MURPHY v. ALLEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ROBERT E. MURPHY, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00463-JRO-MJD
)
ALLEN Warden, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Robert E. Murphy's petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks relief from
his conviction and sanctions in prison disciplinary case ISR 24-12-3570. For the
following 	reasons, 	his 	petition, 	dkt. 	[8], 	is 	DENIED, 	and 	this 	action 	is
DISMISSED.
II. THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
On December 19, 2024, Officer A. Carson was working in the Disciplinary
Hearing Body ("DHB") office when Murphy walked into the office and asked her
a question. Dkt. 15-1 at 1. When Murphy left, he stopped in the lay advocate
room to talk to incarcerated individual Eriberto Quiroz. Id. Murphy asked Quiroz,
"Hey Q, you get that money to dough boy (Sampson Dejuan #951830)?" Id. Later
that day, Officer Carson wrote a conduct report charging Murphy with violating
offense 	220, 	engaging 	in 	unauthorized 	financial 	transaction. 	Id. 	At 	the
conclusion of her report, Officer Carson wrote, "By engaging in the discussion of
moving 	monies 	from 	one 	Incarcerated 	Individual 	to 	another 	without 	prior
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authorization, the aforementioned action violates DHB code 220 Engaging in
Unauthorized Financial Transaction." Id.
On December 27, staff screened Murphy, advised him of the charge, and
provided him with copies of the conduct report and notice of disciplinary hearing
(screening report). Dkt. 15-2 at 1. Murphy pleaded not guilty. Id. Murphy
requested three witnesses.
The first witness was offender Tagliaferri, who Murphy put forward to
answer the question, "How many times have we had a conversation with Sgt.
Ernst and Officer Carson chimed in?" Id. The request was denied as irrelevant.
Second, he wanted Officer Carson as a live witness to answer, "Is it retaliation
for me saying I didn't like gays?" This request was also denied as not relevant.
Id. Third, he wanted Sgt. Ernest as a witness, but the request was denied as
irrelevant. Id.
For physical evidence, Murphy requested trust fund paperwork, but that
was denied as irrelevant. Id. He also requested body camera of his conversation,
and that was denied because it was not available. Id.
On December 27, Murphy submitted a request for interview form to Sgt.
Ernest requesting additional evidence of Carson's body camera. Dkt. 15-3 at 1.
His specific request for footage stated that he wanted footage "from the time she
walked the screening officer into the facility to the time she walked him out up
front." Id.
On January 3, 2025, Murphy submitted another interview form to Sgt.
Ernest, requesting a "continuance and proper evidence. To avoid the clear
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conspiracy vs me." Id. at 2. He wrote, "I need a continuance as #1 These are not
the questions I asked, as the screen [sic] officer misheard, sound familiar?" Id.
He wanted to ask the question, "How many conversations would I have with Sgt.
Ernest in front of OFC Carson and OFC Carson would look up and say 'wait
what'?" Id. Murphy said this "goes to credibility" as OFC Carson "misheard." Id.
This request was denied as not relevant. Id.
Murphy also asked again for Officer Carson's body cam because it would
have recorded "the alleged conversation and disprove her claim of what was
said." Id. This request was denied because the video was not available. Id.
Also on January 3, disciplinary hearing officer ("DHO") Sgt. J. Pardue
reviewed surveillance video of the DHB room (which was a different video than
the 	body 	camera 	footage 	requested 	by 	Murphy 	and 	which 	was 	no 	longer
available) and prepared a video review report, noting that Murphy was not
allowed to view the video because it would allow him "to know the angles and
capabilities of the prison's surveillance system." Dkt. 15-6. The video review
report states:
I Sgt J. Pardue reviewed video footage for ISR 24-12-
0003570.
8:09:09 AM - Offender Murphy #117550 can be seen
entering into the waiting area of DHB.
8:09:12 AM - Murphy walks into the officer's area of
DHB where Officer Carson can be seen sitting at desk.
8:09:31 AM - Murphy exits the officer's area and enters
a side room with nothing in his hands. Murphy can be
seen slightly moving the door and moves out of video.
At this time Officer Carson can be seen looking in the
direction of the office where Murphy just entered.
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8:10:45 AM - Murphy appears back on video and can be
seen speaking. He can be seen holding a piece of paper
in his hands.
8:11:09 AM - Murphy exits the side room and re-enters
the officer's DHB area.
8:11:38 AM - Murphy exits the officer's DHB area and
re-enters the side office.
8:12:56 AM – Offender Quirz #219483 can be seen in
the office speaking with Murphy.
8:13:09 AM - Muphy exits the side office and leaves the
building.
8:13:41 AM – Quirz exits the side office and walks into
the officer's DHB area. At this time Quirz and Carson
can be seen speaking to each other.
There is no audio to determine what is being said.
Dkt. 15-6.
Also on January 3, DHO Pardue used the video review report form to
address Murphy's evidentiary requests:
▪ Offender Murphy #117560 requested that I review
body camera footage from Officer Carson's body camera
for the date of 12/19/2024 around 8:09 AM. I was
advised there was not any footage to pull from.
▪ 	Offender 	Murphy 	#117550 	requested 	trust 	fund
paperwork. No reason was documented as the reason
for 	this 	paperwork. 	At 	this 	time 	I 	do 	not 	see 	any
relevance to this request and it will be denied, but
Murphy may bring the document to his hearing for
review if he can show why it is relevant to the case.
▪ 	Offender 	Murphy 	#117550 	requested 	offender
Tagliaferri # 278071 as a witness with the question,
"How many times have we had a conversation with Sgt.
Ernst and Carson chimed in?" This request is denied
because it is not relevant to the conduct in question.
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▪ 	Offender 	Murphy 	#117550 	requested 	for 	Officer
Carson to be a live witness with the question "Is it
retaliation for me saying I didn't like gays?" That request
is denied as it is opinionated and not relevant to the
case.
▪ Offender Murphy #117550 requested for Sgt. Ernest
as a witness with the question "How many times have
we 	had 	a 	conversation 	with 	Sgt. 	Ernst 	and 	Officer
Carson chimed in?" This request is denied because it is
not relevant to the conduct in question.
▪ Offender Murphy #117550 submitted a request slip
asking for body camera footage from Officer Carson
from 	the 	time 	she 	walked 	Officer 	Robertson 	to 	the
facility to the time she walked him back up front for the
date 	of 	12/27/24. 	Murphy 	claims 	that 	they 	were
conspiring to find him guilty. This request is denied. It
is not relevant to the conduct report and neither of those
two have tried or will influence my decision as the
hearing officer for these cases.
Dkt. 15-8.
On January 15, DHO Pardue held the disciplinary hearing. Dkt. 15-4.
Murphy appeared and pled not guilty. Id. at 1. Under the section of the report
for offender's comment, the following appears:
(Statement-Written 	Submitted). 	I 	asked 	him 	about
Manga. I told him to bring the Manga out and give it to
doughboy. 	It 	was 	something 	miss 	said. 	This 	is
retaliation. When Carson started working I told her I
didn't 	watch 	TV 	with 	homosexuality. 	Carson 	took
offense to the comment. It should have been a 346 if I
said it, but I didn't. Does not meet criteria for 220. I was
talking about a Christmas meal to Quiroz.
Id.
In his written statement, Murphy set out portions of the body camera
policy as well as portions of the disciplinary code 02-04-101. Dkt. 15-5. He also
denied that he engaged in the charged conduct. Id. at 4. He wrote that "I did in
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fact speak to Quiroz but about Magna, not money" and that "Magna is a
Japanese style of book with animated like characters drawn." Id.
At the hearing, DHO Pardue considered offender Tagliaferri's statement,
"This has happened," in response to Murphy's question, "Have I not had a
conversation with Sgt. Ernst right in front of OFC A. Carson, and she, OFC
Carson, look up and say what are you talking about." Dkt. 15-7 at 1. The DHO
also considered Officer Carson's response of "No" to Murphy's question, "Is this
retaliation for my religious preferences about homosexuality." Id. at 2.
After considering the witness statements, the conduct report, Murphy's
written and oral statements, and the video, DHO Pardue found Murphy guilty of
220. Dkt. 15-4. He explained the reason for his decision: "All evidence was
considered. It is clear that the statement 'Hey Q, you get the money to dough
boy' is a discussion about engaging in authorized financial activity. No further
evidence was requested. No procedural errors. Time frame not a valid reason for
not guilty or dismissal. All evidence requests were addressed." Id. DHO Pardue
imposed a custodial sanction of a 30-day loss of earned credit time. Id.
Murphy's appeals were denied. This habeas action followed.
III. DISCUSSION
The 	respondent 	first 	argues 	that 	Murphy 	failed 	to 	exhaust 	his
administrative remedies as to one of his claims, but the Court finds it more
efficient to consider the claims on the merits. See Washington v. Boughton, 884
F.3d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 2018).
Prisoners may not be deprived of good-time credits or of credit-earning
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class without due process. Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016);
Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007); Rhoiney v. Neal, 723 F.
App'x 347, 348 (7th Cir. 2018). The due process requirement is satisfied with: 1)
the issuance of at least 24 hours advance written notice of the charge; 2) a limited
opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence to an impartial decision-
maker; 3) a written statement articulating the reasons for the disciplinary action
and the evidence justifying it; and 4) "some evidence in the record" to support
the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454
(1985); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 –67 (1974).
Murphy's claims in his amended petition are: 1) he was denied evidence;
2) he was not allowed to cross-examine the reporting officer and the conduct
report was wrong, in violation of Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) policy;
3) he was charged with the wrong offense; and 4) he has newly discovered
evidence. Dkt. 8 at 3 –6.
A. 	Denial of Evidence
Murphy first argues that he was denied Sgt. Ernest as a witness and was
denied body cam evidence. Dkt. 8 at 3.
Due process requires that in prisoner disciplinary proceedings, prisoners
be given access to material, exculpatory evidence. Johnson v. Brown, 681 F.
App'x 494, 496 –97 (7th Cir. 2017). Evidence is exculpatory if it undermines or
contradicts the finding of guilt, see id., and it is material if disclosing it creates
a "reasonable probability" of a different result, Toliver v. McCaughtry, 539 F.3d
766, 780–81 (7th Cir. 2008). An inmate "facing disciplinary proceedings should
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be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense
when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety
or correctional goals." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.
Murphy wanted to call Sgt. Ernest to ask, "How many times have I had a
conversation with Sgt. Ernst and OFC A. Carson looked up and said, 'What you
talking about?'" Dkt. 15-2 at 1. This request was denied on the basis of relevance.
Dkt. 15-8. Offender Tagliaferri, however, responded to the same question by
saying, "This has happened." Dkt. 15-2. Even though offender Tagliaferri's
response was deemed irrelevant, it was considered by the DHO. Id. Therefore,
even if Sgt. Ernest had responded the same way and acknowledged that it had
happened before, it would be repetitive evidence. "[P]risoners do not have the
right 	to 	call 	witnesses 	whose 	testimony 	would 	be 	irrelevant, 	repetitive, 	or
unnecessary." Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2002).
The 	request 	for 	body 	cam 	evidence 	was 	denied 	because 	it 	was 	not
available. Prison officials are not obligated to produce evidence that does not
exist. Manley v. Butts, 699 F. App'x 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2017). There is no basis
for habeas relief for the denial of any evidence.
B. 	IDOC Policy Violations
Murphy contends that he was denied his right to cross-examine his
"accuser" as stated in prison policy. Dkt. 8 at 4. He also alleges that the conduct
report was incomplete and violated IDOC policy.
First, prison policy does not provide a basis for federal habeas relief. Estelle
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 at n.2 (1991) ("state-law violations provide no basis
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for federal habeas relief."); Keller v. Donahue, 2008 WL 822255, 271 Fed. Appx.
531, 532 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2008) (an inmate "has no cognizable claim arising
from the prison's application of its regulations."). The federal habeas statute
permits a state inmate to challenge the duration of his custody "only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Second, "[c]onfrontation and cross-examination present greater hazards to
institutional 	interests" 	and 	are 	not 	required 	in 	the 	context 	of 	disciplinary
proceedings. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567; see also Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666
(7th Cir. 2003) (inmates have "no right to confront or cross-examine adverse
witnesses" in disciplinary proceedings.). Murphy's contention that he had a right
to cross-examine the reporting officer is mistaken. This claim fails.
Murphy further alleges that Officer Carson did not include in her report
anything that the other inmate said in response to Murphy. He points to IDOC
policy in support of his claim that the conduct report therefore was incomplete.
Again, a violation of prison policy is not a basis for habeas relief.
C. 	Proper Offense
Next, Murphy argues that he should have been found guilty of offense C-
346 	instead 	of 	B-220. 	Offense 	220 	(Engaging 	in 	Unauthorized 	Financial
Transaction), is defined as:
engaging 	in 	or 	possessing 	materials 	used 	for
unauthorized financial transactions. This includes, but
is not limited to, the use or possession of identifying
information of credit cards, debit cards, or any other
card used to complete a financial transaction. This
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includes the discussion of engaging in unauthorized
financial transaction(s) with any other person.
Dkt. 15 –13 at 5.
Offense 346 (Business Activity) is defined as "unauthorized participation
in 	any 	business 	activity 	or 	any 	activity 	not 	authorized 	under 	Policy 	and
Administrative Procedure 02-01-116, 'Offender Business Activities.'" Id. at 9.
Murphy presented this claim to the DHO at the hearing. The DHO found
that 	there 	was 	sufficient 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	unauthorized 	financial
transaction offense, 220. Murphy's statement to Quiroz satisfies the "discussion
of engaging in unauthorized financial transaction(s) with any other person"
portion of offense 220. Dkt. 15-13 at 5. Therefore, there is no basis for habeas
relief on this claim.
D. 	Newly Discovered Evidence and Sufficient Evidence
For his final claim, Murphy argues that on the day of the hearing, another
officer told him that Officer Carson "would talk bad" about Murphy and had said
"she could find a reason to fire" Murphy. Dkt. 8 at 6. Murphy alleges that he
asked for a continuance of the hearing to obtain the officer's written statement,
but the DHO denied his request as irrelevant. Id.
The DHO's alleged refusal to postpone the hearing to allow Murphy to
obtain 	a 	statement 	from 	the 	officer 	would 	violate 	due 	process 	only 	if 	the
precluded evidence was material and exculpatory. Johnson, 681 F. App'x 496–
97. The alleged disparaging comments made by Carson at some unknown time
would not disprove what Carsno heard Murphy say to Quiroz on December 19,
2024. Even if it tended to undermine the credibility of Carson at the hearing, it
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would not necessarily undermine the accuracy of Carson's report, which was
written on December 19—the same day as the incident. In any case, another
officer's 	testimony 	that 	Carson 	"would 	talk 	bad" 	about 	Murphy 	cannot 	be
considered material or exculpatory as it is consistent with Carson's report
explaining the violation. The denial of this alleged evidence did not violate due
process.
In a prison disciplinary proceeding, the "hearing officer's decision need
only rest on 'some evidence' logically supporting it and demonstrating that the
result is not arbitrary." Ellison, 820 F.3d at 274. This is a "lenient" standard that
requires only a "modicum of evidence." Hawkins v. Sevier, 169 F.4th 749, 753
(7th Cir. 2026) (internal citations omitted). "[T]he relevant question is whether
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56 (emphasis added); see also
Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (same).
Once 	the 	Court 	finds 	"some 	evidence" 	supporting 	the 	disciplinary
conviction, the inquiry ends. Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 849 (7th Cir. 2011).
The 	Court 	may 	not 	"reweigh 	the 	evidence 	underlying 	the 	hearing 	officer's
decision" or "look to see if other record evidence supports a contrary finding."
Rhoiney, 723 F. App'x at 348 (citing Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
As stated in the conduct report, Murphy asked Quiroz, "Hey Q, you get
that money to dough boy?" Dkt. 15-1 at 1. Murphy argues that he never said the
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word "money," and that he actually said "manga, which is a book." Dkt. 20 at 2.1
He made this argument to the DHO, and the DHO considered his position. Dkt.
15-4.2 The DHO weighed the evidence and gave more credit to Officer Carson's
conduct 	report 	than 	to 	Murphy's 	defense 	that 	he 	never 	said 	"money."
Ascertaining whether the "some evidence" standard is satisfied "does not require
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 –56. In this case, there was "some"
evidence that supported the DHO's decision.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary
action 	in 	any 	aspect 	of 	the 	charge, 	disciplinary 	proceedings, 	or 	sanctions
involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional
infirmity 	in 	the 	proceeding 	which 	entitles 	Murphy 	to 	the 	relief 	he 	seeks.
Accordingly, Murphy's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED and
1 In his reply, Murphy submits an affidavit from Quiroz, dkt. 20-1, but this evidence was
not requested before or during the hearing nor was it presented to the DHO, so it cannot
be considered by the Court. "Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are
waived." United States v. Carney, 185 F.4th 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2026).
2 At his hearing, Murphy also said that he "was talking about a Christmas meal to
Quiroz." Dkt. 15-4. It is unclear how this explanation is consistent with his defense that
he said "manga" instead of "money."
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the action DISMISSED with prejudice. Judgment consistent with this Order
shall now issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 10/16/2026
Distribution:
ROBERT E. MURPHY
117550
PENDLETON - CF
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
David Corey
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
david.corey@atg.in.gov
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