COSBY v. FLOYD COUNTY JAIL

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
JERMAINE COSBY, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 4:24-cv-00126-TWP-KMB
)
FLOYD COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, 	)
BRADLEY DANGLER Lieutenant, 	)
MOSES Lieutenant, 	)
BOONE Officer, 	)
BORRAL Officer, 	)
WINEGAURD Officer, 	)
STEVE BUSH Jail Commander, 	)
Lieutenant ROY, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR COUNSEL
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Floyd County Sheriff’s Department, Lieutenant Bradley Dangler, Lieutenant Roy, Lieutenant
Moses, Officer Boone, Officer Wingaurd, and Steve Bush. (together "the Defendants"). (Dkt. 43).
Also pending, the Plaintiff Jermaine Cosby ("Cosby") third Motion for Counsel. (Dkt. 47). 	for
filed this action contending that his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated
at the Floyd County Jail ("the Jail"). In his complaint, Cosby alleges that he was sexually and
physically assaulted by guards during a strip search. The Defendants move for summary judgment
arguing that Cosby failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") before filing this lawsuit. Although the motion is unopposed,
Defendants' evidence shows that Cosby exhausted his claims. Accordingly, the motion for
summary judgment, is denied, and the Court advises Defendants of its intent to grant summary
Case 4:24-cv-00126-TWP-KMB Document 59 Filed 03/05/26 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
judgment in Cosby's favor on the issue of exhaustion. In addition, for the reasons explained in this
Order, Cosby's third Motion for Attorney is once again denied without prejudice.
I. 	SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment,
the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir.
2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because
those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A
court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need
not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d
562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the basis for its motion
and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must
support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions,
documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in
opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered
undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Cosby failed to respond to the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, facts alleged in
the motion are "admitted without controversy" so long as support for them exists in the record.
Case 4:24-cv-00126-TWP-KMB Document 59 Filed 03/05/26 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f); see S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (party opposing judgment must file response
brief and identify disputed facts). Still, "[e]ven where a non-movant fails to respond to a motion
for summary judgment, the movant still has to show that summary judgment is proper given the
undisputed facts." Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, the facts are presented in the light most favorable to the Estate as the non-
moving party. See Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
On August 22, 2024, Cosby was confined at the Jail as a pretrial detainee. (Dkt. 20 at 2)
(Screening Order). After an incident involving several inmates refusing orders. F Block, where
Cosby was housed, was turned into a segregation block and each allegedly non-complaint inmate
was processed for segregation. As part of processing, each inmate was strip searched. Cosby was
singled out for a humiliating strip search, was sexually assaulted when Lt. Dangler inserted his
fingers into Cosby's anus, and was beaten by Lt. Dangler and Officer Boone while other officers
watched. Id.
A. The Jail's Grievance Process
At all times relevant to this litigation, the Jail had an inmate grievance procedure in effect.
The inmate grievance procedure is part of Floyd County Jail's Inmate Handbook, which is available
to all inmates through the Jail-issued tablets and kiosk system. (Dkt. 44-5 at 2). Each time an
inmate logs into their Jail-issued tablet or kiosk, he must acknowledge that he has read the Inmate
Handbook before he may proceed. Id.
Case 4:24-cv-00126-TWP-KMB Document 59 Filed 03/05/26 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Under the Jail's grievance procedure, inmates wishing to resolve a problem must submit an
inmate grievance form through their Jail-issued tablet or kiosk system. Inmates may submit
grievances about various aspects of institutional life including, but not limited to, a criminal act by
another inmate, a prohibited act by a staff member, abuse, harassment, abridgment of civil rights,
and denial of privileges without just cause. Id. at 10. An appropriate grievance form must include
"the date, time, names of all persons involved, and all pertinent details of the incident including
the name of witnesses." Id. Additionally, any grievance must be filed "within 5 days of the incident
or it will be dismissed." Id.
All properly submitted grievances are "promptly and thoroughly investigated," and inmates
receive a notification when a response to the grievance is provided. Id. If an inmate does not agree
with the response to the grievance, he can appeal within five days of receiving the response. Id. If
the inmate does not agree with the response to the appeal, then the inmate can appeal directly to
the Jail Commander, "advising they do not agree with the appeal response they received." Id. The
Jail Commander then gives the inmate a second appeal response. Id. An appeal to the Jail
Commander with a second response given is the final decision under the Jail's grievance procedure.
Id.
B. Cosby's Participation in the Grievance Process
Cosby did not submit a grievance or request within five days of the August 22, 2024,
interaction. (Dkt. 44-6) (Cosby's grievances). He did, however, file a grievance about the incident
on September 21, 2024. Id. at 7. The initial grievance stated that he had been sexually assaulted,
beat up, and dragged through the jail naked despite the fact that he did not "disrespect any guards
or anything[.]" Id. Two days later, Jail staff member Chris Croy responded, "We looked at the
video together. Furtive movements from staff refuted your claims and you were assigned
Case 4:24-cv-00126-TWP-KMB Document 59 Filed 03/05/26 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
segregation time for your actions that night. You may proceed in any fashion that you deem
necessary, but we have done all that can be done with this incident." Id.
That same day, Cosby filed an appeal in which he argued that he was given segregation for
other inmates' action, that he should not have been assaulted, beaten, and handcuffed naked, and
"you can't do anything thank you for your non help." Id. Lt. Ashley Gibson responded to the appeal
the next day, stating, "Detectives investigated, documents, and determined your sexual assault
claim unfounded." Id. (errors in original).
Cosby filed a second level appeal, in which he reiterated his belief that he had been sexually
assaulted and the victim of excessive force. Id. at 7-8. In the "Final Resolution," Captain Gene
Perrot responded, "This was looked into and unfounded." Id. at 8.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Cosby filed this action alleging that the sexual abuse against him was a coordinated event
directed by Steve Bush, and that Lieutenant Moses and Officer Wingaurd failed to intervene to
prevent it. (Dkt. 20). He further alleges that the abuse was racially motivated due to racial slurs
used by Lieutenant Dangler. Id. Following the interaction, Cosby contends that he was placed in
segregation without justification and for the purpose of preventing him from submitting a
grievance concerning the interaction. Id.
Defendants argue that Floyd County’s grievance procedures were always available to
Cosby, yet he never properly submitted a grievance concerning any of his claims prior to filing
this lawsuit. (Dkt. 44 at 2). 	Consequently, they seek summary judgement arguing that Cosby's
claims are barred pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). Id.
The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies before suing
over prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to
Case 4:24-cv-00126-TWP-KMB Document 59 Filed 03/05/26 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (citation omitted).
"To exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must comply strictly with the prison's
administrative rules by filing grievances and appeals as the rules dictate." Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d
325, 329 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006)). A "prisoner must
submit inmate complaints and appeals 'in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative
rules require.'" Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry,
286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
The Seventh Circuit "has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion." Wilborn v.
Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2018). "An inmate must comply with the administrative
grievance process that the State establishes.…" Id.; see also Ross, 578 U.S. at 639 (the mandatory
language of the PLRA "means a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust…").
Still, if jail administrators resolve a grievance on the merits despite an inmate's
noncompliance with procedural rules, the plaintiff's obligation as to exhaustion has been satisfied.
See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721-22 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Where prison officials address an
inmate's grievance on the merits without rejecting it on procedural grounds, the grievance has
served it function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action, and defendants cannot rely on
the failure to exhaust defense."); see also Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We
have held that a prison grievance rejected solely on the basis of untimeliness will not fulfill the
exhaustion requirement. We have also explained, however, that if prison administrators choose to
consider the merits of an untimely grievance, then the claim has been exhausted.") (internal
citations omitted).
Case 4:24-cv-00126-TWP-KMB Document 59 Filed 03/05/26 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
Here, Defendants' designated evidence reflects that jail administrators resolved the
grievance on the merits by investigating Cosby's claims regarding the incident and telling him that
they concluded his claims were unfounded. The Jail administrators could have rejected the
grievance on the basis that it was untimely or that Cosby did not name the officers involved. But
because they answered his grievance on the merits, he satisfied the purpose of alerting jail staff to
the issue at hand. Maddox, 633 F.3d at 721-22 (failure to name defendants in grievance excused
because prison administrators resolved claims on the merits). See also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 219 (2007) (noting that purpose of grievance process is to alert prison officials of a problem,
not provide personal notice to prison staff that he or she may be sued); Schillinger v. Kiley, 954
F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2020) ("[A]n inmate's complaint will suffice for exhaustion purposes if it
provides notice to the prison of the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.") (cleaned up).
Accordingly, because it is undisputed that Cosby filed every level of grievance required by
the Jail's policy and jail administrators resolved it on the merits, the Court finds Cosby is entitled
to summary judgment on the exhaustion defense, and Defendants motion for summary judgment
is denied.
IV. 	MOTION FOR COUNSEL
On the same day that the Court denied Cosby's second motion for counsel, he filed a
renewed motion for counsel. See Dkt. 46 (July 31, 2025, Order Denying Counsel), (Dkt. 	47).
(Plaintiff's third motion to appoint counsel, docketed July 31).
The renewed motion presents no new information. Id. Further, because the Court finds that
Cosby is entitled to summary judgment, in all likelihood (depending on Defendants' response), this
case will proceed to the merits. The next step will be to issue a scheduling order which governs
discovery. There is no reason why Cosby cannot engage in the discovery process without the
Case 4:24-cv-00126-TWP-KMB Document 59 Filed 03/05/26 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
assistance of counsel, especially since he is not incarcerated. Thus, given the stage of the case, and
for the reasons discussed in the Court's previous order, (Dkt. 46), Cosby's renewed motion for
counsel, is denied without prejudice.
V. 	CONCLUSION AND SHOW CAUSE ORDER
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, Dkt. [43], is
DENIED. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f)(1), the Court gives the Defendants
notice of its intent to grant summary judgment in Cosby's favor on the issue of exhaustion. The
Defendants have through March 18, 2026, to SHOW CAUSE why summary judgment should
not be granted. Alternatively, the Defendants may withdraw their affirmative defense by this date.
Cosby's third Motion for Counsel, Dkt. [47], is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 5, 2026
Distribution:
JERMAINE COSBY
377 S. Galt Ave
Apt #3
Louisville, KY 40206
Patrick Muldoon
BARNES MALONEY PLLC
pmuldoon@sbmkylaw.com
Justin M. Schaefer
BARNES MALONEY PLLC
jschaefer@sbmkylaw.com
Case 4:24-cv-00126-TWP-KMB Document 59 Filed 03/05/26 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>