Lannan v. Greenville FPC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REBECCA J. LANNAN,
Petitioner,
v.
SUSAN RUDOLPH, WARDEN OF FCI
GREENVILLE,
Respondent.
Case No. 3:23-cv-02093-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Petitioner Rebecca J. Lannan filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the computation of the prison credit allocated towards her
federal sentence. (Doc. 1). For the reasons set forth below, Lannan’s petition is denied.
RELEVANT F ACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 27, 2019, Lannan was indicted in the Eastern District of Kentucky on one
count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
See United States v. Beeler, et al, No. 6:19-00031-CHB-HAI-5 (E.D. Ky.) (“Criminal Case”).
At the time of her federal indictment, Lannan was in custody in Bell County, Kentucky,
on pending state controlled substance charges. (Doc. 26-1, p. 3). On December 18, 2019,
Lannan was taken into the custody of the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”)
pursuant to a writ of habeas ad prosequendum in connection with her federal case. (Id.;
Criminal Case, Doc. 33). Lannan ultimately pleaded guilty to the federal charge, and on
February 25, 2021, she was sentenced by the Honorable Claria Horn Boom to 87 months
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in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. (Criminal Case, Doc. 257).
The sentencing court specified that Lannan’s federal sentence would run concurrent to
any sentence imposed on her state charge. (Id.).
On April 20, 2021, the state court sentenced Lannan to a 10-year term of
imprisonment. (Doc. 26-1, p. 27). The USMS returned Lannan to the custody of state
authorities on April 29, 2021. (Doc. 26-1, p. 18). On September 16, 2021, Lannan was
paroled to federal custody. (Id. at pp. 18, 32).
On June 12, 2023, Lannan filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this district court, while she was incarcerated at the Federal Prison
Camp in Greenville. (Doc. 1). She argues that the BOP unlawfully failed to credit her
federal sentence for the time between December 18, 2019, and February 25, 2021, when
she was in federal custody on the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, as well as for
the period between June 13, 2019, and December 18, 2019, when she was in custody on
the related state charges. The Court directed the Respondent to answer the petition, and
Respondent did so on November 27, 2023. (Doc. 26).
DISCUSSION
Lannan was released from BOP Custody on April 29, 2025, while her petition was
pending. See BOP Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited on
March 3, 2026). Nevertheless, her release does not moot the petition. Lannan’s federal
sentence included a three-year term of supervised release. (Doc. 26-1). The Seventh
Circuit has held that “[w]hen a former inmate still serving a term of supervised release
challenges the length or computation of [her] sentence, [her] case is not moot so long as
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[s]he could obtain ‘any potential benefit’ from a favorable decision.” Pope v. Perdue, 889
F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir.
2001)); see also Pettis v. United States, 129 F.4th 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Because
supervised release carries collateral consequences, a favorable decision for Pettis could
modify his sentence, providing him with a benefit and preventing his case from being
moot.”). Relevant here, in Pope, the Seventh Circuit explained that finding a petitioner
had spent too long in prison could carry “great weight” in a motion under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) to reduce a term of supervised release. Pope, 889 F.3d at 414. Lannan could
benefit similarly from a favorable decision, so her petition is not mooted by her release.
Turning to the merits, Lannan alleges that the BOP’s calculation of her sentence
does not properly account for two periods: the time she was in temporary federal custody
on the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum (December 18, 2019, to February 25, 2021)
and the time she was in state custody before then (June 13, 2019, to December 18, 2019),
because the sentencing judge ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Respondent
maintains that Lannan is not entitled to credit for either period because she received
credit for those periods against her state sentence.
As an initial matter, Lannan properly brings this challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
A petition under that section is the appropriate means to contest the BOP’s calculation of
the date on which a prisoner must be released. Von Kahl v. Segal, 19 F.4th 987, 988 (7th
Cir. 2021); 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
When imposing a sentence, a federal court may order it to run concurrent to a state
sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). This authority extends to state sentences that are
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anticipated but not yet imposed. See Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236-37 (2012);
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). But by statute, a federal sentence generally does not begin until “the
defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to . . . the official detention
facility at which the sentence is to be served.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Nevertheless, the BOP
has determined that “if the federal sentence is ordered to run concurrently with a state
sentence,” it will designate “the state facility as the place to serve the federal sentence as
of the date the federal sentence was imposed.” Guzman v. Lillard, No. 24-681, 2025 WL
1455363, at *6 (S.D. Ill. May 21, 2025) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BOP Program Statement
No. 5880.28). For Lannan, the upshot is that her federal sentence began to run on February
25, 2021, the date she was sentenced federally. (Doc. 26-1, p. 11 (disclosing a computation
date of February 25, 2021)).
Section 3585(b) of Title 18 makes clear that an inmate is entitled to credit for time
in custody “that has not been credited against another sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
Lannan seeks credit for the time she was in federal custody before her federal sentencing
between December 18, 2019, to February 25, 2021. That argument lacks merit. Lannan was
in federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. (Doc. 26-1, p. 3).
The Seventh Circuit has explained that these writs permit the transfer of an inmate from
one sovereign to another for the purpose of legal proceedings without altering the
inmate’s primary legal custodian. See Pope v. Perdue, 889 F.3d 410, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“Using this writ, a sovereign may take temporary custody of a prisoner in the custody
of another sovereign, for the purpose of prosecution, without acquiring primary
custody.”); Flick v. Blevins, 887 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1989) (“A writ of habeas corpus ad
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prosequendum enables a [jurisdiction] to take temporary custody of a prisoner confined
within another jurisdiction.”). Thus, the fact that the USMS maintained physical custody
over Lannan for this period does not alter the legal reality that the State of Kentucky
retained primary custody over her. And it is evident that the state credited her for that
time. In an email to the BOP employee charged with computing Lannan’s federal
sentence, Dean Foster — a program administrator at the Kentucky Department of
Corrections — explained Lannan had been awarded 677 days of credit against her state
sentence for the period between June 13, 2019, and April 19, 2021. (Doc. 26-1, p. 32).
Because it is evident that the State credited Lannan for the time she was in federal custody
before her federal sentencing, the BOP could not have credited her for that time.
Lannan also seeks credit for the period before she was transferred to federal
custody on the writ. That claim is meritless for a similar reason. The records furnished by
Respondent make clear that the State credited her for that period as well. (Id.).
Lannan is also not entitled to credit based on the circumstances set out in Willis v.
United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971), and Kayfez v. Gasele, 993 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir.
1993). The BOP implements those credits pursuant to Program Statement 5880.28. As the
Seventh Circuit has explained, the so-called Willis credits apply as follows: “if a prisoner’s
federal and state sentences are concurrent, and the federal sentence is to run longer than
the state sentence (not counting any credits), ‘[p]rior custody credits shall be given for
any time spent in non-federal presentence custody that begins on or after the date of the
federal offense up to the date that the [first] sentence begins to run, federal or non-
federal.’” Grigsby v. Bledsoe, 223 F. App’x 486, 488 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Program
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Statement 5880.28(2)(c)). Additionally, the BOP will credit an inmate for time under
Kayfez if “(1) the raw expiration full term date of the state sentence is later than the raw
expiration full term date of the concurrent federal sentence; and (2) the raw expiration
full term date of the state sentence, after applying qualified state presentence time, is
earlier than the raw expiration full term date of the federal sentence.” Medford v.
Emmerich, No. 24-418, 2024 WL 4039794, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 4, 2024).
Here, the BOP determined that the raw expiration full term (EFT) date of the
federal offense was May 24, 2028, and the corresponding state offense date was April 19,
2031, nearly three years beyond the federal date. (Doc. 26-1, pp. 34-35). Accordingly,
Willis credits did not apply. See Grigsby, 223 F. App’x at 488. The BOP also determined
that Lannan had 623 days of qualifying presentence credit. (Doc. 26-1, p. 34). Subtracting
this time from the state EFT does not result in a sentence that expires earlier than the full
federal term, so Lannan is not entitled to Kayfez credits either. Lannan does not explicitly
contest any of the BOP’s determinations with respect to these credits, and no error is
obvious to the Court.
CONCLUSION
Lannan has not identified any error in the BOP’s calculation of her federal
sentence. Accordingly, her Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close
this case and enter judgment accordingly.
If Lannan wishes to appeal this Order, she must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within 60 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). If Lannan
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chooses to appeal, she will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the
outcome of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger,
547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008). If Lannan files a motion for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis, she must include in her motion a description of the issues she intends to present
on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C).
It is not necessary for Lannan to obtain a certificate of appealability from this
disposition of her § 2241 petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 4, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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