Cerritos v. Doe 1 et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RODOLFO A. CERRITOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DANIEL MONTI and
VONETTA HARRIS,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:22-CV-1214-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Rodolfo A. Cerritos, a former inmate of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged
deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights while housed at Centralia Correctional
Center (“Centralia”), as well as for state-law claims of negligence. Specifically, Cerritos
claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious dental needs when
they failed to properly treat his toothache associated with his left lower wisdom tooth,
delayed treatment, and failed to accurately and urgently respond to complaints about his
dental care. (See Doc. 60).
Now pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants 	Daniel 	Monti 	(“Monti”) 	and 	Vonetta 	Harris 	(“Harris”) 	(collectively,
“Defendants”). (Doc. 109). Counsel for Cerritos filed a timely response to the motion.
(Doc. 115). Defendants also filed a reply brief. (Doc. 118). For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
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B ACKGROUND
I. 	Federal Rules of Evidence
The Court first addresses general evidentiary issues raised by the parties’
summary judgment briefing.
Defendants object to the additional statements of undisputed material facts stated
by Cerritos as the facts are derived from prison grievances and sick call slips and, thus,
constitute inadmissible hearsay that fit no exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(See generally Doc. 118, p. 1, ¶ 20).
While a prisoner’s grievances are hearsay when considered for the truth of the
matter asserted, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that summary judgment evidence
“does not need to be admissible in form; it only needs to be admissible in content.”
Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet, 826 F.3d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 2016). Because the
statements contained in a prisoner’s grievances are within his personal knowledge and
he can testify about them at trial, district courts consider them for summary judgment
purposes. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Bowman, 829 F. Supp. 3d 489, 494 (S.D. Ill. 2026) (collecting
cases).
Here, the statements within Cerritos’s grievances and sick call slips are within his
personal knowledge, and he is capable of testifying to their contents at trial. Further, the
grievances could be admissible for purposes other than the truth of the matter asserted,
including to demonstrate that Defendants had notice of his complaints. Therefore, the
Court will not disregard them for purposes of summary judgment, and Defendants’
objection is overruled.
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II. 	Undisputed Material Facts
Cerritos was incarcerated in the IDOC between December 4, 2014, and January 25,
2024, during which time he was housed at several IDOC correctional facilities. (Doc. 109-
1 at p. 12-14). IDOC housed Cerritos at Centralia from December 23, 2013, until December
1, 2021, when he was transferred to Jacksonville Correctional Center. (Doc 109-1 at p. 13).
Cerritos remained at Jacksonville Correctional Center until December 8, 2022, when he
was transferred to Southwestern Illinois Correctional Center. (Id.). Cerritos was released
on January 25, 2024. (Id.).
In August 2021, while housed at Centralia, Cerritos began experiencing pain in the
lower left side of his mouth and requested dental treatment for his lower left tooth.
(Doc. 109-1 at 42). On August 26, 2021, Cerritos was examined by Centralia dental staff
and complained primarily of an aching pain in his tooth. (Doc. 109-1 at 42-44; see Doc. 109-
2). At this visit, Dr. Quang Tran diagnosed Cerritos with a lower left wisdom tooth that
needed to be extracted and informed Cerritos that he would be placed on a waiting list
to have the extraction performed. (Doc. 109-1 at 45; see Doc. 109-2). Dr. Tran further
provided Cerritos with a prescription for ibuprofen to help manage the pain. (Doc. 109-1
at p. 45).
Following this initial visit, Cerritos was seen by medical or dental staff at Centralia
on several occasions. (See generally Doc. 109-1 at p. 45-65). On September 15, 2021, Cerritos
filed an emergency grievance related to his dental care. (See Doc. 1-1 at p. 13). The Chief
Administrative Officer (“CAO”) (the Warden) deemed the grievance an emergency and
expedited it for review. (Doc. 1-1 at p. 13-14). IDOC staff confirmed that Cerritos was
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placed on the waiting list to have his tooth extracted as soon as possible. (Doc. 1-1 at
p. 15).
The next day, September 16, 2021, Dr. Tran again saw Cerritos for his wisdom
tooth and noted swelling in the gums surrounding the tooth. (Doc. 109-1 at p. 46;
see Doc. 109-2). Dr. Tran prescribed antibiotics for an infection and continued the pain
medication prescription. (Doc. 109-1 at p. 46). Cerritos took both the antibiotic and pain
medication as prescribed. (Doc. 109-1 at p. 47). In late September 2021, Dr. Tran reviewed
Cerritos’s chart and provided another prescription for Motrin. (Doc. 109-1 at p. 48-49).
On October 20, 2021, Cerritos was examined by medical staff at Centralia, who
again informed Cerritos that he was on the waiting list for a tooth extraction. (Doc. 109-1
at p. 43; Doc. 109-2). The same day, Cerritos filed a grievance directed to Centralia’s health
care administrator requesting help in obtaining an extraction of his lower left wisdom
tooth. (Doc. 1-1 at p. 18). Staff again informed Cerritos that he was on the waiting list for
an extraction and told him to continue taking the medications as directed. (See id.).
Dr. Tran also provided Cerritos with a prescription for two antibiotics and ibuprofen.
(Doc. 109-1 at p. 50).
A week later, Cerritos filed another emergency grievance related to his dental care
and continued tooth pain. (Doc. 1-1 at p. 21). In this grievance, Cerritos noted that his
tooth had broken, which caused him persistent and pervasive pain in the lower left side
of his mouth. (Id.). He requested 800mg ibuprofen and antibiotics to help with his pain
and so that he could sleep. (Id.). The Grievance Officer recommended that the grievance
should be “partially upheld” since Cerritos had been given Motrin 400mg and antibiotics,
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and the CAO concurred. (Id.).
Cerritos returned to the healthcare unit for his tooth on November 2, 2021.
(See Doc. 109-2 at p. 1). Cerritos described the pain to a nurse as a sharp, throbbing pain
in his mouth and rated his pain as nine out of 10. (Id.). Cerritos denied experiencing any
restriction in jaw movement or any recent trauma to his jaw. (Id.). The nurse did not
observe any swelling, bleeding, discharge, or foul odor at the time. (Id.). The nurse
ultimately prescribed him 18 tablets of 200mg ibuprofen to manage the pain. (Id.).
Following this visit, on November 3, 2021, Cerritos filed a grievance complaining that the
delay in extracting the tooth had resulted in multiple infections and the pain medications
were not adequately treating the pain. (Id. at pp. 26-27). The CAO expedited the grievance
as an emergency. (Id. at p. 26).
Cerritos filed another grievance on November 11, 2021, stating that his tooth had
further broken off and that he was unable to sleep due to the pain. (Id. at p. 28). The CAO
again expedited this grievance as an emergency. (Id.). In response to this grievance,
Cerritos was notified by IDOC staff that tooth extractions were not being performed due
to COVID-19 protocols. (Id. at p. 36).
On November 14, 2021, medical staff again saw Cerritos, noting that his tooth had
broken for a second time and that his pain was at a 12 or 13 out of 10. (Doc. 109-2 at p. 4).
The nurse prescribed Cerritos 200mg of Ibuprofen, to be taken with a meal three times
daily. (Id.).
Cerritos wrote additional grievances on November 16, November 18, November
22, 	and 	November 	23 	expressing 	dissatisfaction 	with 	his 	dental 	treatment 	and
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complained that the tooth was bleeding and puss was seeping out. (Doc. 1-1 at pp. 32, 34-
35, 39, 42). He explained that he had urged dental staff to extract his tooth because of the
blood and puss, but they refused. (Id. at pp. 34, 35). The CAO expedited each of these
grievances as an emergency. (Id.).
On January 5, 2022, the Grievance Officer noted that a full-time dentist had started
on December 6, 2021, and that appointments for extractions would be made. (Doc. 1-1 at
p. 36-37). By this time, however, Cerritos had already been transferred to Jacksonville
Correctional Center. (Doc. 109-1 at p. 65). Shortly after his transfer, on January 7, 2022,
Cerritos’s left wisdom tooth was extracted at Jacksonville. (Doc. 109-2 at p. 10).
A. Defendant Monti
At all relevant times, Monti was the Warden at Centralia. (Doc. 109-1 at p. 72).
Cerritos never had personal, face-to-face communication with Monti. (Doc. 109-1 at p. 72-
73). Cerritos had previously written to the Warden of the prison, and all of his grievances
were reviewed by the Warden. (Doc. 109 at p. 73; see generally Doc. 1-1 at p. 13-37).
B. 	Defendant Harris
Harris was the Assistant Warden of Programs at Centralia from February 2021
through November 2022. (Doc. 113 at ¶ 1). As the Assistant Warden, Harris attested she
“provided general oversight of the overall operations of the healthcare unit.” (Id. at ¶ 3).
Harris further attested that she has never received any formal training as a medical or
dental provider, and as such she does not provide direct medical care to any individual
in custody. (Id. at ¶ 2-3). Harris also attested to her understanding that any referral for an
individual in custody to be treated by an off-site medical provider must be approved by
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a licensed medical or dental professional. (Id. at ¶ 4).
Cerritos testified that he sued Harris primarily because she was the acting
healthcare administrator as the Assistant Warden at Centralia. (Doc 109-1 at p. 91).
Cerritos and Harris engaged in face-to-face conversation on one occasion, during which
Cerritos requested Harris’s help in obtaining a tooth extraction. (Doc. 109-1 at p. 75).
Harris took down Cerritos’s name and IDOC number and stated that she would “look
into it.” (Doc. 109-1 at p. 76).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute of material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). When
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court views the evidence
and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). When the moving party establishes the basis for
summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must go beyond
mere allegations and offer specific facts establishing there is a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party “has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the
burden of proof.” Id.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Deliberate Indifference
Deliberate indifference to serious medical 	needs of 	individuals in 	custody
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constitutes the “’unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
“By prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, the Eighth Amendment imposes duties
on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement’ and ‘ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.’” Thomas v. Blackard,
2 F.4th 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). In
order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, a prisoner
must show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s
objectively serious medical need. Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 234-35
(7th Cir. 2021); see also Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he plaintiff
must prove that he suffered from ‘(1) an objectively serious medical condition to which
(2) a state official was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.’”). “Deliberate means
more than negligent, though something less than purposeful.” Duckworth v. Ahmad,
532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008).
A medical condition is objectively serious if “a physician has diagnosed it as
requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson.” Lockett
v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1022-23 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409
(7th Cir. 2014)); see also Guiterrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1370-73 (7th Cir. 1997). A medical
condition “need not be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it could be a condition that
would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if
not treated.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).
To prevail on the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show that a prison official has
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subjective knowledge of, and then disregards, an excessive risk to inmate health. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837. “This inquiry has two components. The official must have subjective
knowledge of the risk to the inmate’s health, and the official also must disregard that
risk.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 620. A plaintiff need not show the individual ignored their
complaint, but that the individual knew of the condition and either knowingly or
recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008).
Something more than mere negligence or malpractice is required to prove
deliberate indifference. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2016). “An official’s
failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not cannot be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 550 (7th
Cir. 2022). Medical malpractice “does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Proving deliberate indifference
is “a high bar because it requires a showing of something approaching a total unconcern
for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.” Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710
(7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
For purposes of summary judgment, the parties do not dispute that Cerritos was
suffering from an objectively serious medical need. Therefore, the Court turns to the
subjective component: whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Cerritos’s
serious medical condition. Defendants argue that Cerritos’s claims fail because there is
no evidence that they were personally involved in any alleged violation of Cerritos’s
constitutional rights. (Doc. 109 at p. 7-8).
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A. Defendant Monti
Cerritos claims that Monti was aware of his condition, knew that it was not
improving, and acted with deliberate indifference to that condition. Monti moves for
summary judgment on the basis that he, as the Warden of Centralia, was not a medical
provider and was not authorized to make medical decisions regarding IDOC inmates.
Therefore, he lacked sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional
violation and cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C § 1983.
Although Cerritos never had a personal interaction with Monti, the record shows
that Cerritos filed nine grievances between September 15, 2021, and November 23, 2021.
(See generally Doc. 1-1). The grievances described Cerritos’s worsening pain, swelling, and
bleeding in his tooth and gums as his decaying tooth broke, as well as Cerritos’s claim
that the prescribed ibuprofen did not alleviate his symptoms. Cerritos also complained
that the delay in extracting the tooth had resulted in multiple infections. The Warden
expedited each grievance as an emergency.
In arguing that Monti lacked personal involvement, Defendants focus their
argument on what Cerritos knew, i.e., Cerritos testified he did not know if Monti was the
Warden while he was incarcerated at Centralia. That is the wrong inquiry. The relevant
question is what did Monti know about Cerritos’s condition.
“An inmate’s correspondence to a prison administrator may [] establish a basis for
personal liability under § 1983 where that correspondence provides sufficient knowledge
of a constitutional deprivation.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2015)
“Indeed, once an official is alerted to an excessive risk to inmate safety or health through
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a prisoner’s correspondence, ‘refusal or declination to exercise the authority of his or her
office may reflect deliberate disregard.’” Id. (quoting Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755
(7th Cir. 2011)). “If investigation into the grievance would make it ‘obvious’ that the
inmate ‘might not be receiving adequate care,’ then the grievance gives the warden actual
knowledge of the condition. Gevas v. Pfister, No. 16-CV-10599, 2024 WL 5452703, at *1
(N.D. Ill. June 14, 2024) (quoting Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Here, a reasonable jury could conclude that Monti, as the Warden and Chief
Administrative Officer, had actual knowledge that Cerritos was experiencing worsening
pain and infection that was not alleviated by the prescribed medication when he
expedited Cerritos’s nine grievances in two months as emergencies. Although Monti
apparently delegated the job of reviewing grievances to another staff member, since his
signature does not appear on the grievance responses, that does not absolve him of
responsibility. Indeed, “[b]y delegating the responsibility to review grievances, a warden
may effectively consent to or approve of how the grievances are handled.” Dixon v.
Brown, No. 3:16-CV-01222-GCS, 2021 WL 1171657, at *8 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2019); see also
Drapes v. Hardy, No. 14-c-9850, 2019 WL 1425733, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2019)
(“[A]lthough the warden may delegate [the responsibility to review inmate grievances]
to others who sign his name for him, the buck still stops at the warden.”).
And based on Cerritos’s grievances, a reasonable jury could find that Monti
violated the Eighth Amendment when he turned a blind eye to Cerritos’s inadequate care.
A plaintiff does not need to prove that his complaints of pain were literally ignored,
rather, he must show only that the defendant’s response to it was so plainly inappropriate
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as to permit the inference that the defendants intentionally or recklessly disregarded his
needs. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, Monti’s failure to further
investigate Cerritos’s constant complaints of intense pain and suffering could constitute
deliberate indifference.
True, each time Cerritos filed a grievance, the CAO expedited the grievance as an
emergency. But a prison official cannot persist in a course of care known to be ineffective.
Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. And it is clear from the seven grievances Cerritos filed in
November 2021 alone that the prescribed ibuprofen was insufficient to deal with his
persistent and “overwhelming pain.” (Doc. 1-1 at p. 40). The Court therefore finds there
is sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that Monti knew
about Cerritos’s dental condition, yet knowingly and recklessly disregarded it. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Cerritos, Monti is not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
B. 	Defendant Harris
Harris moves for summary judgment on the basis that she, as the Assistant
Warden of Programs, is not a medical provider and is not authorized to make medical
decisions regarding IDOC inmates. Therefore, she lacked sufficient personal involvement
in the alleged constitutional violation and cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C § 1983.
As noted above, however, once an official is alerted to an excessive risk to inmate
safety or health, the official’s refusal to exercise the authority of her office may constitute
deliberate indifference. Perez, 792 F.3d at 781–82. Cerritos testified that he spoke with
Harris on one occasion and relayed his concerns about his treatment to her. (Doc. 109-1
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at pp. 74-76). Cerritos testified that he asked Harris if she could help him get his tooth
extracted. (Id.). Harris asked for his name and IDOC number, which she wrote down, and
told him she would look into it. (Id.). Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could find
that Harris, the Assistant Warden of Programs who oversaw the healthcare unit, knew
about Cerritos’s dental condition and turned a blind eye to it when she did nothing
further to ensure Cerritos received adequate dental care. Therefore, Harris also is not
entitled to summary judgment.
II. 	Qualified Immunity
Defendants next argue that the doctrine of qualified immunity bars any liability
for their actions or inactions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants argue in a cursory fashion
that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the facts here do not rise to the level
of a Constitutional violation.
The doctrine of qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that “shields officers
from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). In reviewing whether a government official is protected by the
doctrine of qualified immunity, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has
shown make out a violation of a constitutional right and whether the right at issue was
“clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). “Qualified immunity is applicable
unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Id.
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
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As discussed above, Cerritos has produced sufficient evidence to establish a
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
And, as Cerritos argues, that constitutional right has been clearly established since Estelle
was decided in 1976. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (holding that deliberate indifference to a
serious medical condition is akin to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and
suffering which the Eighth Amendment prohibits). Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
III. 	Sovereign Immunity
Cerritos also asserts state-law negligence claims against Defendants. Specifically,
Cerritos claims Defendants owed Cerritos a duty of ordinary care, and Defendants
breached their duty of care by failing to notify medical staff that his condition was
deteriorating, failing to assist Cerritos in getting additional medical treatment, and failing
to respond accurately and urgently to his complaints about his medical care. As a direct
and proximate cause of Defendants’ negligence, Cerritos argues, he suffered personal and
pecuniary 	injuries, 	including 	but 	not 	limited 	to 	unnecessary pain 	and 	suffering,
emotional distress, and mental anguish. (Doc. 60, p. 8-10, ¶¶ 34-36, 43-45).
Defendants 	argue 	that 	the 	Court 	lacks 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	because
Cerritos’s claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Doc. 109 at p. 12).
Specifically, Defendants assert that because their actions with regard to Cerritos’s dental
treatment were merely a product of their duties as State employees, Cerritos’s state law
claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Doc. 109 at p. 14-15). In
response, Cerritos argues only that since Defendants are being sued in their individual
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capacity, not their official state capacity, sovereign immunity does not bar his state law
negligence claims. (Doc. 115 at p. 22).
“When a federal court is exercising supplemental jurisdiction over claims based
on state law, the court must apply state law immunities.” Stoker v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., No. 25-CV-00661-SPM, 2026 WL 709710, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2026) (citing Rodriguez
v. Cook Cnty., 664 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2011)). The Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act
provides that the State of Illinois is immune from suit in federal court for state law claims.
745 ILCS 5/1. Instead, the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over state
law tort claims against the State. Frakes v. Warren, No. 3:23-CV-2963-MAB, 2026 WL
1328219, at *2 (S.D. Ill. May 13, 2026) (citing Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 441 (7th Cir.
2001)). State sovereign immunity extends to claims against state employees, even when
they are sued in their individual capacities, when the action is “nominally one against the
servants or agents of the State” but “the real claim is against the State of Illinois itself and
. . . the State of Illinois is the party vitally interested.” Id. (quoting Murphy v. Smith, 844
F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2016)).
An action brought against a state employee is considered one against the State
when:
[T]here are (1) no allegations that an agent or employee of the State
acted beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts;
(2) the duty alleged to have been breached was not owed to the
public generally independent of the fact of State employment; and
(3) where the complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily
within that employee’s normal and official functions of the State.
T. S. v. Cnty. of Cook, Illinois, 67 F.4th 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Healy v. Vaupel,
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549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (Ill. 1990)). “And if an action brought against a state official in his
or her personal capacity could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to
liability, it is also considered an action against the state.” Id. (quotation omitted).
A. Scope of Authority
Whether an employee of the State acted beyond the scope of their authority
depends on whether “the employee intended to perform some functions within the scope
of [their] authority when committing the legal wrong.” Id. (quoting Healy, 549 N.E.2d at
1247); see also Jackson v. Alverez, 831 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
Monti’s actions with regard to Cerritos were, at all times, within the scope of his
role as Warden at Centralia. Monti’s office was responsible for reviewing Cerritos’s
grievances, and there is no allegation, much less evidence, that Monti acted outside the
scope of his authority. Likewise, Harris acted within the scope of her authority as
Assistant Warden of Programs. As Harris attested, she provided general oversight to the
healthcare unit at Centralia. There is nothing in the record to suggest that her actions
were otherwise outside the scope of her authority.
B. 	Source of Duty
The Court next examines whether the duty owed to Cerritos arose solely out of
Defendants’ employment. “Where the alleged wrongful conduct ‘arose out of the State
employee’s breach of a duty that is imposed on him solely by virtue of his State
employment,’ sovereign immunity bars the action[.]” Id. (quoting Currie v. Lao, 592
N.E.2d 977, 980 (Ill. 1992)). But “where the employee is charged with breaching a duty
imposed on him independently of his state employment, sovereign immunity will not
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attach.” Id. (quoting Jinkins v. Lee, 807 N.E.2d 411, 420 (Ill. 2004)).
In this case, the alleged duty that Defendants owed to Cerritos arose solely from
their employment at Centralia as Warden and Assistant Warden. Outside of the prison
context, neither Monti nor Harris would owe any duty of care to Cerritos. And, as
Defendants argue, the alleged violation of the duty of care arises solely from their alleged
failure to adhere to their job requirements, not from any duty owed to the public in
general. Because the alleged duty owed to Cerritos arose solely from Defendants’
employment with the State, sovereign immunity attaches.
C. Official Functions
Finally, the Court asks whether the breach involved matters that are ordinarily
within the normal official functions of the state employee. Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 1247.
Here, the alleged breach of duty includes Defendants’ failure to notify medical
staff at the prison that Cerritos’s condition was getting worse, failure to assist Cerritos in
obtaining medical treatment, and failure to respond accurately and urgently to Cerritos’s
complaints about his medical care. (Doc. 60, p. 10, ¶ 44; Doc. 60, p. 8, ¶ 35). These matters
are all within the normal functions of a Warden and Assistant Warden, who are tasked
with providing oversight of the prison facility, ensuring inmates’ health and safety, and
general administration of the prison’s programs. And, at all relevant times, Monti and
Harris were acting within their official capacities.
Having analyzed the relevant factors, the Court finds that Defendants acted within
the scope of their authority, their actions were within their normal and official functions
as Warden and Assistant Warden of Programs, and the source of the duty alleged to be
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owed to Cerritos stems solely from their State employment. Therefore, the claims of
negligence against Defendants are actually claims against the State of Illinois and are
barred by sovereign immunity. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
Cerritos’s state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Daniel
Monti and Vonetta Harris (Doc. 109) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Defendants are GRANTED judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff Rodolfo Cerritos’s
state law negligence claims. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Cerritos’s deliberate
indifference claims.
A status conference to discuss the potential for mediation and to set a firm trial
date will be set by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 8, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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