USA v. Moore

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-CR-1036-CJW-MAR
Plaintiff,
vs. ORDER
DERRICK DEONTE MOORE,
Defendant.
_________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
A Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) by the Honorable Mark A. Roberts,
United States Magistrate Judge recommending the Court deny defendant’s motion to
suppress is before the Court. (Doc. 39). Defendant filed an objection to the R&R. (Doc.
44). The government filed a response to defendant’s objection. (Doc. 45). For the
following reasons, defendant’s objection is overruled, the R&R is adopted, and
defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 30) is denied.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party files a timely objection to a magistrate judge’s R&R, a “judge of the
court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3) (“The district judge must consider de
novo any objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.”); United States v.
Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that a district judge must
“undertake [ ] a de novo review of the disputed portions of a magistrate judge’s [R&R]”).
“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also
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Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3) (“The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the
recommendation, receive further evidence, or resubmit the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.”). It is reversible error for a district court to fail to engage in a de novo
review of a magistrate judge’s R&R when such review is required. Lothridge, 324 F.3d
at 600. Accordingly, the Court reviews the disputed portions of Judge Roberts’ R&R de
novo.
Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed
under at least a “clearly erroneous” standard. See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d
793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed “[the district court
judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “a finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). A district judge may, however, elect to review
an R&R under a more exacting standard even if no objections are filed. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural History
On July 22, 2025, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with
one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance—fentanyl—in
violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); one count
of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 922(g)(1), 922(g)(9), and 924(a)(8); and one count of distribution of a
controlled substance—fentanyl—in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). (Doc. 3).
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On September 15, 2025, defendant filed a motion to suppress, (Doc. 30),
requesting suppression of “[a]ll firearms, controlled substances, paraphernalia relating to
controlled substances, and cash seized during search of XXXX Woodlawn St., Dubuque,
Iowa, on March 30, 2023.” (Doc. 30-1). In support of his motion, defendant submitted
two search warrants for the Woodlawn residence—one from March 28, 2023, (Doc. 30-
3), and one from March 30, 2023, (Doc. 30-4)—along with defendant’s booking sheet,
(Doc. 37-1), as exhibits. On September 22, 2025, the government filed a resistance,
(Doc. 34), and provided the same two search warrants as exhibits along with the warrant
cover sheets, returns of service, property and evidence vouchers, and DocuSign
certificates of completion. (Docs. 34-2 & 34-3). The March 28, 2023 search warrant
authorized law enforcement to seize defendant’s person as well as marijuana, controlled
substances, and drug paraphernalia. (Docs. 30-3, at 3; 34-1, at 4). The March 30, 2023
search warrant authorized law enforcement to seize a Glock handgun, firearms
accessories, and any documents related to the purchase or ownership of firearms. (Doc.
30-4, at 3; 34-2, at 4).
On September 30, 2025, Judge Roberts held a hearing on the motion. (Doc. 38).
At the hearing, the government called Dubuque Police Corporal Austin Weitz. The
government offered the two warrants and defendant offered his booking sheet. (Id.).
The Court accepted all three exhibits. (Id.). On October 28, 2025, Judge Roberts issued
his R&R, recommending the Court deny defendant’s motion to suppress. (Doc. 39).
Specifically, Judge Roberts found the March 28, 2023 and the March 30, 2023 search
warrants were supported by probable cause, that defendant had not made the necessary
showing entitling him to a Franks hearing, and that alternatively the Leon good faith
exception would apply. (Id.). On November 11, 2025, defendant filed an objection in
which he objected to all of Judge Roberts’ legal conclusions. (Doc. 44). The government
filed a resistance to defendant’s objection. (Doc. 45).
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The Court has independently reviewed the record and finds no errors in Judge
Roberts’ detailed and thorough findings of fact; the Court adopts Judge Roberts’ factual
findings in their entirety. Because defendant objects to all Judge Roberts’ legal
conclusions, the Court conducts a de novo analysis of the legal issues.
B. Probable Cause for Search Warrant
Defendant argues, first, that “[t]he evidence seized from the residence at . . .
Woodlawn Street must be suppressed. Although conducted with a warrant, the search of
the residence was not supported by probable cause.” (Doc. 30-2, at 4). More
specifically, defendant argues that “the link between [himself] and the place to be
searched is extremely tenuous . . . [and] the nexus between the contraband sought (blue
fentanyl pills), and the residence is non-existent.” (Id., at 8). At the same time,
defendant admits that he was an overnight guest at the residence searched, thereby
conceding there was some link between himself and the Woodlawn Street residence. (Id.,
at 5–6).
In response, the government argues that the search warrant contained information
about an ongoing fentanyl investigation and also information about an “investigator’s
observations related to defendant and his whereabouts, as well as . . . several items
related to the consumption and trafficking of illegal controlled substances.” (Doc. 34, at
8). Thus, according to the government, “the totality of the circumstances supports a fair
probability that defendant, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia and evidence of drug
trafficking would be found [in the Woodlawn residence].” (Id., at 11). In addition, the
government pointed out, “defendant had a probation violation warrant issued on January
11, 2023; a failure to appear warrant issued February 27, 2023; and another failure to
appear warrant issued on March 16, 2023[,]” emphasizing that the warrant authorized
law enforcement seizing defendant’s person as well. (Id., at 8).
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The Fourth Amendment ensures that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also
United States v. Green, 954 F.3d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Under the Fourth
Amendment, search warrants must be supported by probable cause.”). “Probable cause
exists, if under the totality of the circumstances, a showing of facts can be made sufficient
to create a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be
searched.” United States v. Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks removed) (citing United States v. Wallace, 550 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir.
2008) (per curium)); accord United States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir.
2008) (“If an affidavit in support of a search warrant sets forth sufficient facts to lead a
prudent person to believe that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place, probable cause to issue the warrant has been
established.”).
More specifically, to be supported by probable cause a warrant must contain
“evidence of a nexus between the contraband and the place to be searched[.]” United
States v. Tellez, 217 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2000). In looking for a nexus, courts
consider “the nature of the crime and the reasonable, logical likelihood of finding useful
evidence.” United States v. Etheridge, 165 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 1999). Conclusory
statements are insufficient to demonstrate that probable cause exists. United States v.
Moore, No. 25-cr-1036-CJW, 2025 WL 3014225, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 28, 2025)
(citing United States v. Summage, 481 F.3d 1075, 1077–78 (8th Cir. 2007)). At the
same time, “probable cause is about fair probabilities, not near certainties.” United
States v. James, 3 F.4th 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). And, “[a]s a reviewing
court, we pay ‘great deference’ to the probable cause determinations of the issuing judge
or magistrate, and limit our inquiry to discerning whether the issuing judge had a
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substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” United States v. Butler,
594 F.3d 955, 962 (8th Cir. 2010).
Here, the information in the search warrant included the following: (1) a woman
who suffered a fentanyl overdose told Dubuque Drug Task Force investigators that she
bought fentanyl from a man nicknamed Smooth who was arrested on Christmas Eve 2022,
(2) Smooth is defendant’s nickname, (3) defendant’s phone number in Dubuque Police
Department’s records matches the number the woman provided for Smooth, (4) defendant
was arrested on Christmas Eve 2022, (5) defendant had a rented Dodge Challenger,
(6) Corporal Weitz saw defendant driving the Dodge Challenger and saw the Dodge
Challenger parked at the Woodlawn Street address twice, (7) a trash pull at the Woodlawn
Street address revealed two Chick-fil-A wrappers with “Smooth” and “black sedan”
written on them, two commercial marijuana packages with marijuana residue, a plastic
sandwich bag missing a corner, three cigarillo wrappers, stripped out tobacco fillings
from cigarillos, and a lid from a digital scale, and (8) defendant had three active arrest
warrants. (Doc. 30-3, at 8–10; Doc. 34-1, at 9–11). In addition, the search warrant
stated that the investigator believed “drug use and the sale of drugs is occurring at . . .
Woodlawn Street, Dubuque, IA. Also [defendant] is living at the residence while
avoiding apprehension[.]” (Doc. 30-3, at 10; Doc. 34-1, at 11).
The Court finds, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the March 28,
2023 warrant was supported by probable cause and a sufficient nexus. Defendant’s
argument to the contrary misses the mark. Although defendant was charged with crimes
related to fentanyl after the execution of the search warrant, law enforcement was
intending to seize much more than that, including defendant “on his three active arrest
warrants” and “[m]arijuana or any derivatives.” (Doc. 30-3, at 3; Doc. 34-1, at 4). The
information included in the warrant application demonstrated a link between drug use,
drug sales, and defendant’s location based on defendant’s nickname associated with drug
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sales and the residence, defendant’s vehicle associated with the residence, and trash with
his nickname and vehicle written on it located at the residence. Also, the trash pull
uncovered marijuana residue located in commercial marijuana packages as well as items
related to other controlled substances including the plastic sandwich baggie missing a
corner and the lid from the digital scale. Thus, the Court finds there was a fair probability
that contraband and defendant would be found at the Woodlawn Street residence, and
defendant’s challenge to the warrant fails.
In addition, defendant’s case fits squarely within the reasoning in United States v.
Thurmond. In that case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that probable
cause existed in a warrant when law enforcement found suspected marijuana roaches,
blunt material, blunt paper, two baggie knots, and a cigarillo wrapper in a defendant’s
garbage. United States v. Thurmond, 782 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2015). The Eighth
Circuit concluded that those “facts are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that
there was a ‘fair probability’ that contraband would be found in the residence.” Id. The
Eighth Circuit upheld the execution of a search warrant that then uncovered “a sawed-
off shotgun, marijuana and paraphernalia, and documents associated with Thurmond.”
Id. at 1044; see also United States v. Briscoe, 317 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2003 (finding
that marijuana seeds and stems uncovered in a trash pull provided probable cause for a
search warrant that led to the seizure of “a scale with marijuana residue, a roach clip,
$1835 in cash, a firearm, and ammunition”); United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385,
387 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[A] reasonable magistrate would conclude the materials found in
the trash—two plastic bags with cocaine residue, two corners torn from plastic bags,
Brillo pads, a film canister with white residue—were sufficient to establish probable cause
that cocaine was being possessed and consumed in Allebach's residence.”). Thus, the
Court also finds that binding caselaw supports the conclusion that the search warrant here
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was supported by probable cause and a sufficient nexus to defendant and that the items
seized following its execution must not be suppressed.
Because defendant’s challenge to the March 30, 2023 warrant is based entirely on
his challenge to the March 28, 2023 warrant, the Court finds that challenge fails as well.
See (Doc. 30-2, at 10; Doc. 34, at 11). The Court overrules defendant’s objection on
this first issue.
C. Franks Hearing
Second, defendant “requests a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978)” because, according to defendant, “the warrant affidavit contained a significant
factual misrepresentation relevant to the probable cause determination.” (Doc. 30-2, at
5, 9). The government responds that “[t]he detailed information presented in the affidavit
did not contain a false statement[.]” (Doc. 34, at 14).
At the outset, the Court finds this issue likely moot as defendant cross-examined
Corporal Weitz at the suppression hearing and defendant conceded that, following his
cross-examination, he received the Franks hearing that he requested. (Doc. 52, at 46);
see Haden v. Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000) (“When, during the course of
litigation, the issues presented in a case lose their life because of the passage of time or
a change in circumstances and a federal court can no longer grant effective relief, the
case is considered moot.” (cleaned up)); Sorcan v. Rock Ridge Sch. Dist., 131 F.4th 646,
650 (8th Cir. 2025) (explaining that an issue is moot “when it is impossible for a court
to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party”).
Regardless, the Court also finds that defendant has failed to demonstrate that there
is a false statement here that was knowingly and intentionally included in the warrant
application, and, therefore, defendant has not met his required preliminary showing for
a Franks hearing. “The requirement of a substantial preliminary showing is not lightly
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met[.]” United States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations
omitted); accord United States v. Hansen, 27 F.4th 634, 637 (8th Cir. 2022).
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the
Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's
request.
. . .
To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be more
than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-
examine. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless
disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an
offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant
affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a
statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable
statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily
explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.
Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56, 171; accord United States v. Kucharo, 127 F.4th 1152,
1158 (8th Cir. 2025). “[I]f these requirements are met, and if, when material that is the
subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains
sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no
hearing is required.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72. “A showing of negligence or innocent
mistake is not enough to establish a Franks violation. . . . [Rather], the affiant must have
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt
the accuracy of the information he reported.” Butler, 594 F.3d at 961; see also Mathison,
157 F.3d at 548 (“A mere allegation standing alone, without an offer of proof in the form
of a sworn affidavit of a witness or some other reliable corroboration, is insufficient to
make the difficult preliminary showing.”).
Defendant, without providing an offer of proof or any affidavit or sworn statement,
claims that Paragraph 8 of the March 28, 2023 search warrant contains a false statement
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that was knowingly and intentionally included. (Doc. 30-2, at 8–9). Paragraph 8 in its
entirety reads: “On January 11, 2023, a parole violation warrant was issued for Moore’s
arrest. Moore’s whereabouts were unknown, and it appeared as if he was no longer
associated with . . . Central Avenue.” (Doc. 30-3, at 8; 34-1, at 9). At the suppression
hearing, Corporal Weitz testified that around January 2023, he did not know where
defendant was residing or staying. (Doc. 52, at 14). Around that same time frame,
Corporal Weitz began conducting intermittent surveillance around the Central Avenue
address. (Id., at 14–15). Between January and March, Corporal Weitz did not see
defendant at the Central Avenue address, despite it being defendant’s last known address.
(Id., at 15; Doc. 37-1 (defendant’s booking sheet listing his addresses as both Central
Avenue and Woodlawn Street)). Only later did Corporal Weitz begin observing
defendant’s rental vehicle at the Woodlawn Street residence. For that reason, Corporal
Weitz concluded that defendant’s whereabouts in January 2023 were unknown. (Doc.
52, at 21 (“earlier in the investigation the whereabouts were unknown.”), 42 (“On
January 11, 2023, had you concluded, personally that [defendant’s] whereabouts were
unknown? Yes.”)).
The Court does not find that the statements in Paragraph 8 establish a deliberate
falsehood, a reckless disregard for the truth, or cast doubt on the affidavit’s showing of
probable cause to search the residence. Rather, it seems to this Court that the statements
accurately summarize Corporal Weitz’s knowledge, and, as such, defendant has not met
his initial burden and does not merit a Franks hearing. The Court also overrules
defendant’s objection on this second issue.
D. Leon Good Faith Exception
Defendant also argues the Leon good faith exception does not apply. Judge
Roberts made an alternative ruling in his R&R that if “the initial March 28, 2023 search
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warrant lacked probable cause, the Leon good faith exception should be applied in this
matter.” (Doc. 39, at 18).
Under the Leon good faith exception, if law enforcement officers’ reliance on a
warrant was objectively reasonable even if the warrant is later determined to be invalid,
the evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant will not be suppressed. United States
v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007) (relying on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984)).
The Court has already found that the warrants were supported by probable cause
and therefore valid, so the Court need not address the Leon good faith exception. Were
the Court to assume, however, the warrants were not supported by probable cause, the
Court would find, like Judge Roberts, that the Leon good faith exception would apply,
for the reasons Judge Roberts articulated in his R&R. (Doc. 39, at 18-20). Thus, the
Court overrules defendant’s objection on this final issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, defendant’s objection, (Doc. 44), is overruled. The Court
adopts the R&R. (Doc. 39). Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, (Doc. 30), is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of December, 2025.
_______________________________
C.J. Williams, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
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