Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
CLIFFORD B.,1 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-01192-JMS-TAB
)
FRANK J. BISIGNANO , Commissioner of Social
Security Administration,
)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
Plaintiff Clifford B. applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
("DIB") from the Social Security Administration ("SSA") on February 6, 2023, with a disability
onset date of November 29, 2022. [Filing No. 9-5 at 5-9.] His application was denied initially on
May 26, 2023, [Filing No. 9-4 at 8-11], and upon reconsideration on September 25, 2023, [Filing
No. 9-4 at 15-17]. Administrative Law Judge Monica LaPolt ("the ALJ") conducted a hearing on
March 22, 2024, [Filing No. 9-2 at 43-70], before issuing a decision on April 26, 2024 in which
she concluded that Clifford B. was not entitled to benefits, [Filing No. 9-2 at 26-38]. The Appeals
Council denied review on April 18, 2025. [Filing No. 9-2 at 2-5.] On June 17, 2025, Clifford B.
filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking a review of the denial of his benefits.
[Filing No. 1.]
1 To protect the privacy interests of claimants for Social Security benefits, consistent with the
recommendation 	of 	the 	Court 	Administration 	and 	Case 	Management 	Committee 	of 	the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to
use only the first name and last initial of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial
review opinions.
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I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The Social Security Administration provides benefits to individuals who cannot obtain
work because of a physical or mental disability." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1151
(2019). Disability is the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Hess v. O'Malley, 92 F.4th 671, 677 (7th
Cir. 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)).
When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, the Court "will reverse an ALJ's
decision only if it is the result of an error of law or if it is unsupported by substantial
evidence." Martin v. Kijakazi, 88 F.4th 726, 729 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d
893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021)). Substantial evidence is "evidence that 'a reasonable mind might accept
as 	adequate 	to 	support 	a 	conclusion.'" Zoch 	v. 	Saul, 	981 	F.3d 	597, 	601 	(7th 	Cir.
2020) (quoting Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154). "Although this Court reviews the record as a whole,
it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the SSA by reevaluating the facts, or reweighing
the evidence to decide whether a claimant is in fact disabled." Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323,
327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 	Reviewing courts also "do not decide questions of
credibility, deferring instead to the ALJ's conclusions unless 'patently wrong.'" Zoch, 981 F.3d at
601 (quoting Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2017)). 	"But even under this
deferential standard of review, an ALJ 'must provide a logical bridge between the evidence and
[the] conclusions.'" Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Butler v.
Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021)).
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The 	SSA 	applies 	a 	five-step 	evaluation 	to 	determine 	whether 	the 	claimant 	is
disabled. Hess, 92 F.4th at 677 (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4). The ALJ must evaluate the following, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed;
(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
(3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments
listed by the [Commissioner];
(4) whether the claimant can perform [his] past work; and
(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy.
Hess, 92 F.4th at 677 (quoting Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001)). A claimant
is disabled if he satisfies Steps One, Two, and Three. Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 898. If a claimant
satisfies Steps One and Two, but not Step Three, the claimant must then satisfy Step Four to be
found disabled. See id. "The burden of proof is on the plaintiff at steps one through four, but the
burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five." Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644, 651 (7th Cir.
2022). "[I]f the ALJ can make a conclusive finding at any step that the claimant either is or is not
disabled, then [he] need not progress to the next step." Hess, 92 F.4th at 677-78 (quotations and
citation omitted).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant's residual
functional capacity ("RFC"), which is an assessment of "the most an individual can work despite
his or her limitations or restrictions." Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773 (citation omitted). An ALJ
must consider seven strength functions when assessing a claimant's RFC to work: "lifting,
carrying, sitting, standing, walking, pushing, and pulling." Id. at 773-74 (citing SSR 96-8p, 61
Fed. Reg. 34474, 34475 (July 2, 1996)). An ALJ must also describe "how the evidence supports
each conclusion [on strength functions], citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings)
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and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations)." 	Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773
(quoting SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34478). "In making a proper RFC determination, the ALJ
must consider all of the relevant evidence in the record, even limitations that are not severe and
may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling." Id. at 774 (quotations and citation
omitted). "Essentially, an ALJ's RFC analysis 'must say enough to enable review of whether the
ALJ considered the totality of a claimant's limitations.'" Id. (quoting Lothridge v. Saul, 984 F.3d
1227, 1233 (7th Cir. 2021)). The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant
can perform his own past relevant work and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant
can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.920(a)(4)(iv), (v).
If the ALJ's decision "uses the correct legal standards, is supported by substantial evidence,
and builds an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the ALJ's conclusions," the Court
must affirm the denial of benefits. Hess, 92 F.4th at 677 (quotations and citation omitted); Chavez
v. O'Malley, 96 F.4th 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 2024). But if the ALJ's decision "is based on incorrect
legal standards or unsupported by substantive evidence," the Court will remand for further
consideration. Baptist v. Kijakazi, 74 F.4th 437, 441 (7th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted).
II.
BACKGROUND
Clifford B. was 63 years of age on his alleged onset date. [See Filing No. 9-5 at 2.] He has
a high school education and previously worked as a machine operator and a mixer operator.2
[Filing No. 9-2 at 49-54.]
2 The relevant evidence of record is amply set forth in the parties' briefs and need not be repeated
here. Specific facts relevant to the Court's disposition of this case are discussed below.
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The ALJ determined that Clifford B. meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through June 30, 2026. 	[Filing No. 9-2 at 28.] 	The ALJ followed the five-step
sequential evaluation set forth by the SSA in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and ultimately concluded
that Clifford B. was not disabled. 	[Filing No. 9-2 at 26-38.] 	Specifically, the ALJ found as
follows:
• 	At Step One, Clifford B. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity3 since
November 29, 2022, the alleged onset date. [Filing No. 9-2 at 28.]
• 	At Step Two, Clifford B. has the following severe impairment: right chest wall
neuropathy. [Filing No. 9-2 at 28-29.]
• 	At Step Three, he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments.
[Filing No. 9-2 at 29.]
• 	After Step Three but before Step Four, Clifford B. had the RFC to perform "the
full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)." [Filing No. 9-2 at
29-37.]
• 	At Step Four, Clifford B. was able to perform past relevant work as a machine
operator. [Filing No. 9-2 at 37.]
III.
DISCUSSION
Clifford B. raises three issues: (1) the ALJ failed to account for all of Clifford B.'s
impairments when formulating the RFC; (2) the RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence; and (3) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the subjective symptom testimony. [Filing
No. 11 at 5-12.] The Court addresses each issue in turn.
3 Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity that is both substantial (i.e., involves
significant physical or mental activities) and gainful (i.e., work that is usually done for pay or
profit, whether or not a profit is realized). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a).
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A. 	Impairment Determination
Clifford B. argues that the ALJ erred by not qualifying his bilateral shoulder issues as a
"severe, non-severe, or non-medically determinable impairment." [Filing No. 11 at 6.] He points
to medical records reflecting that he had bilateral shoulder pain and "crepitus of the left shoulder
and decreased range of motion with pain or abduction greater than 120 degrees and with post-
flexion and internal rotation." 	[Filing No. 11 at 6.] 	Clifford B. contends that the ALJ did not
discuss his shoulder issues when assessing his severe impairments and that "even if the ALJ had
concluded that [his] shoulder issues were non-severe, the ALJ should have found appropriate
functional limitations in the RFC assessment that accounted for them" [Filing No. 11 at 6.]
The Commissioner argues in response that the only reference to bilateral shoulder pain that
Clifford B. points to indicates that his right shoulder pain had resolved six months earlier. [Filing
No. 13 at 5.] He notes that the ALJ considered Clifford B.'s "minimal left shoulder treatment and
resolved right shoulder complaint" later in her opinion as part of the RFC analysis and that Clifford
B. "does not explain how a single treatment note from June 2023 that indicated some crepitus
(popping) and reduced range of motion, but no swelling, weakness, tenderness, or pain with lifting
and that was treated with a prescription for a nonsteroid anti-inflammatory and a referral to
physical therapy translates to a severe impairment mandating RFC limitations." [Filing No. 13 at
5-7.] 	The Commissioner asserts that Clifford B. does not identify what limitations in his RFC
would have addressed his non-severe left shoulder pain and does not cite to any medical evidence
"showing specific functional work limitations or that he would be limited to such a degree as to
preclude employment." 	[Filing No. 13 at 7-8.] 	He argues further that the ALJ only needs to
consider all impairments, including non-severe impairments, in determining the RFC and is not
obligated to impose RFC limitations from non-severe impairments. 	[Filing No. 13 at 8.] 	The
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Commissioner contends that the ALJ "specifically recounted the minimal record medical evidence
as to [Clifford B.'s] left shoulder pain," and "more than sufficiently articulated and supported her
RFC finding." [Filing No. 13 at 8.]
In his reply, Clifford B. argues that the ALJ only discussed the treatment for shoulder pain
"in the context of evaluating the evidence of record as a whole," and "did not list any impairment
in connection with [his] shoulder issues and did not discuss this portion of his treatment in the
context of assessing severe impairments." [Filing No. 14 at 2.] He reiterates that even if the ALJ
found that his shoulder issues were non-severe, she "should have found appropriate functional
limitations in the RFC assessment that accounted for them." [Filing No. 14 at 2-3.]
At the hearing, Clifford B. testified regarding issues with his right side, but focused on the
after-effects of his right middle lobe lobectomy with right upper lobe wedge resection and
mediastinal lymph node dissection, along with cryoablation of the intercostal nerves, and feeling
tired. [See Filing No. 9-2 at 59-66 (Clifford B. testifying that he did not feel "100% healed" from
the surgery, that he has nerve issues from nerve blocks done during surgery on his right side, and
that he is able to complete household chores but sometimes feels tired and short of breath).]
Notably, he did not raise any issues with his shoulders nor did his attorney question him regarding
his left shoulder. [See Filing No. 9-2 at 48-66.]
The ALJ acknowledged and discussed Clifford B.'s shoulder issues in connection with her
RFC finding, stating:
The claimant presented to his primary care provider, Dr. Vanita Yakhmi, M.D., on
June 1, 2023, with complaint of left-sided shoulder pain, ongoing for one month,
aggravated by certain movements and a report of right-sided shoulder pain the prior
January, for which he was referred to Physical Therapy, and which resolved shortly
thereafter…. On examination, he was noted to have crepitus of the left shoulder
and decreased range of motion with pain on abduction greater than 120 degrees and
with post-flexion and internal rotation, with normal strength…. He was assessed
with acute pain of the left shoulder and referred to Physical Therapy, and he was
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assessed with neuropathic pain, with plans to continue with gabapentin 600 mg
three times per day and to continue care with Thoracic Surgery.
[Filing No. 9-2 at 34.] The ALJ noted, "[a]s to precipitating and aggravating factors, I have taken
these matters into account in assessing the claimant's [RFC]." [Filing No. 9-2 at 35.] She limited
Clifford B. to "the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)." [Filing No. 9-2 at
29.]
The medical records that the ALJ acknowledged in connection with her RFC finding are
the only records to which Clifford B. points. [See Filing No. 11 at 6; Filing No. 14 at 2-3.] The
Seventh Circuit has held that "[w]hen no doctor's opinion indicates greater limitations than those
found by the ALJ, there is no error." Dudley v. Berryhill, 773 F. App'x 838, 843 (7th Cir. 2019)
(citing Rice v. Barnhard, 384 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 904
("A fundamental problem is [the claimant] offered no opinion from any doctor to set…any other
limits, greater than those the ALJ set."). Clifford B. has not pointed to any medical records that
would support a limitation greater than the RFC the ALJ imposed.
Additionally, an ALJ "doesn't need to address every piece of evidence, but he or she can't
ignore a line of evidence supporting a finding of disability." Deborah M. v. Saul, 994 F.3d 785,
788 (7th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases (citing Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1162 (7th Cir. 2010)).
The Court finds it significant that Clifford B. did not raise any issues with his shoulders during the
ALJ's hearing, nor did his counsel ask him about any shoulder issues. See Skinner v. Astrue, 478
F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2007) (a claimant represented by counsel is presumed to have made his
best case for benefits). And although Clifford B. discussed issues with his right side during the
hearing, he tied those issues to the surgery and the cryoablation, not to a shoulder issue. [See Filing
No. 9-2 at 59-66.] Further, Clifford B.'s medical records reflect that any right shoulder issues had
resolved with physical therapy. [See Filing No. 9-8 at 375-76.]
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As for Clifford B.'s argument that even if his shoulder issues were not severe the ALJ was
still required to consider them in connection with his RFC, the Court acknowledges that the ALJ
"must determine whether or not the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that is
'severe' or a combination of impairments that is 'severe.'" 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Further, an
ALJ's decision must be based on consideration of all relevant evidence and her conclusions must
be stated in a manner sufficient to permit an informed review. Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d
605, 610 (7th Cir. 1984). 	Here, the ALJ recognized the medical evidence of shoulder pain and
noted "[a]s to precipitating and aggravating factors, I have taken these matters into account in
assessing the claimant's [RFC]." [Filing No. 9-2 at 35.] She then explained that "given [Clifford
B.'s] status post lung resection and chemotherapy for lung cancer, as well as his neuropathy, I
restricted the claimant to the full range of light work, to reduce stressors from greater exertional
demands and consistent with his level of activities of daily living as set forth in [a Function Report]
and in his hearing testimony." [Filing No. 9-2 at 35.] This minimal articulation indicating that
she considered the combination of Clifford B.'s symptoms and conditions is sufficient. 	See
Orlando v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1985) ("We examine the [ALJ's] opinion as a
whole to ascertain whether [she] considered all of the relevant evidence, made the required
determinations, and gave supporting reasons for [her] decisions.").
Based on the lack of testimony regarding shoulder issues, the lack of medical evidence
indicating that shoulder issues warranted a more limited RFC, and the fact that the ALJ
acknowledged and considered the limited evidence relating to shoulder issues, the Court finds that
the ALJ sufficiently considered Clifford B.'s shoulder issues and that remand is not warranted.
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B. 	RFC Determination
Next, Clifford B. argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence and that he cannot perform work at the light exertional level, pointing to medical records
showing that he had a mass, "moderate upper lobe predominant emphysema," and "lingular
calcified granuloma" in 2022; he underwent "right middle lobe lobectomy with right upper lobe
wedge and mediastinal lymph node dissection" in January 2023; he had nodules and lesions that
were likely cysts in April 2023; he had a small pulmonary nodule in August 2023; and he had an
unchanged right upper lobe nodule and liver lesions in November 2023. [Filing No. 11 at 7-8.]
Clifford B. contends that "a decision to impose exertional imitations is consistent with the
exertional limitations opined by the non-examining State Agency examiners" and that the ALJ
"insert[ed] her own lay interpretation of raw medical data to justify her RFC determination" when
she "found the only opinion evidence of record to be partially persuasive and assessed less
restrictive limitations than was initially opined," and when she "concluded [that Clifford B.'s] lung
cancer and status post…right lung resection were non-severe because subsequent imaging shows
no recurrence of the disease, following resection and treatment with chemotherapy." [Filing No.
at 8-9 (quotation and citation omitted).] He notes that the VE classified his previous jobs as "light
and performed as heavy" (machine operator) and "medium" (mixer operator), so the ALJ should
have concluded that Clifford B. could not perform his past relevant work. [Filing No. 11 at 9.]
Because he was over 60 at the time of the ALJ's decision, Clifford B. argues that a finding that he
could not perform his past relevant work would have led to a finding of disability so the ALJ's
error was not harmless. [Filing No. 11 at 9.]
In his response, the Commissioner argues that Clifford B. points to medical evidence from
before his lung cancer surgery yet acknowledges that he has recovered from lung cancer, that
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Clifford B. does not identify any ongoing issues that require accommodations despite claiming
that they exist, and that "the ALJ's decision reflects that she considered [Clifford B.'s] lung cancer
and other lung impairments at Step Two and throughout her decision." [Filing No. 13 at 10.] As
for adopting a less restrictive RFC than that recommended by state-agency medical consultants,
the Commissioner contends that the ALJ was not required to adopt a particular physician's opinion
and the ALJ "provided a detailed analysis of the record evidence before finding that [Clifford B.]
could perform light work." 	[Filing No. 13 at 10-11.] 	The Commissioner argues further that
Clifford B. "ignores that the medical consultants opined that he could perform light work and the
only additional limitations they offered were that he could frequently perform all postural
movements," the machine operator position is light as performed in the national economy, a
claimant is not disabled if he can perform his past relevant work either as performed or as
performed in the national economy, and the machine operator position as performed in the national
economy requires "no more than frequent postural movements." [Filing No. 13 at 11.]
In his reply, Clifford B. points to the same medical records and reiterates his argument that
he is not able to perform the full range of light exertional work. [Filing No. 14 at 3-4.] He also
reiterates his arguments that the state-agency examiners found that some exertional limitations
were appropriate, that the ALJ "insert[ed] her own lay interpretation of raw medical data to justify
her RFC determination," and that the ALJ's error was not harmless. [Filing No. 14 at 4-5.]
The RFC is an indication of the most that the claimant can do in a work setting despite his
mental and physical limitations, and must incorporate all of the claimant's limitations supported
by the medical record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545; Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015);
Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 2014). While the ALJ need not discuss every piece
of evidence in the record, the ALJ must "build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to
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[the] conclusion" so that the reviewing court "'may assess the validity of the agency's final decision
and afford [a claimant] meaningful review.'" Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotations omitted); see also Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2012)
("Although an ALJ need not mention every snippet of evidence in the record, the ALJ must connect
the evidence to the conclusion; in so doing, [she] may not ignore entire lines of contrary
evidence."); Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 889 ("[T]he ALJ's analysis must provide some glimpse into the
reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits."). "The RFC assessment must always consider
and address medical source opinions. If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a
medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted." SSR 96-8p.
Here, the ALJ discussed all of the medical evidence to which Clifford B. points. [See Filing
No. 9-2 at 32-36.] She noted that she was restricting Clifford B. to the full range of light work due
to his "status post lung resection and chemotherapy for lung cancer as well as his neuropathy," that
the restriction to light work was "consistent with his level of activities of daily living as set forth
in [a Function Report] and in his hearing testimony," and that while Clifford B. has required
"surveillance and monitoring," gabapentin was discontinued with no other treatment provided and
"[t]he lack of more extensive treatment is inconsistent with the existence of a disabling
impairment." [Filing No. 9-2 at 35-36.]
As for the state-agency examiner, the ALJ discussed its opinion, noted that the opinion "is
mostly supported by and consistent with the claimant's treatment records that demonstrate reports
of neuropathy," but noted that "given [Clifford B.'s] improvement in symptoms, such that he
discontinued the medication of gabapentin that was prescribed for the neuropathy, the state agency
opinion is not entirely persuasive, as the evidence supports the claimant's ability to perform the
full range of light work, as set forth in the above stated [RFC]." [Filing No. 9-2 at 36-37.] The
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ALJ was not required to adopt the state agency examiner's opinion, but only had to consider and
address the opinion and build a logical bridge to her conclusion. See Giles, 483 F.3d at 487; SSR
96-8p. She has done this.
Additionally, the ALJ's RFC discussion is thorough and the Court has not identified
instances of the ALJ "inserting her own lay interpretation of raw medical data to justify her RFC
determination." [Filing No. 11 at 8.] Rather, she noted that medical records show that Clifford
B.'s lung cancer has not recurred and discussed other medical records in detail. [Filing No. 9-2 at
32-36.] Clifford B. has not pointed to medical evidence indicating that he cannot perform light
work. 	And while the VE testified that Clifford B.'s past job as a machine operator was "light,
actually performed as heavy," Clifford B. need only be able to perform the job either as he
performed it ("heavy") or as performed generally ("light"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b) (noting that
a VE may offer expert opinion testimony regarding whether claimant can "meet the demands of
the claimant's previous work, either as the claimant actually performed it or as generally performed
in the national economy"). 	Because the machine operator position is light as performed in the
national economy, the ALJ did not err in finding that Clifford B. could perform that job with his
RFC limitation to light work.
Clifford B. has not pointed to any issues with the ALJ's RFC determination that warrant
remand.
C. 	Consideration of Subjective Symptom Testimony
Finally, Clifford B. argues that the ALJ noted Clifford B.'s ability to perform certain daily
activities of living such as managing personal care and hygiene, driving with no problems,
watching television, grocery shopping, preparing meals, washing laundry, cleaning his apartment,
riding his bike, spending time with others once or twice per week, attending church, and watching
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his friends bowl, but "does not explain how [his] performance of these activities equates to the
ability to sustain competitive work at the light exertional level." [Filing No. 11 at 10-11.]
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ "sufficiently analyzed the evidence," and properly
considered Clifford B.'s activities of daily living. 	[Filing No. 13 at 12-13.] 	He contends that
Clifford B. is arguing that the ALJ "equated [Clifford B.'s] activities of daily living with full-time
work," but that there is no indication she did so. [Filing No. 13 at 13-14.] He notes that "activities
of daily living are but one factor under SSR 16-3p" and that "[c]ourts have upheld otherwise well-
supported subjective symptom assessments, even where the ALJ's consideration of daily activities
[was] not fully explained." [Filing No. 13 at 14.]
Clifford B. reiterates his arguments in his reply. [Filing No. 14 at 6-7.]
As the Seventh Circuit has observed, "working sporadically or performing household
chores are not inconsistent with being unable to engage in substantial gainful activity." Engstrand
v. Colvin, 788 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). That is because there are "critical differences between
activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job[.]…[A] person has more flexibility in
scheduling the former than the latter, can get help from other persons…and is not held to a
minimum standard of performance, as she would be by an employer." 	Bjornson v. Astrue, 671
F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). Consequently, an ALJ must strike a balance. On the one hand, an
ALJ may not "equat[e] activities of daily living with an ability to work." Loveless v. Colvin, 810
F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2016). 	On the other hand, "it is entirely permissible to examine…a
claimant's daily activities[ ] to assess whether testimony about the effects of his impairments was
credible or exaggerated." 	Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738, 748 (7th Cir. 2022). 	For example, if
activities of daily living involve the kinds of exertions that contradict the claimant's testimony, the
ALJ can properly discount the claimant's testimony regarding symptoms. 	See, e.g., Mitze v.
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Colvin, 782 F.3d 879, 880-82 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming ALJ's denial of benefits where claimant
trained for a marathon and "ran 5,000 meters in a race.") (emphasis omitted).
Here, the ALJ stated the following regarding Clifford B.'s ability to perform certain daily
activities:
Regarding the claimant's daily activities, the evidence as a whole demonstrates his
limitations are less severe than he alleges. 	Specifically, the claimant is able to
manage his personal care and hygiene, drive with no problems, watch television,
grocery shop, prepare meals, wash laundry, clean his apartment, ride his bike, and
spend time with his others once or twice per week, attend church, and watch his
friends bowl. Accordingly, I find the claimant's daily activities are consistent with
the ability to perform work according to the aforementioned modest residual
functional capacity.
[Filing No. 9-2 at 32.]
The ALJ's statements do not reflect that she was equating Clifford B.'s ability to perform
activities of daily living with the ability to perform light work. Rather, she found that his ability
was inconsistent with his testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms. This is permissible.
Prill, 23 F.4th at 748. 	Further, the ALJ did not put undue emphasis on Clifford B.'s ability to
perform activities of daily living. After making this finding, she went on to provide a five-page,
thorough assessment of the medical evidence before concluding that Clifford B. could engage in
light work. This is not a situation where the ALJ listed the daily activities a claimant could perform
and concluded based only on those activities that the RFC was appropriate.
The Court finds that the ALJ provided a logical bridge from her discussion of Clifford B.'s
ability to perform activities of daily living to her RFC finding and that the ALJ's consideration of
Clifford B.'s activities of daily living was appropriate and does not warrant remand.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
"The standard for disability claims under the Social Security Act is stringent." Williams-
Overstreet v. Astrue, 364 F. App'x 271, 271 (7th Cir. 2010). 	"The Act does not contemplate
degrees of disability or allow for an award based on partial disability." 	Id. (citing Stephens v.
Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 285 (7th Cir. 1985)). "Even claimants with substantial impairments are
not necessarily entitled to benefits, which are paid for by taxes, including taxes paid by those who
work despite serious physical or mental impairments and for whom working is difficult and
painful." Williams-Overstreet, 364 F. App'x at 274. Taken together, the Court can find no legal
basis presented by Clifford B. to reverse the ALJ's decision that he was not disabled during the
relevant period. 	Therefore, the decision below is AFFIRMED. 	Final judgment shall issue
accordingly.
Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record
Date: 1/26/2026
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