RACKEMANN v. FOX et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
KENNETH RACKEMANN, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:24-cv-01441-SEB-CSW
)
ANGELA REYNOLDS, 	)
QUINTA NTEMGWA, 	)
SUSANNA CONLIN, 	)
TRENT ALLEN, 	)
LISA HAMBLEN, 	)
CENTURION HEALTH OF INDIANA, LLC, 	)
HALEY COX, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff Kenneth Rackemann filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit while he was incarcerated
at Pendleton Correctional Facility ("Pendleton"). The Court's screening order allowed two claims
to proceed: (1) an Eighth Amendment claim against the individual defendants based on allegations
that they failed to properly administer his insulin; and (2) an Eighth Amendment Monell claim
against Centurion Health of Indiana, LLC ("Centurion") based on allegations related to its staffing
and documentation practices. See dkt. 22.1 Mr. Rackemann has filed several motions for
preliminary injunction since filing his complaint. On July 18, 2025, the Court denied Mr.
Rackemann's remaining motion as moot because Mr. Rackemann had been transferred from
Pendleton to Westville Correctional Facility ("Westville"). See dkt. 43.
1 Under, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), municipalities are liable under § 1983 when
their actions violate the Constitution. Private corporations acting under color of state law, such as Centurion,
are treated as municipalities for purposes of § 1983. Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214,
235 (7th Cir. 2021).
Case 1:24-cv-01441-SEB-CSW Document 81 Filed 01/20/26 Page 1 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
On August 4, 2025, Mr. Rackemann filed another motion for preliminary injunction, asking
the Court to order Centurion, not the individual defendants at Pendleton, to document all insulin
administered to him and to ensure that its workers properly administer all insulin orders. Dkt. 47.
Addressing the Court's discussion of jurisdiction and mootness in its previous order, Mr.
Rackemann argued that, even though he is no longer housed at Pendleton, he is still subjected to
Centurion's actions because Westville's medical provider is also Centurion. Id. The Court then
ordered Centurion to respond to Mr. Rackemann's orders. After two rounds of briefing, Centurion
has now responded, and Mr. Rackemann has replied. For the reasons explained below, the Court
DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Mr. Rackemann's motion for preliminary injunction, dkt.
[47].
I. 	Jurisdiction
The Court specifically asked Defendants to brief the issue of jurisdiction given that Mr.
Rackemann transferred from Pendleton—where the events at issue in this lawsuit took place—to
Westville. Mr. Rackemann argues that this Court has jurisdiction over Centurion because he is
proceeding on a Monell claim against them. Citing Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir.
2004), Defendants concede that this Court has jurisdiction "over Mr. Rackemann's request for
Centurion to provide documentation on insulin administration." Dkt. 76 at 7. The Defendants do
not claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Rackemann's request that Centurion ensure that
its workers properly administer insulin. Instead, they argue that the issue is moot because "there is
no 'understaffing' at [Westville]," and they have implemented a plan to address medication
administration. Id.
Following Lehn, the Court determines that it has jurisdiction over Mr. Rackemann's request
for injunctive relief to the extent that it relates to his Monell claims against Centurion because they
Case 1:24-cv-01441-SEB-CSW Document 81 Filed 01/20/26 Page 2 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
transcend Pendleton-specific practices. 464 F.3d at 871–72. Therefore, the Court will address the
merits of Mr. Rackemann's motion.
II. 	Preliminary Injunction Standard
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that is available only when
the movant shows clear need." Turnell v. Centimark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). To
obtain a preliminary injunction Mr. Rackemann first must show that: "(1) without this relief, [he]
will suffer irreparable harm; (2) traditional legal remedies would be inadequate; and (3) [he] has
some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of [his] claims." Speech First, Inc. v. Killen, 968 F.3d
628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020). If Mr. Rackemann meets these threshold requirements, "the court then
must weigh the harm the denial of the preliminary injunction would cause the plaintiff against the
harm to the defendant if the court were to grant it." Id. "[A] preliminary injunction is an exercise
of a very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it." Orr
v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490. 501 (7th Cir. 2020).
Furthermore, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") provides that "[p]reliminary
injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the
court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that
harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). "This section of the PLRA enforces a point repeatedly made by the
Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: '[P]rison officials have broad administrative
and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.'" Westerfer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679,
683 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983)); see also Mays v. Dart,
974 F.3d 810, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2020)). "Mandatory preliminary injunctions" requiring affirmative
acts are viewed with particular caution and have been "sparingly issued[.]" Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d
810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).
Case 1:24-cv-01441-SEB-CSW Document 81 Filed 01/20/26 Page 3 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
III. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
"A movant's showing of likelihood of success on the merits must be strong." Tully v.
Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). A "better than negligible"
likelihood of success is not enough. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 762−63 (7th
Cir. 2020). "A 'strong' showing . . . does not mean proof by a preponderance . . . [b]ut it normally
includes a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements of its case." Id.
To succeed on the merits of his Monell claim against Centurion, Mr. Rackemann must show
that its practices of understaffing and not documenting insulin administration were "moving
force[s]" behind his constitutional injuries. Taylor v. Hughes, 26 F. 4th 419, 435 (7th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Bd. Of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–407 (1997)).
"Municipal liability only attaches when the plaintiff shows that the municipality act[s] with
deliberate indifference." Gasaway v. Vigo Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 672 F. Supp. 3d 651, 660 (S.D. Ind.
2023) (citing J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2020)). Under that standard, Mr.
Rackemann must show that he is at serious risk of exposure to harm, and Centurion "knows of a
substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in disregard of that risk." Donald
v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Here, the parties do not appear to dispute that Mr. Rackemann has a serious medical
condition—diabetes—and that missing insulin doses exposes him to serious risk of harm. Instead,
Centurion argues that "[t]here has been no evidence from which there may be an inference of
intentional or reckless conduct on the part of Centurion in providing nursing staff coverage at
[Pendleton] or in the restrictive housing unit at [Westville]. Nor is there any evidence of conduct
so dangerous that a deliberate nursing staffing shortage by Centurion at [Pendleton] or at
Case 1:24-cv-01441-SEB-CSW Document 81 Filed 01/20/26 Page 4 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
[Westville] can be inferred." Dkt. 76 at 11. In support, Centurion cites three forms of proof. First,
the Healthcare Services Administrator at Westville, Silverio Napules, states in a sworn declaration
that he and Centurion's Statewide Medical Director, Dr. Stephanie Riley, "have been part of an
analysis and assessment concerning documentation issues raised by the empty spaces in the date
and time of documentation of Mr. Rackemann's insulin medication since he arrived at [Westville.]"
Dkt. 76-1 ¶ 4. In addition to providing "instructional education" to nursing staff, Dr. Riley
implemented "a plan of correction," providing for the documentation of insulin administration and
ongoing review of said documentation by Mr. Napules or the Director of Nursing. Id., ¶¶ 10–14.
Second, Mr. Napules declares that Westville does not have a nursing staff shortage. Id., ¶ 15. Third,
Mr. Napules declares that his analysis revealed that, because Mr. Rackemann is in restrictive
housing at Westville, the nurses' ability to deliver his medication in a timely fashion depends on
cooperation with custody staff and meal delivery, both of which are outside the control of the
nurses. Id., ¶¶ 7–8. In response, Mr. Rackemann provides medical records showing that he
consistently missed insulin doses from July until October. See dkts. 78–80. He also provides a
sworn declaration from a witness stating that he has seen Centurion nurses fail to deliver insulin
in December and January. Dkt. 80-1.
Based on the current record Mr. Rackemann has not established a likelihood of success
on the merits of his Monell claims against Centurion. This is because Centurion's current
documentation and administration practices do not tend to show deliberate indifference towards
Mr. Rackemann's serious medical needs as they are now. In Rasho v. Jeffreys, the Seventh Circuit
reversed a district court's decision to grant a permanent injunction because "the evidence
establishe[d] that IDOC made reasonable efforts to cure the deficiencies in the five areas identified
in the plaintiffs' claim and to alleviate the staffing shortage." 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022).
Case 1:24-cv-01441-SEB-CSW Document 81 Filed 01/20/26 Page 5 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
Importantly, the "reasonable efforts" to cure the deficiencies worked against a finding of deliberate
indifference because "[e]vidence that the defendant responded reasonably to the risk, even if he
was 	ultimately 	unsuccessful 	in 	preventing 	the 	harm, 	negates 	an 	assertion 	of 	deliberate
indifference." Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994)). Here, Mr. Rackemann's
evidence shows that Centurion has not been 100% successful with implementing its above-
described plan. Nevertheless, it has demonstrated a reasonable effort to respond to the very real
risk to Mr. Rackemann's health by educating its nursing staff and implementing a review protocol.
Furthermore, the record shows that Westville currently does not have a staffing shortage.
Importantly, the Court's decision today is limited to the question of injunctive relief and
does not reflect any judgment on the merits of Mr. Rackemann's claims for damages. As the
Supreme Court explained in Farmer, when reviewing a plaintiff's request for "injunctive relief to
prevent a substantial risk of serious injury from ripening into actual harm, the subjective factor,
deliberate indifference, should be determined in light of the prison authorities' current attitudes and
conduct, . . . their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought and persisting thereafter. 511
U.S. at 845–46 (internal citations and quotations omitted). "[T]o establish eligibility for an
injunction, the inmate must demonstrate the continuance of that disregard during the remainder of
the litigation and into the future." Id. Here, the record does not reveal that Centurion's practices
evince a continuing disregard for Mr. Rackemann's medical needs.
Because Mr. Rackemann has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his
Monell claim against Centurion's current practices, the Court does not discuss irreparable harm or
the inadequacy of legal remedies.
Case 1:24-cv-01441-SEB-CSW Document 81 Filed 01/20/26 Page 6 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Mr. Rackemann's motion for preliminary injunction, dkt.
[47], is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: __________________
Distribution:
KENNETH RACKEMANN
132668
WESTVILLE - CF
WESTVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Carlton Wayne Anker
Lewis and Wilkins LLP
anker@lewisandwilkins.com
David Douglas Becsey
ZEIGLER COHEN & KOCH
dbecsey@zcklaw.com
Roger K. Kanne
ZEIGLER COHEN & KOCH
rkanne@zcklaw.com
Eric Ryan Shouse
Lewis And Wilkins LLP
shouse@lewisandwilkins.com
_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
1/20/2026
Case 1:24-cv-01441-SEB-CSW Document 81 Filed 01/20/26 Page 7 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>