable—on its
face.”7 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must provide a “short and plain statement
of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Additionally, the complaint must state
more than “labels and conclusions” and “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief beyond the speculative level.”8 Plaintiff proceeds pro se, thus her pleadings must be
construed liberally.9 However, she still bears the burden to allege “sufficient facts on which a
4 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
5 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
6 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2007).
7 Fisher v. Lynch, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1260 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
8 Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 545.
9 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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recognized legal claim could be based,”10 and the Court cannot “take on the responsibility of
serving as her attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.”11
“Apart from the court’s obligation to screen IFP complaints for merit, the court has an
independent obligation to determine if subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”12 “[F]ederal courts are
courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction” and “may only hear cases when empowered to do so
by the Constitution and by act of Congress.”13 Within the meaning of § 1915(e), a complaint is
frivolous “if its subject matter is outside the jurisdiction of the court.”14
III. Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
a. Plaintiff’s Claims on Behalf of Her Minor Child
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s attempt to bring claims on behalf of her minor child.
“[U]nder Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1654, a minor child cannot bring suit through a
parent acting as next friend if the parent is not represented by an attorney.”15 Because Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se the undersigned recommends any claims brought on behalf of her minor child
be dismissed.
b. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Individually Named Defendants in Their Official
Capacities
Plaintiff brings her claims against individually named Defendants Andrew Bolton, Darrell
Robinson, Neisha Miser, Malique Taylor, Jennifer Agee, Dan Livingston, and Dr. Rodney McNeal
(“individually named Defendants”) in both their personal and official capacities. However, “a suit
10 Id.
11 Mays v. Wyandotte Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2010 WL 6032763, at *2 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Garrett v.
Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)).
12 Martinez v. Pickering, No. 21-4083-JAR-ADM, 2021 WL 12146947, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-4083-JAR-ADM, 2022 WL 21778539 (D. Kan. Feb. 28,
2022) (citing Gad v. Kan. State Univ., 787 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 2015)).
13 Gad, 787 F.3d at 1035.
14 Oltremari by McDaniel v. Kan. Social & Rehabilitative Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D. Kan. 1994).
15 Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986).
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against an individual in his official capacity is, in reality, a suit against the agency which the
individual represents.”16 Plaintiff does not allege that any of the individually named Defendants
represent a governmental agency, and it does not appear any of them are employed by a
governmental agency. Nor does the fact that a Defendant holds a supervisory position give rise to
an official capacity claim. For example, Plaintiff brings her claims against Jennifer Agee “in her
official capacity as supervisor of Malique Taylor,” D.L’s therapist. While Defendant Agee may
serve in supervisory position in her private employment, this does not mean she is working in an
official capacity for any agency or other governmental entity. Plaintiff has not stated an official
capacity claim against any of the individually named Defendants who are privately employed by
non-governmental agencies or entities, as they do not possess an official capacity in which to be
sued.17 Plaintiff pleads no facts or law to support her contention she can bring such official
capacity claims. Therefore, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s claims against the all
individually named Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
c. Plaintiff’s Claims for Equitable Relief
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges during the course of Plaintiff’s state court case involving the
custody of her son, her constitutional rights have been violated. Plaintiff alleges Defendants
coordinated to inflict psychological harm on D.L., failed to provide the state court with reports and
other evidence, and generally attempted to “sabotage” Plaintiff’s custody rights. Plaintiff seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief for such actions, in addition to monetary damages. Particularly,
16 Whitney v. State of N.M., 113 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 1997). See also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,
25 (1991) (“Suits against state officials in their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits
against the State.”).
17 See Tenison v. Byrd, 826 F. App'x 682 (10th Cir. 2020) (dismissing official capacity claims against
private employees of a prison because they are not employees of the state and do not possess an official
capacity in which to be sued).
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Plaintiff asks this Court to restore her custody of D.L., enjoin Defendants from further interference
with the state court proceedings, and mandate compliance with the ADA. As discussed below, the
Court concludes it lacks jurisdiction over such claims for equitable relief pursuant to the principles
of Younger abstention.
“Younger abstention dictates that federal courts not interfere with state court proceedings
by granting equitable relief—such as injunctions of important state proceedings or declaratory
judgments regarding constitutional issues in those proceedings—when such relief could
adequately be sought before the state court.”18 There are three factors that dictate whether Younger
abstention applies: “(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2)
the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and
(3) the state proceedings ‘involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state
law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.’”19
In 2013, the Supreme Court in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, limited Younger’s
application to the following three types of state court proceedings: (1) ongoing state criminal
prosecutions; (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions; and (3)
“civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability
to perform their judicial functions.”20 These three categories are the “exceptional” circumstances
to which Younger applies.21 The “exceptional circumstances” requiring abstention under
Younger’s third civil proceedings category are present only when “the relief requested from the
federal court would enjoin or otherwise interfere with such proceedings.”22 Since the Sprint
18 Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999)).
19 Id. (quoting Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999)).
20 Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013).
21 Id.
22 Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 672 (10th Cir. 2020).
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opinion, the Tenth Circuit has affirmed cases applying Younger to child custody cases.23 And,
because Plaintiff’s requested relief would “enjoin or otherwise interfere with” the state court child
custody proceedings, this case presents an “exceptional circumstance.”24 Therefore, the Court now
analyzes whether Younger abstention is appropriate in this matter.
First, a review of the docket in Plaintiff’s state court proceedings shows that her case is on
appeal and ongoing.25 Therefore, the first Younger factor is met.
Second, the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the
Complaint. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that state law prevents her from presenting
her federal claims in the state court proceedings.26 However, Plaintiff merely states that her
constitutional right and statutory rights under the ADA have been violated or otherwise ignored.
Plaintiff does not provide any authority or arguments that would support a conclusion the state
23 See Thompson v. Romeo, 728 F. App’x 796, 798 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (holding that district
court properly applied Younger abstention to dismiss claims arising from allegedly unconstitutional
orders entered in ongoing state-court divorce and child-custody proceeding); Alfaro v. Cnty. v. Arapahoe,
766 F. App’x 657, 661 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (holding that district court properly applied
Younger abstention to dismiss claims arising from allegedly unconstitutional orders entered in ongoing
state court divorce and child-custody proceeding to the extent the state court proceedings were ongoing).
See also Escalante v. Escalante, No. 23-CV-2176-KHV-TJJ, 2023 WL 11872503, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 30,
2023); Blanchard v. Woltman, No. 24-2290-JWB, 2025 WL 949037, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2025)
(finding Younger abstention applies to federal claims deriving from state court child custody
proceedings); Zesiger v. Zesiger, No. 25-4055-DDC-RES, 2025 WL 1837375, at *2 (D. Kan. July 3,
2025) (finding to the extent state court proceedings were ongoing, Younger abstention likely applies to
federal claims deriving from state court divorce proceedings).
24 See Elna Sefcovic, LLC, 953 F.3d at 672; Culbertson v. Billam, et al., No. 25-4049-JAR-TJJ, 2025 WL
1368846, at *3 (D. Kan. May 12, 2025).
25 See Burnett v. Reno Cnty. Comm'n, No. 18-3160-SAC, 2019 WL 1000882, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 1,
2019) (finding state court case ongoing when on appeal). Plaintiff does not provide her pending state
court case number, and there appear to be two Kansas State Court domestic relations cases related to her
divorce and custody of D.L. Given Plaintiff names Anderson County as a Defendant, the undersigned
presumes Plaintiff’s allegations are related to the domestic case currently pending in Anderson County.
See In the Matter of the Marriage of Johnathan David Lawson v. Angeliina Lynn Lawson, 2020-DM-
000131, Anderson County, Kansas (Notice of Appeal filed January 13, 2026). However, even if
Plaintiff’s allegations arise from the other domestic relations case pending in Leavenworth County, it is
also on appeal and is currently ongoing. See In the Matter of the Marriage of Angeliina Lynn Lawson v.
Jonathan David Brent Lawson, LV-2025-DM-000861, Leavenworth County, Kansas (Notice of Appeal
filed December 19, 2025).
26 See Morkel v. Davis, 513 Fed. App’x 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2013).
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court could not entertain the constitutional or statutory claims arising from her state court
proceedings. In fact, state courts have been found adequate forums for federal constitutional and
statutory claims.27 To the extent Plaintiff has already raised her constitutional and statutory
concerns in the state court, “that court’s decisions are not ‘inadequate’ for Younger purposes
simply because the court did not rule in her favor.”28 Therefore, the second Younger factor is met.
Third, the state court proceedings involve important state interests. Plaintiff’s allegations
arise from a child custody matter, the resolution of which presents an important state interest.29
The law in the Tenth Circuit is clear that issues of familial relations and issues of child custody are
“especially delicate subject[s] of state policy.”30 Therefore, the third Younger factor is met.
However, a court may decline to abstain under Younger when extraordinary circumstances
are present, including when the underlying state court action was: (1) a criminal prosecution
commenced in bad faith or to harass, (2) based on a flagrantly and patently unconstitutional statute,
or (3) related to any other such extraordinary circumstance creating a threat of “irreparable injury”
both great and immediate.31 “[I]t is the plaintiff’s ‘heavy burden’ to overcome the bar of Younger
abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith or harassment.”32
Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to show any of these three circumstances exist in
this case. First, Plaintiff’s underlying state court case concerns a domestic relations matter, not a
27 Id. (finding state court adequate forum for raising constitutional claims); D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No.
497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding state court adequate forum for raising ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims).
28 Morkel, 513 Fed. App’x at 728.
29 Fisher, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1267 (“it is well established that the State of Kansas maintains a significant
interest in child custody matters”).
30 Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1393 (10th Cir. 1996).
31 Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
53–54 (1971)).
32 See Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational and Pro. Licensing of Dept. of Com. of State of Utah, 240 F.3d 871,
876 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Phelps, 122 F.3d at 889).
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criminal prosecution, so the first exception is inapplicable. Next, Plaintiff does not allege the action
is based on a flagrantly and patently unconstitutional statute. Instead, her allegations are all based
on the alleged actions of the named Defendants, so the second exception is inapplicable. Finally,
nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint rises to the level necessary to show a threat of “irreparable injury”
to Plaintiff that is “both great and immediate.”33 In Younger, the Supreme Court noted in order to
show irreparable injury, “the threat to plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot
be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.”34 Although Plaintiff’s state
court case is not a criminal prosecution, the same principal applies. The pending state court action
may resolve any alleged violation of Plaintiff’s protected rights, so the third exception is
inapplicable.35 Thus, no exception to Younger abstention applies to this action. Therefore, this
Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief, and the
undersigned recommends their dismissal.
d. Plaintiff’s Claims for Monetary Damages
In addition to her claims for equitable relief, Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages. She
asserts claims for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II), 29 U.S.C. § 794
(Count III), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count IV); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count V), the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Count VI), and Kansas State Law (Counts VII–XI). Plaintiff does not specify
33 Cheatham v. Thompson, No. 21-3195-SAC, 2021 WL 4206332, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 2021)
(“Generally, a threat of irreparable injury occurs alongside a bad-faith prosecution or where there are a
series of repeated prosecutions” and “the threat to the [individual’s] federally protected rights must be one
that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution”); Hambright v. Kansas,
No. 21-3045-SAC, 2021 WL 1821801, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2021) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 46)
(“irreparable injury” must be “both great and immediate”).
34 Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
35 Weitzel, 240 F.3d at 876 (finding third Younger exception did not apply when state court proceedings
could resolve claims brought in federal court).
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which counts are brought against which Defendants, therefore the Court presumes for purposes of
this Report and Recommendation that Plaintiff intends to bring all counts against all Defendants.
i. Plaintiff’s Claims for Monetary Damages Against Defendant Andrew
Bolton
Plaintiff asserts her claims for monetary damages against Defendant Andrew Bolton.
Bolton serves as the GAL in the state court custody proceedings. As a GAL, Bolton is generally
immune from claims for monetary damages. GALs are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when
they act “within the core duties of a GAL in assisting the court—that is, in performing a ‘function
closely associated with the judicial process.’”36 A GAL, however, is not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity for acts taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.37 A given act does not exceed a
GAL’s jurisdiction “just because it is wrongful, even unlawful. Immunity still applies when an
act was [taken] in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of . . . authority.”38
Actions that entitle a GAL to immunity generally include: “testifying in court, prosecuting
custody or neglect petitions, and making reports and recommendations to the court in which the
guardian acts as an actual functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but
in reality.”39 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bolton concern his role in the state court
proceedings, including drafting legal pleadings and citing legal authority.40 Plaintiff also claims
Bolton fabricated, distorted, and suppressed facts to “sabotage” Plaintiff’s custody rights.
Plaintiff, however, asserts no facts to support an inference that Bolton committed these acts
in the absence of authority or jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s general allegations that Bolton was biased
36 Dahl v. Charles F. Dahl, M.D., P.C. Defined Ben. Pension Trust, 744 F.3d 623, 630 (10th Cir. 2014).
37 Id. (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978)).
38 Shophar v. City of Olathe, No. 15-cv-4961-DDC-KGS, 2017 WL 2618494, at *11 (D. Kan. June 16,
2017), aff’d, 723 F. App’x 579 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39 Dahl, F.3d 623 at 630 (quoting Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3rd Cir. 1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
40 Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1, p. 2
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against her, suppressed facts, or made false statements, are not enough to deprive him of
immunity.41 Because Bolton is immune from suits for monetary damages, the undersigned
recommends the dismissal of such claims against him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii),
in addition to the reasons stated below.
ii. Plaintiff’s Claims for Monetary Damages Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (Counts I and II)
Plaintiff asserts several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of her First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends
dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants.
1. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against the Individually
Named Defendants, The Bolton Law Firm, and Livingston
Center, LLC
Plaintiff asserts her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Andrew
Bolton, The Bolton Law Firm, Darrell Robinson, Neisha Miser, Malique Taylor, Jennifer Agee,
Dan Livingston, Livingston Center, LLC, and Dr. Rodney McNeal, in Counts I and II. In order to
state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the challenged conduct must constitute state action.”42
Because the above listed Defendants are private actors, Plaintiff must show that their conduct is
“fairly attributable to the state.”43
In addition to Defendant Bolton being immune from suit for monetary damages, Plaintiff’s
claims against him fail due to want of state action. Plaintiff alleges no facts from which the Court
41 See Shophar, 2017 WL 2618494, at *11.
42 Weaver v. Boyles, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342 (D. Kan. 2001), aff’d, 26 F. App’x 908 (10th Cir. 2002).
43 Id. The Tenth Circuit applies four different tests to determine whether a private person is subject to
liability as a state actor: the nexus test, the symbiotic relationship test, the joint action test, and the public
function test. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995). None of
Plaintiff’s pleadings acknowledge any of these tests, and regardless of which is applied, Plaintiff fails to
show state action on behalf of Defendants Andrew Bolton, The Bolton Law Firm, Darrell Robinson,
Neisha Miser, Malique Taylor, Jennifer Agee, Dan Livingston, Livingston Center, LLC, and Dr. Rodney
McNeal.
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could infer that Bolton’s actions are fairly attributable to the state. A GAL is not a state actor, but
instead “is a fiduciary who must act in the minor’s best interest” and thus “owes his or her
undivided loyalty to the minor, not the state.”44
Similarly, Plaintiff fails to show Defendants Robinson, Miser, Taylor, Livingston, or
McNeal’s actions are fairly attributable to the state. Plaintiff alleges these Defendants served as
therapists, supervisors of therapists, and physicians who were involved in Plaintiff’s state court
case, and provided services to D.L. Plaintiff does not include facts describing the extent of these
Defendants’ treatment of D.L. or their involvement in her state court case. Plaintiff generally
alleges these Defendant failed to provide meaningful therapeutic services, denied Plaintiff access
to their notes, failed to adequately document their findings, and used their findings against Plaintiff
to deny her parental rights in the state court proceedings.
Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts suggesting these Defendants’ actions are fairly
attributable to the state. The Tenth Circuit and courts across the country have found therapists and
physicians—even those who are court appointed—are not state actors for purposes of § 1983
claims. 45 Generally, “the mere fact that a private party’s actions are performed pursuant to a court
44 Meeker, 782 F.2d at 155.
45 Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1466 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding a private therapist’s “conduct [did] not rise
to the level of state action” and the therapist “did not exercise some right or privilege or act under a rule
of conduct created by state law,” so the therapist was not liable under § 1983); Vietti v. (1) Welsh &
McGough, PLLC, No. 21-CV-00058-WPJ-SH, 2024 WL 870562 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 29, 2024), aff'd sub
nom. Vietti v. Welsh & McGough, PLLC, No. 24-5032, 2024 WL 5220734 (10th Cir. Dec. 26, 2024), cert.
denied, No. 24-1033, 2025 WL 1549789 (U.S. June 2, 2025) (finding court appointed therapist’s conduct
is not fairly attributable to the state as he was acting on behalf of the interest of minor child, and not on
the behalf of the state). Many other courts have also concluded that court-appointed therapists are not
state actors for purposes of § 1983. See James v. Grand Lake Mental Health Center, Inc., 161 F.3d 17
(10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a private therapist who had the plaintiff involuntarily confined based on
state law “did not exercise some right or privilege or act under a rule of conduct created by state law” to
be a state actor under § 1983); Anderson v. Glismann, 577 F. Supp. 1506, 1509 (D. Colo. Jan. 18, 1984)
(holding the “mere fact [the psychiatrist] acted as a court-appointed psychiatrist will not sustain a cause of
action under section 1983”); see also Landry v. Odom, 559 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. La. 1983) (no state action
where a private psychiatrist acted pursuant to state statute but without something more, that “is not
sufficient to justify a characterization of him as a state actor”); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th
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appointment does not make those actions fairly attributable to the state.”46 Further, and to the
extent these Defendants provided information to the state court that was used to determine
Plaintiff’s custodial rights, “[a] private person does not engage in state action simply by furnishing
information to state officers who make the independent decision to act thereon.”47 Providing
information in the form of recommendations or reports to the state court, which it may have
considered in making its independent judgement, “carries with it no special state-generated
authority that would make [Defendants] conduct fairly attributable to the state.”48 Therefore,
Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts suggesting Defendants Robinson, Miser, Taylor, Livingston,
or McNeal’s actions are fairly attributable to the state and the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s
claims against them contained in Counts I and II be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants the Bolton Law Firm, LLC and the
Livingston Center LLC fail for want of state action. These Defendants appear to be entities
operated by Defendants Andrew Bolton and Dan Livingston, respectively. The relevant inquiry
into whether a private entity has engaged in state action is a fact-specific inquiry, and requires a
plaintiff to show the entity had a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged
conduct, a symbiotic relationship between the state and the private entity, a showing the private
entity engaged in joint action with the state, or the state delegated to a private entity functions
traditionally exclusively reserved for the state.49 Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support a
finding that Defendants the Bolton Law Firm, LLC and the Livingston Center LLC, as private
Cir. 1980) (concluding that a state appointed physician is “entitled to dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 action
against [him] for want of state action”).
46 Anderson, 577 F. Supp. at 1509.
47 Weaver, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
48 Pino, 75 F.3d at 1466.
49 Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1447–57.
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entities, have engaged in state action. Therefore, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s claims
against them contained in Counts I and II be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
2. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against Board of County
Commissioners of Anderson County, Kansas
Plaintiff also brings her § 1983 claims against Defendant Board of County Commissioners
of Anderson County, Kansas (“Anderson County”). However, “a local government may not be
sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”50 Instead, “the
government as an entity” can only be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”51 To establish municipal liability a plaintiff must
demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy or custom and a causal link between the policy
and/or custom and the alleged injury.52
The Tenth Circuit has held that a municipal policy or custom may take on any of the
following forms:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a
widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express
municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage
with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking
authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions—and the
basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these
policymakers’ review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or
supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to
the injuries that may be caused.53
50 Wright v. City of Ponca City, 2023 WL 5765848, at *7 (10th Cir. Sept. 7, 2023) (quoting Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
51 Id.
52 Id. at n.9.
53 Waller v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bryson v. City of
Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)).
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Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate the existence of a formal policy statement, an informal
custom, decisions of employees with final policymaking authority, or the ratification by final
policy makers of decisions of subordinates. Plaintiff alleges Anderson County “is responsible for
systemic policies that denied due process, discrimination against disable individuals, and
facilitated judicial misconduct leading to constitutional violations” and “maintained customs or
failed to train and supervise employees and contactors . . . that caused constitutional
violations . . . .”54 However, all of Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory; they do not point to any
specific policy or practice executed by Anderson County. And “[l]ocating a ‘policy’ ensures that
a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly
constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the
municipality.”55 Plaintiff similarly fails to allege any non-conclusory facts regarding Anderson
County’s failure to train or supervise employees. Because Plaintiff fails to show a municipal policy
or custom, or failure to train employees on behalf of Anderson County resulted in her alleged
injury, she fails to state a claim under § 1983 against Anderson County, and the undersigned
recommends Plaintiff’s claims against it, in Counts I and II, be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
iii. Plaintiff’s Claims for Monetary Damages Pursuant to the
Rehabilitation Act and ADA (Counts III & VI)
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and Titles II
and III of the ADA in Counts III and VI. Preliminarily, the Court notes that individually named
Defendants in their individual capacities are not subject to liability under the Rehabilitation Act or
54 Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1, p. 4.
55 Brocks v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Sedgwick Cnty., No. 08-1134-WEB, 2008 WL 5095997, at *4 (D.
Kan. Nov. 26, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Brocks v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Sedgwick Cnty., Kan., 329 F.
App’x 200 (10th Cir. 2009).
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ADA.56 Therefore, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s claims, in Counts II and IV, against
Defendants Bolton, Robinson, Miser, Taylor, Agee, Livingston, and McNeal in their individual
capacities be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Plaintiff brings claims in Count III pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which
states: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”57 However, Plaintiff makes no allegations any of the Defendants operates a “program”
or “activity” that has received federal funds. The undersigned therefore recommends Count III be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Plaintiff brings her claims in Count VI pursuant to Titles II and III of the ADA. As to
Defendant Anderson County, Plaintiff’s claims under Title III of the ADA are subject to dismissal
because Title III “applies to discrimination in public accommodations by private entities.”58 As
to Plaintiff’s claims under Title II, Plaintiff’s only allegation as to her ADA claims state Defendant
Anderson County “discriminated against disabled individuals” and failed to train/supervise ADA
officers. Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations as to her ADA claims against Anderson
County, and her claims are woefully inadequate to state a claim under any provision of the ADA.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Bolton Law Firm, LLC and the Livingston Center,
LLC are also subject to dismissal. Title II of the ADA only prohibits “public entities” from
discriminating against disabled individuals.59 A “public entity” is defined broadly to include “any
56 See Wilson v. Hous. Auth. of Silver Lake, Kansas, No. 19-cv-4026-HLT-ADM, 2019 WL 2943054, at
*2 (D. Kan. May 30, 2019).
57 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
58 Farris v. Garden City, Kan., No. CIV.A. 15-1078-MLB, 2015 WL 3949244, at *2 (D. Kan. June 29,
2015), aff'd, 634 F. App'x 674 (10th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original).
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
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State or local government” and “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government.”60 Plaintiff never alleges the Bolton Law
Firm, LLC or the Livingston Center, LLC are public entities, and there are no facts contained in
the Complaint that could support an inference that Bolton Law Firm, LLC or the Livingston
Center, LLC are public entities as defined by Title II the ADA.
Plaintiff’s claims against Bolton Law Firm, LLC and the Livingston Center, LLC also fail
under Title III of the ADA. Title III of the ADA requires Plaintiff to establish that (1) she is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the Bolton Law Firm, LLC and the Livingston Center,
LLC operate as a place of public accommodation; and (3) the Bolton Law Firm, LLC and the
Livingston Center, LLC discriminated against her.61 Plaintiff, without any supporting facts,
alleges the Bolton Law Firm, LLC and the Livingston Center, LLC operate as a place of public
accommodation. Plaintiff, however, does not set forth any facts regarding her alleged disability,
what sorts of accommodations she requested that were denied or obstructed, or any facts to support
a finding that she was discriminated against on the basis of her disability. In fact, there are no
nonconclusory allegations to support a finding Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff or took
any actions against Plaintiff on the basis of her disability. For all the above reasons, the
undersigned recommends Count VI be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
iv. Plaintiff’s Claims for Monetary Damages Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3), and 1986 (Counts IV and V)
Plaintiff also asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against all Defendants. Plaintiff
alleges Defendants “conspired to deny Plaintiff equal protection and due process, based on
coordinated conduct involving therapists, GAL, and other actors under color of law.”62 To state a
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See Pl.’s Am. Complaint, ECF No. 13, p. 11.
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claim under § 1985, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) to deprive plaintiff of equal
protection or equal privileges and immunities; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4)
an injury or deprivation resulting therefrom.”63 Section 1985(3) does not apply to all tortious,
conspiratorial interference with the rights of others, but only to conspiracies motivated by “some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.”64 Plaintiff does not
allege the conspiracy was driven by any specified animus. Construing Plaintiff’s claims broadly,
the Court presumes Plaintiff is attempting to allege the conspiracy was driven by a disability-based
animus. However, the Tenth Circuit has routinely held physical disability does not constitute a
class for purposes of § 1985.65 Therefore, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s claims against
all Defendants Count IV be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Plaintiff also asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 in Count V. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides
a remedy for plaintiffs against those who have knowledge of a section 1985 conspiracy, the ability
to aid in its prevention, and who fail to exercise that ability. But because Plaintiff’s § 1985(3)
claim is insufficient, any claim pursuant to § 1986 also fails.66 Therefore, the undersigned
recommends Count V be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
v. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims (Counts VII–XI)
63 Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993).
64 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
65 Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1176–77 (10th Cir. 1983); Phibbs v. Am. Prop.
Mgmt., 60 Fed. App'x 738, at *1–2 (10th Cir. 2003); Sullivan v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 22-
2095-KHV-ADM, 2022 WL 2309095, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 20, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 22-CV-2095-KHV, 2022 WL 2309034 (D. Kan. May 26, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-3118, 2023
WL 4635888 (10th Cir. July 20, 2023).
66 Taylor v. Nichols, 558 F.2d 561, 568 (10th Cir. 1977) (“A claim under Section 1986 exists for refusal to
take positive action where the circumstances demand to prevent acts which give rise to a cause of action
under Section 1985. In view then of this relationship, there cannot be a valid claim under Section 1986
unless there is also a claim under Section 1985.”); Tarshik v. Kansas, No. 08-408-SAC, 2008 WL
4489789, at *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2008), aff’d, 327 F. App’x 56 (10th Cir. 2009).
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Plaintiff’s remaining theories of recovery against Defendants are based on Kansas State
law. They include fraud, misrepresentation, unauthorized practice of law, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, custodial interference, and negligent hiring and
supervision. The undersigned recommends that this Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over
such claims.
When the Court has original jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims. Supplemental jurisdiction “is exercised on a discretionary basis,
keeping in mind considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants.”67
But “[w]hen all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to
exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”68 Indeed, courts routinely decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal claims do not survive
screening, as is recommended here.
Accordingly, finding no federal claims should survive screening, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
• Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant in their official capacity, and any
claims against any Defendant in their official capacity should be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
67 Bauchman for Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 549 (10th Cir. 1997).
68 Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Exum v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1138–39 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the district has discretion
to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has dismissed all claims
over which it had original jurisdiction). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if “the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).
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• Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief should be dismissed as the Court lacks jurisdiction
over them pursuant to the principles of Younger abstention.
• Defendant Andrew Bolton is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, and any claims for
monetary damages against him should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
• Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Counts I
and II should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
• Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant under the Rehabilitation Act or the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Counts III and VI should be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
• Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) or § 1986
and Counts IV and V should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
• Because the undersigned recommends no federal claims survived screening, the
undersigned also recommends the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims in Counts VII–XI.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the District Judge dismiss without
prejudice all of Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants, as set forth in the Complaint, under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) because they fail to state claims upon which relief may be
granted and seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The
undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims.
A copy of this Report and Recommendation shall be mailed to Plaintiff.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated March 12, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
Teresa J. James
U. S. Magistrate Judge
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