Link v. City of Granite City

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KEVIN LINK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF GRANITE CITY,
Defendant.
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Case No. 25-CV-1802-DWD
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Kevin Link has sued Defendant the City of Granite City (the “City”)
seeking damages under 42 USC § 1983 in relation to the City citing Plaintiff for alleged
city ordinance violations on parcels of property he no longer owned. The City has filed a
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 7). Plaintiff
has not responded to the Motion. For the reasons that follow, the City’s Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. (Doc. 1-1). Plaintiff
formerly operated rental property in the City. In recent years, the City has enacted new
regulations “with an eye toward ending small home rental business” in the City. (Doc. 1-
1, ¶ 3). Believing he was “no longer welcome to do business,” Plaintiff sold all of his rental
property. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 4). Thereafter, the City cited Plaintiff “on over a dozen counts,
concerning over a dozen parcels of property” for failure to comply with city ordinances.
(Doc. 1-1 ¶ 5). Plaintiff, however, no longer owned any of the cited properties. (Doc. 1-1
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¶ ¶ 4-6). Public records with the recorder of deeds reflected that he did not own the
properties and that some had been sold years prior to issuance of “the citation.” (Doc. 1-
1 ¶ 6). The City blamed Plaintiff, alleging he failed to “deregister” the properties. (Doc.
1-1 ¶ 7). But there is no process for or requirement that properties be “deregistered.” (Doc.
1-1 ¶ 7). The City is subject to liability under § 1983 because it “maintains a policy and
practice of failing to check public property ownership records prior to charging persons,
like Plaintiff, with violations, and prosecuting same, with no actual evidence of any such
violation by that person.” (Doc. 1-1 ¶ ¶ 8-10).
II. 	Legal Standard
A motion 	to dismiss under Rule 	12(b)(6) challenges 	the 	sufficiency 	of 	the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). To survive dismissal, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on 	its 	face.” Bancorpsouth, 	Inc. 	v. 	Fed. 	Ins. 	Co., 	873 	F.3d 	582, 	586 	(7th 	Cir.
2017) (quoting Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	662, 	678 	(2009)). 	The 	purpose 	of 	a Rule
12(b)(6) motion is to decide the adequacy of the complaint, not to determine the merits of
the case or decide whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910
F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990).
Although a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it must include
“enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as
true and draws all possible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch
& Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 2012). “But [the court] ‘need not accept as
true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.’ ” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 666
(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 Monell 1 claim against the City. The City claims that under
the principles set forth in Monell and its progeny, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient
to establish municipal liability. Specifically, the City claims the Complaint does not
sufficiently allege a policy or custom of constitutional violations on the part of the City.
Additionally, the City contends Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not responded to the City’s arguments.
To 	establish 	liability 	against 	a municipality under Section 1983, 	a 	plaintiff
must allege that his injury was caused by an official policy, custom, or practice. Id. A
policy, custom, or practice may be demonstrated by:
(1) 	an 	express 	policy 	that, 	when 	enforced, 	causes 	a 	constitutional
deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by
written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled
as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) an allegation
that 	the 	constitutional 	injury 	was 	caused 	by 	a 	person 	with 	final
policymaking authority.
1 The Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035–36, 56
L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), established a theory of municipal liability under § 1983 for constitutional violations caused by
their official policies. The Court in Monell also rejected the notion that municipal liability may rest solely on a theory
of respondeat superior. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036; see also Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi, 928
F.2d 788, 790 (7th Cir. 1991).
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McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir.1995) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff is proceeding under the second option, the existence of a defacto
policy. To Succeed on a Monell claim based on a theory that there was a de facto
policy, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the practice is widespread and that the
specific 	violations 	complained 	of 	were 	not 	isolated
incidents.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Jackson 	v.
Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's
Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no clear consensus as to how frequently
such conduct must occur to impose Monell liability, ‘except that it must be more than one
instance.’ ”). Thus, at the pleading stage, “a plaintiff pursuing this theory must allege
facts that permit the reasonable inference that the practice is so widespread as to
constitute a governmental custom. Id.
To do this, a plaintiff needs to show that there have been enough similar incidents
to establish a pattern of conduct. Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017).
This requirement ensures that a municipality is not held liable for an isolated incident
outside of its control—something that would start to look very similar to the respondeat
superior liability that Monell explicitly rejected. See Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380
(7th Cir. 2005); Monell, 436 U.S. at 692–93. Thus, a plaintiff bringing a custom-or-practice
Monell claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss with a complaint based only on his own
experience. 	See 	Gill, 	850 	F.3d 	at 	344. 	For 	example, 	in
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Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2017), 	the 	plaintiff 	alleged 	the
municipality had “a de facto policy of ‘placing an emphasis on clearing cases and
convicting suspects over seeking the truth[.]’ ” Id. at 344. The Appellate Court affirmed
the dismissal of the plaintiff's Monell claim, finding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim
of a widespread practice because he did not provide examples of other similar violations
nor plausibly allege that they existed. Id. The court held that, “[t]he specific actions of the
detectives in Gill's case alone, without more, cannot sustain a Monell claim based on the
theory of a de facto policy.” Id. (citing Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir.
2003)).
The same is true here. Plaintiff alleges the City issued one or more citations that
included “over a dozen counts” concerning “over a dozen parcels” he once owned. This
was allegedly part of a deliberate “municipal crusade against plaintiff and rental
property.” Even accepting that allegation as true and construing the vague reference to
“rental property” as an attempt to implicate other landlords, the claim fails. The
Complaint identifies no other property owner, landlord, or citizen who received citations
for properties they no longer owned. It describes only Plaintiff’s personal experience.
While it is not impossible for a plaintiff to establish a widespread practice or
custom based on his own experience, it is “necessarily more difficult” to do so. Grieveson
v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2008). He must plausibly allege a true municipal
policy, 	not 	a 	random 	or 	isolated 	event. 	Id. (citation 	omitted). 	See 	also
Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2017), League of Women Voters of Chicago v.
City of Chicago, 757 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2014)Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d
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293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s encounter with the City, framed as a personal “crusade”
against him, falls short.
Nor do Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions salvage the claim. The vague reference to
“rental property,” and the legal conclusion that the City ““maintains a policy of failing to
check public property ownership records prior to issuing citations” are boilerplate
allegations and contribute nothing to plausibility. See McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d
611 (7th Cir. 2011) (conclusory allegations of a policy or practice in support of
a Monell claim 	are 	not 	factual 	allegations 	and 	as 	such 	contribute 	nothing 	to 	the
plausibility analysis under Twombly/Iqbal.”); Arita v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15-
CV-01173, 2016 WL 6432578 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2016) (single conclusory allegation that
defendant had a policy of treating others in the same way plaintiff was allegedly treated
was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).
Because the Complaint pleads only Plaintiff’s own experience and provides no
factual content from which the Court could plausibly infer that the alleged failure to
verify ownership is a widespread, municipal custom rather than an isolated event, it fails
to state a plausible Monell claim based on custom or practice.
Additionally, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege Plaintiff
suffered a deprivation of a federally protected right. Section 1983 provides a cause of
action only when a person acting under color of law deprives another of rights secured
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Reed v. City of
Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiff merely alleges that the City
wrongfully cited him for city ordinance violations on parcels of land he no longer owned.
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He provides no specifics about the citation or citations, and he does not explain how the
issuance 	of 	the 	citation 	or 	citations, 	however 	erroneous, 	rose 	to 	the 	level 	of 	a
constitutional violation. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a malicious-
prosecution theory of liability (the only constitutional claim the Court can plausibly
discern), he has not alleged the required elements, including termination of the
underlying proceedings in his favor or the absence of probable cause. See Reed, 77 F.3d at
1051.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The
Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to file an
Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order, if such filing
would not be futile. Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Mun. Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682,
687 (7th Cir. 2004). If nothing is filed by that date, then the dismissal will be converted to
a dismissal with prejudice and the Court will enter final judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 18, 2025 	/s/ David W. Dugan
______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
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