USA v. MEEHAN

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:22-cr-00002-JPH-CMM
)
SHANE M. MEEHAN, 	) 	-01
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
Shane Meehan was indicted in January 2022 with offenses punishable
by the death penalty, including the premeditated murder of a federal officer.
The government included special findings related to aggravating factors in that
indictment, leaving its final decision whether to seek the death penalty for later
in this case after its internal decision-making process. 	The Court and the
parties acknowledged at the outset of this case that the government's decision
whether it would seek the death penalty would fundamentally impact the
Court's management of the case and the parties' case strategy. 	About six
months after the indictment was returned, and after the Court held several
status conferences regarding the government's decision, the government
informed the Court and Mr. Meehan that it would not seek the death penalty if
Mr. Meehan were found guilty. 	With that decision, which the government
confirmed was its final decision, the case proceeded on the premise that this
was no longer a death-penalty case.
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More than three years later, the government reversed course, informing
the Court and Mr. Meehan that it would seek the death penalty. 	Mr. Meehan
objects, arguing that the government is bound by its previous decision to not
seek the death penalty and that putting the death penalty back on the table at
this juncture is unlawful, prejudicial, and fundamentally unfair. 	He therefore
has filed a motion to strike the government's notice of intent to seek the death
penalty. 	For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Meehan's motion to strike the
government's notice of intent to seek the death penalty is GRANTED. 	Dkt.
[175].
I.
Facts and Background
On July 7, 2021, Federal Bureau of Investigation Task Force Officer Greg
Ferency was shot and killed outside the FBI's Terre Haute office. 	Shortly
thereafter, the United States charged Mr. Meehan in a criminal complaint with
the premeditated murder of TFO Ferency. 	Dkt. 10.
On January 19, 2022, the United States filed a grand jury indictment
charging Mr. Meehan with: (1) premeditated murder of a federal officer in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114; (2) attempted arson of federal property in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1); and (3) use/carry/discharge of a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence, causing death, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(j). 	Dkt. 39. 	For Counts 1 and 3, the statutory maximum penalty
is death. 	18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b), 1114(a); 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). 	The indictment
included special findings that preserved the government's ability to seek the
death penalty. 	Id. at 3–4; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591, 3592.
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From the very start of the case, the Court and the parties acknowledged
that the government's decision as to whether it would seek the death penalty
would fundamentally impact how the case would be managed and litigated. 	At
the April 25, 2022, status conference, the government outlined the process that
the Department of Justice, including "Main Justice" in Washington, D.C.,
would follow to determine whether to seek the death penalty. 	Dkt. 68 at 4–7.
Also at this conference, defense counsel explained "why death penalty cases are
different." 	Id. at 9. 	Because of those fundamental differences, she concluded,
"when I'm looking at this case as a death penalty lawyer, I'm looking at it very
differently than I am as just a defense lawyer who is battling the Government
and their ability to prove all of their elements beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 	Id.
at 11–12. 	Citing the Department of Justice Manual, defense counsel asked the
Court to "schedule a deadline for filing a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty." 	Id. at 14. 	The government responded that the DOJ's decision-
making process was lengthy and complex, so it couldn't predict when it would
have a decision. 	Id. at 17–18. 	Because it was unknown at that point whether
the government would seek the death penalty, the Court did not set a trial date
and instead set the case for another status conference in June 2022. 	Id. at 22–
23.
At the June status conference, approximately six months after the
indictment was filed, the government informed the Court that while its internal
process was moving forward, no decision had been made. 	Dkt. 76 at 3–4. 	So,
the Court again did not set a trial date and scheduled another status
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conference, for July 28, 2022. 	Id. at 6. 	The Court also ordered that by that
date, the government was to either notify defense counsel that it will
recommend an expedited decision that it would not seek the death penalty or
have made a firm commitment as to a date when defense counsel may make
their mitigation presentation to decision-makers at the U.S. Attorney's Office.
Id.
On July 11, 2022, the government filed its notice that it would not seek
the death penalty:
Dkt. 75.
At the July 28, 2022, status conference, the Court asked the government
if its notice "represents the final decision having been made and approved at all
necessary levels at Main Justice," and the government confirmed that it did.
Dkt. 166 at 2. 	The Court stated that resolution of the death penalty issue was
a "game changer, creating a different landscape" of the case, id. at 6, and set
the case for trial commencing on May 8, 2023, dkt. 80.
On February 21, 2023, however, defense counsel filed a motion for a
psychological evaluation to determine if Mr. Meehan was competent, that is,
whether he was unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
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proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. 	Dkt. 81; see 18
U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4242. 	So, beginning in March 2023, Mr. Meehan underwent a
series of psychological evaluations. 	Dkt. 82; dkt. 119; dkt. 121; dkt. 124; dkt.
141; dkt. 151; dkt. 163; dkt. 176. 	Meanwhile, on April 5, 2024, defense
counsel provided notice of an insanity defense. 	Dkt. 122; see Fed. R. Crim. P.
12.2(a). 	Proceedings related to psychological evaluations and the restoration
process have taken more than two years, see dkt. 154, resulting in multiple
continuances of the trial date. see dkt. 125; dkt. 138; dkt. 154; dkt. 177. 	Trial
is currently set for August 17, 2026. 	Dkt. 182.
On November 18, 2025, while the parties were in the process of
preparing filings related to the competency evaluations, dkt. 173, the
government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, indicating that if
Mr. Meehan is convicted of Count 1 or Count 3, then "the United States will
seek a sentence of death." 	Dkt. 170. 	Mr. Meehan has filed a motion to strike
that notice. 	Dkt. 175.
II.
Analysis
Mr. Meehan sets forth several legal bases in support of his position that
the government must be held to its decision announced on July 11, 2022, that
it would not seek the death penalty. 	Dkt. 175 at 10–24. 	The government
responds that regardless of its prior notice that it would not seek the death
penalty and the passage of several years, it still has the authority and
discretion to change its position and seek the death penalty. 	Dkt. 185.
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Having considered all arguments raised by the parties, the Court
concludes that the doctrine of judicial estoppel, applied to the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, precludes the government from seeking the death
penalty here. 	The government does not identify changed circumstances related
to this case, such as newly discovered evidence or a change in the law, in
support of its position. 	As the government's brief explains, the previous
presidential administration chose to not pursue the death penalty against Mr.
Meehan and the current presidential administration "reconsidered and
reversed" that decision.1 Dkt. 185 at 16. 	While the Executive Branch has
extremely broad discretion to decide whether and when to seek the death
penalty, it may not do so here where more than three years have passed since
the government represented to the Court and defense counsel that it had
unequivocally decided that it would not seek the death penalty.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel "protect[s] the integrity of the judicial
process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to
1 The decision to reverse course, as Mr. Meehan points out, was preceded by President
Trump's Executive Order 14164 signed January 20, 2025, "Restoring the Death
Penalty and Protecting Public Safety," which ordered the Attorney General to seek the
death penalty in certain cases, including cases involving the murder of a law
enforcement officer. Dkt. 175 at 8; 90 Fed. Reg. 8463. Thereafter, Attorney General
Bondi issued a February 5, 2025 memorandum to attorneys in the Department of
Justice titled, "Reviving the Federal Death Penalty and Lifting the Moratorium on
Federal Executions." Dkt. 175 at 8-9. Attorney General Bondi's memo states, "Absent
significant mitigating circumstances, federal prosecutors are expected to seek the
death penalty in cases involving the murder of a law-enforcement officer." Id. at 9.
The memorandum further also directed the Capital Review Committee "to review no-
seek decisions in all pending capital-eligible cases (i.e., death-eligible cases that have
not yet resulted in a conviction) charged between January 20, 2021, and January 19,
2025. This group shall reevaluate no-seek decisions and whether additional capital
charges are appropriate. . . . The review required by this paragraph shall be completed
within 120 days." Id.
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the exigencies of the moment." 	New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50
(2001); see Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.
2014); Levinson v. United States, 969 F.2d 260, 265 (7th Cir. 1992). 	So "where
a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in
maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests
have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of
the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken." 	Zedner v. United
States, 547 U.S. 489, 504 (2006).
The government first argues that "it is unclear whether judicial estoppel
can even apply to the federal government." 	Dkt. 185 at 14. 	While the Supreme
Court has stated that "the Government may not be estopped on the same terms
as any other litigant," it has been "hesitant . . . to say that there are no cases in
which the public interest in ensuring that the government can enforce the law
free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of
citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their
dealings with the government." Heckler v. Cmty. Heath Servs. of Crawford
Cnty., 467 U.S. 51, 60–61 (1984); see also Niz–Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S.
155, 172 (2021) ("If men must turn square corners when they deal with the
government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square
corners when it deals with them."). 	And in Maine, the Supreme Court applied
judicial estoppel against New Hampshire while recognizing the same underlying
concerns about applying estoppel against a state government. 	532 U.S. at
755–56; see also United States v. Penn. Indus. Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655,
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674 (1973) (explaining that the government can be "prevent[ed] . . . from
proceeding" with a federal criminal prosecution if the defendant relied on
federal guidance indicating that its conduct was not criminal). 	The
government's status therefore is not an exemption, but an important part of
the estoppel analysis. 	Given the Supreme Court's admonitions in these cases,
the Court approaches Mr. Meehan's judicial estoppel argument with great
caution and care, mindful that "the Government may not be estopped on the
same terms as any other litigant." Maine, 532 U.S. at 755–56.
While the doctrine of judicial estoppel is equitable and therefore "cannot
be reduced to a precise formula or test," it typically focuses on several factors.
Zedner, 547 U.S. at 504. 	"First, a party's later position must be clearly
inconsistent with its earlier position." 	Id. "Second, courts regularly inquire
whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's
earlier position." 	Id. 	And a "third consideration is whether the party seeking to
assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an
unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped." 	Id.
Here, the government's notice of intent to seek the death penalty is a
complete reversal that is "clearly inconsistent" with its prior decision to not
seek the death penalty. 	Id. And the government was not merely correcting
some "inadvertence or mistake," Maine, 532 U.S. at 754, as the decision in July
2022 to not seek the death penalty was made deliberately after a careful,
months-long process within and among the United States Attorney's Office and
Main Justice. 	See dkt. 68; dkt. 75; dkt. 76 (describing the process that the
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government followed between July 2021 and July 2022 that culminated with
the decision to not seek the death penalty against Mr. Meehan). 	Indeed, the
government concedes that it intentionally reversed its position after more than
three years of pursuing this prosecution under its prior "notice to the Court
that it will not seek the death penalty in this cause." 	Dkt. 75; dkt. 185 at 16.
The Court also accepted the government's decision not to seek the death
penalty at the July 28, 2022 status conference, more than three years before
the government's reversal. 	At that conference, the Court asked, and the
government confirmed, that its decision not to seek the death penalty had
"been made and approved at all necessary levels" and was its "final decision."
Dkt. 166 at 2. 	In fact, the very purpose of the Court's status conferences
during the early stages of this case was to ensure that the government reached
a timely decision whether to seek the death penalty that the Court and Mr.
Meehan could rely on. 	See dkt. 68 at 23–24; dkt. 166 at 2.
So, after the "no seek" decision was made in July 2022, the Court then
turned to the next steps in the case—including discovery and a trial date—that
were ripe after the government's decision. 	Dkt. 166; see dkt. 76. 	Similarly, the
subsequent competency proceedings in this case have been directed solely at
Mr. Meehan's competency to stand trial and a potential insanity defense—not
to any aspects of potential death-penalty litigation. 	See dkt. 82; dkt. 121; dkt.
141; dkt. 167; dkt. 174. 	This procedural path reflects the Court's acceptance
of the government's decision not to seek the death penalty. See United States v.
Spurlock, 782 F. Supp. 3d 987, 1010 (D. Nev. 2025) (striking the government's
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notice that it would seek the death penalty based on judicial estoppel); United
States v. Suarez, 801 F. Supp. 3d 872, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (same); United
States v. Constanza–Galdomez, 787 F. Supp. 3d 131, 147–48 (D. Md. 2025)
(same)
Next, the government's reversal would impose an unfair detriment on Mr.
Meehan. 	The government does not contest that, after its "final" decision that it
would not seek the death penalty, "defense counsel strategized as if this were
not a death penalty case" for more than three years. 	Dkt. 175 at 3. 	Moreover,
Mr. Meehan's counsel explained in April 2022 that strategic decisions are
fundamentally different in a death penalty case. 	Dkt. 68 at 9 (explaining that,
based on 39 years working on capital cases, "they are quantitatively and
qualitatively different" than "a murder case on steroids" and from the beginning
must be approached "very differently than [just] battling the government and
their ability to prove all of their elements beyond a reasonable doubt"); accord
Spurlock, 782 F. Supp. 3d at 1011–12. 	In other words, as the Court recognized
at the time, the government's decision not to seek the death penalty was "a
game changer, creating a different landscape." 	Dkt. 166 at 6; accord
Constanza–Galdomez, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 148 ("At every step, preparation for a
death penalty trial differs from preparation for an ordinary criminal trial.").
This case has been proceeding on that landscape for more than three years—
through substantial developments including extensive competency
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proceedings—and it would be unfairly prejudicial to fundamentally alter it
now.2
The government's argument that Mr. Meehan could not have "reasonably
relied" on the "no-seek" notice "because there was no clear and definite
promise" ignores the nature of death penalty cases. 	Dkt. 185 at 17–18. 	As
explained above, the fundamental differences between death penalty cases and
non-death penalty cases affect case management and defense strategy from the
earliest stages of a case. 	See Spurlock, 782 F. Supp. 3d at 1011–12
("Preparation for a non-capital trial cannot be simply imported into a capital
case, with its combined guilt and penalty phases. 	In order to present an
'integrated defense theory' in a capital case, it is 'critical' that such a theory be
formulated 'well before trial.'" (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases)).
In short, and as evident from the complex docket, the Court and defense
counsel have made numerous decisions over more than four years that have
shaped the case to its present form. 	It would be impossible to review this
docket and meaningfully evaluate the extent to which each of those decisions
were made in reliance of the government's no-seek notice from July 2022.
Suffice to say that the no-seek decision underpinned and infused every one of
the decisions, leaving no way to fully, fairly, and meaningfully restore the
2 The government argues that bad faith is required for judicial estoppel, dkt. 185 at
15, but neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has imposed that
requirement, see Zedner, 547 U.S. at 504, so the Court addresses unfair detriment
without determining whether the government acted in bad faith.
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parties to the positions they would have been in had the government never
provided its "final" no-seek notice. 	Simply put, the bell cannot be unrung.
Finally, as discussed above, estoppel is applied more sparingly when the
government is the party to be estopped. 	Maine, 532 U.S. at 755; see Heckler,
467 U.S. at 60 ("[I]t is well settled that the government may not be estopped on
the same terms as any other litigant."). 	That's because "broad interests of
public policy may make it important to allow a change of positions" to not
"compromise a governmental interest in enforcing the law." 	Maine, 532 U.S. at
755. 	But the government can be estopped even from pursuing a criminal
prosecution if it misleads a defendant into believing that its conduct was not
criminal. 	See Penn. Indus. Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. at 674 ("[W]e think there
can be no doubt that traditional notions of fairness inherent in our system of
criminal justice prevent the government from proceeding with the
prosecution."); Heckler, 467 U.S. at 60 n.12. 	The same principle applies here,
when the government has formally informed the Court and the defendant of its
final decision that it will not seek the death penalty. See Spurlock, 782 F.
Supp. 3d at 1010; Suarez, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 877; Constanza–Galdomez, 787
F. Supp. 3d at 147–48.
Applying judicial estoppel in this case therefore would not "compromise a
governmental interest in enforcing the law." 	Maine, 532 U.S. at 755. The
charges against Mr. Meehan are proceeding, with two of the charges carrying a
mandatory life sentence. 	18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b), 1114(a); 18 U.S.C. § 924(j).
Seeking the death penalty, by contrast, is discretionary on the part of the
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government based on whether it "believes that the circumstances of the offense
are such that a sentence of death is justified." 	18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). 	The
government made that decision in this case, after full consideration, in the
summer of 2022. 	See dkt. 75; dkt. 166. 	There have been no changes in the
"pertinent statutory provisions" or "in facts essential to the prior" decision.
Maine, 532 U.S. at 755. 	Instead, the government's notice cites only facts
underlying the charges against Mr. Meehan that were known to the government
at the time of its initial decision not to seek the death penalty. 	Dkt. 170; see
Maine, 532 U.S. at 749 ("Where a party assumes a certain position in a legal
proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter,
simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position.").
In this situation, the government's reliance on public policy
considerations carries less weight. 	See United States v. Owen, 54 F.3d 271,
275 (6th Cir. 1995) (cited in Maine, 432 U.S. at 755) (judicially estopping the
government from making an argument previously "presented by the
government and accepted by the Court"). 	As the Supreme Court has explained,
the public's interest in the government's ability to enforce a law—here, a
discretionary penalty—can be "outweighed by the countervailing interest of
citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their
dealings with their government." 	Heckler, 467 U.S. at 60. That countervailing
interest is at its highest in this case, when the government reverses its position
on such an important issue with no relevant changes in law or facts after years
of reliance. 	See Maine, 532 U.S. at 749.
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* 	* 	*
In sum, the Court's decision here does not address whether the
government may ever seek the death penalty after filing a notice that it would
not do so. 	See Maine, 532 U.S. at 751. ("[W]e do not establish inflexible
prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of
judicial estoppel. 	Additional considerations may inform the doctrine's
application in specific factual contexts."). 	"In this case, [the Court] simply
observe[s] that the factors above firmly tip the balance of equities in favor of
barring" the government from reversing its decision not to seek the death
penalty. 	Id. 	The government's notice of intent to seek the death penalty is
therefore prohibited by judicial estoppel.3
III.
Conclusion
Mr. Meehan's motion to strike the government's notice of intent to seek
the death penalty is GRANTED, dkt. [175], and the notice is STRICKEN WITH
PREJUDICE, dkt. [170].
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
All electronically registered counsel
3 The Court therefore does not address Mr. Meehan's other arguments in favor of
striking the government's notice of intent.
Date: 2/17/2026
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