USA v. Quiroz et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HUGO CHAVEZ-CADENAS (10),
Defendants.
Case No. 09-20005-10-DDC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
For the umpteenth time, defendant Hugo Chavez-Cadenas1 asks for a reduced sentence.
He seeks compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). He also asserts that the
Sentencing Commission reduced his sentence, entitling him to a sentence reduction under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). And he asks the court to appoint him counsel.
The court rejects these requests. It explains why, below.
I. 	Background
In January 2010, Mr. Chavez-Cadenas pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. Doc. 580; Doc. 880
at 7–8 (PSR ¶ 6). The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) attributed 4.53 kilograms of
methamphetamine to Mr. Chavez-Cadenas. Doc. 880 at 17–18 (PSR ¶ 81). And, based on all of
the methamphetamine seized during the government’s investigation into the large drug-
trafficking organization, the PSR calculated a 46.05% average purity. Id. at 17 (PSR ¶ 80). The
1 	Mr. Chavez-Cadenas filed his motions pro se. People in prison “who proceed pro se . . . are
entitled to liberal construction of their filings[.]” Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 911 (10th Cir. 2012); see
also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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PSR then attributed 2.07 kilograms of methamphetamine (actual) to Mr. Chavez-Cadenas. Id. at
17–18 (PSR ¶ 81).
A methamphetamine quantity of over 1.5 kilograms of actual methamphetamine led to a
base-offense level of 38 for Mr. Chavez-Cadenas. Id. at 19 (PSR ¶ 88). The PSR added two
levels because the methamphetamine came from Mexico, id. (PSR ¶ 89), and it added three
levels for Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s managerial role in the drug conspiracy, id. (PSR ¶ 91). Mr.
Chavez-Cadenas also received a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on a
potentially threatening letter he sent to the mother of a cooperating witness. Id. at 18–19 (PSR
¶¶ 83, 84, 92). After a few reductions, the PSR calculated a final offense level of 42. Id. at 19
(PSR ¶ 96). Mr. Chavez-Cadenas also received one criminal-history point, establishing a
criminal-history category of I. Id. at 20 (PSR ¶ 99).
With an offense level of 42 and a criminal-history category of I, Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s
2010 Guideline range was 360 months to life. Id. at 24 (PSR ¶ 119). The court sentenced him to
360 months in prison. Doc. 892 at 2 (Judgment). In February 2015, the court reduced Mr.
Chavez-Cadenas’s sentence to 292 months based on a retroactive Guidelines amendment that
lowered his offense level. Doc. 1085.
It’s evident that Mr. Chavez-Cadenas remains unhappy with his sentence. Not including
the February 2015 sentence reduction and the motions decided in this Order, he’s filed 17
motions to reduce his sentence further. Doc. 1099; Doc. 1106; Doc. 1132; Doc. 1136; Doc.
1137; Doc. 1186; Doc. 1189; Doc. 1263; Doc. 1291; Doc. 1317; Doc. 1320; Doc. 1322; Doc.
1326; Doc. 1333; Doc. 1337; Doc. 1358; Doc. 1366.
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In this Order, the court takes up two motions for a reduced sentence (Doc. 1381; Doc.
1399) and one motion to appoint counsel (Doc. 1392). The court begins with the governing legal
standard.
II. 	Legal Standard
“‘Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of imprisonment
once it has been imposed; but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions.’” United
States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 937 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S.
522, 526 (2011)). Compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) is one of those
exceptions. Id. When it passed the First Step Act in 2018, Congress amended § 3582(c)(1) to
allow a defendant, not just the Bureau of Prisons, to move for a sentence reduction—but only
“after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights” with BOP. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Eccleston, 543 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1125 (D.N.M. June
10, 2021) (recounting history of First Step Act). Exhaustion aside, the court may grant a
defendant’s motion for compassionate release only if it finds that (1) “extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”; (2) the “reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (3) the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors favor a reduced sentence. United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir. 2021).
Another exception to the rule of finality is 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which “authorizes a
district court to reduce a sentence ‘based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.’” United States v. Chavez-Meza, 854 F.3d 655, 657
(10th Cir. 2017) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
III. 	Analysis
The court must begin its analysis with a threshold issue: defining the scope of Mr.
Chavez-Cadenas’s filings that the court will consider. This is necessary because Mr. Chavez-
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Cadenas has filed three motions (Doc. 1381; Doc. 1392; Doc. 1399), two replies (Doc. 1384;
Doc. 1402), and eight “supplements” (Doc. 1386; Doc. 1387; Doc. 1388; Doc. 1389; Doc. 1395;
Doc. 1396; Doc. 1397; Doc. 1398).
Our local rules imagine that a party may file supplements. D. Kan. R. CR1.3(c). But
those supplements must set forth “pertinent and significant authorities[.]” Id. Mr. Chavez-
Cadenas’s supplements contain no pertinent and significant authorities. To the contrary, they are
confusing and repetitive. Doc. 1386; Doc. 1387; Doc. 1388; Doc. 1389; Doc. 1395; Doc. 1396;
Doc. 1397; Doc. 1398. The court thus declines to consider these supplements and will consider
only the arguments made in Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s motions and his replies supporting those
motions. The court also warns Mr. Chavez-Cadenas. His litigation strategies are ineffective and
could obscure any persuasive arguments he might have someday. If he chooses to file a motion
in the future, he should not file any supplements unless they meet the criteria of D. Kan. R.
CR1.3(c). If they don’t, the court won’t consider them.
The court begins its analysis with Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s compassionate-release request.
It first evaluates whether he has established extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release.
He has not. It then evaluates whether the § 3553(a) factors favor compassionate release. They
do not. The court next considers whether Mr. Chavez-Cadenas is entitled to relief under
Amendment 821 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. He is not. The court concludes
with Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s request that the court appoint him counsel. It declines.
A. 	Extraordinary & Compelling Reasons
The Sentencing Commission has issued a policy statement describing extraordinary and
compelling circumstances that warrant a reduced sentence. The policy statement defines six
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release:
• 	Medical circumstances;
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• 	Advanced age;
• 	Family circumstances;
• 	Victim of abuse;
• 	Other reasons; and
• 	Unusually long sentence.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b).
Of these six, Mr. Chavez-Cadenas invokes four. He argues that he’s suffering from
several worsening medical conditions. He also asserts that a prison transport van wrecked and he
sustained injury, qualifying him as a victim of abuse while in BOP custody. And he invokes the
“other reasons” catch-all to assert that the COVID-19 pandemic and his youth qualify as
extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduced sentence. Finally, Mr. Chavez-Cadenas
asserts that he received an unusually long sentence.
The court tackles each argument, in turn, below.
1. 	Medical Conditions
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas lists the following medical conditions: diabetes, hypertension, high
blood pressure, back pain, glaucoma, gout, hypothyroidism, obesity, heart failure, chest pain,
endocrine disorder, hyperlipidemia, anxiety, depression, thyroid issues, sleep apnea, arthritis,
tendon issues in both hands, kidney failure, and injuries sustained in the prison transport
accident. Doc. 1384 at 2, 4; Doc. 1399 at 2, 3. He also suffered an allergic reaction to food
served in prison. Doc. 1384-1 at 17. He asserts that these conditions are worsening and he’s at
risk of death. Doc. 1384 at 3. He further argues that his medical conditions aren’t under control
in prison, pointing out that he had one medical condition when he entered prison in 2009, and
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now he has 14 medical conditions. Id. at 4. He’s lost mobility in his hands, can’t work a full
service, and has lost vision to the point that he can’t watch television. Id. at 8.
The government has consulted Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s medical records from September
2025, which reports a slightly shorter list of ailments: age-related cataracts, diabetes with
diabetic neuropathy, hypertension, chest pain, unspecified joint contracture, hypothyroidism, low
back pain, and general pain. Doc. 1401 at 10. Mr. Chavez-Cadenas doesn’t clarify the
discrepancy between his self-reported ailments and the September 2025 health records. See
generally Doc. 1402. Because these are the only supported ailments in the record, the court
considers only these. It disregards the rest of Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s list because he hasn’t
shown that these illnesses present a current concern.
The government also provides that Mr. Chavez-Cadenas is on a variety of medications:
semaglutide (Ozempic), duloxetine, amlodipine, aspirin, atorvastatin, glipizide,
hydrochlorothiazide, levothyroxine, metformin, metoprolol tartrate, nitroglycerin, omeprazole,
and ondansetron. Doc. 1401 at 12. These medications treat diabetes, mood issues, pain issues,
hypertension, inflammation, high cholesterol, fluid retention, hypothyroidism, chest pain, high
levels of stomach acid, nausea, and vomiting.
As relevant here, the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement provides that medical
circumstances qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason if the defendant is suffering
from:
• 	A terminal illness, such as “a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life
trajectory”;
• 	Substantially diminished ability to provide self-care in the prison environment due
to a (i) serious physical or medical condition, (ii) serious functional or cognitive
impairment, or (iii) deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging
process, from which the defendant won’t recover; or
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• 	A “medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is
not being provided and without which the defendant is at risk of serious
deterioration in health or death.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A)–(C). The court concludes that Mr. Chavez-Cadenas hasn’t shown
that his medical conditions meet these criteria.
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas asserts that his conditions put him at risk of death. But the
government has shown that he receives treatment for these conditions—with a variety of
medications—so they don’t qualify as a terminal illness. Doc. 1401 at 12. To be sure, Mr.
Chavez-Cadenas has several chronic conditions. But he hasn’t shown that any of the conditions
listed in his September 2025 health record—cataracts, diabetes, hypertension, chest pain, joint
contracture, hypothyroidism, low back pain, and unspecified pain—are terminal illnesses. The
Sentencing Commission provided the following examples of terminal illnesses: “metastatic
solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced
dementia.” U.S.S.G. § 1.1B1.13(b)(1)(A). None of Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s ailments rise to the
level of these terminal illnesses.
Nor has Mr. Chavez-Cadenas demonstrated that his ailments diminish his ability to
provide self-care in prison. He claims issues with hand mobility, yet the government proffers
that Mr. Chavez-Cadenas had carpal-tunnel release surgery in May 2025. Doc. 1401 at 10–11.
He also claims he can’t work a full service and can’t see the television, but this doesn’t
demonstrate a substantially diminished ability to provide self-care.
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas also asserts that he’s not receiving the care he requires. He points
out that he has more ailments now than when he entered prison in 2009. The problem with his
theory, however, is that the government has suggested that Mr. Chavez-Cadenas receives
medication for all that ails him, with the exception of his cataracts. And Mr. Chavez-Cadenas
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hasn’t shown that, without treatment for his cataracts, he’s at serious risk of deterioration in
health or death.
The court thus concludes that Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s medical circumstances don’t
present an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release.
2. 	COVID-19
Liberally construed, Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s motion argues that the prison lockdown
caused by COVID-19 violated his constitutional rights and thus constitutes extraordinary and
compelling reasons for his release. Doc. 1381 at 4. He calls the COVID-19 lockdown extremely
cruel, causing debilitating mental and physical effects. Id.
The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement “does not list unduly harsh prison
conditions as an extraordinary and compelling reason.” United States v. McCoy, No. 25-6039,
2025 WL 2353013, at *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 14, 2025) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)). So, Mr.
Chavez-Cadenas relies on the policy statement’s catch-all provision. It provides that
extraordinary and compelling reasons exist if the “defendant presents any other circumstance or
combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the
reasons described in [§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4)], are similar in gravity to those described in
[§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4)].” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5).
Our Circuit has held, albeit in an unpublished opinion, that COVID-19 lockdown policies
“fail to rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.”
McCoy, 2025 WL 2353013, at *3. Like the McCoy defendant, Mr. Chavez-Cadenas hasn’t
demonstrated that his experience left him with a medical diagnosis or treatment caused by the
COVID-19 protocols. Id. So, the court can’t conclude the COVID-19 lockdown conditions
“were so harsh that they are ‘similar in gravity’” to the Sentencing Commission’s other described
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circumstances. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5)). The court thus declines to consider this
an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduced sentence.
3. 	Youth
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas next asserts that his youth should matter to the court, claiming he
was only 19 when sentenced. Doc. 1381 at 4. This claim is untrue. Mr. Chavez-Cadenas was
born in July 1969, so he was 40 when sentenced in June 2010. Doc. 880 at 3 (PSR). Later, he
claims he was young when he committed the crime because he was only 38. Doc. 1402 at 5.
The court disagrees that 38 qualifies as a young age. It thus rejects this argument.
4. 	Actual v. Mixture Methamphetamine
Recall that the PSR used “actual methamphetamine” quantities to determine Mr. Chavez-
Cadenas’s base offense level. Doc. 880 at 19 (PSR ¶ 88). Mr. Chavez-Cadenas devotes the bulk
of one of his motions to arguing that the disparity between actual methamphetamine and mixture
methamphetamine should qualify him for a sentence reduction. Doc. 1381 at 5. To understand
this argument, the court must briefly describe how the Guidelines treat methamphetamine
offenses.
The Guidelines use the purity of methamphetamine as a proxy for culpability. So the
Guidelines treat actual or highly pure methamphetamine differently than methamphetamine
mixture. Specifically, the Guidelines “treat every 1 gram of actual methamphetamine as
equivalent to 10 grams of a mixture.” United States v. Espinoza-De Paz, No. 23-5085, 2024 WL
4448794, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 9, 2024) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)). Some judges have
concluded that this ten-to-one ratio lacks an empirical basis and have disagreed with the
Guidelines’ policy choice on this matter. See, e.g., United States v. Pereda, No. 18-00228-CMA,
2019 WL 463027, at *3–4 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 2019) (collecting cases).
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Our Circuit recently held that a district judge has discretion to decide whether the
Guidelines’ treatment of actual methamphetamine qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling
reason for compassionate release. United States v. Fraser, No. 25-6023, 2025 WL 3042362, at
*2 (10th Cir. Oct. 31, 2025). And at least one judge from our court has held that the disparity
between methamphetamine mixture and actual methamphetamine can qualify—in certain
circumstances—as an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. United
States v. Sands, No. 06-20044-03-JAR, 2025 WL 252929, at *5–6 (D. Kan. Jan. 21, 2025).
The court, exercising its discretion, declines to consider the use of actual
methamphetamine quantities in Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s sentence an extraordinary and compelling
reason for compassionate release. In Sands, the court disagreed with the actual-
methamphetamine numbers because the defendant had low-purity methamphetamine, indicating
that the defendant was low in the drug-trafficking hierarchy. Id. at *5. That’s not the case here.
Mr. Chaves Cadenas received an enhancement to reflect his managerial role in the conspiracy.
Doc. 880 at 19 (PSR ¶ 91). So the sentencing record provides an independent basis to evaluate
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s culpability.
The court thus rejects Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s argument on this front.
5. 	Unusually Long Sentence
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas next argues that he received an unusually long sentence and a
change of law—particularly, the methamphetamine actual v. mixture disparity—qualifies as an
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. Doc. 1381 at 4. The Guidelines
provide that an “unusually long sentence” may present extraordinary and compelling reasons for
compassionate release under certain circumstances. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). The Guidelines
allow the court to consider changes in the law (other than non-retroactive Guidelines
amendments) if a defendant (1) received an unusually long sentence and (2) has served at least
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ten years of that sentence. Id. The court may consider such a change in the law only if the
change “would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence
likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed[.]” Id.
Here, Mr. Chavez-Cadenas doesn’t identify any change in law that would apply to him.
He claims that the Sentencing Commission “made changes to the Guidelines for the difference
between ‘actual’ and ‘mixture’ . . . methamphetamine.” Doc. 1381 at 5 (quotation cleaned up).
Not so. The Sentencing Commission issued a report on this issue. United States Sentencing
Commission, Methamphetamine Trafficking Offenses in the Federal Criminal Justice System
(June 2024), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2024/202406_Methamphetamine.pdf. But the Sentencing Commission hasn’t
amended the Guidelines to eliminate the difference between actual and mixture
methamphetamine. So, there’s no disparity for the court to consider, and the court thus rejects
Mr. Cavez Cadenas’s invocation of the “unusually long sentence” theory.
6. 	Transport Van Accident 2
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas has informed the court that he sustained injuries in a car accident.
Doc. 1392 at 1; Doc. 1399 at 3. He explains that a prison transport van was travelling too fast
and got into an accident, causing Mr. Chavez-Cadenas to hit his head. Doc. 1392 at 1. He
accuses the correctional officer who drove the van of maliciously and intentionally causing the
accident to harm him and, alternatively, driving negligence. Id. In Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s view,
this accident qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason for release because he was a
victim of a prison official’s misconduct. Id.
2 	The government halfheartedly invokes failure to exhaust on this claim. Doc. 1394 at 3. Given
the meager information provided by the government’s argument, the court declines to evaluate this
cursory invocation and addresses this claim on its merits.
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Mr. Chaves Cadenas cites U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(4)(B). Doc. 1392 at 1. In that policy
statement, the Sentencing Commission provides an extraordinary and compelling reasons
category for defendants who were victims of physical abuse while in BOP custody. U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(4). The policy statement requires, however, that “the misconduct . . . be established
by a conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, or a finding
in an administrative proceeding, unless such proceedings are unduly delayed or the defendant is
in imminent danger.” Id.
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas has not shown that the accident led to a criminal case, a civil case,
or an administrative proceeding—much less any finding of misconduct. He asks the court to
request evidence of the incident. Doc. 1392 at 1. The court declines to do so because generally,
“a prisoner who challenges the conditions of his confinement must do so through a civil rights
action.” Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012). Indeed, Mr. Chavez-
Cadenas’s filing resembles a civil lawsuit, though it’s titled as a motion to appoint counsel and a
motion for compassionate release. Compare Doc. 1392 at 1, with id. at 2–13. A post-conviction
proceeding makes a poor substitute for the fact-finding and discovery processes of a civil
lawsuit.
To the extent that Mr. Chavez-Cadenas argues that his injuries from this accident qualify
as medical conditions warranting extraordinary and compelling release, the court rejects this
notion. Medical records suggest that Mr. Chavez-Cadenas sustained a small bump and reported
headaches and a sore neck. Doc. 1401 at 11. These issues, to say the obvious, are not terminal
ones. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). Nor does Mr. Chavez-Cadenas demonstrate that these issues
substantially diminish his ability to provide self-care. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B). And these medical
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conditions don’t require long-term or specialized medical care that BOP isn’t providing. Id.
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(C).
The court thus rejects Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s argument that the transport vehicle accident
entitles him to a reduced sentence.
B. 	§ 3553(a) Factors
Even if Mr. Chavez-Cadenas presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for his
release, the court would deny him a reduce sentence for an independent, alternative reason: the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors do not favor release.3
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas relies on his rehabilitative efforts to demonstrate that he’s earned a
reduced sentence. Doc. 1381 at 10. And he’s served a significant portion of his sentence. Id. at
11. The court commends Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s admirable efforts at rehabilitation and hopes he
will continue them. The court previously has concluded, however, that the § 3553(a) factors
don’t favor a reduced sentence for Mr. Chavez-Cadenas. See, e.g., Doc. 1332 at 8–9; Doc. 1348
at 8–9. The court hasn’t changed its mind.
The nature and circumstances of Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s offense do not favor a reduced
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Mr. Chavez-Cadenas occupied a leadership role in a large
drug trafficking organization that imported methamphetamine from Mexico to distribute—in
large quantities—in the Kansas City area. Doc. 880 at 11, 19 (PSR ¶¶ 37, 91). After his arrest,
3 	Those factors are: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;” “(2) the need for a sentence imposed . . . (A) to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and (D) to provide the defendant with needed . . . correctional treatment;” “(3) the kinds of sentences
available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for . . . the applicable category of
offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines;” “(5) any
pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing Commission;” “(6) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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Mr. Chavez-Cadenas sent a threatening letter to a cooperating witness’s mother. Id. at 18 (PSR
¶¶ 83–85). This is a serious felony offense, with a splash of obstruction of justice, and it does
not favor compassionate release.
The court also concludes that Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s current sentence accurately reflects
the seriousness of his offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). And a reduced sentence would not
promote adequate respect for the law, nor would it provide just punishment for Mr. Chavez-
Cadenas’s offense. Id. Mr. Chavez-Cadenas already has benefitted from a Guidelines
amendment, and he received a sentence at the low end of the new Guidelines range.
The court notes that some of the § 3553(a) factors favor Mr. Chavez-Cadenas, like his
thin criminal history and his chronic health conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
3553(a)(2)(D). But these factors simply don’t outweigh the others.
In sum, even if Mr. Chavez-Cadenas could demonstrate extraordinary and compelling
circumstances for a reduced sentence, the court still would decline because the § 3553(a) factors
do not favor a reduced sentence.
C. 	Amendment 821
Liberally construed, one of Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s motions argues that he’s eligible for a
sentence reduction under Amendment 821. Doc. 1381 at 1, 2. Section 3582(c)(2) allows the
court to modify a sentence “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission[.]” “Section 3582(c)(2) plainly tells us a defendant must overcome three distinct
hurdles before he may obtain a sentence reduction thereunder.” United States v. C.D., 848 F.3d
1286, 1289 (10th Cir. 2017) (emphases omitted). The court need only consider the first hurdle
here: “under the statute’s ‘based on’ clause, the defendant must show he was sentenced based on
a guideline range the Sentencing Commission lowered subsequent to defendant’s sentencing. If
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not, the district court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant’s motion and the motion must be
dismissed.” Id. Mr. Chavez-Cadenas fails to clear this first hurdle because Amendment 821
doesn’t lower his Guideline range.
Amendment 821 contains two parts. It’s not clear which one Mr. Chavez-Cadenas
invokes, so the court addresses both. First, Amendment 821 lowered the criminal-history points
a defendant receives if he committed the offense “while under any criminal justice sentence,
including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.”
United States Sentencing Commission, Amendment 821,
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/821 (last visited Dec. 2, 2025). Second,
Amendment 821 enacted U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, which reduces a defendant’s offense level by two
levels if a defendant has zero criminal-history points and meets other criteria.
Mr. Chavez-Cadenas didn’t receive any points for committing his crimes while under a
criminal-justice sentence. And he received a criminal-history point, so he’s not a zero-point
offender. So, Amendment 821 doesn’t lower Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s Guideline range. The court
thus lacks jurisdiction to reduce his sentence further based on Amendment 821. C.D., 848 F.3d
at 1289 (explaining that, to secure sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), “the defendant must
show he was sentenced based on a guideline range the Sentencing Commission lowered
subsequent to defendant’s sentencing” and if the defendant fails to make this showing, “the
district court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant’s motion and the motion must be dismissed”).
D. 	Motion to Appoint Counsel
Finally, Mr. Chavez-Cadenas asks the court to appoint him counsel. Doc. 1392 at 1.
“There is no constitutional right to counsel beyond the direct appeal of a criminal conviction[.]”
Coronado v. Ward, 517 F.3d 1212, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008). That includes compassionate-release
motions. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2021). Our
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court appointed the Office of the Federal Public Defender to help eligible defendants seek relief
under Amendment 821. See D. Kan. S.O. 23-03. The Federal Public Defender has declined to
enter an appearance on Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s behalf. Doc. 1385. And besides, his flood-the-
zone strategy notwithstanding, Mr. Chavez-Cadenas has capably presented his arguments
himself. The court thus denies Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s motion for counsel.
IV. 	Conclusion
The court denies Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s request for compassionate release under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). And it dismisses Mr. Chavez-Cadenas’s request for a reduced sentence
based on an amended Guideline range under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). It also denies Mr. Chavez-
Cadenas’s request for appointed counsel.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the Motion to Reduce
Sentence (Doc. 1381) is denied in part and dismissed in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and for
Compassionate Release (Doc. 1392) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc.
1399) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 10th day of December, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
Case 2:09-cr-20005-DDC Document 1406 Filed 12/10/25 Page 16 of 16