Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
JOSE LUIS LUNA JIMENEZ, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:26-cv-00004-JPH-MKK
)
BRISON SWEARINGEN Sheriff/Warden
of the Clay County Justice Center,
)
)
KRISTI NOEM Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security,
)
)
PAMELA J. BONDI U.S. Attorney 	)
General, 	)
SAMUEL OLSON Field Office Acting
Director of Enforcement and Removal
Operations, Chicago Field Office,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
)
)
)
)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY,
)
)
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW,
)
)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner Jose Luis Luna Jimenez is detained at the Clay County Jail in
Brazil, 	Indiana, 	under 	the 	authority 	of 	U.S. 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement ("ICE"). He filed this writ of habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 seeking immediate release or, in the alternative, a bond hearing pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Dkt. 2. Mr. Luna Jimenez argues that ICE is unlawfully
detaining him under a statute making him ineligible for bond. Respondents
argue that Mr. Luna Jimenez's detention is lawful and reasonable. Dkt. 9. For
the reasons explained below, the Court grants the petition to the extent that no
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later than 5:00 p.m. on January 16, 2026, Respondents must either: (1)
afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge
pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a); 	or 	(2) 	release 	him 	from 	custody, 	under
reasonable conditions of supervision.
I. 	Background
Mr. Luna Jimenez is a citizen of Mexico. Dkt. 2 ¶ 15. In March 2015, he
entered the United States when he was 14 years old. Dkt. 10 at 1.
On December 16, 2025, Mr. Luna Jimenez was detained by the Indiana
State Police after a traffic stop. Dkt. 9 at 5. The next day, he was detained by ICE
pursuant to a warrant, and the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issued
a Notice to Appear and placed him in removal proceedings under section 240 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Dkt. 9-1 at 4 (Warrant); id. at 5
(Notice to Appear).
The Notice to Appear charges Mr. Luna Jimenez with being subject to
removal under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] as "an alien
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived
in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General" and under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i) of the INA [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)] as "an
immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of
a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other
valid 	entry 	document 	required 	by 	the 	Act." 	Id. 	at 	11. 	The 	"arriving 	alien"
checkbox is unmarked. Id. He was ordered to appear before an immigration
judge on January 9, 2026. To the Court's knowledge, he remains in detention.
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See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Online Detainee Locator
System," https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (search reflecting that Mr. Luna
Jimenez is still housed at the Clay County Detention Center as of January 12,
2026).
Mr. Luna Jimenez filed this habeas petition on January 5. Dkt. 2. The
Court ordered Respondents to show cause why the relief should not be granted
the same day. After reviewing the parties' submissions, the Court now turns to
the petition.
II. 	Discussion
Mr. Luna Jimenez claims that his current detention violates the INA and
due process. Dkt. 2 ¶¶ 60–66. Respondents argue that Mr. Luna Jimenez 's claim
is premature, that he is lawfully detained under the INA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A), 	and 	that 	his 	continued 	detention 	is 	reasonable. 	Dkt. 	9. 	As
explained below, the Court finds that Mr. Luna Jimenez 's detention is unlawful
because he has not been afforded an individualized bond hearing. Because Mr.
Luna Jimenez is entitled to habeas corpus relief on these grounds, the Court
does not address the constitutional arguments.
A. Exhaustion
Respondents 	argue 	that 	Mr. 	Luna 	Jimenez 	's 	claims 	are 	premature
because he has not received a decision on bond from an Immigration Judge. Dkt.
9 at 6. Mr. Luna Jimenez argues that any attempt to exhaust his administrative
remedies would be futile because the BIA has already directly addressed the
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issue of his statutory qualification for bond in Matter of Yajure Hurtado and
Matter of Q. Li. Dkt. 17 at 6–7.
There is no statutory requirement that Petitioner move for a bond hearing
before an immigration judge before seeking habeas relief. In the absence of a
statutory mandate, the Seventh Circuit holds that "sound judicial discretion
governs" whether courts should require exhaustion. Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355
F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004). In similar circumstances, other district courts
determined 	that 	the 	petitioner 	was 	not 	required 	to 	exhaust 	administrative
remedies by seeking a bond hearing before an immigration judge because doing
so would be futile given Matter of Yajure Hurtado's holding. 	Valencia v. Noem,
No. 25-CV-12829, 2025 WL 3042520, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2025) ("Requiring
Petitioner 	to 	exhaust 	his 	administrative 	remedies 	would 	be 	futile 	because
Respondents' position is that he is statutorily precluded from obtaining the relief
he seeks. The Court declines to require exhaustion because [t]here is nothing to
indicate the BIA would change its position [once] the BIA has predetermined the
statutory issue.") (internal quotes and citations omitted); see also Ceballos Ortiz
v. Olson, et al., 2:25-cv-00548-MPB-MJD, dkt. 18 at 2-3, 6-9 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 19,
2025) (finding exhaustion would be futile, proceeding to merits, and ordering
that petitioner be provided a bond hearing). The Court finds the reasoning
applied in these cases persuasive and concludes that Petitioner was not required
to exhaust administrative remedies because doing so would be futile.
B. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1225
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At issue here are 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. While "§ 1226 applies to
aliens 	already 	present 	in 	the 	United 	States," 	U.S. 	immigration 	law 	also
"authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the
country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)." Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 	281,
303 (2018). Section 1226 governs the "usual" removal process, which involves
an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8
U.S.C. § 1229(a), also known as "full removal," by filing a Notice to Appear with
the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (BIA
2011).
Section 1226(a) provides:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is
to 	be 	removed 	from 	the 	United 	States. 	. 	. 	. 	[T]he 	Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond . . . or
(B) conditional parole.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). "Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under §
1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention." Jennings, 583 U.S. at
306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1); see also
8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). At that hearing, the noncitizen "may secure his
release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight
risk and no danger to the community." Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98
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(2019) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)); see also Hernandez v. Sessions,
872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he burden is on the non-citizen to
'establish to the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge . . . that he or she does
not present a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national
security, and does not pose a risk of flight.'") (citing In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec.
37, 38 (BIA 2006)).
Section 1225(b)(1) deals with "inspection of aliens arriving in the United
States and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled" and
provides 	that 	immigration 	officers 	shall 	order 	certain 	noncitizens 	removed
without further hearing or review unless the noncitizen indicates an intention to
apply for asylum. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This applies to noncitizens who have engaged
in misrepresentation or have failed to meet document requirements under §§
1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7). Id.
Section 1225(b)(2) pertains to "[i]nspection of other aliens." In relevant
part, it provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,
if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained 	for 	a 	proceeding 	under 	section 	1229a 	of 	this 	title." 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). An "applicant for admission" is "[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)." 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1). In other words, noncitizens subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for
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expedited removal but are subject to mandatory detention while their removal
proceedings are pending.
C. Mr. Luna Jimenez Is Eligible for a Bond Hearing Pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a)
The record reflects that Mr. Luna Jimenez is eligible for a bond hearing
under § 1226(a).
Respondents argue that Mr. Luna Jimenez is subject to the broader
"catchall provision" in § 1225(b)(2) because he is an "applicant for admission"
according to § 1225(a)(1), who is not covered by the narrower provisions for
"arriving aliens" in § 1225(b)(1), and who is "not clearly and beyond doubt
entitled to be admitted." Dkt. 9 at 8-9.
The Court has previously determined that considering § 1225 as a whole,
the most natural meaning is that it applies to "arriving" noncitizens attempting
to enter the United States rather than undocumented aliens like Mr. Luna
Jimenez who have lived in the interior of the United States for years. See
Alejandro v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-02027-JPH-MKK, 2025 WL 2896348, at *7 (S.D.
Ind. Oct. 11, 2025); Mendoza-Loera v. Warden, Clay Co. Jail, 2:25-cv-00554-JPH-
MJD, dkt. 16 at 8−11 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2025). As the Court has previously
explained, Respondents' interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain
meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between §§ 1225 and
1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is
inconsistent 	with 	decades 	of 	prior 	statutory 	interpretation 	and 	practice.
Alejandro, 2025 WL 2896348, at *14-19. Respondents have cited no binding
precedent to the contrary. In Mendoza-Loera, 2:25-cv-00554-JPH-MJD, the
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Court found that the few district court decisions adopting the Respondents'
interpretation of § 1225 were distinguishable or otherwise unpersuasive.
The Court concludes that Mr. Luna Jimenez is entitled to a bond hearing
under § 1226, and it declines to reach Mr. Luna Jimenez's other arguments.
III. 	Scope of Relief
Mr. Luna Jimenez is entitled to habeas relief because his continued
detention without a bond hearing violates ". . . the laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The remaining question is the remedy, which
should be "appropriate to the violation." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50
(1984). Mr. Luna Jimenez requests immediate release from custody or, in the
alternative, 	an 	individualized 	bond 	hearing 	before 	an 	immigration 	judge.
Immediate release is the customary remedy in habeas proceedings. See Dep't of
Homeland 	Sec. 	v. 	Thuraissigiam, 	591 	U.S. 	103, 	107 	(2020) 	("Habeas 	has
traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful detention."); Munaf
v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 698 (2008) (explaining that "the quintessential habeas
remedy" is release from custody). 	However, the Court finds that it would not be
in the interests of justice to order Mr. Luna Jimenez's immediate release and
instead orders Respondents to provide him an individualized bond hearing as
required by § 1226(a).
IV. 	Conclusion
The Court grants the petition to the extent that no later than 5:00 p.m.
on January 16, 2026, Respondents must either: (1) provide Mr. Luna Jimenez
with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8
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U.S.C. § 1226(a); or (2) release him from custody, under reasonable conditions
of supervision. No later than January 18, 2026, Respondents must file a notice
with the Court certifying that they have complied with the Court's order. The
clerk is directed to enter final judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
All ECF-Registered Counsel of Record
Date: 1/13/2026
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