Hodges v. Effingham Community Unit School District #40

Page 1 of 11
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JULIE HODGES,
Plaintiff,
v.
EFFINGHAM COMMUNITY UNIT
SCHOOL DISTRICT #40,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:25-CV-00344-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Julie Hodges brings this employment discrimination action against her
former employer Effingham Community Unit School District #40 (“Effingham”). Hodges
claims that Effingham constructively discharged her in violation of state and federal law
after she refused to get vaccinated against COVID-19 and declined to undergo weekly
testing as an alternative to vaccination. She advances claims under the Illinois Human
Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/2-102 (“IHRA”), and Title VII of Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e,
et seq. (“Title VII”).
Effingham removed the case to federal court based on federal question and
supplemental jurisdiction. (Doc. 1); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. It then moved to
dismiss Hodges’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 7).
Hodges filed a response in opposition, and Effingham a reply. (Docs. 9, 10 respectively).
Effingham’s motion to dismiss is thus fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 1 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 2 of 11
B ACKGROUND
On September 3, 2021, Governor J.B. Pritzker issued Executive Order 2021-22 (the
“Executive Order”) 1 requiring “school personnel” 2 to either obtain a full vaccination
against COVID-19 or submit to weekly testing. (Doc. 7-2, p. 4-5 (Exec. Order); Doc. 1-1,
¶ 5 (Compl.)). Effingham implemented these requirements by enforcing a “policy”
requiring “all . . . employees” who were not vaccinated, including Hodges, to submit to
weekly COVID-19 testing (the “Policy”). (Id. ¶ 4).
Hodges objected to the vaccine because it “violates her moral conscience.” (Id. ¶ 6).
This is so, Hodges explains, because she holds “sincere beliefs” that prohibit her from
getting a vaccine that was ostensibly researched and developed through “the use of stem
cells or other materials obtained from aborted fetuses.” (Id. ¶ 8). Hodges also refused to
be vaccinated or tested because she “holds sincere beliefs that prevent her from submitting
to healthcare procedures which she, a competent adult, does not believe are medically
necessary.” (Id. ¶ 7). The testing requirement also conflicted with Hodges’s “moral
conscience” because she “holds sincere beliefs that prevent her from submitting to or
1 Effingham provided a copy of the Executive Order as an attachment to its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 7-2,
p. 1-8). Although a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ordinarily limits the inquiry to the four corners
of the complaint, the Court will consider the Executive Order under the “incorporation by reference”
doctrine. See Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012) (courts may consider
“documents attached to a motion to dismiss if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central
to his claim”) (citation modified). Here, the complaint cites the Executive Order as Effingham’s purported
legal basis for the requirement that its employees, including Hodges, get vaccinated or submit to weekly
COVID-19 testing. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 4-5). The Executive Order is thus referred to in the complaint and central
to Hodges’s claims.
2 Hodges’s complaint does not identify her position at Effingham. Nevertheless, because she brings this
action against the Effingham Community Unit School District #40 and alleges that she was employed there,
the Court assumes Hodges qualified as “school personnel” under the Executive Order. “School personnel”
is broadly defined as “any person who . . . is employed by, volunteers for, or is contracted to provide
services for a School or school district.” (Doc. 7-2, p. 4).
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 2 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 3 of 11
participating in workplace procedures which arbitrarily discriminate between employees
on the basis of healthcare choices made pursuant to freedom of conscience.” (Id. ¶ 9).
On September 7, 2021, Hodges sent Effingham a letter objecting to the Policy’s
alternative requirements. 3 (Id. ¶ 10). The letter allegedly requested an “exemption” from
the vaccination requirement based on Hodges’s “religious beliefs,” and explained that
the testing requirement conflicted with her “religious belief that testing for a disease
when she is not sick is a violation of the human body.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-12).
On September 16, 2021, Effingham denied Hodges’s request for an exemption
from the vaccine or testing requirements. 4 (Id. ¶ 13). Effingham allegedly denied
Hodges’s request because she “did not provide information about her religious beliefs
and religion.” (Id. ¶ 14). On September 21, 2021, Hodges submitted a second exemption
request (the complaint does not elaborate on the content of the second request). (Id. ¶ 15).
Effingham responded to the second request by demanding that Hodges either provide
proof of vaccination or submit to weekly testing by September 27, 2021. (Id. ¶ 16).
Effingham never asked Hodges about her religious beliefs or the religion she subscribed
to (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18), nor did it “engage in discussion with [Hodges] to determine whether
any accommodation of [her] religious beliefs might be possible.” (Id. ¶ 19). Effingham
also did not discuss with Hodges whether accommodating her religious beliefs would
impose an undue burden on it. (Id. ¶ 20). It simply denied Hodges’s exemption requests
3 The timeline of Hodges’s allegations is a bit confusing. She claims she was first notified of the Policy’s
requirements on September 15, 2021. (Id. ¶ 1). It is thus unclear why she would have sent Effingham a letter
objecting to these requirements on September 7, 2021.
4 The complaint only alleges that Hodges “objected” to the testing requirement; it does not allege that she
also sought an exemption from the testing requirement. (Id. ¶ 12).
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 3 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 4 of 11
“outright.” (Id. ¶ 21).
On September 27, 2021, Hodges was placed on unpaid leave because she refused
to comply with the Policy. 	(Id. ¶ 22). Hodges remained on unpaid leave until
February 2022, when Effingham invited her to return to work because vaccinations,
testing, and masking had become optional. (Id. ¶ 24). Hodges told Effingham that she
was willing to return but only if a letter confirming her exemption from vaccination,
testing, and mask wearing requirements was placed in her personnel file. (Id. ¶ 25).
Effingham declined to document Hodges’s exemption from these requirements in her
personnel file. (Id. ¶ 27). Hodges took this as Effingham’s “refusal” to “accommodate her
religious beliefs,” and determined that she had no choice but to resign. (Id. ¶ 28).
Hodges resigned from her position at Effingham on March 28, 2022. (Id. ¶ 29). On
June 2, 2022, Hodges filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of
Human Rights (“IDHR”) alleging constructive discharge based on her religious beliefs.
(Id. ¶ 30). Hodges also filed a separate charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) alleging the same theory of liability against Effingham. (Id. ¶ 31).
On October 25, 2024, the IDHR issued a “Notice of Substantial Evidence,” and on October
31, 2024, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35). This action followed.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests whether
the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d
635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court accepts as true the complaint’s well-pleaded factual
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 4 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 5 of 11
allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Burke v. 401 N.
Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff’s allegations must support a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim is plausible where a plaintiff ‘pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). A reviewing court must “ask itself could these things have happened, not
did they happen.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). This means
that the plaintiff must “provide some specific facts to support the legal claims asserted in
the complaint,” and offer “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present
a story that holds together.” Bilek, 8 F.4th at 586 (citation modified).
DISCUSSION
The Court will review Hodges’s claims under the IHRA and Title VII together
because their respective legal frameworks are “essentially identical.” Begwe v. Sedgwick
Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 879 n.39 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted); see also
Moultrie v. Penn Aluminum Int’l, LLC, 766 F.3d 747, 754 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2014) (examining
Title VII and Illinois state law claims together because “[t]he standards for Illinois state-
law discrimination claims mirror those for Title VII claims.”). A Title VII claim based on
the failure to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs requires the plaintiff to show
(1) a conflict between a religious observance or practice and an employment requirement;
(2) notice to the employer; and (3) that the religious observance or practice was the basis
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 5 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 6 of 11
for an adverse employment action. Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 449
(7th Cir. 2013). Effingham contests the sufficiency of Hodges’s allegations with respect to
the first and third elements of her prima facie case.
Effingham’s argument that the complaint fails to allege a “religious belief” that
conflicted with the Policy is a tough one to win on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. This is so
because the question of whether Hodges’s request for an exemption was religiously
motivated can lead to unnecessary exploration of the commands of her religion. Such
judicial 	forays 	are 	discouraged 	because 	“[c]ourts 	are 	not 	arbiters 	of 	scriptural
interpretation.” Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)). Thus, “[i]f an
accommodation request can be read on its face as plausibly based in part on an aspect of
the plaintiff-employee’s religious belief or practice, that is enough to survive a motion to
dismiss.” Id. at 1011.
“At the pleading stage, an employee seeking an accommodation in the form of an
exemption from an employer’s vaccine mandate must allege facts plausibly permitting
an inference that some ‘aspect’ of the request is based on the employee’s ‘religious
observance and practice’ or ‘belief.’” Id. at 1009 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). This means
that the employee must “plausibly base[] her vaccination exemption request at least in
part on an aspect of her religious belief or practice.” Id.
Hodges alleges that she objected to the Policy’s vaccination requirement due to
her “religious beliefs” because, as she saw it, the COVID-19 vaccine was developed
through the “use of stem cells or other materials obtained from aborted fetuses.” This
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 6 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 7 of 11
allegation permits an inference that Hodges’s religion compels her opposition to
abortion. The religious nature of her objection to the vaccination requirement then
follows logically because, in her view, the COVID-19 vaccine is derived from abortion
procedures. Hodges thus refused to get vaccinated because she believes that doing so
would be tantamount to an endorsement of abortion. At this stage, no more is required
to conclude that Hodges’s objection to the Policy’s vaccination requirement was based on
her religious beliefs. “It is not within [the courts’] province to evaluate whether particular
religious practices or observances are necessarily orthodox or even mandated by an
organized religious hierarchy.” Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 452. Accordingly, a generous reading
of the complaint plausibly suggests that the Policy’s vaccine requirement created a
conflict between an employment requirement and Hodges’s religion.
But the Policy, as noted, gave employees the option of getting vaccinated or
submitting to weekly testing for COVID-19. Hodges’s allegations therefore must also
support a religious objection to the testing requirement to survive Effingham’s motion to
dismiss. And on this point, the allegations regarding Hodges’s objection to the testing
requirement are notably (albeit subtlety) different from those regarding her objection to
the vaccine requirement. Hodges alleges that she refused vaccination and testing because
she “holds sincere beliefs that prevent her from submitting to healthcare procedures
which she, a competent adult, does not believe are medically necessary.” The testing
requirement also conflicted with Hodges’s “moral conscience” because she “holds sincere
beliefs that prevent her from submitting to or participating in workplace procedures
which arbitrarily discriminate between employees on the basis of healthcare choices
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 7 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 8 of 11
made pursuant to freedom of conscience.” Notably absent from the complaint is any
nexus between Hodges’s refusal to submit to testing and a religious belief. This omission
is problematic for Hodges because her failure to explain how the testing requirement
burdened her religious beliefs means she has not pled a conflict between an employment
requirement (COVID-19 testing) and her religion. See Jackson v. Methodist Health Servs.
Corp., 121 F.4th 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 2024).
Hodges’s objection to testing may have been based on sincerely held moral or
personal views. But that is not enough to state a viable religious discrimination claim
under Title VII. “The difference [between personal and religious beliefs] is important
because only religious beliefs, observances, and practices must be accommodated.”
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 451 (emphasis in original). Indeed, the complaint appears to
expressly distinguish Hodges’s objection to the vaccine from her objection to testing.
Hodges’s objection to the vaccine, as noted, is based on her faith-based disagreement with
the use of stem cells from abortion procedures to research and develop it. Her objection
to testing, on the other hand, is based on her concerns about personal agency and health.
She alleges that as a “competent adult,” she possesses the right to make decisions
regarding her healthcare, including the right to refuse procedures or care that, in her
view, are not “medically necessary.” The testing requirement, as Hodges saw it,
presented an affront to her right to make such decisions for herself. And while the Court
will not second-guess Hodges’s assertion of agency over her healthcare, it is apparent
that her objection to the testing requirement was not based on her religion.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson v. Methodist Health Services is directly on
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 8 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 9 of 11
point. Jackson dealt with the same Executive Order at issue here, and the plaintiff objected
to her employer’s implementation of it in nearly identical fashion: she refused to either
get vaccinated against COVID-19 or undergo weekly testing. Jackson, 121 F.4th at 1124.
The plaintiff was placed on unpaid leave and later discharged due to her refusal to
comply with the Executive Order. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s Title VII
claim because she “had not identified any religious tenet that was inconsistent with the
testing requirement.” Id. at 1125. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff had
“identified no objection to testing that is grounded in her religious beliefs. She opposes
the testing requirement, yes, but she cites no religious tenet that is at odds with the testing
requirement and no religious practice with which testing would interfere.” Id. at 1126.
The lack of a nexus between the plaintiff’s objection to COVID-19 testing and her religious
faith was therefore fatal to her Title VII claim. Id. at 1127.
The facts of this case track those in Jackson with notable precision. Indeed, in its
current form, the complaint offers no meaningful factual distinction from Jackson. Even
an indulgent view of the complaint does not reveal a religious basis for Hodges’s
objection to the testing requirement. At best, she claims in conclusory fashion that her
request for an exemption from the vaccine and testing mandates was based on her
“religious beliefs.” But that, without more, is not enough. Reed v. Great Lakes Co., 330 F.3d
931, 935-36 (7th Cir. 2003). To state a viable claim, a plaintiff must explain the religious
nature of the conflict necessitating the accommodation. See id. at 936. (“Even if [the
plaintiff] wears a religious symbol, such as a cross or a yarmulka, this may not pinpoint
his particular beliefs and observances.”). Here, the complaint fails to clear this initial
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 9 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 10 of 11
hurdle with respect to the testing requirement because it bases Hodges’s objection on her
personal 	views 	of 	medical 	necessity. 	See 	Passarella, 	108 	F.4th 	at 1011 	(“Religious
accommodation requests rooting themselves entirely in safety considerations with no
plain and express connection to religion will fall outside of the statute even at the
pleading stage.”).
Other 	courts 	have 	reached 	similar 	conclusions 	in 	the 	context 	of 	religious
accommodation requests arising out of COVID-19 vaccine and testing requirements.
See e.g., Nelson-Godfrey v. Cook Cnty., 735 F. Supp. 3d 976, 980 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (invocation
of “vaguely religious themes” and “broad appeals to personal health” insufficient to state
qualifying “religious observance” that supported Title VII claim); Guthrie-Wilson v. Cook
Cnty., No. 1:23-cv-362, 2023 WL 8372043, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2023) (dismissing Title VII
claim where “plaintiff’s stated opposition to the Covid-19 [vaccine] is facially tied to her
view that receiving the vaccine is incompatible with a ‘healthy lifestyle’ and ‘could bring
her harm.’”); Egelkrout v. Aspirus, Inc., No. 22-cv-118, 2022 WL 2833961, at *3 (July
22, 2022) (same where basis of plaintiff’s refusal to submit to testing was “for personal
and medical reasons”). Consistent with the logic of Jackson and these instructive
decisions, the Court finds that Hodges’s complaint fails to satisfy the first element of her
prima facie case under Title VII. 5
5 The Court does not reach Effingham’s argument regarding the third element of Hodges’s prima facie case
because her failure to satisfy the first is dispositive. Nevertheless, if Hodges decides to file an amended
complaint, she should include factual allegations that address all elements of a Title VII claim, to the extent
she can do so in good faith.
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 10 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

Page 11 of 11
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendant Effingham Community Unit School District #40’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is GRANTED. Hodges is GRANTED leave to file an amended
complaint on or before April 13, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 13, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-00344-NJR Document 11 Filed 03/13/26 Page 11 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>