HACKNER v. JOHNS et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
DE'SHAY JARNAIZE HACKNER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-00377-JPH-MJD
)
STEPHEN C. JOHNS, 	)
LEXISNEXIS DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS,
)
)
IDOC COMMISSIONER, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff De'Shay Hackner is a prisoner at Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility. He filed this civil action alleging that another inmate defamed him by
filing a lawsuit with false accusations. Because Mr. Hackner is incarcerated, this
Court must screen the complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a), (c).
I. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
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(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720
(7th Cir. 2017).
II. The Complaint
Mr. Hackner names three defendants: (1) fellow inmate Stephen C. Johns,
(2) Lexis Nexis Director of Operations, and (3) IDOC Commissioner.
Mr. Hackner alleges that, in February 2021 while he was housed at Miami
Correctional Facility, Inmate Johns falsely accused Mr. Hackner of sexually
assaulting him, despite the two inmates never having met or interacted with one
another. Mr. Hackner subsequently learned that Inmate Johns made this false
accusation by filing a civil lawsuit in an effort to accelerate his transfer to a lower-
level-security prison. Mr. Hackner alleges that Inmate Johns defamed him.
The lawsuit appears on Lexis Nexis. Thus, Mr. Hackner wants to hold Lexis
Nexis liable for defaming him, too.
Inmate 	Johns 	was 	eventually 	transferred 	to 	a 	different 	facility. 	Mr.
Hackner has named the IDOC Commissioner as a defendant because he wrote
letters to the Commissioner in February 2021 complaining that although Mr.
Hackner 	had 	been 	cleared 	of 	the 	sexual 	assault 	accusation 	by 	Miami
Correctional staff, the Commissioner still allowed the lawsuit to be filed. Further,
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Mr. Hackner believes the Commissioner treated Inmate Johns better than Mr.
Hackner because Mr. Hackner is black, while Inmate Johns is white.
Mr. Hackner is suing for monetary damages and injunctive relief in the
form of the lawsuit being removed from Lexis Nexis and the Commissioner being
removed from his post.
III. Dismissal of Complaint
Applying the screening standard to the facts alleged in the complaint, the
complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
First, any claim against the IDOC Commissioner would be dismissed as
being barred by the statute of limitations. Suits under § 1983 use the statute of
limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims. In
Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards
v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34–11–2–4. "Although
untimeliness is an affirmative defense, a complaint can be dismissed sua sponte
if a valid affirmative defense is so plain from the face of the complaint that the
suit is frivolous." Baldwin v. Raemisch, 788 F. App'x 390, 392 (7th Cir. 2019)
(citing Muhammad-Ali v. Final Call, Inc., 832 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2016)). Here, Mr.
Hackner states that these events occurred in February 2021 and that he wrote
to the IDOC Commissioner at that time to complain about the lawsuit. He did
not file this lawsuit until August 2025, long after the statute of limitations had
expired.
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Further, Mr. Hackner has failed to state a constitutional claim against the
IDOC Commissioner. Any plaintiff alleging an equal protection claim must raise
a reasonable inference that he was intentionally treated differently from similarly
situated inmates. See 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759, 771 (7th Cir.
2021) ("class of one" claims); Alston v. City of Madison, 853 F.3d 901, 906 (7th
Cir. 2017) (class-based discrimination claims). Mr. Hackner has not sufficiently
alleged a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. He states that he was
treated differently based on his race because Inmate Johns was transferred due
to the filing of the lawsuit. But he does not allege that he wanted to be transferred
and 	was 	denied 	that 	ability. 	Thus, 	there 	is 	no 	indication 	that 	he 	was
discriminated against based on his race or for any other reason, and any equal
protection claim is dismissed.
Further, 	Mr. 	Hackner 	alleges 	that 	the 	Commissioner 	violated 	his
constitutional rights by "allowing" Inmate Johns to file a lawsuit. This claim is
dismissed for failure to state a claim. "Individual liability under § 1983 …
requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation." Colbert
v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).
The Commissioner has no ability to prevent an inmate, or any other individual,
from filing a lawsuit. Rather, the Court is open for anyone to file a lawsuit,
whether it is meritorious or frivolous.
Because the Court has dismissed Mr. Hackner's federal constitutional
claims, 	it declines 	to 	exercise 	supplemental jurisdiction 	over 	his 	state-law
defamation claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio,
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Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) ("The district courts
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . .
. "); Ex rel. Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis
added) ("Indeed, when the federal claims are dismissed before trial, there is a
presumption that the court will relinquish jurisdiction over any remaining state
law claims."). These claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Because the Court has been unable to identify a viable claim for relief
against any particular defendant, the complaint is subject to dismissal.
Further, because the Court has not identified a viable claim, Mr. Hackner's
motion for preliminary injunction, dkt. [8], is denied without prejudice. Until a
defendant 	has 	been 	served 	and 	appeared 	in 	this 	action, 	the request 	for
preliminary injunction is premature. See Maddox v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
528 F. App'x 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) ("An injunction, like any enforcement
action, may be entered only against a litigant, that is, a party that has been
served and is under the jurisdiction of the district court.") (internal quotation
omitted).
IV. Opportunity to Show Cause
Mr. Hackner's complaint must be dismissed for each of the reasons set
forth above. He has through February 27, 2026, in which to show cause why
Judgment consistent with this Order should not issue. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart
Stores, 	Inc., 	722 	F.3d 	1014, 	1022 	(7th 	Cir. 	2013) 	("Without 	at 	least 	an
opportunity to amend or to respond to an order to show cause, an IFP applicant's
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case could be tossed out of court without giving the applicant any timely notice
or opportunity to be heard to clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend.");
Jennings v. City of Indianapolis, 637 F. App'x 954, 954–955 (7th Cir. 2016) ("In
keeping with this court's advice in cases such as Luevano . . . , the court gave
Jennings 14 days in which to show cause why the case should not be dismissed
on that basis.").
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
DE'SHAY JARNAIZE HACKNER
200955
WABASH VALLEY - CF
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
6908 S. Old US Hwy 41
CARLISLE, IN 47838
Date: 2/9/2026
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