Randall Eric LaDue

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Appearances:
Randall Eric LaDue, Chapter 7 Debtor, pro se
James Justin May, Johnson May, Boise, Idaho, Attorney for the Chapter 7 Trustee Timothy R.
Kurtz
______________________________________________________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is an “Amended Omnibus Motion” (Doc. No. 34) (the “Omnibus
Motion”) filed by Randall Eric LaDue (the “Debtor”) and an “Application to Employ Riley
Wilcox of Guardian Group Real Estate as Realtor” (Doc. No. 29) (the “Application”) filed by the
Chapter 7 Trustee Timothy R. Kurtz (the “Trustee”).
The Court held a telephonic hearing on the Omnibus Motion and the Application on
February 11, 2026, at which the Debtor appeared pro se and the Trustee appeared through
counsel. Certain requests within the Omnibus Motion were orally withdrawn by the Debtor
during the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the remaining issues within
the Omnibus Motion and the Application under advisement and now issues this Memorandum of
Decision. Rules 9014 and 7052. 1 For the reasons and analysis that follow, the Omnibus Motion
is denied, and the Application is granted.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101–1532, and all citations to a “Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
In re:
RANDALL ERIC LADUE,
Debtor.
Case No. 25-00875-BRW
Chapter 7
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II. JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY, AND VENUE
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding as referred to it by the
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334(b). This is a “core” proceeding and is
within this Court’s constitutional authority to adjudicate via final judgment or order. 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). Finally, venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1408 and 1409.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FILINGS IN
THE BANKRUPTCY CASE
This chapter 7 case was filed by the Debtor pro se on October 27, 2025, as a skeletal
petition. Doc. No. 1. The Debtor sought and obtained a waiver of the filing fee in the case upon
representation that he made $0 in monthly net income. See Doc. No. 3 (Application to Have the
Chapter 7 Filing Fee Waived); and Doc. No. 24 (Order Granting Application to Waive Chapter
Filing Fee). The Debtor also sought and obtained an extension of time to file required
documents in the case. See Doc. No. 17 (Motion for Extension of Time to File Required
Documents); and Doc. No. 18 (Order Granting Motion to Extend Deadline to File Schedules or
Provide Required Information).
Consistent with the Court’s extension deadline, the Debtor filed his Schedules and other
documents on November 24, 2025. See, e.g., Doc. No. 20 (Schedules and other required
documents). On December 4, 2025, the Trustee filed a Notice of Assets in the case alerting
creditors to file proofs of claim. Doc. No. 26.
On December 10, 2026, the Trustee filed the Application. Doc. No. 29. The Application
indicated that the Trustee intended to market and sell, with the assistance of the proposed realtor,
Riley Wilcox of Guardian Group Real Estate, LLC (the “Realtor”), real property commonly
known as 1453 N. Laconia Ave., Eagle, Idaho 83616 (the “Property”). The Application seeks to
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employ the Realtor pursuant to § 327, and the Realtor claims therein that he is a “disinterested
person,” pursuant to the definition of that term at § 101(14).
On January 2, 2026, the Debtor filed two motions along with exhibits (the “Original
Motions”). Doc. No. 31. Within the Original Motion, the Debtor included a “Motion to
Determine Secured Status & Avoid Penalty Liens,” and a “Motion to Compel Abandonment &
for Injunctive Relief (Halt RE Agent).” Id. The Original Motions clearly state an objection to
the Application, among other things. See, e.g., Doc. No. 31 at 13 (requesting that the Court enter
an order “halting the engagement of a real estate agent”).
On January 5, 2026, the Debtor filed an “Emergency Motion for Extension of Time
Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1) and for Leave to Amend Pleadings” (the “Emergency
Motion”). Doc. No. 32. The Emergency Motion seeks additional time to file an objection to the
Application and seeks leave of the Court to file amended motions to the Original Motions. Id.
On January 8, 2026, the Debtor filed the Omnibus Motion, which includes multiple
exhibits and attachments. Doc. No. 34. The Omnibus Motion included the relief previously
sought in the Original Motions and the Emergency Motion, along with several new requests for
relief. Id.
On January 15, 2026, the Court entered an Order Denying as Unnecessary the Emergency
Motion. Doc. No. 39. Within this order, the Court held that an extension to object to the
Application and for leave to file amended motions, as requested by the Debtor in the Emergency
Motion, was unnecessary because the Original Motions clearly stated a timely objection to the
Application, and because the Debtor had already filed the Omnibus Motion, which amended the
Original Motions. Id. Within the order, the Court stated that the Emergency Motion would not
be heard at the hearing on February 11, 2026. Id. The Court further stated that the Application
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would be considered by the Court at the February 11, 2026 hearing due to the Debtor’s objection.
Id.
On January 20, 2026, the Trustee moved to employ counsel in this case to represent him.
Doc. No. 42. The Trustee then objected to the Omnibus Motion on January 26, 2026 (the
“Objection”). Doc. No. 52.
The Omnibus Motion includes motions and several requests:
1. 	“Amended Motion to Determine Secured Status & Avoid Penalty Liens”2
2. 	“Amended Motion to Compel Abandonment & For Injunctive Relief (Stay of Realtor
Employment)”
3. 	“Removal of Trustee for Cause (11 U.S.C. § 324)”
4. 	“Finding of Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duty”
5. 	“Protective Order Staying Rule 2004 Examination and Property Sale”
6. 	“Compulsion of Zoom Usage Reports”
See Doc. No. 34.
In addition, the day before the hearing on these matters, the Debtor filed a “Notice of
Filing Supplemental Exhibits for Hearing on Feb. 11, 2026.” Doc. No. 65. This supplement
includes a Declaration of Seryna LaDue, who is the Debtor’s ex-spouse, as well as additional
2 As detailed below, this motion within the Omnibus Motion was orally withdrawn by the Debtor.
However, the Debtor indicated that this motion or a similar one may be pursued by him at a later date.
The Court would direct the Debtor’s attention to DeMarah v. United States of Am. (In re DeMarah), 62
F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1995) and Hutchinson v. United States of Am. (In re Hutchinson), 15 F.4th
1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 2021). Both of these binding Ninth Circuit cases expressly hold that debtors “lack
‘the right to remove tax liens from their otherwise exempt property.’” In re Hutchinson, 15 F.4th at 1235
(quoting In re DeMarah, 62 F.3d at 1252). Moreover, as to the Debtor’s request to determine secured
status of one of the alleged “tax liens” on the Property, the Idaho State Tax Commission has since filed a
proof of claim in this case asserting that it does not have a lien and instead has an unsecured claim. See
Proof of Claim No. 3-1. As to the other alleged “tax lien” held by the IRS, no proof of claim has been
filed at this time.
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exhibits. Id. Ms. LaDue objects to the sale of the Property, which she states she co-owns with
the Debtor, and claims that she did not receive notice of the Application from the Trustee. Id.
The Debtor also claimed during the hearing on these matters to have not received notice of the
Application from the Trustee. Also attached to the supplement is a comparative market analysis
of the Property. Id.
During the hearing held on February 11, 2026, the Debtor orally withdrew the “Amended
Motion to Determine Secured Status & Avoid Penalty Liens,” as well as the request of
“Compulsion of Zoom Usage Reports.” The Debtor reserved, and the Court acknowledged, the
right to bring these matters before the Court later if he determines it appropriate.
The Court has reviewed and considered all the various documents filed in this case, some
of which are discussed above, and has reviewed and considered the arguments of the parties in
the various filings in the case and as made on the record during the hearing on these matters.
IV. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Evidentiary Hearing Requirement
The determination whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is within the bankruptcy
court’s discretion. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Fibercom, Inc. (In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc.), 503
F.3d 933, 946 (9th Cir. 2007). If there is an adequate factual basis for the bankruptcy court’s
decision, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. Id.
In this case, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, declines to hold an evidentiary
hearing given the status of the chapter 7 case and the facts and arguments presented to the Court
related to the Omnibus Motion and the Application. At this early stage of the case and based on
the allegations in the Omnibus Motion and the various documents submitted by the Debtor in
support, and as stated in the Application, the Court concludes that additional evidence or
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testimony is not necessary. Moreover, the Court concludes that, again at this stage, the relief
requested by the parties in the Omnibus Motion and the Application are legal issues that may be
resolved without a further developed evidentiary record.
B. The Omnibus Motion
As stated, the Omnibus Motion includes multiple requests for relief. For clarity, the
Court will address the issues as the Debtor presented them, omitting the motion and request that
were withdrawn by the Debtor during the hearing on February 11, 2026.
1. 	Amended Motion to Compel Abandonment and for Injunctive Relief (Stay of
Realtor Employment)
a. The Debtor’s Arguments
The Debtor requests that the Court order abandonment of the Property from the
bankruptcy estate and for injunctive relief under § 105(a) to stay the Realtor’s employment and
other actions in the case. Generally, the Debtor argues that the Property is not valuable enough
to have equity available to the bankruptcy estate after considering the liens and other expenses
that would be paid in the event of a sale. Based on the Debtor’s math, the Property should be
abandoned because it has no value for the bankruptcy estate.
Moreover, the Debtor argues that the Realtor should not be employed by the Trustee
because there is no equity in the Property and because of how quickly the Realtor was identified
by the Trustee. The Debtor points out, for instance, that before the Realtor was engaged the
Trustee referred to the Realtor as “my realtor.” The Debtor further argued at the hearing that the
Realtor was not “disinterested” as required under § 327 and the applicable Rules. Based on these
things, the Debtor objects to the engagement of the Realtor as requested in the Application and
seeks further an injunction staying the actions of the Realtor to proceed in evaluating, and
possibly, listing, marketing, and selling the Property.
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b. Law Related to the Motion to Compel Abandonment
Section 554 governs the abandonment of property of the estate. “On request of a party in
interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may order the trustee to abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the
estate.” § 554(b). Courts have determined that compelling abandonment should be the
exception, rather than the rule. In re Garcia, 521 B.R.680, 684 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2014). “Absent
an attempt by the trustee to churn property worthless to the estate just to increase fees,
abandonment should rarely be ordered.” Vu v. Kendall (In re Vu), 245 B.R. 644, 647 (9th Cir.
BAP 2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
While the Code does not define what is “burdensome,” of “inconsequential value,” or of
“inconsequential benefit” to the estate, it is a “factual determination about whether there is any
‘potential value’ the estate may derive from administration of the property.” In re Garcia, 521
B.R. at 686 (citing Yack v. Dacquisto (In re Yack), 2009 WL 7751419, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP Feb.
18, 2009)). The party requesting abandonment has the burden of proof and the party opposing
abandonment must demonstrate some likely benefit to the estate. 5 C OLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 554.02[4] (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). Where a trustee “has not had
sufficient time to investigate possible assets of the estate,” a request for abandonment may be
considered premature. Id.
c. Application of Law to this Case
Based on the present status of this case, and under the applicable law, the Court denies
the Debtor’s motion to compel abandonment of the Property at this time. The Trustee is in the
process of evaluating the Property and is considering whether there will be an objection to the
homestead exemption claimed by the Debtor. As a result, it is not clear whether the Property is
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of “inconsequential value” or “inconsequential benefit” to the bankruptcy estate. At this time, an
order compelling abandonment of the Property would be premature, particularly considering the
legal standards governing such a motion. Nevertheless, the Court will consider a later filed
motion to compel abandonment, if necessary, as the value of the Property to the bankruptcy
estate becomes clearer.
d. Law Related to § 327(a) Engagements and § 105(a) Injunctions
Under § 327 the trustee, with court approval, may employ professionals to assist the
trustee in carrying out his duties so long as the person to be engaged does not hold an interest
adverse to the estate and is disinterested. § 327(a).
A “disinterested person” is
a person that—(A) is not a creditor, an equity secured holder, or an
insider; (B) is not and was not, within 2 years before the date of the
filing of the petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor;
and (C) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest
of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders,
by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with,
or interest in, the debtor, or for any other reason.
§ 101(14).
Importantly, “employment of a realtor is a preliminary step,” which is not the equivalent
of the bankruptcy court approving a sale of the real property. In re Greenfield, 623 B.R. 847,
857 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2020). Instead, any proposed sale of real property would also need to
come before the bankruptcy court for approval, and such request is subject to an objection by
interested parties, including the debtor. Id.
Section 105(a) of the Code provides that the “court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” § 105(a). This
provision has been invoked to seek an injunction. See, e.g., Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel
Innovations (In re Excel Innovations, Inc.), 502 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the
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§ 105(a) standard with respect to injunctions). The standard for granting an injunction is under
the “usual preliminary injunction standard,” of (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) the possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if the relief is not granted; (3) a balance of
hardships between the parties; and (4) advancement of the public interest. Id. at 1093.
Moreover, a party seeking an injunction generally must commence an adversary
proceeding in order to effectuate the injunction. See Rule 7001(g) (stating an adversary
proceeding must be filed to pursue an injunction); see also In re Greenfield, 623 B.R. at 857-58
(holding that a motion to stay the trustee from “taking steps to sell property of the estate” is
“procedurally improper” and instead requires an adversary proceeding to be filed).
e. Application of the Law of § 327 and § 105(a) to this Case
Here, the Debtor’s concerns over the employment of the Realtor do not stem from the
actual employment but rather the implication of a forthcoming sale of the Property. Such a
reason is insufficient to halt employment, because the requirements of § 327(a) are met.
Moreover, there is no indication in this case that the Realtor is not a “disinterested person,” as
that term is defined under § 101(14), or is otherwise disqualified from acting as a professional in
the case. The Trustee’s early identification of the Realtor as his realtor does not cause the
Realtor to be disqualified from engagement in the case. The Court is unaware of any prohibition
under the Code or applicable case law that would prohibit a trustee from engaging a professional
whom the trustee had previously engaged in other matters, so long as the professional meets the
requirements of § 327 and the applicable Rules in each new engagement.
The Trustee has not pursued sale of the Property at this time, and any sale by the Trustee
in the future would require the Court’s approval under § 363 after notice to the Debtor and
creditors. In addition, in the case of a co-owner (i.e. Ms. LaDue), which appears to be an issue
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present in this case, the Trustee may be required to file an adversary proceeding to ultimately
gain this Court’s approval to sell the Property. See, e.g., § 363(h) (listing the requirements to be
established for a trustee to sell co-owned property); Rule 7001(c) (stating such an action requires
an adversary proceeding to be filed).
Based on this analysis, there are still steps to be taken before the sale of the Property may
be approved. The preliminary step of hiring the Realtor in this case is just the first of those and it
is appropriately ordered now on this record. With the assistance of the Realtor, the Trustee will
be able to fully evaluate the Property to determine whether to market and seek approval of the
sale of the Property. Pursuant to the Application, and as acknowledged by the Trustee at the
hearing, the bankruptcy estate will not have to pay anything to the Realtor unless and until the
Realtor successfully markets and a sale of the Property is approved by this Court. Additionally,
the Realtor will not be paid unless the Court approves an application to pay the Realtor, as
required under § 330. As such, employing the Realtor, even if there is a question about the
equity available to the bankruptcy estate at this time, will not cause an expense to the bankruptcy
estate if the sale is ultimately not completed.
As such, the Debtor’s objection to the Application is overruled and the Application is
approved.
Of particular note, however, the Debtor and Ms. LaDue have indicated that their son has
special health concerns and conditions and that the disturbance by the Trustee and the Realtor
being in the Property in an attempt to market and sell the Property could cause issues for their
son’s wellbeing. The Court takes these issues seriously and expects that the Realtor and the
Trustee will accommodate the reasonable requests by the Debtor and Ms. LaDue to avoid, as
much as possible, disruption to this child in marketing or evaluating the Property. To the extent
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that a dispute arises over these issues, the parties should bring those matters to the Court for
determination.
Finally, the Court concludes under the § 105(a) analysis that the Debtor has not made a
showing that an injunction should be issued to stop the Realtor from proceeding in this case.
Again, the Realtor’s employment and actions taken after employment are preliminary and typical
in bankruptcy cases such as this one. Moreover, Debtor’s submissions do not meet the
requirements of the “usual preliminary injunction” standard, nor is this matter on the correct
procedural footing for the issuance of any injunction. As such, the Court declines to order an
injunction to prevent the Realtor from being employed or taking steps to evaluate and ultimately
market and attempt to sell the Property should the Trustee determine such action is appropriate in
the exercise of his informed business judgment. Again, the Court is not approving a sale of the
Property at this stage, but is simply authorizing the Realtor’s engagement by the Trustee to
permit the Realtor to proceed as appropriate as a professional engaged by the Trustee.
2. 	Removal of Trustee for Cause (11 U.S.C. § 324) and Finding of Negligence and
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The Debtor seeks removal of the Trustee pursuant to § 324. The Debtor claims, among
other things, that he has not been properly served in this case by the Trustee, that the Trustee has
listed in § 341(a) meeting minutes that he was a “no show” despite the Trustee telling the Debtor
he need not appear at those continued hearings, that the Trustee has threatened a Rule 2004
examination of he and his ex-spouse due to the Trustee finding them “uncooperative,” and that
the Trustee kept from the Debtor Zoom “usage reports” from the § 341(a) meetings that were
conducted.
Relatedly, the Debtor states that these actions should also be found as negligence and a
breach of the fiduciary duty by the Trustee.
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Section 324 provides that a trustee may be removed by the Court only “for cause.” Cause
is determined on a case-by-case basis after notice and hearing. Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding,
Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2008). Although non-exhaustive, some forms of “cause” for
removal “may include trustee incompetence, violation of the trustee’s fiduciary duties,
misconduct or failure to perform the trustee’s duties, or lack of disinterestedness or holding an
interest adverse to the estate.” Id. However, many courts have held that the trustee will not be
removed absent actual fraud or injury. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 324.02[2]. Courts
primarily consider that if the estate “would suffer more from the discord created by the present
trustee than would be suffered from a change of administration, the removal of the trustee is
necessarily the better solution.” In re AFI Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d at 846.
As stated, the Debtor asserts the trustee should be removed for misrepresentation of the
attendees in the §341 meeting of creditors, miscommunication of the §341 meeting dates,
attempting to portray the debtor as non-compliant through his “no shows,” improperly serving
the Debtor at the wrong address, impartiality by seeking employment of “my” realtor,
withholding a Zoom “usage reports,” and using a Rule 2004 examination as a threat. At the
hearing on the Omnibus Motion, the Debtor withdrew his request for the Zoom “usage reports.”
As the Court stated during the hearing, the Court does not know if those reports are created or
exist. But, in any event, a § 341(a) meeting is generally a public proceeding where parties are
able to attend and listen and the participants are not required to disclose their appearance at the
meeting. Ultimately, the actions complained of by the Debtor do not rise to the level necessary
for a finding of fraud or injury or otherwise meet the standard for removal under § 324. The
Court therefore denies the Debtor’s request to remove the Trustee in this case. The Court also
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declines to find that the Trustee has been negligent or has breached his fiduciary duty in this case
on these facts.
3. 	Protective Order Staying Rule 2004 Examination and Property Sale
Finally, the Debtor seeks a protective order staying a future Rule 2004 examination, as
has been mentioned by the Trustee, and the sale of the Property.
A Rule 2004 Examination allows inquiry into the debtor’s acts, conduct, or property;
liabilities and financial condition; matters affecting the administration of the debtor’s estate; or
the debtor’s right to discharge. Rule 2004(b)(1). A debtor may be examined by a trustee under
§ 343. The party seeking the examination bears the burden of showing “good cause,” that such
examination is necessary and denial would cause undue hardship or injustice. Lee v. Field (In re
Lee), 2021 WL 2283910 at *4 (9th Cir. BAP June 3, 2021). Further, a court may deny a Rule
2004 examination where the purpose is abuse or harassment. Id. at *3.
The Debtor seeks to preemptively prevent a Rule 2004 Examination not yet pursued by
the Trustee. In the event the Trustee does seek a Rule 2004 examination, the Trustee must
demonstrate “good cause,” and the Debtor, or any other target of such an examination, has the
opportunity to object. LBR 2004-1.
In addition, and on the same line of reasoning, a sale of the Property has not been brought
to this Court for approval. Any sale of the Property is required to be approved by the Court, and
parties in interest, including the Debtor, will have an opportunity to object to that sale.
Based on the foregoing, the Court will not preemptively order that a Rule 2004
examination may not be taken nor will the Court stay the Trustee’s efforts to sell the Property, to
the extent that the Trustee determines it appropriate to do so. Again, any such sale will need to
be brought to this Court for its approval, and the Debtor or other parties in interest will be given
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the opportunity to object if they wish.
C. The Application
As analyzed above, the Application is granted, and the Debtor’s objections thereto are
overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, the remaining requests of the Omnibus Motion are denied,
and the Application is granted.
A separate order will be entered on the Omnibus Motion. The Trustee shall submit a
proposed order granting the Application.
DATED: February 13, 2026
_________________________
Brent R. Wilson
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
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