AMES v. COMMON WEALTH HOTEL et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
XENA K. AMES, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00869-SEB-MG
)
COMMON WEALTH HOTEL, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment challenging the legal suf-
ficiency of pro se Plaintiff Xena K. Ames's ("Ms. Ames")1 Title VII complaint against her former
employer, Commonwealth Hotel ("Commonwealth"), asserting claims for race-based and retalia-
tory termination of employment for her having filed a claim with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC"), which constituted protected activity on her part. For the reasons
stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. 48.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Procedural History
We must begin by deciphering the somewhat confusing procedural history of this litigation.
Ms. Ames initiated this litigation on May 5, 2025, asserting a laundry list of employment discrim-
ination claims based on her race, color, gender/sex, religion, national origin, disability, and age,
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (race,
color, gender/sex, religion, national origin); the Americans with Disabilities in Employment Act
1 On July 21, 2026, counsel entered an appearance on Ms. Ames's behalf. Dkts. 79, 80. Ms. Ames
has proceeded pro se throughout all relevant portions of this litigation, however.
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of 1967 ("ADA"), 29 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. (disability); and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (age). As an African American woman, Ms.
Ames sought relief for having been subjected to a hostile work environment, denied a promotion,
made to suffer from inequal terms and conditions of employment, and retaliated against by being
wrongfully terminated from her employment with Commonwealth.
On August 11, 2025, Commonwealth moved for partial dismissal of the Complaint, pursu-
ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 20. On August 29, 2025, as Commonwealth's
motion to dismiss remained pending, Ms. Ames moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 30. Approx-
imately one week later, on September 8, 2025, we denied without prejudice Ms. Ames's summary
judgment motion, pursuant to Rule 56(d), because Commonwealth established that additional time
was necessary to conduct fact discovery, which had not yet occurred in the early stages of litiga-
tion. Dkts. 32, 33, 35. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (stating that the court may "deny" a motion
for summary judgment where the "nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition").
On January 23, 2026, we issued an Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Partial Dismis-
sal. Dkt. 66. Confronted as we were by a hodge-podge of court filings by and between the parties,
we sorted through the confusion noting that Ms. Ames's Complaint consisted of allegations en-
compassed within two successive charges of discrimination that Ms. Ames had previously filed
with the EEOC relating to her employment with Commonwealth. The complaints encompassed in
her first charge, filed on August 29, 2024, arose during her employment tenure and included alle-
gations of racial harassment and age discrimination. A notice of Ms. Ames's right to sue issued on
October 25, 2024, thereby triggering the statutory 90-day deadline to file suit. Ms. Ames did not
file suit based on the claims she had raised in her first EEOC complaint. Her failure to file a timely
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lawsuit based on the claims asserted in the first charge of discrimination subjected her to a forfei-
ture of any judicial recovery.
Thereafter, on November 26, 2024, following the termination of her employment on Octo-
ber 1, 2024, Ms. Ames filed a second EEOC charge of discrimination repeating in substance many
if not all of her prior allegations of workplace discrimination, but including a new claim relating
to her termination—that she was wrongfully discharged based on her race and in retaliation for
having engaged in the protected activity of filing an EEOC complaint. The EEOC issued its right
to sue notice on this second claim on April 29, 2025, and this time Ms. Ames responded by timely
filing this lawsuit on May 5, 2025, against Commonwealth. Her complaint, however, included
claims from her first as well as the two new claims in her second charge of discrimination.
Commonwealth's request for partial dismissal of Ms. Ames's claims, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), was directed to all of her discrimination claims except for the wrongful discharge based
on her race and her retaliation claim. Dkt. 20. The Court granted Commonwealth's request for
partial dismissal on January 23, 2026, agreeing that her prior claims had been forfeited but her
racial discrimination discharge and retaliation claims remained for resolution. Dkt. 66.
Prior to the issuance of our ruling on the Motion for Partial Dismissal, Commonwealth
filed on January 5, 2026, a Motion for Summary Judgment directed at Ms. Ames's two surviving
discrimination claims relating to her termination of employment. Dkt. 48. On January 13, 2026,
Ms. Ames submitted two responses to Commonwealth's motion, the first she captioned a "Motion
for Reconsideration," dkt. 59, and the second she designated as her response in opposition, dkt.
60. Nearly a week later, on January 21, 2026, Ms. Ames filed a "Second Motion for Reconsidera-
tion for Summary Judgment." Dkt. 64. (Commonwealth timely opposed both so-called motions
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for reconsideration. Dkts. 63, 65.) Commonwealth's Reply brief in support of its Summary Judg-
ment motion was filed on January 22, 2026. Dkt. 62.
On January 28, 2026, Ms. Ames filed a "Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Facts in
Dispute in Support of [Her Response in] Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment." Dkt. 68.
Arguing that this statement was an impermissible surreply, Commonwealth moved to strike the
brief and memorandum. Dkt. 69. Ms. Ames has filed no response to Commonwealth's motion to
strike, and the time for doing so has long since passed.
Commonwealth's Motion for Summary Judgment is now fully briefed and ripe for decision
as to Ms. Ames's race-based termination and retaliation claims. (Also pending is Commonwealth's
Motion to Strike.) We deem the filings by Ms. Ames captioned "Motions to Reconsider," dkts. 59,
64, to be responses to the motion for summary judgment; despite their titles, they will not be ruled
on as separate motions.2
II. 	Factual Background
Ms. Ames did not provide Commonwealth or the Court a chronology of events leading up
to the filing of her lawsuit, nor did she include other factual details relating to her various claims
of employment discrimination, such as her age, the nature of her disability, a description of her job
2 To the extent that Ms. Ames seeks reconsideration of our September 8, 2025, order denying with-
out prejudice her motion for summary judgment, she has failed to demonstrate that reconsideration
is warranted. "Motions to reconsider serve a limited function, to be used 'where the Court has
patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to
the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.' " Davis v.
Carmel Clay Schs., 286 F.R.D. 411, 412 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (quoting Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester
Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)) (internal citation omitted). Neither of Ms.
Ames's motions to reconsider cogently articulates any such circumstances. Rather, each reflects
her continued disagreement with Commonwealth's supporting evidence as well as her apparent
dissatisfaction with Commonwealth's discovery production. These circumstances do not warrant
reconsideration. In light of Ms. Ames's pro se status, we shall nonetheless construe these supple-
mental filings liberally and treat them as responses to Commonwealth's summary judgment mo-
tion.
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responsibilities, the names of her co-workers and supervisors along with a summary of their job
responsibilities, etc. We were thus required to cull her thirty-eight page complaint to extract the
relevant background facts and circumstances and to rely on Commonwealth's uncontroverted fac-
tual submissions to round out the details.
From our search of the record before us, we gleaned that Ms. Ames was apparently hired
by Commonwealth on February 15, 2024, to fill the position of night auditor, which job she held
until her termination ten months later on October 1, 2024. (As previously noted, her first complaint
was filed with the EEOC on August 29, 2024, and a second EEOC complaint on November 26,
2024, approximately two months following her termination.) As explained in our prior order, the
Complaint filed on May 5, 2025, raises claims for wrongful termination based on her race and in
retaliation for having engaged in protected activity by filing her EEOC complaint, which we re-
solve below.
Ms. Ames's prolix account of the underlying facts reveals a workplace fraught with em-
ployee conflicts, ongoing disagreements between her and co-workers, various offenses and slights
she allegedly suffered at the hands of fellow employees, which discriminatory behaviors, she
claims, were racially motivated against her as an African American woman and for which she
sought vindication through her EEOC complaints. She maintains that during her ten-month tenure
she "continuously reported incidents of discrimination, harassment and retaliation" that went un-
heeded or ignored or resulted in her being called a liar, and that non-African American employees
were consistently treated more favorably. Compl. 18–19, dkt. 1. She further alleges that Common-
wealth "started shortening [her] pay to have her removed as a form of retaliation for filing a [sic]
EEOC complaint." Id. at 22. Finally, she maintains that "Commonwealth did not have a legitimate,
non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory reason, to fire [her]." Id. at 21.
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Commonwealth has submitted two affidavits—one by Kimberly Jennings ("Ms. Jen-
nings"), the other by Sarah Orellana ("Ms. Orellana")—in support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment and as a counter to Ms. Ames's cited discriminatory reasons for her termination of em-
ployment. See generally Jennings Aff., dkt. 48-1; Orellana Aff., dkt. 48-2. Ms. Jennings states in
her affidavit that she served as Commonwealth's Vice President of Human Resources during the
period of Ms. Ames's employment. Jennings Aff. ¶ 1, dkt. 48-1. She explains that Commonwealth
had a personnel policy prohibiting dishonesty by employees and that, on September 11, 2024, Ms.
Ames made "factually specific racial statements" about a co-worker which, when Ms. Jennings
and Ms. Orellana met with Ms. Ames in an effort to investigate her allegations, Ms. Ames ex-
plained by accusing her fellow employee of "merely [being] at her desk with a white cleaning
bottle, which [Ms. Ames] described as being subliminally racist." Id. ¶¶ 2–4. Ms. Ames regarded
the possession of the white cleaning bottle by her co-worker as a "subliminal" white power gesture.
Id. ¶ 4. In addition, as recounted in Ms. Jennings's affidavit, Ms. Ames accused her co-worker of
discussing with other employees certain disclosures (allegedly) previously made by Ms. Ames to
her regarding Ms. Ames's having previously been sexually assaulted. Id. ¶ 3. When Ms. Jennings
requested that Ms. Ames explain the underlying factual basis for this allegation, Ms. Ames again
"responded that her belief was subliminal" and that her co-worker's alleged harmful behavior was
also "subliminal." Id. ¶ 5.
Thereafter, Ms. Jennings, in an effort to investigate Ms. Ames's allegations, confronted the
co-worker about Ms. Ames's accusations of having engaged in subliminal racist behaviors, which
the co-worker totally denied, responding that she had never engaged in any such inappropriate
behaviors towards Ms. Ames, including racially motivated attacks. Id. ¶ 6.
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Ms. Jennings explained in her sworn affidavit that she was the decision maker with respect
to Ms. Ames's firing, and that the following summarizes her decision to terminate Ms. Ames's
employment:
I concluded that [Ms. Ames] had misled or had become dishonest about the above
specific statements of fact. These were negative statements about a co-worker. I
reached the conclusion of dishonesty because [Ms. Ames] had articulated her com-
plaint as statements of fact, then essentially admitted she had no facts to support
the statements. Moreover, [she] offered non-responsive, non-sense answers to di-
rect questions about her statements of fact. . . . [Ms. Ames's] repeated reliance on
the term "subliminal" made no sense.
Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
Continuing, Ms. Jennings stated in her affidavit: "I decided to discharge [Ms. Ames] and
Ms. Orellana concurred. The fact that race was a subject of [Ms. Ames's] complaint was irrelevant
to the outcome. The reasonable belief that dishonest, misleading, negative statements of fact had
been made against a co-employee was the reason for discharge." Id. ¶ 9.
Ms. Jennings concluded: "I did not terminate [Ms. Ames] based on a mere disagreement
with allegations of perceived racism. . . . I have never terminated an employee because I merely
disagreed about an allegation of racism. [Ms. Ames] presented an unprecedented fact pattern be-
cause she articulated nothing rational to support her statements that the conduct in fact occurred,
which supported my conclusion that she had been dishonest and/or had misled us about [the co-
worker]." Id. ¶ 11.
Ms. Orellana's affidavit mirrors the factual averments contained in Ms. Jennings' affidavit.
Ms. Orellana was general manager for Commonwealth and worked at the hotel where Ms. Ames
was employed. In the final paragraph of Ms. Orellana's sworn statement, she stated: "I agreed with
Ms. Jennings that [Ms. Ames] had misled or had been dishonest during our interview. [Ms. Ames]
just kept saying subliminal, which has nothing to do with whether, for example, [the co-worker]
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made statements about a [sexual] assault. Guest Service Agents like [the co-worker] at times hold
white cleaning bottles because they use them to clean. This has nothing to do with race or white
power, and it was misleading for [Ms. Ames] to have said so." Orellana Aff. ¶ 6, dkt. 48-2.
In brief, the two employees of Commonwealth who made the decision to terminate Ms.
Ames's employment and then proceeded to do so based their action on Ms. Ames's dishonesty and
false allegations against her co-worker whom she accused of subliminal racism. The instant record
does not otherwise reveal a connection between Ms. Ames's firing and her pending EEOC com-
plaint.
Ms. Ames has responded to the factual assertions of Ms. Jennings and Ms. Orellana by
claiming that their statements are untrue, and, in any event, her workplace complaints of racism
were never investigated by Commonwealth because it sought to protect the co-worker who was
white at the expense of Ms. Ames. Ms. Ames maintains that in that way the co-worker was treated
more favorably than she was. She argues, but without referencing any specific rebuttal facts to the
contrary, that the two Affiants' statements are not only false, but that "defendant's management
team bullied [her], over talked [her], demoralized [her] in the meeting on October 1, 2024, that
resulted in an unlawful termination while protected by the EEOC." Dkt. 60 at 2.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Because summary judgment requires "no genuine issue of material fact," "the mere exist-
ence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247−48
(1986) (emphasis in original). Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit,"
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and a dispute of material fact is genuine when "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Id. at 248.
As the "put up or shut up" moment in a lawsuit, summary judgment requires parties to
"show what evidence [they] ha[ve] that would convince the trier of fact" to find in their favor on
any disputed elements. Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 2014). Because summary
judgment is not "a vehicle for resolving factual disputes," the district court need not "sift through
the evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe." Waldridge
v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). "The court has one task and one task only:
to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that re-
quires a trial." Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. 	Commonwealth's Motion to Strike
Commonwealth has moved to strike Ms. Ames's January 28, 2026, "Statement of Genuine
Issues of Material Facts in Dispute in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment,"
arguing that this submission constitutes an improper surreply under our Local Rules, which pro-
vide, in relevant part, as follows:
A party opposing a summary judgment motion may file a surreply brief only if the
movant cites new evidence in the reply or objects to the admissibility of the evi-
dence cited in the response. The surreply must be filed within 7 days after the mo-
vant serves the reply and must be limited to the new evidence and objections.
S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(d). Ms. Ames has filed no response to Commonwealth's Motion to Strike, and
the time for doing so has long since passed.
Commonwealth contends, and we agree, that its reply brief neither cited new evidence nor
objected to the admissibility of evidence cited in Ms. Ames's (various) response(s). Under these
circumstances, we have little trouble concluding that Ms. Ames's filing of a surreply brief was not
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permitted by our Local Rules. Accordingly, Commonwealth's Motion to Strike shall be granted,
dkt. 69, and Ms. Ames's "Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Facts in Dispute in Support of
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment," dkt. 68 shall be stricken.
II. 	Commonwealth's Motion for Summary Judgment
Before turning to the merits of Ms. Ames's legal claims, we note that, although she has
criticized both the form and content of the Ms. Jennings's and Ms. Orellana's Affidavits, Ms. Ames
has failed to proffer any evidence to counter the factual allegations set out therein as submitted by
Commonwealth in support of its motion for summary judgment. More specifically, Ms. Ames has
failed to submit any item of admissible evidence showing there is a material issue for trial. "To
survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party"—counseled and uncounseled
alike—"must set forth specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a material issue for trial."
Henderson v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 1:17-cv-01332-SEB-MJD, 2018 WL 4110856, at *1 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 29, 2018) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "[A] party opposing a
properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of
h[er] pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. See also Anderson v. Street, 104 F.4th 646 (7th Cir. 2024) (stating that
"generalized and unsupported allegations cannot create a genuine dispute"). Our Local Rules sim-
ilarly provide that "the facts as claims and supported by admissible evidence by the movant are
admitted without controversy" unless the non-movant specifically controverts the facts . . . with
admissible evidence." S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f) (emphasis added). "A party must support each fact
the party asserts in a brief with a citation" that "refer[s] to a page or paragraph number or otherwise
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similarly specif[ies] where the relevant information can be found in the supporting evidence." S.D.
Ind. L.R. 56-1(e) (emphasis added).3
Because Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment and accompanying memoran-
dum are supported by admissible evidence and Ms. Ames has failed to dispute those factual asser-
tions with admissible evidence and to raise any genuine issue of material fact to show a causal
connection between a protected activity and/or her race and her discharge, as we discuss more fully
below, Commonwealth is entitled to summary judgment in its favor.
A. 	Retaliatory Discharge
"Title VII's anti-retaliation provision provides that it is unlawful for an employer to dis-
criminate against its employee because the employee filed a complaint or participated in an inves-
tigation of an unlawful employment practice." Robertson v. Dep't of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371,
378 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). To prove unlawful retaliation, Ms. Ames must
adduce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that (1) she engaged in a
protected activity within the meaning of Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action;
and (3) a but-for causal connection exists between the two. Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs.,
Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2019). "When the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
3 Throughout her filings, Ms. Ames repeatedly references her August 29, 2025, Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, which we previously denied without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(d). Dkt. 30. Ms. Ames did not renew her motion for summary judgment, though we
have nevertheless reviewed her original submission in the interest of completeness. In so doing,
we discovered that her factual assertions lack any supporting evidentiary citations, as required by
our summary judgment rules. To that end, her countervailing assertions of fact, which she has
interposed haphazardly throughout her various submissions, necessarily fail for lack of proof. Sim-
ilarly, we note that Ms. Ames's January 13, 2026, response in opposition to Commonwealth's mo-
tion for summary judgment asserts that Ms. Ames "has submitted voice recordings into evidence"
that "prove the reality of the conversation" that occurred on October 1, 2024. Dkt. 60 at 2. A review
of the instant record reveals no such alleged voice recording. We, therefore, do not credit Ms.
Ames's unsubstantiated references thereto.
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retaliation, an employer may produce evidence which, if taken as true, would permit the conclusion
that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment action." Rob-
ertson, 949 F.3d at 378. "If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff, to avoid summary judg-
ment, then must produce evidence that would permit a trier of fact to establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not its true reasons but
were a pretext for discrimination" Id.
Here, Commonwealth challenges the first and third elements of Ms. Ames's prima facie
case. That is, Commonwealth contends that Ms. Ames cannot establish that she engaged in a pro-
tected activity and/or that her engagement in any alleged protected activity caused her termination.
We address each challenged element seriatim.
1. 	Protected Activity
Although Ms. Ames's first charge of discrimination undoubtedly qualifies as a protected
activity, Li v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, 110 F.4th 988, 997 (7th Cir. 2024), Commonwealth ad-
dresses separately another potential protected activity: namely, Ms. Ames's reporting to manage-
ment about her co-worker's allegedly racist conduct. See Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis-
consin, L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that "an informal complaint may constitute
protected activity for purposes of retaliation claims"). Commonwealth argues that Ms. Ames did
not engage in a protected activity by reporting her co-worker's alleged racism towards her because
no reasonable jury could find that Ms. Ames "reasonably believed in good faith that the practice
she opposed violated Title VII." Fine v. Ryan Int'l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citation modified). It is well-established law that "utterly baseless claims do not receive protection
under Title VII." Brooks v. City of Kankakee, Illinois, 7 F.4th 649, 660 (7th Cir. 2021). Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit has explained:
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The purpose of requiring that plaintiffs reasonably believe in good faith that they
have suffered discrimination is clear. Title VII was designed to protect the rights of
employees who in good faith protest the discrimination they believe they have suf-
fered and to ensure that such employees remain free from reprisals or retaliatory
conduct. Title VII was not designed to "arm employees with a tactical coercive
weapon" under which employees can make baseless claims simply to "advance
their own retaliatory motives and strategies."
Id. (quoting Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2004)). "Unless a claim is
completely groundless, there is nothing wrong with disciplining an employee for filing frivolous
complaints." Id. (citation modified).
Based on these legal principles, Commonwealth argues that Ms. Ames did not engage in a
statutorily protected activity when she made serious allegations against her co-worker that lacked
any legitimate factual basis. Dkt. 51 at 5. As detailed in Ms. Jennings's Affidavit, on September
11, 2024, Ms. Ames alleged that a co-worker used a "white power gesture," which Ms. Ames later
clarified as being in reference to "a white cleaning bottle" that she perceived as being "subliminally
racist." Jennings Aff. ¶ 4, dkt. 48-1. Ms. Ames also alleged that the same co-worker spread harmful
rumors about her having experienced a sexual assault. Id. ¶ 5. When Ms. Jennings asked Ms. Ames
to provide further details, Ms. Ames "responded that her belief was 'subliminal.' " Id. Based on
Ms. Ames's nonresponsive answers, Ms. Jennings (and Ms. Orellana) reasonably concluded that
Ms. Ames's allegations were misleading and dishonest, in violation of Commonwealth's employ-
ment policies. No reasonable jury viewing this (unrefuted) evidence in the light most favorable to
Ms. Ames could conclude that Ms. Ames reasonably and in good faith believed that she suffered
race-based discrimination. Thus, Ms. Ames's September 11, 2024, complaint about her coworker
"do[es] not receive protection under Title VII." Brooks, 7 F.th at 660.
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2. 	But-for Causation
Although Ms. Ames's allegation that her coworker was racist towards her does not consti-
tute a protected activity, Commonwealth recognizes that Ms. Ames did file her first charge of dis-
crimination in August 2024. See dkt. 51 at 3. Because filing a charge of discrimination qualifies as
a protected activity, we must assess whether Ms. Ames has adduced evidence that her first charge
was the but-for cause of her termination. Li, 110 F.4th at 997. Commonwealth argues that Ms.
Ames cannot establish causation because an intervening event occurred between Ms. Ames's filing
of her first charge of discrimination and her termination; to wit, Ms. Ames made statements to Ms.
Jennings that Ms. Jennings concluded were dishonest and misleading, in contravention of company
policy.4
Approximately one month elapsed between Ms. Ames's August 29, 2024, charge of dis-
crimination and her October 1, 2024, termination. Ms. Ames's retaliation theory thus hinges on the
temporal proximity between her protected activity and her discharge. "Suspicious timing alone
rarely establishes causation, but if there is corroborating evidence that supports an inference of
causation, suspicious timing may permit a plaintiff to survive summary judgment." Sklyarsky v.
Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2015). "The reason is obvious: '[s]uspi-
cious timing may be just that—suspicious—and a suspicion is not enough to get past a motion for
summary judgment.' " Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., LLC, 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011)).
4 "Knowledge of the protected activity is necessary to show causation for a retaliation claim." Lesiv
v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 915 (7th Cir. 2022). In this case, neither Commonwealth
nor Ms. Ames has addressed whether the decisionmakers, Ms. Jennings and Ms. Orellana, knew
about Ms. Ames's first charge of discrimination.
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Here, Ms. Ames has failed to adduce corroborating evidence supporting an inference of
causation between her initial charge of discrimination and her termination. That approximately one
month elapsed between her protected activity and her termination does not, without more, create
a dispute of material fact about Commonwealth's non-discriminatory reasons for her termination.
See Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 966–67.
Similarly, Commonwealth has adduced persuasive evidence that a significant intervening
event occurred between Ms. Ames's protected activity and her discharge: On October 1, 2024,
prior to her termination, Ms. Ames made statements that Ms. Jennings and Ms. Orellana sincerely
believed were dishonest and misleading, in violation of company policy. It is well-established law
that an employee's violation of her employer's policies can constitute a significant intervening
event between a protected activity and a discharge that disrupts the causal chain and defeats an
inference of causation. See Parker v. Brooks Life Sci., Inc., 39 F.4th 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2022).
Here, Ms. Jennings's Affidavit establishes that Commonwealth prohibits employee dishon-
esty and that dishonesty is among the terminable offenses set forth in its handbook. Jennings Aff.
¶ 2, dkt. 48-1. Ms. Ames filed her initial charge of discrimination on August 29, 2024. Thereafter,
on September 11, 2024, she reported to Commonwealth's Human Resources that her coworker had
engaged in white power hand gestures and had spread harmful rumors about her. Id. ¶ 3. On Oc-
tober 1, 2024, after meeting with Ms. Ames to investigate her allegations, Ms. Jennings and Ms.
Orellana concluded that Ms. Ames's inability (or unwillingness) to articulate any legitimate factual
basis supporting her claims demonstrated that Ms. Ames's complaint was frivolous and dishonest,
in violation of company policy. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7. Ms. Jennings decided that Ms. Ames's dishonesty war-
ranted her termination of employment—hence, Ms. Ames's discharge on that same day. Id. ¶ 9.
"Far from supporting a causal connection between [Ms. Ames's] termination" and her initial charge
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of discrimination, this timeline of events supports Commonwealth's asserted link between Ms.
Ames's dishonesty, in violation of company policy, and her termination. Parker, 39 F.4th at 937.
Because Ms. Ames has failed to adduce evidence that she engaged in a protected activity
that was the but-for cause of her termination, Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment
shall be granted as to her retaliation claim.
B. 	Race Discrimination
Ms. Ames avers that her termination constitutes unlawful race discrimination. To establish
a prima facie claim that her termination was racially discriminatory, Ms. Ames must establish: (1)
that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she performed her job to her employer's expec-
tations; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that one or more similarly
situated individuals outside her protected class received better treatment. Anderson, 104 F.4th at
652. "Regardless of the framework, we ultimately consider all admissible evidence as a whole 'and
determine whether a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff suffered an adverse action because
of [her] protected characteristics.' " Id. at 652–53 (quoting Singmuongthong v. Bowen, 77 F.4th
503, 508 (7th Cir. 2023)).
In this case, Commonwealth asserts that Ms. Ames's discrimination claim fails as a matter
of law because Ms. Ames did not meet her employer's legitimate expectations, as evidenced by the
frivolous complaint she made against her coworker, and because Ms. Ames cannot identify any
similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably than she. As discussed above, the
undisputed record evidence supports the finding that Ms. Jennings and Ms. Orellana sincerely
believed that Ms. Ames's prevarications during their October 1st meeting constituted dishonest and
misleading behavior that violated Commonwealth's legitimate expectations of its employees. Ms.
Ames has adduced no contrary evidence indicating that she was, in fact, meeting Commonwealth's
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employment expectations. Similarly, Ms. Ames has identified no similarly situated employee such
that a reasonable jury could conclude that Commonwealth's alleged reason for Ms. Ames's "differ-
ential treatment" was pretext for discrimination. Id. at 635. Ms. Ames, therefore, has failed to es-
tablish the prima facie elements of race discrimination.
Evaluating the record evidence "as a whole," we conclude Ms. Ames has introduced no
evidence whatsoever that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that her first EEOC
charge or her race caused the discharge of which she complains. Igasaki v. Illinois Dep't of Fin. &
Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021). Because Ms. Ames has failed to present "enough
evidence," never mind any evidence, "to allow the jury to find in [her] favor," id. at 957–58 (cita-
tion modified), Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment must and therefore shall be
granted in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Commonwealth's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED
in its entirety. Dkt. 48.
Additionally, Commonwealth's Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Dkt. 69. Ms. Ames's
"Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Facts in Dispute in Support of Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment" is hereby STRICKEN. Dkt. 68.
All other motions are hereby DENIED. Dkt. 59, 64.
Final judgment shall issue accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:9/23/2026_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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Distribution:
Andrew Dutkanych, III
BIESECKER DUTKANYCH & MACER LLC (Indianapolis)
ad@bdlegal.com
Brett Alexander Hession
FBT Gibbons LLP
bhession@fbtgibbons.com
Robert D. Hudson
Frost Brown Todd LLP
rhudson@fbtlaw.com
Madison Monfreda
Biesecker, Dutkanych, & Macer LLC
mmonfreda@bdlegal.com
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