Edgar et al v. Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries, Ltd. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
DENA BURGE, LEIGH HOCKETT,
JORDAN FURLAN, CRISTINE RIDEY,
PATRICIA SAWCZUK, and ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS
INDUSTRIES, LTD.,
TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.,
TEVA PARENTERAL MEDICINES, INC.,
TEVA NEUROSCIENCE, INC.,
TEVA SALES & MARKETING, INC., and
CEPHALON, INC.,
Defendants.
Case No. 22-cv-2501-DDC-TJJ
(related to Case No. 26-mc-202-DDC-TJJ)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Regarding Goodwin
Procter LLP’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ Subpoena to Produce Documents (ECF No.
229). Plaintiffs request an order, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i), compelling Goodwin
Procter LLP (“Goodwin”), a law firm representing Defendants in this action, to search for and
produce documents responsive to subpoena document Requests 1 through 9 and to log documents
withheld on the basis of privilege or other protection. As explained below, Plaintiffs’ motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
I. 	Nature of the Case and Discovery Dispute Background
Plaintiffs—representing a proposed class—allege Defendants and their co-conspirators
entered an unlawful reverse payment settlement and conspired to safeguard their monopoly on
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Nuvigil, a wakefulness drug with the generic name armodafinil. Plaintiffs allege Defendants
agreed to stay out of the EpiPen market, allowing Mylan and Pfizer to maintain their EpiPen
monopoly. In exchange, Plaintiffs contend, Mylan and Pfizer agreed to stay out of the Nuvigil
market, allowing Defendants to maintain their Nuvigil monopoly. Plaintiffs refer to these
agreements as the “trade-for-delay” agreement.
Since June 2024, this case has been bifurcated with Phase I discovery focused on the pivotal
issues of the timeliness of Plaintiffs’ claims under the applicable statutes of limitations and the
related issues of tolling and fraudulent concealment.1 The Court has previously ruled on a motion
filed by Defendants to compel three law firms representing the named Plaintiffs to comply with
Phase I subpoenas.2
Pertinent to the present dispute, Plaintiffs served a subpoena duces tecum upon Goodwin
(the “Subpoena”), one of the law firms representing Defendants in this action, and which also
represented Teva to some extent with regard to the EpiPen settlement and Nuvigil settlement. The
Subpoena set an April 29, 2025 date for compliance. It set forth twelve document Requests,
including the following nine that are challenged and at issue here (the “Challenged Subpoena
Requests”):
1. 	All Communications between you and any employee, representative, lawyer, or
law firm acting on behalf of Mylan, Pfizer, Meridian, or King concerning the
EpiPen Settlement, including, but not limited to, all attachments to such
communications.
2. 	All Communications between you and any employee, representative, lawyer, or
law firm acting on behalf of Mylan, Matrix Laboratories Limited, or Matrix
1 See June 14, 2024 Order Regarding Phase I Disc. (ECF No. 88) and July 15, 2024 Phase I Sched.
Order (ECF No. 92) at 2.
2 See May 27, 2025 Mem. & Order (ECF No. 202).
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Laboratories, Inc. concerning the Nuvigil Settlement, including, but not limited
to, all attachments to such communications.
3. 	All Documents and Communications concerning the Mylan Press Releases.
4. 	All Documents and Communications concerning the Teva Press Release.
5. 	All Communications and Documents concerning or discussing disclosure or
potential disclosure of the terms of the EpiPen Settlement.
6. 	All Communications and Documents concerning or discussing disclosure or
potential disclosure of the terms of the Nuvigil Settlement.
7. 	All Communications and Documents concerning or discussing any relationship
between the EpiPen Settlement and Nuvigil Settlement.
8. 	All Communications and Documents relating to or concerning any filing
pursuant to Section 1112(a) and (c)(2) of Title XI of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, arising from or pertaining
to the EpiPen Settlement.
9. 	All Communications and Documents relating to or concerning any filing
pursuant to Section 1112(a) and (c)(2) of Title XI of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, arising from or pertaining
to the Nuvigil Settlement.3
The Subpoena provides that the applicable time period for the document requests is “April 30,
2012 through the present.”4 The Subpoena defines the “EpiPen Settlement” to mean the settlement
of the litigation captioned King Pharm., Inc., et al, v. Teva Parenteral Med., Inc., et al., No. 1:09-
cv-00652 (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2009) and the “Nuvigil Settlement” as the settlement of the litigation
captioned Cephalon, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00954 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2009). The
Subpoena defines “EpiPen MDL” as referring to the multidistrict litigation heard in the District of
Kansas, captioned In re: EpiPen, No. 17-md-2785, and all actions consolidated within it.5
3 Subpoena (ECF No. 229-1) at 11–12. The communications and documents sought by Requests
8–9 are referred herein as “MMA” letters or filings.
4 Id. at 11, ¶ 11.
5 Id. at 7–8, ¶¶ 16–17, 19.
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On May 30, 2025, Goodwin served its objections and responses to the Subpoena.6 Goodwin
objected to all the Requests but agreed to produce the transcript and exhibits from the deposition
of Goodwin attorney Christopher Denn (“Denn”), taken in connection with the EpiPen MDL.
Following two meet-and-confer conferences, Goodwin agreed to allow Plaintiffs access to the
prior production of documents from the EpiPen MDL.7 After a D. Kan. Rule 37.1(a) pre-motion
discovery conference with the Court failed to resolve the dispute over the Subpoena, Plaintiffs
timely filed their motion in this case on August 6, 2025, requesting an order compelling Goodwin
to search for and produce documents and communications responsive to the Challenged Subpoena
Requests 1 through 9.
Noting the Goodwin Subpoena required compliance in California, the Court entered a text
order denying Plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice to refiling in the district where the subpoena
required compliance, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i).8 On November 21, 2025, Plaintiffs
initiated a miscellaneous action in the Central District of California seeking enforcement of the
Goodwin subpoena and filed a motion to transfer their motion to compel back to the District of
Kansas. On January 15, 2026, the Central District of California approved the parties’ Stipulation
to Transfer Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel to the District of Kansas. Upon transfer to the District of
Kansas, the case was assigned miscellaneous case number 26-mc-202-DDC-TJJ.
At the suggestion of the Court and consistent with the parties’ Joint Stipulation Regarding
6 Goodwin Objs. to Subpoena (ECF No. 229-2). Requests 10–12 are not at issue. Goodwin agreed
to produce the Denn deposition transcript taken in the EpiPen MDL (responsive to Request 12) and re-
produce documents Goodwin produced in response to a subpoena in the EpiPen MDL (responsive to
Request 10). Plaintiffs state they are not moving to compel regarding Request 11 at this time. Pls.’ Mot.
(ECF No. 229) at 11 n.9.
7 June 30, 2025 Email (ECF No. 229-3) at 5.
8 See Nov. 7, 2025 text Order (ECF No. 261)
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Procedure for Resolution of the Goodwin Subpoena Dispute,9 the Court entered a text order (ECF
No. 305) stating it would rule on the transferred Goodwin subpoena dispute based on the parties’
briefing previously filed in this case.
II. 	Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs subpoenas served upon non-parties. Under
Rule 45(d)(2)(B), if the entity commanded to produce documents serves written objections to the
subpoena, the serving party may seek compliance by filing a motion to compel production of the
documents. “The scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as party discovery permitted by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.” 10 The court must determine “whether a request contained in a subpoena duces
tecum is overly broad or seeks irrelevant information under the same standards as set forth in Rule
26(b) and as applied to Rule 34 requests for production.”11 Under Rule 26(b)(1), unless otherwise
limited by court order, the “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” The court
must also limit the extent of discovery otherwise allowed if it determines the discovery sought is
“unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”12
The party issuing the subpoena must take “reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue
9 Filed as ECF No. 51 in the transferred miscellaneous Case No. 26-mc-202-DDC-TJJ.
10 In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., MDL No. 2591, No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2017 WL
1106257, at *16 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2017) (citing Schneider v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 13-4094, 2014 WL
4749181, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 24, 2014)). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee note to the 1970
amendment (the 1970 amendments “make it clear that the scope of discovery through a subpoena is the
same as that applicable to Rule 34 and the other discovery rules”).
11 Stewart v. Mitchell Transp., No. 01-2546-JWL, 2002 WL 1558210, at *3 (D. Kan. July 11, 2002).
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
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burden or expense” on the subpoenaed entity.13 Non-parties responding to Rule 45 subpoenas
generally receive heightened protection from discovery abuses.14 Document subpoenas seeking
discovery from current counsel representing the opposing party raise additional concerns. Counsel
are not automatically exempt from being subjected to a subpoena to produce documents or to
testify, however, courts generally disfavor subjecting opposing trial counsel to broad discovery
and recognize its potential disruptive effect on the attorney-client relationship and the adversarial
process.15 Consistent with the Court’s May 27, 2025 Memorandum and Order (ECF No. 202)
ruling on the subpoenas Defendants served upon the law firms representing Plaintiffs in this case,16
the Court will not apply the three Shelton criteria17 to the document subpoena served upon the
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1).
14 In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Antitrust Litig., No. 17-MD-
2785-DDC-TJJ, 2018 WL 4854027, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 2018) (citations omitted).
15 See Monster Energy Co. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., No. 5:18-cv-01882-JGB, 2020 WL 2405295, at
*9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020) (applying a heightened standard to document subpoenas served on former
opposing counsel and law firm, noting “discovery sought from opposing counsel is universally
disfavored”); In re Allergan, Inc, No. 14-cv-02004-DOC (KES), 2016 WL 5922717, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
23, 2016) (finding the fact that the defendant served the subpoena upon opposing trial counsel a factor to
be considered in determining if the subpoena imposed an undue burden); In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis
Friedman, 350 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Courts have been especially concerned about the burdens
imposed on the adversary process when lawyers themselves have been the subject of discovery requests,
and have resisted the idea that lawyers should routinely be subject to broad discovery.”).
16 	The 	subpoenas 	Defendants 	served 	upon 	Plaintiffs’ 	counsel 	sought 	documents 	and
communications the law firms disseminated to solicit potential plaintiffs for participation in the EpiPen
MDL and this action and documents made publicly available via the law firms’ websites and other platforms
for various time periods. ECF No. 202 at 4.
17 Shelton v. Am Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986). Under Shelton, a party seeking
to depose opposing counsel must show: “(1) no other means exist to obtain the information than to depose
opposing counsel; (2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is
crucial to the preparation of the case.” Id. The Tenth Circuit has adopted the Shelton criteria for requests to
take the deposition of opposing counsel. Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 829–30 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Tenth Circuit has not applied the Shelton criteria to a document subpoena served upon opposing
counsel.
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Goodwin law firm, but proceeds with heightened caution relative to the challenged Subpoena
Requests.
III. 	Goodwin’s Objections to the Challenged Subpoena Requests
Goodwin asserted multiple objections to the nine Challenged Subpoena Requests 1–9. It
objected the Requests are unreasonably cumulative and duplicative, not relevant, overly broad,
unduly burdensome, disproportionate to the needs of the case, and seek documents not in its
possession, custody, or control. It also objected to the Requests as seeking information that is
protected by attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. After objecting,
Goodwin stated it “will not search for, log, or produce any documents or communications in
response to these Requests.”18
In its response to Plaintiffs’ motion, Goodwin argues the broad discovery sought by these
Requests is largely duplicative of discovery that has already been produced in the case, overly
broad and irrelevant, and/or protected from disclosure as attorney work product. Goodwin also
argues the Subpoena Requests are highly invasive and harassing as they would require production
of its internal and privileged emails. Goodwin therefore contends it should not be required to
produce or log any of the requested internal law firm communications.
A. 	Goodwin’s Objections That the Requests are Duplicative and/or Cumulative
Goodwin argues the subpoenaed documents are largely duplicative of documents already
produced or logged as privileged by Defendants in this case. To the extent Goodwin communicated
with Defendants concerning the Teva Press Release, disclosure of the terms of the EpiPen or
Nuvigil settlements, or MMA filings pertaining to those settlements, Goodwin argues those
18 Goodwin Objs. to Subpoena Requests 3–6 and 8–9 (ECF No. 229-2) at 10–26.
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documents and communications were captured by the collection and review already conducted by
Defendants. Goodwin claims Defendants have already produced over 81,000 documents and
logged thousands more on a privilege log. Because Defendants’ production and privilege log
contain all responsive communications with Goodwin, it argues the discovery Plaintiffs seek now
is duplicative of Defendants’ production and privilege log and it should not be compelled to search
for and produce these same documents.
Plaintiffs argue the existence of duplication in documents requested from multiple parties
is not enough for a party to quash a third-party subpoena and there is no absolute rule prohibiting
a party from seeking to obtain the same documents from a non-party that can be obtained from a
party. They also argue Goodwin’s duplication concerns are misplaced. Plaintiffs are skeptical of
the completeness of Defendants’ collection and production of documents in this case, stating their
analysis of Defendants’ production has revealed a number of important documents that appear to
be missing. They cite, as an example, the incomplete production of Teva’s regulatory notification
MMA letters.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i), the court is required to limit the frequency or extent
of discovery otherwise allowed if it determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive.” The court is also required to quash or modify a subpoena that
subjects the recipient to undue burden.19 “A subpoena that seeks irrelevant, overly broad, or
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv).
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duplicative discovery causes undue burden, and the trial court may quash it on those bases.”20
However, discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative simply because it can be or has
been obtained from another source.21
At the outset, the Court recognizes Defendants have already produced or logged a
significant number of documents in Phase I discovery, although it is not clear how many of them
would be responsive to the Subpoena Requests challenged here by Goodwin. However, given the
nature of Goodwin’s attorney-client relationship with Defendants and the number of times
Goodwin attorneys are listed on Defendants’ privilege log,22 the Court finds the Subpoena likely
would require Goodwin to produce or log a significant number of duplicate documents already
produced or logged by Defendants. Requiring Goodwin to produce or log duplicate documents
makes little sense for any party here. It would be unduly burdensome, inefficient, and cause
needless and additional delay and expense. But there may be responsive documents that were not
produced or logged previously by Defendants. The Court therefore modifies and limits the
Goodwin Subpoena Requests 1–9 to exclude responsive communications and documents that have
already been produced by Defendants or logged on a privilege log in this case.
B. 	Goodwin’s Objections to Requests for Internal Law Firm Communications
and Documents
Goodwin also objects to Requests 3–9 to the extent they require production of its internal
20 Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282-JWB-GEB, 2021 WL 1238269, at
*4 (D. Kan. Apr. 2, 2021); Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., No. 05-2164
MLBDWB, 2007 WL 2122437, at *5 (D. Kan. July 20, 2007).
21 See Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., Inc., No. 94-2304-EEO, 1996 WL 397567, at *5
(D. Kan. July 11, 1996) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not prohibit parties from obtaining
similar discovery from multiple sources.”).
22 See Defs.’ Priv. Log (ECF No. 177-2) (sealed). Goodwin email addresses are found 591 times
on Defendants’ 3/10/2025 privilege log and some emails have 2012 sent dates. ECF No. 177-2 at 6–7.
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law firm communications and documents regarding legal work it was conducting for its client. It
argues the discovery Plaintiffs seek is irrelevant because unless and until Goodwin’s contemplated
legal strategies or advice are conveyed to its client those documents are not relevant to the claims
and defenses in this case. It also argues requiring it to produce its internal documents and
communications is a violation of the work product doctrine and, from a policy perspective, would
have a chilling effect on a law firm’s ability to adequately represent its clients.
Plaintiffs argue Goodwin’s internal communications and documents that are responsive to
the Subpoena Requests should be produced or, if withheld, logged on a privilege log. They argue
the unique circumstances present here, where Goodwin was involved in Defendants’ actions,
including its alleged fraudulent concealment of the trade-for-delay agreement, distinguishes this
case. Plaintiffs stress that Goodwin’s involvement in both this case and the EpiPen MDL—where
Goodwin attorneys allegedly negotiated and drafted the settlements and were involved in decisions
about the disclosure (or non-disclosure) of the settlements to regulators and the public—warrants
discovery of Goodwin’s internal communications and documents.
The Court finds Plaintiffs have shown that Goodwin likely has documents responsive to
the Subpoena Requests based upon its attorneys’ involvement with public statements and MMA
filings related to the EpiPen or Nuvigil settlements and their role in “papering” pre-negotiated
settlement terms into binding term sheets. Those documents would be relevant to the Phase I issues
of Defendants’ alleged fraudulent concealment or non-disclosure of the trade-for-delay agreement,
but only if they reveal the actions or inactions of Defendants and what they knew and learned. The
Court therefore questions the relevance of Goodwin’s wholly internal law firm documents and
communications, if as Goodwin states, they were never shared with their client. Even if Goodwin’s
attorneys were significantly involved with the Mylan and Teva 2012 press releases, the disclosure
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of the terms of the EpiPen and Nuvigil settlements, and MMA filings related to those settlements,
Goodwin’s wholly internal communications and documents would not be relevant unless conveyed
to its client, because the actions or inactions of Defendants, not Goodwin, are at issue. The Court
therefore sustains Goodwin’s relevance objection to the production of its wholly internal law firm
communications and documents. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii), the Court modifies the
Goodwin Subpoena Requests 3–9 to exclude internal law firm communications and documents.23
Because the Court here sustains Goodwin’s relevance objection to producing its internal
law firm communications and documents, it need not address whether the documents are also
protected from disclosure as attorney work product or whether Goodwin should be required to log
them on a privilege log. However, the Court pauses here to stress its very significant concerns with
any subpoena served on a law firm while it is actively representing an opposing party that seeks
the internal communications of that law firm. These concerns include the potential for use of such
a subpoena to harass, unduly burden, increase the litigation costs, or promote other improper
purposes, especially given the likelihood that internal law firm communications would be
protected from disclosure as attorney work product.
Additionally, if Goodwin withholds documents responsive to the Subpoena, as now
modified, other than wholly internal law firm communications and documents (i.e., such
communications or documents that are sent to others who are not clients), it must comply with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)(A). Specifically, that subsection requires “[a] person withholding
subpoenaed information under a claim it is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation
23 There is no need to modify Requests 1–2 to exclude internal law firm communications. Goodwin
does not object to producing internal law firm communications and documents for Requests 1–2, and they
do not seek Goodwin’s internal communications, only those with third parties concerning the EpiPen
settlement and Nuvigil settlement.
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material” to “(i) expressly make the claim and (ii) describe the nature of the withheld documents .
. . in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable the
parties to assess the claim.” If Goodwin withholds documents, other than wholly internal ones,
responsive to the now-modified Subpoena Requests on the basis of any privilege or work product,
it must provide a privilege log describing the withheld documents.
C. 	Goodwin’s Objections to the “April 30, 2012 through Present” Time Period
Goodwin objects to the “April 30, 2012 through the present” time frame set out in the
Subpoena as irrelevant, overly broad and unduly burdensome, and disproportionate to the needs
of this case. It argues the sweeping 13-year time frame is not tied to the January through April
2012 relevant time period of the negotiations and the April 26 and 30, 2012 press releases, and
would 	require 	Goodwin 	to 	search 	for 	and 	produce 	years 	of 	irrelevant, 	post-settlement
communications between Goodwin and its client. Plaintiffs argue this objection could and should
have been resolved through the meet-and-confer process.
For Requests 1–2, Goodwin continues to object but states it would be willing as a good-
faith compromise to search for and produce non-privileged and non-duplicative responsive
documents and communications if limited to the time period “April 30, 2012 through December
31, 2012,” and limited to communications “in which no Teva personnel is included on the
communication.”24 For Requests 5–6, Goodwin indicates it is willing to search for and produce
non-privileged, non-duplicative “communications between Goodwin and the FTC or DOJ from
April 30, 2012 through December 31, 2012 concerning the EpiPen settlement or Nuvigil settlement
24 Goodwin Resp. (ECF No. 238) at 11.
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in which no Teva personnel is included on the communication.”25 For Requests 8–9, Goodwin
states it is willing to search for and produce non-privileged and non-duplicative MMA filings
arising from or pertaining to the EpiPen Settlement or Nuvigil Settlement, but does not indicate a
limiting end date.26
Plaintiffs argue Goodwin’s late offer to search for and produce limited documents
responsive to some of the Challenged Subpoena Requests is insufficient. They argue Goodwin’s
proposed December 31, 2012 end date for Requests 1–2 and 5–6 is arbitrary in that Defendants’
privilege log indicates Goodwin’s involvement in relevant matters into November 2016. They also
argue Goodwin does not explicitly state that responsive materials do not exist for the longer time
frame, nor could it, because materials post-dating April 30, 2012 confirm the existence of
responsive documents. Plaintiffs also argue that an appropriate start date for Requests 1–6 is
January 2012 because Goodwin admits that the EpiPen and Nuvigil Settlements were negotiated
over the four-month period between January and April 2012.
The Court finds the time frame “April 30, 2012 through the present” applicable to all the
Challenged Subpoena Requests would require Goodwin to search for and produce (or log) thirteen
years’ of documents and communications concerning the EpiPen settlement and the Nuvigil
settlement, press releases, disclosure of the terms of the EpiPen or Nuvigil settlements, and MMA
filings pertaining to those settlements. As the settlements at issue were finalized and press releases
issued in 2012, the lack of any end date for the Subpoena document requests, with no explanation
for such a lengthy thirteen-year period, makes it overly broad on its face and would subject
25 Id.
26 Id.
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Goodwin to an undue burden in responding to the Subpoena. Goodwin’s offered December 31,
2012 end date is reasonable for Requests 1–2 seeking Goodwin’s communications with third
parties concerning the EpiPen settlement and Nuvigil settlement, which occurred in 2012. The
December 31, 2012 end date is also reasonable for Requests 3–6 seeking documents and
communications concerning the 2012 press releases and concerning disclosure of the 2012
settlements. It is also reasonable for Request 7 seeking documents and communications
“concerning or discussing any relationship between the EpiPen settlement and Nuvigil settlement.”
Plaintiffs offer no reasonable alternative end date for Requests 1–7.
The Court is significantly reducing the thirteen-year time period of the Goodwin Subpoena
to a much shorter time period, but the Court also modifies the Subpoena start date for Requests 1–
7 to the earlier start date of January 1, 2012. This is based upon Goodwin’s acknowledgement in
its response that “[i]t has long been established that the two settlements were independently
negotiated between the business leaders and in-house attorneys at Mylan, Pfizer, and Teva, over a
four month period between January and April 2012, with binding term sheets that were drafted by
respective in-house and outside counsel signed on April 26, 2012.”27 The Court therefore finds
January 1, 2012 to be a more relevant start date and modifies the Goodwin Subpoena to limit
Requests 1–7 to the one-year time period “January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012.”
For Requests 8–9, the Court finds a longer December 31, 2016 end date reasonable for the
requested MMA filings based upon Plaintiffs’ showing that Goodwin attorneys were involved in
drafting MMA-related filings throughout 2016.28 The Court therefore modifies the Goodwin
27 Id. at 9.
28 See MMA letters (ECF Nos. 229-8 to 229-11) (sealed).
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Subpoena to limit Requests 8–9 to the time period “April 30, 2012 through December 31, 2016.”
Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv), the Court is required to quash or modify a subpoena that
subjects the subpoenaed entity to an “undue burden.” Here, the Court finds Goodwin would be
subjected to an undue burden if required to search for and produce documents responsive to the
Subpoena’s broad thirteen-year time frame. Therefore, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv), the
Court modifies the Goodwin Subpoena to limit Requests 1–7 to the one-year time period “January
1, 2012 through December 31, 2012” and limit Requests 8–9 to the longer time period “April 30,
2012 through December 31, 2016.”
D. 	Goodwin’s Proposed Exclusion of Documents in Which Teva Personnel are
Included on the Communication
Goodwin’s proposal to limit the search for and produce non-privileged, non-duplicative
communications responsive to Requests 1–2 and 5–6 also proposes limiting it to those “in which
no Teva personnel is included on the communication.” Plaintiffs take issue with Goodwin’s
proposed restriction that would exclude production of both drafts and documents where Teva
personnel are copied. They argue this means Goodwin would not produce a document if a Teva
employee was copied, even if that document was never produced by Defendants. They contend
this restriction is too narrow and therefore inappropriate.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Goodwin’s proposal to exclude responsive documents
on which Teva personnel are copied from any of the Challenged Subpoena Requests is too narrow
and should be rejected. As discussed above, the Court is modifying the Challenged Subpoena
Requests to exclude Goodwin’s wholly internal law firm communications and exclude responsive
documents already produced or logged by Defendants. These modifications should address
Goodwin’s concerns by limiting the number of responsive documents to be produced or logged.
Goodwin must still produce communications and documents responsive to the Challenged
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Subpoena 	Requests, 	as 	modified 	herein, 	even 	if 	Teva 	personnel 	are 	included 	on 	the
communication.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Regarding Goodwin
Procter LLP’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ Subpoena to Produce Documents (ECF No.
229) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein. Subpoena Requests 1–9 are
hereby modified to exclude all communications and documents that have already been produced
by Defendants or logged on a privilege log in this case and exclude Goodwin’s wholly internal
law firm communications and documents. Requests 1–7 are limited to the one-year time period
“January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012” and Requests 8–9 are limited to the longer time
period “April 30, 2012 through December 31, 2016.”
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Goodwin shall produce documents responsive to the
Subpoena, as modified herein, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Goodwin withholds documents responsive to
Subpoena Requests 1–9, as modified above, on the basis of any privilege or work product, it must
provide a privilege log describing the withheld documents within thirty (30) days after the
production ordered herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated March 13, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
Teresa J. James
U. S. Magistrate Judge
Case 2:22-cv-02501-DDC-TJJ Document 312 Filed 03/13/26 Page 16 of 16