STANLEY et al v. BROWN COUNTY ELECTION BOARD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
RICHARD STANLEY, JR., 	)
TIM CLARK, 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 1:25-cv-01482-TWP-MKK
)
BROWN COUNTY ELECTION BOARD, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Filing
No. 27) filed by Defendant Brown County Election Board (the "Election Board"), as well as a
Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 25) and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Filing
No. 29) filed by Plaintiffs Richard Stanley, Jr. ("Stanley") and Tim Clark ("Clark") (together,
"Plaintiffs"). Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit alleging that the Election Board's enforcement of the
Indiana Republican Party's decision—that Plaintiffs are not Republicans in good standing for a
period of five years and thus may not appear on the Republican primary ballot—violates Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights (Filing No. 1). For the reasons discussed below, the Election Board's Motion
to Dismiss is granted, Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied, and their Motion
for Summary Judgment is denied as moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On December 20, 2024, Stanley, as counsel for Clark, filed a complaint with the Indiana
Republican Party asserting that the chairman of the local Republican Party violated "GOP Rule 1-
25" (Filing No. 22-1 at 1). In the complaint, Clark requested that the Indiana Republican Party
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remove the local Republican Chairman from his office and ban him from running for elected office
for five years as a Republican. Id. On January 23, 2024, the District 9 Officers of the Indiana
Republican Party held a hearing on Clark's complaint. Id. At the end of the hearing, the District 9
Officers issued a written decision dismissing Clark's complaint against the local Republican
chairman and determining that both Stanley and Clark are not Republicans in good standing for a
period of five years. Id. Specifically, the written decision stated that Clark is not a Republican in
good standing "because of his long and well-documented history of opposition to Republican
candidates, financial support for candidates opposing Republican nominees, and frequent public
self-declarations of being an independent." (Filing No. 1-7 at 2). The decision found that Stanley
is not a Republican in good standing "because of his contribution to independent candidate Greg
Taggart." Id.
On February 5, 2025, Stanley and Clark filed an appeal with the Indiana Republican Party
(Filing No. 22-1 at 2). On May 14, 2025, the Indiana Republican Party issued a written decision
upholding the District 9 Officers' decision in its entirety. Id. On July 2, 2025, Stanley sent a copy
of a draft civil complaint to the Election Board and requested it issue a written statement refusing
to enforce the decision of the Indiana Republican Party. That same day, the chairman of the
Election Board responded but declined to state whether the Election Board intends to enforce the
Indiana Republican Party's decision against Stanley and Clark. Id. On July 16, 2025, Stanley sent
a follow-up letter to the Election Board concerning a potential lawsuit. Id. at 3. The Election Board
did not respond. Id.
Because he is "concerned about dysfunction in his local government and corruption in the
local Republican party," Stanley recently confirmed that he intends to run for elected office in
Brown County as a Republican and announced in a public forum his plans to run for the elected
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office of County Commissioner in Brown County Indiana in the 2026 election cycle (Filing No.
22-1 at 2). The deadline to file a declaration of candidacy for major political party primary
nomination is February 6, 2026.
Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on July 25, 2025 (Filing No. 1) and filed their Amended
Complaint on November 12, 2025 (Filing No. 22-1). That same day, Plaintiffs filed the instant
Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 25). On December 12, 2025, the Election Board moved
to dismiss the Amended Complaint (Filing No. 27). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed their Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction (Filing No. 29). On January 15, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a motion to
submit additional legal authority (Filing No. 35), which the Court granted (Filing No. 37). This
case is now ripe for ruling on the various motions.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint
that has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When
deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all factual allegations
in the complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski v. Cnty. of Kane, 550
F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008). However, courts "are not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions
or unsupported conclusions of fact." Hickey v. O'Bannon, 287 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2002).
The complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United
States Supreme Court explained that the complaint must allege facts that are "enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level." 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The allegations must "give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly,
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550 U.S. at 555. Stated differently, the complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
The question is whether relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established
consistent with the allegations. Northern Trust, 69 F.3d at 129. To be facially plausible, the
complaint must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
B. 	Preliminary Injunction Standard
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. In each
case, courts must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each
party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the party seeking relief must show:
(1) it has some likelihood of success on the merits of its claim; (2) it has no adequate
remedy at law; (3) without relief it will suffer irreparable harm. If the plaintiff fails
to meet any of these threshold requirements, the court must deny the injunction.
However, if the plaintiff passes that threshold, the court must weigh the harm that
the plaintiff will suffer absent an injunction against the harm to the defendant from
an injunction, and consider whether an injunction is in the public interest.
GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield, 922 F.3d 357, 364 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). "The court weighs the balance of potential harms on a 'sliding scale'
against the movant's likelihood of success: the more likely he is to win, the less the balance of
harms must weigh in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the more it must weigh in his favor."
Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2015).
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C. 	Summary Judgment Standard
The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in
order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary
judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hemsworth v.
Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court reviews "the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "However, inferences that are supported by only speculation or
conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion." Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624,
627 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).
Additionally, "[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on
its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted).
"The opposing party cannot meet this burden with conclusory statements or speculation but only
with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence." Sink v. Knox County Hosp., 900 F.
Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).
Here, Defendant failed to respond to the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, facts
alleged in the motion are "admitted without controversy" so long as support for them exists in the
record. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f); see S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (party opposing judgment must file
response brief and identify disputed facts). "Even where a non-movant fails to respond to a motion
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for summary judgment, the movant still has to show that summary judgment is proper given the
undisputed facts." Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert that the Indiana Republican Party's decision—finding them not in good
standing for a period of five years—violates federal constitutional principles of due process, equal
protection, and freedom of speech. As a result of this situation, Plaintiffs argue, "the Brown County
Election Board is . . . at risk of violating the U.S. Constitution if it enforces the private decision of
the Indiana Republican Party." (Filing No. 26 at 1). Plaintiffs contend the Election Board cannot
enforce the Indiana Republican Party's decision preventing them from running for office as
Republicans without enmeshing itself in multiple violations of the Constitution. Id.
The Election Board argues the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because "[a]bsent
from Plaintiffs' Complaint are any allegations of actions taken, policies made, decisions upheld or
denial of candidate filings that involve the Plaintiffs or Brown County." (Filing No. 27-1 at 1). And
because the Election Board "has taken zero action against or involving Plaintiffs['] desire to run
for elected office," Plaintiffs have no standing to bring their claims and this controversy is not ripe
for judicial review. Id.
The Court will address the Election Board's Motion to Dismiss first, because it is
dispositive.
A. 	Motion to Dismiss
The Amended Complaint seeks declaratory relief and a permanent injunction enjoining the
Election Board from enforcing the Indiana Republican Party's determination that Plaintiffs are not
Republicans in good standing (Filing No. 22-1 at 4). A party seeking a permanent injunction must
demonstrate:
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(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy
in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). In addition, a permanent injunction
requires success on the merits, not just a likelihood of success. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-
Woodridge Fire Prot. Dist., 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012).
The Election Board argues that Plaintiffs have requested relief against the Election Board
before any action has been taken (Filing No. 27-1 at 1). It asserts that not only has no action been
taken, but Plaintiffs purported constitutional violations were allegedly committed by the Indiana
Republican Party, which is not a party to this lawsuit. The Election Board adds that Plaintiffs are
not asking the Court to declare whether the decision of the Indiana Republican Party is valid; rather
they ask the Court, ad hoc, to unconditionally and permanently bar a local unit of government from
following the law for the foreseeable future. Id. at 2. The Election Board argues that Plaintiffs have
failed to meet even the bare minimum requirement for pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (8)(a) because no relief can be given when no harm by the Election Board has been
done. Id. at 3.
In their Response, Plaintiffs cite Hero v. Lake County Election Board, 42 F.4th 768 (7th
Cir. 2022), arguing that it is squarely on point and that this Court has jurisdiction over this case
(Filing No. 28 at 1–2). In Hero, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the district
court did have jurisdiction to hear Hero's similar claims against the Lake County Election Board.
Hero, 42 F.4th at 771–75. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Hero lost on the merits of his case, but they
argue that it nonetheless undercuts the Election Board's Motion.
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Plaintiffs explain that they have not sued the Indiana Republican Party because it is a
private organization. They assert that the Election Board, as a government body, is bound by the
U.S. Constitution and thus cannot enforce the Indiana Republican Party's decision against them.
Plaintiffs argue to do so would convert what is otherwise an internal private decision into an
unlawful governmental restriction on their constitutional rights. Id.
In response to the Election Board's contention that no actions have been taken, Plaintiffs
argue that the Election Board did act because Plaintiffs' letter to the Election Board explained that
a nonresponse would be interpreted as an intention to enforce the decision. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs then
cite other Seventh Circuit precedent—Wisconsin Right to Life State Political Action Committee v.
Barland, 664 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 2011)—for the proposition that they satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). The court
in Barland explained that "[r]ipeness concerns may arise when a case involves uncertain or
contingent events that may not occur as anticipated, or not occur at all. Whether a claim is ripe for
adjudication depends on the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties
of withholding court consideration." Id. at 148.
This Court agrees that it must first determine whether Plaintiffs have standing and whether
the case is ripe. The Court will address each issue in turn before turning to the merits of the Election
Board's Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
1. 	Standing
Article III of the Constitution limits judicial power to "Cases" and "Controversies," U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, "a limitation that confines federal courts 'to the traditional role of Anglo-
American courts, which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons
caused by private or official violation of law.'" Barland, 664 F.3d at 139 (quoting Summers v. Earth
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Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009)). "The doctrine of standing enforces this constitutional
limitation." Id.
"To satisfy standing, a party must demonstrate an injury in fact that is traceable to the
defendant and is redressable by a court ruling." Big Shoulders Cap. LLC v. San Luis & Rio Grande
R.R., 13 F.4th 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423
(2021)). "An injury in fact must be concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent." Id.
"'[T]raditional tangible harms, such as physical harms and monetary harms' will 'readily qualify as
concrete injuries.'" Id. (quoting Ramirez, 594 U.S. at 425). "But if a concrete injury has not already
occurred, a plaintiff cannot establish standing by alleging merely a possible future injury—rather,
the injury must be 'certainly impending.'" Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398,
409 (2013) (emphases in original). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a concrete or
imminent injury. Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC, 2 F.4th 1002, 1007–
08 (7th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiffs submitted supplemental authority, citing the United States Supreme Court
decision in Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 607 U.S. ---, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 431 (2026). In
Bost, the Supreme Court held that a political candidate had standing to challenge the rules that
govern the counting of votes in his election. Id. at *5. The Supreme Court then held that,
Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must have a personal stake in a case
to have standing to sue. They must, in other words, be able to answer a basic
question What's it to you? Congressman Bost has an obvious answer: He is a
candidate for office. And a candidate has a personal stake in the rules that govern
the counting of votes in his election.
Id. at *7–8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court went on to say,
"[c]andidates, in short, are not 'mere bystanders' in their own elections. They have an obvious
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personal stake in how the result is determined and regarded. Departures from the preordained rules
cause them particularized and concrete harm." Id. at *11 (internal citation omitted).
This authority is persuasive, and the Court agrees that Plaintiffs have standing. As Plaintiffs
argue, if a political candidate has standing to challenge the rules for counting votes well before
any actual voting has occurred, then political candidates such as Plaintiffs, who have announced
their candidacy, may challenge decisions excluding them from access to a ballot.
In addition to the holding in Bost, Plaintiffs have demonstrated imminent harm and thus
have standing. Plaintiffs will be denied access to the Republican ballot, and such harm is certainly
impending, as the deadline for political candidates to file their declarations of candidacy for major
political party primary nominations—February 6, 2026—is approaching.
2. 	Ripeness
The ripeness doctrine "is based on the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirements as
well as discretionary prudential considerations." Barland, 664 F.3d at 148. "Ripeness concerns
may arise when a case involves uncertain or contingent events that may not occur as anticipated,
or not occur at all." Id. "Whether a claim is ripe for adjudication depends on the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Id.
(citation modified). Claims presenting purely legal issues are normally fit for judicial decision. Id.
(citing Abbott Lab'ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). "And in challenges to laws that chill
protected speech, the hardship of postponing judicial review weighs heavily in favor of hearing
the case." Id.
As with standing, the Court finds that this case is ripe for judicial review. This case does
not involve uncertain or contingent events that may not occur as anticipated or at all. Rather, the
sole issue is whether Plaintiffs' constitutional rights will be violated by the impending decision by
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the Election Board to uphold the Indiana Republican Party's decision. Though it is true, as the
Election Board argues, it has not yet stated whether it will enforce the Indiana Republican Party's
decision, the writing is on the wall. Were it planning to repudiate the Indiana Republican Party's
decision, this lawsuit would not have been filed. Accordingly, this case is ripe for judicial review.
3. 	Merits of the Election Board's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
Although Plaintiffs have standing and this case is ripe for review, that does not end the
analysis. While it is true that a motion to dismiss may be granted on the grounds that a plaintiff
does not have standing or the case is not ripe, the proper vehicle for doing so is a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); see Apex
Digit., Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (standing); Flying J Inc. v.
City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 2008) (ripeness). Here, the Election Board moves
for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)—rather than Rule 12(b)(1)—on the grounds that even if all of
Plaintiffs' allegations are true, they fail to state a claim for relief. The Court agrees with the Election
Board that even if all of Plaintiffs' allegations are true, their claims fail.
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights (Filing No. 22-1 at 3). Plaintiffs contend, albeit in their summary judgment motion, that the
Election Board's enforcement of the Indiana Republican Party's decision will violate their due
process rights because GOP Rule 1-25 is being used by the Indiana Republican Party as a
discriminatory tool to protect party leadership, and the State of Indiana cannot participate in a
discriminatory scheme via the Election Board (Filing No. 26 at 21). Plaintiffs also assert that the
enforcement by the Election Board will deprive them of their equal protection rights because the
Indiana Republican Party's decision to "convict" Plaintiffs was made in a "selective and vindictive"
way. Id. at 25. Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that their freedom of speech rights will be violated because
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the Indiana Republican Party only made its decision because Plaintiffs wrote a letter requesting
the party ban the Republican chairman from running for office for five years. Id. at 28.
"The First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of citizens and political parties
to participate in the electoral system." Hero, 42 F.4th at 775 (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279,
288 (1992)). The Seventh Circuit has stated that "the Anderson/Burdick test applies to all First and
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state election laws." Id. (citation modified) (emphasis in
original). The Anderson-Burdick framework derives from two Supreme Court cases, Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). See Hero, 42 F.4th
at 775. In Anderson, the United States Supreme Court held that Ohio's early filing deadline, which
required candidates to declare their candidacy in March ahead of a November election, was
unlawful. 460 U.S. at 786–87. However, in Burdick, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Hawaii law prohibiting write-in voting. 504 U.S. at 432–33. Hawaii had an interest in avoiding
unrestrained factionalism, and the Supreme Court found that the law imposed a low burden. Id. at
433–40.
The resulting test requires courts to engage in a two-part inquiry:
First, [the court] determine[s] whether the law imposes severe or reasonable and
nondiscriminatory restrictions on candidates' and voters' constitutional rights so
that [the court] can ensure application of the appropriate level of scrutiny. Second
[the court] must determine whether the state interest offered in support of the law
is sufficiently weighty under the appropriate level of scrutiny.
Hero, 42 F.4th at 775–76 (citation modified). "Severe restrictions on voter rights trigger strict
scrutiny, whereas courts generally defer to the state's interest for less restrictive ones, those that
impose reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions." Id. at 776 (citation modified).
As mentioned earlier by Plaintiffs, their case is akin to Hero v. Lake County Election Board,
42 F.4th 768 (7th Cir. 2022). In Hero, the town council decided to exercise its eminent domain
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authority to seize property of low-income residents. Id. at 770. The plaintiff, Hero, opposed the
measure 	and 	backed 	independent 	candidates 	to 	replace 	two 	incumbent 	Republican
councilmembers. Id. The Indiana Republican Party banned Hero from the Republican party for ten
years after learning of his actions. Id. When Hero attempted to appear as a Republican on the Lake
County election ballot, the Lake County Election Board sided with the Indiana Republican Party
and struck Hero's name from the ballot. Id. Hero then sued the Lake County Election Board seeking
declaratory relief and an injunction arguing that his First and Fourteenth Amendments rights were
violated—the same arguments Plaintiffs raise before this Court. Id.
In Hero, the Seventh Circuit determined that the Lake County Election Board did not
violate Hero's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 776. The court explained that striking
Hero's name from the ballot merely imposed a minor restriction on his ballot access because
Indiana law provides alternative measures such as running as an independent. Id. As an
independent, Hero could tout his Republican virtues, tell voters he supports Republicans, and run
on a platform identical to any political party. Id. The only limitation was that Hero could not appear
on the Republican Party's primary ballot. Id.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the restriction was reasonable and nondiscriminatory
because the State of Indiana had an interest in protecting a party's right to determine its own
membership and limit its candidates to those party members. Id. at 776–77 (citing Ray v. Blair,
343 U.S. 214 (1952) (party loyalty oath); Kucinich v. Tex. Democratic Party, 563 F.3d 161 (5th
Cir. 2009) (party loyalty oath); De La Fuente v. Cortes, 751 F. App'x 269 (3d Cir. 2018) (sore-loser
law); (S.C. Green Party v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 612 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 2010) (sore-loser
law)). The Seventh Circuit added that "[p]olitical parties enjoy these associational rights like any
other organization. And '[i]n no area is the political association's right to exclude more important
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than in the process of selecting its nominee.'" Id. at 777 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000)).
Here, the Election Board did not violate Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
As in Hero, Plaintiffs have alternative means of accessing the general election ballot and may run
as independents. And Plaintiffs may tout any views they wish, including their support for
Republicans. They merely cannot appear on the Republican Party's primary ballot.
The Court also finds the restriction in this case to be reasonable and nondiscriminatory.
First, the state has an interest in protecting a party's right to determine its membership and
candidates. Id. "Implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment is a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Id. (citation modified). "The forced inclusion
of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of expressive association if the
presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints." Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000). Thus, the Indiana Republican
Party has the right to exclude Plaintiffs from appearing on the Republican primary ballot.
Second, while Plaintiffs use the word "discriminatory," nothing they argue points to a
discriminatory scheme on part of the Indiana Republican Party. Plaintiffs claim that they were
discriminated against because GOP Rule 1-25 is being used as a tool to protect party leadership
rather than to exclude individuals who disagree with party viewpoints (Filing No. 26 at 21).
However, the Indiana Republican Party found that Clark is not a Republican in good standing
"because of his long and well-documented history of opposition to Republican candidates,
financial support for candidates opposing Republican nominees, and frequent public self-
declarations of being an independent." (Filing No. 1-7 at 2). The Indiana Republican Party then
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found Stanley to not be a Republican in good standing "because of his contribution to independent
candidate Greg Taggart." Id. As such, Hero controls as "political parties may accordingly protect
themselves from intrusion by those with adverse political principles." 42 F.4th at 777 (citation
modified). "[S]o too can a state protect the First Amendment rights of a political party, as the
Election Board did here by allowing the Republican Party to determine its own membership and
restrict its standard bearers to members in good standing." Id. And like Hero, Plaintiffs can still
access the general election ballot and may run as independents.
The Court finds that even taking Plaintiffs' assertions as true, their claims fail under Rule
12(b)(6), and their request for a permanent injunction fails, as they have no likelihood of success
on the merits of their claims. See ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 672 F.3d at 498. Accordingly, the Election
Board's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
B. 	Motion for Preliminary Injunction
"Out of an abundance of caution," Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction
because the deadline for political candidates to file declarations of candidacy for major political
party primary nominations is February 6, 2026 (Filing No. 29 at 1). Plaintiffs submit that "they are
entitled to a preliminary injunction prior to February 6, 2026 preventing the Brown County
Election Board from removing Mr. Stanley from the 2026 Republican primary ballot." Id. at 4.
Having granted the Election Board's Motion to Dismiss above, Plaintiffs have no likelihood
of success on the merits, so their Motion for Preliminary Injunction fails at step one. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied.
C. 	Motion for Summary Judgment
Because the Court granted the Election Board's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied as moot. See Vasquez v. Gertler & Gertler, Ltd., 987 F. Supp. 652,
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659 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Bradley Mem'l Hosp. v. Leavitt, 599 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18 (D.D.C. 2009)
(finding motion for summary judgment moot because court granted defendant's motion to dismiss).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Election Board's Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 27) is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Filing No. 29) is DENIED, and
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 25) is DENIED AS MOOT.
This lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice.
Final Judgment shall issue separately.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 	1/27/2026
Distribution:
Samantha Elaine DeWester
DeWester Law, LLC
sdewester@gmail.com
Richard Stanley, Jr
stanleyiplaw@yahoo.com
Case 1:25-cv-01482-TWP-MKK Document 41 Filed 01/27/26 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:
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