Applegate et al v. Colby Operator, LLC et al

2:24-cv-02509KsdOct 30, 2025

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
DELANA APPLEGATE, as surviving child and
co-special administrator of estate of Jeanette
Applegate, and DANIEL APPLEGATE, as
surviving child and co-special administrator of
estate of Jeanette Applegate,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COLBY OPERATOR, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-2509-JWB-ADM
ORDER
This matter comes before the court on the parties’ joint motion to extend scheduling order
deadlines by approximately 90 days. 	(ECF 68.) 	As explained below, the motion is denied
because the parties have not shown good cause for any extension. 	However, as a practical matter,
the court must vacate the dispositive-motion deadline and extend pretrial-conference deadlines to
account for the parties’ inaction.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) provides that a scheduling order “may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” 	The Tenth Circuit has described
Rule 16(b)(4)’s good-cause standard as requiring the movant to show that “existing scheduling
order deadlines cannot be met despite the movant’s diligent efforts.” 	Tesone v. Empire Mktg.
Strategies, 942 F.3d 979, 988–89 (10th Cir. 2019) (applying the Rule 16(b)(4) good-cause standard
to affirm the district court’s denial of an extension of time to designate an expert witness);
Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat. Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 2014)
(applying the standard to a motion to amend filed after the scheduling order deadline); see also
Case 2:24-cv-02509-JWB-ADM Document 69 Filed 10/30/25 Page 1 of 3
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FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4) advisory committee’s note to the 1983 amendment (stating good cause
exists when a schedule cannot be reasonably met despite the diligence of the party seeking the
extension). 	The good-cause standard generally requires the moving party to provide an adequate
explanation for the delay. 	Testone, 942 F.3d at 988. 	The court is “afforded broad discretion in
managing the pretrial schedule.” 	Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011).
In the present motion to amend the scheduling order, the parties state that new counsel
appeared for defendants on October 10 and “has since learned that discovery is not complete,
expert disclosures are not complete, mediation has not been scheduled, and the parties are not able
to prepare a pretrial order as a result.” 	(ECF 68, at 2.) 	New counsel express a need to get up to
speed and coordinate calendars before depositions can move forward.
These reasons do not demonstrate good cause for delaying the progress of this case.
Discovery has been open since at least February 14, 2025, and the court granted the parties’ earlier
extension request, pushing the close of discovery to October 14. 	The parties have not explained
why they could not have completed discovery during this extended, eight-month period, had they
acted with diligence. 	As the parties note, the court was not persuaded that the last extension was
necessarily warranted, and so cautioned the parties that it would grant further extensions only on
a showing of “truly extraordinary circumstances.” 	(ECF 29, at 2.) 	Although the court
appreciates that defendants’ change in counsel might cause some delay, that is a product of
defendants’ own choosing. 	In sum, the parties’ motion does not establish any level of diligence
in attempting to meet existing deadlines, and therefore the court denies the motion for lack of good
cause.
Be that as it may, under the present state of affairs created by the parties’ inaction, this case
is not ready to proceed to the final pretrial conference scheduled for November 7. 	The parties
Case 2:24-cv-02509-JWB-ADM Document 69 Filed 10/30/25 Page 2 of 3
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did not submit a proposed pretrial order by the October 28 deadline to do so. 	(ECF 29.) 	Thus,
the court necessarily vacates the pretrial-conference setting and the December 10 dispositive-
motion deadline. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29 permits the parties to conduct limited
discovery by agreement outside of the discovery deadline, so long as such ongoing discovery does
not interfere with other court-imposed deadlines or delay the briefing of or ruling on dispositive
motions or other pretrial preparations; the court will be unavailable to resolve any discovery
disputes during this extended period.
As a practical matter, the parties and the court will not be in a position to be able to
formulate a meaningful pretrial order until discovery is complete. 	Thus, the court re-sets the
pretrial conference to January 20, 2026, at 1:30 p.m., by telephone. 	The parties must submit
their proposed pretrial order to the email of the undersigned judge’s chambers by January 8, 2026.
The court will re-set the dispositive-motion deadline when it enters the final pretrial order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties’ Joint Motion to Extend Scheduling
Order (ECF 68) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the pretrial conference is reset to January 20, 2026,
at 1:30 p.m., with the proposed pretrial order due by January 8, 2026. 	The dispositive-motion
setting is vacated, to be re-set in the pretrial order.
Dated October 30, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Angel D. Mitchell
Angel D. Mitchell
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Case 2:24-cv-02509-JWB-ADM Document 69 Filed 10/30/25 Page 3 of 3

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