Lawson v. Godderz et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ANGELIINA LYNN LAWSON1,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-2199-JWB
ERIC GODDERZ, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s objection (Doc. 21) to Magistrate Judge Teresa
James’ Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 20) recommending that Plaintiff’s action be
dismissed in its entirety; Plaintiff’s motion for protective reassignment (Doc. 24); and Plaintiff’s
motion to vacate striking of supplemental pleading and request for reinstatement under Rule 15(d).
(Doc. 28.) 	After review, Plaintiff’s motions are DENIED (Docs. 24, 28), her objection is
OVERRULED (Doc. 21), the court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 20) and DISMISSES the instant
action. Thus, Plaintiff’s remaining pending motions (Docs. 29, 31) are DENIED AS MOOT.
I. 	Facts
The facts set forth herein are taken from Angeliina Lynn Lawson’s (“Plaintiff’s”) first
amended complaint. (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Kansas
1 The court notes that Plaintiff has several pending actions that are presently before the undersigned. On August 25,
2025, Plaintiff filed a “Notice Regarding Judicial Complaint and Renewed Request for Protective Reassignment” in
this case. (Doc. 25.) According to the notice, Plaintiff’s judicial complaint to the Tenth Circuit was filed due to the
undersigned’s rulings in Plaintiff’s cases. Plaintiff also included an exhibit which identifies adverse rulings in both
her federal and state cases. Notably, only one ruling identified was issued by the undersigned. The remaining rulings
in the federal cases were issued by the magistrate judge. In any event, although Plaintiff filed a judicial complaint
against the undersigned and it remains pending before the Tenth Circuit, this court finds that the judicial complaint is
frivolous as it merely complains of an adverse ruling against Plaintiff which is not a basis to find improper judicial
conduct. 	Therefore, the court will proceed to rule on pending motions in this case as there is no basis for the
undersigned to recuse from this matter at this time.
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state court Judges Eric Godderz, Taylor Wine, and John Bryant in both their individual and official
capacities, as well as against the State of Kansas (“Defendants”).2 (Id. at 3–4.) Plaintiff’s factual
allegations center on a state trial court custody and divorce proceeding in Anderson County District
Court that she claims has been marked by systemic violations of her rights. 	(Id. at 4–6.) 	She
alleges that the state court has improperly maintained jurisdiction over her case. (Id.) According
to her, it was only after she began filing various complaints, grievances, and accommodation
requests related to her documented disability that the court stripped her of all custody rights and
limited her to just two hours of supervised visitation per week. (Id.) She asserts the presiding state
judge Defendants refused to recuse themselves despite her allegations of bias and have declined
to enforce alimony and child support orders. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff further contends she has been
obstructed from accessing her case files and court transcripts, that pleadings have been altered,
and that she was subjected to an order requiring a psychological evaluation—a requirement she
characterizes as imposed solely to prevent her trial from proceeding. (Id.)
Plaintiff raises six claims: (1) violation of her due process rights (“Count I”), (2) violation
of Title II of the ADA (“Count II”), (3) retaliation in violation of the ADA (“Count III”), (4)
retaliation for protected First Amendment activity (“Count IV”), (5) unconstitutional taking and
deprivation of property (“Counts V” and “Count VII”), and (6) fraud upon the court and
constructive fraud (“Count VI”) (collectively “Counts”). 	(See id.) 	Magistrate Judge James
screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and recommended
dismissal of all counts. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiff timely objected.3 (Doc. 21.) Since filing her objection
2 Plaintiff has another pending action in this court against most of the defendants in this case. See Lawson v. Godderz,
Case No. 25-1179-JWB.
3 The court notes that Plaintiff's objection (Doc. 21) largely fails to specifically address any of Magistrate Judge
James’ R&R ruling. (Doc. 20.) Rather, the document that she filed appears to be Plaintiff’s attempt to add facts.
Nevertheless, and in the spirit of liberally construing pro se filings, the court will consider Plaintiff’s objection as
timely, proper, and under a de novo review standard pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). See United States v. Pinson,
585 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009).
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to Magistrate Judge James’ R&R, Plaintiff has filed numerous motions and attempted to file
supplemental pleadings. (See Docs. 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 31.)
II. 	Standard
R&R Standard of Review. On a dispositive matter the district judge “must determine de
novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 	A failure to properly object, however, leaves a party with no entitlement to
appellate review, and allows the district court to review the R&R under any standard it deems
appropriate. See Williams v. United States, No. 19-2476-JAR-JPO, 2019 WL 6167514, at *1 (D.
Kan. Nov. 20, 2019) (citing United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th
Cir. 1996)) (“The Tenth Circuit requires that objections to a magistrate judge’s recommended
disposition ‘be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court
. . .’”). When reviewing a magistrate judge’s ruling on a dispositive matter, the district judge “must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected
to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face. 	Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepts all well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Albers v. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm'rs of Jefferson Cnty., Colo., 771 F.3d 697, 700 (10th Cir.
2014). Conclusory allegations, however, have no bearing upon the court's consideration. Shero v.
City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007).
Pro Se Party. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court is to liberally construe his
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filings. United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). However, liberally construing
filings does not mean supplying additional factual allegations or constructing a legal theory on
Plaintiff's behalf. Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).
III. 	Analysis
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Reassignment (Doc. 24)
Plaintiff filed a motion for protective reassignment of this matter to an out of-district judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 292(b), 294. 4 (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff asserts that the undersigned is biased
because of a previous ruling against Plaintiff involving withholding service of summons. Notably,
this ruling was not issued by the undersigned. However, a notice that was filed does accuse the
undersigned of bias based on rulings he previously issued in Plaintiff’s cases. (See Doc. 25.) In
any event, Plaintiff seeks referral of the instant case “to Chief Judge Holmes of the Tenth Circuit”
to then be reassigned to an out-of-district visiting judge. (Doc. 24.)
As the Tenth Circuit has summarized:
Disqualification is required both when a judge has “a personal bias or prejudice”
against a party, § 144; see also § 455(b)(1) (same), or when presiding over the case
would create an appearance of bias, see § 455(a). Recusal for an appearance of bias
is required when “sufficient factual grounds exist to cause an objective observer
reasonably to question the judge’s impartiality.” [United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d
985, 992 (10th Cir. 1993).] The party seeking a judge’s disqualification must show
that “a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about
the judge's impartiality.” Id. at 993 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because this
standard is an objective one, “[t]he inquiry is limited to outward manifestations and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id.
United States v. Walker, 838 F. App’x 333, 337 (10th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff ‘s motion is devoid of
any fact that could provide a basis for recusal under these standards. Moreover, “judicial rulings
4 The nature of this motion very closely resembles two other motions filed by Plaintiff in a separate action in this court
against almost all of the defendants in this case. See Lawson v. Godderz, Case No. 25-1179-JWB. In that case, the
undersigned denied Plaintiff’s motion for reasons nearly identical to the reasons used to deny Plaintiff’s motion for
reassignment in the instant case. See id. at Doc. 11; see also Lawson v. Bolton, Case No. 25-2251-JWB at Doc. 17
(seeking disqualification of the undersigned for many of the same reasons Plaintiff alleges in the instant motion).
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alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Nothing in any ruling by the undersigned or Magistrate Judge James
indicates that these judicial officials are biased against Plaintiff. Plaintiff also appears to imply
that the court has “delayed” ruling on her cases. (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff provides no facts to support
this assertion. The court, again, notes that Plaintiff’s actions in repetitively filing motions and new
cases delays rulings in her cases and in others. 	Such delay is not a basis for recusal. 	Thus,
Plaintiff’s motion seeking protective reassignment (Doc. 24) is denied.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Striking of Supplemental Pleading and Request for
Reinstatement (Doc. 28)
On July 25, 2025, Plaintiff attempted to file a supplemental pleading. 	(Doc. 23.) 	In an
order dated August 29, 2025, Magistrate Judge James struck the supplemental pleading from the
record for failure to comply with the requirements set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). 	(Doc. 26.)
Specifically, Magistrate Judge James struck Plaintiff’s supplemental pleadings because they were
procedurally improper and substantively deficient. 	Plaintiff failed to file a motion for leave as
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) before submitting a supplemental pleading. The filing did not
show that the alleged facts occurred after the original complaint, as the rule requires. And Plaintiff
attempted to add two Kansas state court judges without following proper joinder procedures. (See
Doc 20.) 	Plaintiff objected to the striking of her supplemental pleadings. 	(Doc. 28.) 	Plaintiff
argues that Rule 15(d) entitles her to supplement her complaint whenever she pleases so long as
“no responsive pleadings have been filed.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff proceeds to argue that striking her
pleading was a retaliatory act because it was issued after she filed a judicial complaint against
Magistrate Judge James and thus violates her due process and First Amendment rights.
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The language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(d), which governs supplemental
pleadings, makes clear that a supplemental pleading may not be filed without leave of court. Rule
15(d) provides that “[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party
to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened
after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Accordingly, the filing
of a supplemental pleading is not available to the pleader as a matter of right, but upon proper
motion seeking leave of court. See, e.g., Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1278
(10th Cir. 2001) (explaining the necessary prerequisite of seeking leave “to serve a supplemental
pleading”); T Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of Wilmington, Delaware, 913 F.3d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 2019)
(“[A]ll supplemental pleadings require leave of court under Rule 15(d)”); Saddozai v. Davis, 35
F.4th 705, 709 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that, with leave
of court, plaintiffs can supplement their pleadings.”).
In the current matter, Plaintiff failed to request leave of court prior to filling her
supplemental pleading. (Doc. 23.) “Although [Plaintiff] is proceeding pro se, [s]he ‘must follow
the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants,’” including Rule 15(d). Johnson v. Marlar,
807 F. App’x 791, 796 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir.
1992)).5 	Thus, Plaintiff’s motion seeking reinstatement of her stricken supplemental pleading
(Doc. 28) is denied.
C. Magistrate Judge James’ Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 20)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Magistrate Judge James screened Plaintiff’s first amended
complaint because Plaintiff sought to proceed without the prepayment of fees. (Doc. 20.) Upon
5 Even though pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, pro se litigants
must follow the same procedural rules as other litigants. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). Plaintiff is
encouraged to keep this in mind regarding her numerous other federal actions pending in this court.
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screening, a district court may dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the action is (1)
frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (3) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); see also Grigsby v. Dick, 671 F. App’x 1031, 1033 (10th Cir. 2016). 	The
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s complaint is reviewed under the same standards as those used when
considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214,
1217–18 (10th Cir. 2007). The court will address each of Plaintiff’s claims below.
1. 	Judicial Immunity and Immunity Under the Eleventh Amendment (Counts I,
IV, V, VI, and VII)
Plaintiff brings claims against the State of Kansas alleging it “is responsible for acts and
omissions of its judiciary, court administrators, and ADA coordinators . . . and has failed to ensure
access to judicial services for individuals with disabilities.” (Doc. 9 at 3–4.) Plaintiff also brings
claims against state court Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant in their individual and official
capacities. (See id.) Magistrate Judge James recommended dismissal on the basis of immunity;
that is, the State of Kansas and Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant, in their official capacities, are
immune under the Eleventh Amendment, and Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant, in their
individual capacities, are immune under the doctrine of judicial immunity. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiff
objects, arguing that “refus[ing] to rule on indigency filings, den[ying] ADA relief across multiple
dockets, and actively suppress[ing] procedural filings” are not judicial acts and thus judicial
immunity does not apply. (Doc. 21 at 10–11.) Plaintiff goes on to generally argue that judicial
immunity does not apply to ongoing constitutional violations—wherein she vaguely categorizes
the constitutional violations currently being committed by state Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant
as retaliation, “[i]gnor[ing] recusal motions, “[s]uppressed emergency motions, and “[d]enied all
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ADA-related motions across [the] majority [of] separate lawsuits.” (Id.) Ultimately, Plaintiff fails
to address the R&R’s reasons for dismissal. Accordingly, following a de novo review, the court
finds these objections uncompelling and adopts the Magistrate’s recommendations regarding
immunity in their entirety. (Doc. 20 at 7–12.)
With regard to the State of Kansas, Plaintiff raises monetary claims under § 1983,
including: deprivation of her due process rights (Count I) and unconstitutional taking and
deprivation of property (Counts V and VII). (Doc. 9 at 6–8.) “The State of Kansas and its agencies
are absolutely immune from suits for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment. The
Eleventh Amendment presents a jurisdictional bar to suits against a state and ‘arms of the state’
unless the state waives its immunity.” 	Brooks v. Kobach, No. 25-cv-3054-JWL, 2025 WL
1100048, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2025). There is no evidence the State of Kansas has consented
to the instant suit, and “[i]t is well established that Congress did not abrogate the states’ sovereign
immunity when it enacted § 1983.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims (Counts I, V, VII) against
the State of Kansas are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff also asserts a claim against
the State of Kansas for fraud upon the court and constructive fraud (Count VI). (Doc. 9 at 7–8.)
Plaintiff again has failed to provide any authority suggesting that immunity has been waived or
abrogated as to Count VI. Thus, it is dismissed.
Plaintiff similarly asserts Counts I, V, VI, and VII seeking monetary relief under § 1983
against state court Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant, plus a claim for retaliation for protected
First Amendment activity (Count IV). (Id. at 6–8.) The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal
court against state officials who are sued in their official capacities, unless the state waives its
immunity, or its immunity is abrogated. Allen v. St. Francis Ministries, No. 23-1166-DDC-GEB,
2024 WL 2831606, at *3 (D. Kan. June 4, 2024); Brooks v. Kobach, No. 25-cv-3054-JWL, 2025
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WL 1100048, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2025). 	“District Court judges are state officials.”
Roubideaux-Davis v. Klenda, No. 24-3167-JWL, 2024 WL 4381227, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 2024)
(citing Schroeder v. Kochanowski, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1256 (D. Kan. 2004)). 	Thus, to the
extent Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from the State of Kansas or Judges Godderz, Wine, and
Bryant in their official capacities, such claims (Counts I, IV, V, VI, and VII) are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment and therefore dismissed.
Plaintiff also brings this action against Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant in their
individual capacities. (Doc. 9 at 1, 3.) Magistrate Judge James recommends dismissal of all such
claims on the basis of judicial immunity. (D0c. 20 at 9–12.) Plaintiff objects to dismissal on the
basis that judges do not enjoy judicial immunity for “ongoing constitutional violations.” (Doc. 21
at 10.) She alleges such violations include not ruling on filings, falsifying docket entries, denying
motions under false pretenses, and generally alleges perceived procedural mistakes in the
Anderson County state court divorce and child custody proceedings. 	(Id.; Doc. 9 at 7–8.)
Additionally, Plaintiff objects that these actions by the Defendant state judges are properly
characterized as “administrative acts,” to which judicial immunity does not apply. (Doc. 20 at 10.)
Following a de novo review due to Plaintiff’s objections, the court nevertheless finds these
objections unpersuasive and adopts the reasoning articulated in the R&R.
Judicial immunity applies to this action against Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant in their
individual capacities. 	See Crowe v. Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1156 (10th Cir.
2011) (“Judicial immunity applies only to personal capacity claims.”). A state judge is absolutely
immune from § 1983 liability except when the judge acts “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because
the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he
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will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Id. at
356–57 (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant are not immune
from suit here because they refused to recuse themselves after she filed a motion seeking such
relief, that they retaliated against her, and generally alleges that she disagrees with their rulings in
her state court case involving parental rights, alimony, and child support. (See Doc. 9, 20.) 6
Plaintiff’s assertions on these issues are conclusory and fail to assert facts that would show that
any of these state judges were acting in the absence of jurisdiction. 	Plaintiff does argue that
jurisdiction was improper in her objections to the R&R, but merely makes conclusory statements
about the judges’ lack of jurisdiction and cites a Kansas statute that explains the procedure for
filing a poverty affidavit in lieu of a docket fee. (Doc. 21 at 10–11.) It is clear from the record
that all of the actions taken by Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant were in their capacities as state
court judges presiding over the child custody proceedings. 	Plaintiff makes no more than
conclusory allegations regarding a lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, judicial immunity properly
applies to their actions.
In summary, this court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s objection de novo pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3), holds that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), Counts I, IV, V, VI, and VII are
dismissed because the State of Kansas and Judges Godderz, Bryant, and Wine in their official
capacities are immune from suit for monetary damages pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, and
Judges Godderz, Bryant, and Wine in their individual capacities are entitled to judicial immunity.
2. 	Failure to State a Claim Under Title II of the ADA (Counts II and III)
Plaintiff brings claims under Title II of the ADA against the State of Kansas and Judges
Godderz, Bryant, and Wine, alleging discrimination because she was denied access to judicial
6 Magistrate Judge James thoroughly explains the numerous allegations that Plaintiff brings against Judges Godderz,
Wine, and Bryant. (See Doc. 20 at 9–12.)
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proceedings after requesting accommodations and retaliation for submitting such accommodation
requests. (Doc. 9 at 6.) Magistrate Judge James upon screening Plaintiff’s complaint dismissed
all ADA-related claims for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiff, in her objections, argues
that the “ADA claims are supported by detailed facts and are legally cognizable.” 	(Doc. 21.)
Ultimately, Plaintiff fails to address the R&R’s reasons for dismissal of her ADA claims.
With regard to the State of Kansas, the extent of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding these
ADA discrimination claim is as follows: “Defendant State of Kansas is responsible for the acts
and omissions of its judiciary, court administrators, and ADA coordinators, operations of its courts
and judicial ADA compliance infrastructure, and has failed to ensure access to judicial services
for individuals with disabilities.” 	(Id. at 3–4.) 	Otherwise, Plaintiff generally alleges that her
requests for accommodations have been denied, lost, destroyed, or otherwise mishandled and she
has been excluded from participation in judicial proceedings.
First, the court notes that Congress has abrogated state sovereign immunity regarding Title
II of the ADA. See Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2001). To
state a claim under a failure to accommodate theory, Plaintiff must show (1) she is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) she was “excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of
some public entity’s services, programs, or activities,” and (3) the exclusion or denial of benefits
was because of Plaintiff’s disability. 	Brooks v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., 12 F.4th 1160, 1167
(10th Cir. 2021). 	Plaintiff’s conclusory statements fail to plead facts that show Plaintiff has a
qualified disability under the ADA, as she merely states she “has a documented and qualified
disability.” (Doc. 9 at 4.) Additionally, Plaintiff fails to mention any details as to ever making an
accommodation request, making denial of such request impossible for this court to infer. Finally,
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Plaintiff 	pleads 	facts 	evidencing 	extensive 	participation 	in 	the 	state 	court 	proceedings,
contradicting the requirement that she be excluded from such participation due to her disability.
Plaintiff also raises a claim of retaliation in violation of the ADA. (Id. at 6.) However,
Plaintiff merely alleges that she was retaliated against through “coercive procedural rulings,
canceled hearings, unlawful psychological evaluation demand, and denial of litigation tools such
as subpoenas and discovery.” (Id.) Again, such conclusory statements fail to show any actions
taken by the State of Kansas or its actor that could conceivably amount to retaliation. 	Thus,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for discrimination or retaliation under the ADA against the State
of Kansas.
Plaintiff also brings claims under the ADA against Judges Godderz, Bryant, and Wine.
However, “no individual, including a state court judge, may be held liable under Title II of the
ADA.” 	Smith v. Glanz, 662 F. App’x 595, 597 (10th Cir. 2016). 	Accordingly, in reviewing
Plaintiff’s claims de novo pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), she fails to state a claim of
discrimination or retaliation under the ADA against Judges Godderz, Bryant, and Wine.
3. 	Failure to State a Claim Under § 1983 (Counts I, IV, V, and VII)
As an alternative, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims (Counts I, IV, V, and VII) are also deficient for
failure to state a claim and thus would be dismissed on that ground. To state a claim under § 1983,
Plaintiff must allege the violation of a constitutionally secured right and the “alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Gilhaus v. Gardner Edgerton Unified
Sch. Dist., 138 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1237 (D. Kan. 2015). In each claim brought under § 1983 in
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, she merely states Defendants violated her First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 9.) In Plaintiff’s objections, she expounds by claiming that
her constitutional rights were violated because of “venue fraud, ADA grievances, and retaliatory
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judicial conduct” based on Judge Wine’s “failure to intervene [and] recuse” himself.” (Doc. 21 at
10, 12). In either instance, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts beyond vague, conclusory allegations
that would support these claims. Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s claims brought under § 1983 are
dismissed.
4. 	Equitable Relief Claims Stemming from Plaintiff’s Proceedings in Anderson
County District Court Regarding Her Divorce, Child Custody, and Support
Plaintiff's first amended complaint alleges judicial manipulation, ADA exclusion, and
fraudulent procedural sabotage that was designed to strip her of parental rights and limit her access
to justice. 	(Doc. 9 at 1, 2, 8, 9.) 	Magistrate Judge James recommended dismissal based on
principles of Younger Abstention, concluding that the relief Plaintiff seeks is more appropriately
pursued in state court. (Doc. 20 at 3–7.) In Plaintiff’s objection, she fails to address the Younger
abstention doctrine. 	(Doc. 20.) 	Instead, she continues to rehash allegations of perceived
jurisdictional defects and procedural irregularities in the underlying Anderson County custody and
divorce proceedings. (Id.) Ultimately, Plaintiff fails to address the R&R’s reasons for dismissal.
Therefore, the court finds that she has waived this issue by not specifically addressing it.
Nevertheless, the court briefly addresses it.
Under the Younger doctrine, a federal court is generally required to abstain from interfering
with ongoing state legal proceedings. Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Pro. Licensing of Dep’t
of Com., 240 F.3d 871, 874-75 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). It
applies when: (1) a state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding is pending;7 (2) the state
court provides an adequate forum to hear the claim raised in the federal complaint; and (3) the
7 The reference point for determining if a plaintiff filed her federal complaint during an ongoing state proceeding is
the filing date of the complaint. Dauwe v. Miller, 364 F. App’x 435, 437 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Bettencourt v. Bd.
of Registration In Med., 904 F.2d 772, 777 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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state proceedings involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for
their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies. Phillips v. Martin, 315 F. App’x
43, 44 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
However, the Supreme Court has limited the application of Younger to three categories:
(1) criminal prosecutions; (2) certain “civil enforcement proceedings;” and (3) “civil proceedings
involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
judicial functions.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
350, 368 (1989). These categories have subsequently been referred to as the “Sprint categories”
because “the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sprint said that Younger abstention does not extend
beyond these categories.” Bellinsky v. Galan, No. 24-1351, 2025 WL 2047809, at *3 (10th Cir.
July 22, 2025) (citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78). The Tenth Circuit recently noted that “only if the
state court proceeding falls within one of” these Sprint categories, then a court may assess the
Younger abstention elements. 	Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., 98
F.4th 1307, 1317 (10th Cir. 2024). Here, the state court proceedings in Plaintiff’s case involve her
“divorce, custody, and support matters” and she seeks “enforcement of [her] court-ordered
alimony and child support.” (Doc. 9 at 4, 8.) Thus, Plaintiff’s suit concerns child support, child
custody, and other domestic relation matters currently being adjudicated by a state court.8
In looking at the Sprint categories, there is no indication that the child support or other
domestic relations matters relate to a criminal prosecution, thus the first exception does not apply.
See Covington, 2025 WL 1448661, at *5 (stating that “[t]he first category does not apply because
8 The type of injunctive relief requested by Plaintiff is not completely clear. 	However, the court believes this
construction to be most likely based on the entirety of the complaint. (See Doc. 9.) To the extent Plaintiff seeks this
court to review the state court orders or overrule them, such actions are barred by the domestic-relations exception to
federal court jurisdiction. See Alfaro v. County of Arapahoe, 766 F. App’x 657, 660 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that
the domestic-relations exception applied where the plaintiff asked the federal court to “scrutinize[ ]” the “legal merits”
of “each order” in the state court divorce and child-custody proceedings).
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the state [domestic relations] case is not a criminal prosecution”). 	The second exception is not
applicable because “domestic relations proceedings are not civil enforcement proceedings brought
by state actors.” Id.
Plaintiff’s current case, however, falls squarely into the third Sprint category. 	The third
category, in short, includes “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial function.” Travelers Cas. Ins. Co.
of Am. v. A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., 98 F.4th 1307, 1317 (10th Cir. 2024) (citing Graff v. Aberdeen
Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted). Federal courts have repeatedly held that child support, alimony, and similar domestic
relations orders fall into this third Sprint category. See, e.g., Stephens v. Child Support Servs. of
Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 24-cv-216-JDR-CDL, 2025 WL 1194950, at *4 (N.D. Okla.
Apr. 25, 2025) (“Although [the plaintiff] does not directly challenge any state-court orders
pertaining to divorce in her motion, she does contest the seizure of funds to pay a child-support
award and she disputes the power and authority of those involved in the state-court proceedings.”);
Hawkins v. Region 8 IV-D Agency, No. 24-CV-02802-GPG-KAS, 2025 WL 2197307, at *4 (D.
Colo. July 29, 2025) (applying Younger where plaintiff sought relief from the state courts orders
involving alimony and child support); Hayes v. Ibarra et al., No. CIV 25-0783 JB/LF, 2025 WL
2817962, at *1 (D.N.M. Oct. 3, 2025) (applying Younger where plaintiff “alleges the court took
his parental rights.”). 	Accordingly, the current matter falls in the third Sprint category and the
Younger elements can be assessed.9
9 The Tenth Circuit recently rejected application of Younger in a similar context, i.e., where a “domestic relations case
regarding [the parties’] marriage dissolution and parenting of their children[.]” See Covington v. Humphries, No. 24-
1158, 2025 WL 1448661, at *1 (10th Cir. May 19, 2025). There, the Circuit held “[t]he July 2022 order address[ing]
a parenting time dispute . . . [did] not concern the state court’s ability to enforce compliance with judgments already
made.” Id. at *5 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). However, the Circuit specifically noted
that Younger still applies to some state court domestic relations cases, so long as they “fall into a Sprint category.” Id.
at *5 n.10. Here, Plaintiff alleges she “has been denied enforcement of court-ordered alimony and child support.”
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Now to the Younger elements. Here, Plaintiff filed her federal complaint on April 14, 2025.
(Doc. 1.) 	While Plaintiff does not affirmatively state that her state case is ongoing, the court’s
independent review of the publicly available docket in the state court case reveals 31 docket
entries, with the most recent occurring on October 16, 2025, entered after April 14, 2025.10 	Thus,
there is no question that the state proceedings were ongoing at the time Plaintiff filed her complaint
in federal court. (See Doc. 1.) The first Younger factor is met.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated why Kansas state court is an inadequate forum to raise her
claims—which is her burden. Morkel v. Davis, 513 Fed. App’x 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff
states that her constitutional rights and ADA protections have been violated. 	Plaintiff does not
provide any authority that would support a conclusion the state court could not entertain these
constitutional or statutory claims. In fact, state courts have been found adequate forums for federal
constitutional claims. See id. (finding state court adequate forum for raising constitutional claims).
The second Younger factor is met.
Lastly, Plaintiff’s federal claims also derive from her child custody proceedings in
Anderson County District Court. 	According to the Tenth Circuit, domestic relations involving
husband and wife, parents and children, and relatedly, child custody disputes implicate important
state interests. Thompson v. Romeo, 728 F. App’x 796, 798 (10th Cir. 2018) (“Of course, the state
proceedings at issue in this case implicate important state interests: ‘[t]he whole subject of
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not
the laws of the United States.’”) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 692 (1992)); Hunt
v. Lamb, 427 F.3d 725, 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-established that federal courts lack
(Doc. 9 at 8.) Such requests for injunctive relief appear to go directly to the mechanisms through which the state court
manages and enforces its child support proceedings.
10 See In the Matter of the Marriage of Jonathan David Lawson v. Angeliina Lynn Lawson, Case No. 2020-DM-
000131.
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jurisdiction over the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, and parent and
child.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). 	The third Younger factor is met,
rendering application of the doctrine proper.
Therefore, the Younger abstention doctrine properly applies to Plaintiff’s claims against
state court Judges Godderz, Wine, and Bryant seeking equitable relief stemming from her family
law proceedings in Anderson County District Court. 	Accordingly, all Plaintiff’s claims for
equitable relief are dismissed.
IV. 	Conclusion
THEREFORE, Plaintiff’s motions are DENIED (Docs. 24, 28) and the court ADOPTS the
R&R (Doc. 20) and DISMISSES the instant action. Thus, Plaintiff’s remaining pending motions
(Docs. 29, 31) are DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 29th day of October, 2025.
__s/ John W. Broomes________________
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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