Anger v. County of Hawaii

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JORDAN JAMES ANGER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COUNTY OF HAWAII, BY AND THROUGH
ITS CORPORATION COUNCIL (RENEE
SCHOEN);
Defendant.
CIV. NO. 26-00004 LEK-WRP
ORDER: DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
AND RESERVING RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO
PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS
On January 5, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Jordan James
Anger (“Anger”) filed a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights
(“Complaint”) and an Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“Application”). [Dkt. nos. 1,
2.] For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint is dismissed
without prejudice, and the Court will reserve ruling on the
Application. Anger will be given the opportunity to file an
amended complaint to try to cure the defects in the Complaint
that are identified in this Order, and this Court will rule on
the Application if any portion of the amended complaint survives
the screening process. Anger’s amended complaint must be filed
by April 17, 2026.
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 1 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

2
BACKGROUND
Anger states that his “CJIS report” erroneously states
that he was “[a]rrest[ed] for allegedly ‘Intoxicating Liquors
prohibited in certain public places (HCO 14-01)’ and ‘Liquor
Violation involving a minor (HRS 281-0101.5)’” 1 but that the
charges were later dismissed. [Complaint at § III.C.1.] Anger
states that he was not on the Island of Hawai`i near the time of
the purported June 22, 2005 arrest. See id. Anger contends the
“inaccurate record functioned as (one of) the first criminal
justice reference point(s) relied upon by law enforcement and
related systems.” [Id.] According to Anger, the 2005 arrest
record influenced the plea agreement that the County of Hawai`i
Prosecutor’s Office offered him when he was on trial for
allegedly misusing the 911 system. See id.; see also id. at
§ III.C.3 (allegations regarding Anger’s 10/9/24 arrest for
misusing the 911 system and harassing a 911 operator).
Anger argues the erroneous 2005 arrest record
“subjected [him] to ongoing exposure to detention, enforcement
action, and restriction of liberty.” Id. at § III.C.1; see also
§ IV.1 (alleging “irreparable harm to personal autonomy,
including normal sexual activity and intimate association,
arising from prolonged restraint, surveillance, and criminal
1 “HCO” refers to the Hawai`i County Code and “HRS” refers
to the Hawai`i Revised Statutes.
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 2 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

3
justice interference rooted in an improper and erroneous record
maintained for approximately twenty-five (25) years”). Anger
seeks compensatory damages for his “constructive confinement and
restriction of liberty over approximately 25.6 years (May 13,
2000 - December 31, 2025).” 2 [Id. at § V.I.A.]
With regard to the October 9, 2024 arrest, Anger
alleges that: he made the 911 call in response to an ongoing
emergency; he said during the 911 call that he intended to make
a harassment complaint against a police officer who had recently
left Anger’s residence; and he also said during the call that he
wanted to make a complaint about the 911 operator’s behavior.
[Id. at § III.C.3.] According to Anger, “the operator
acknowledged understanding that [Anger] was disabled and [the
operator] admitted, both in recorded transcripts and in sworn
testimony, that reasonable accommodations were not provided
during the interaction.” [Id.] Anger states that, “[f]ollowing
the arrest, portions of body-worn camera footage were not
preserved, provided, and or are missing . . . .” [Id.]
Anger also alleges he was subjected to “multiple
wrongful arrests and detentions, including seven arrests in
2 Anger identifies May 13, 2000 as one of the dates of the
events giving rise to his claims. See Complaint at § III.B.1.
However, the Complaint does not identify the event that
allegedly occurred on May 13, 2000. The alleged arrest on
June 22, 2005 is the earliest event described in the Complaint.
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 3 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

4
Hawaii and one arrest in Washington State, all traceable to
erroneous criminal justice records and their continued
reliance.” [Id. at § V.I.B.]
The sole defendant in this case is the County of
Hawai`i (“the County”). See id. at § I.B. Anger states that he
is bringing: a claim against the County under Title 42 United
States Code Section 1983; a claim under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), Title 29
United States Code Section 794; and a claim under Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title 42 United
States Code Sections 12131 to 12134. See Complaint at § II.
STANDARD
“Federal courts can authorize the commencement of any
suit without prepayment of fees or security by a person who
submits an affidavit that demonstrates he is unable to pay.”
Smallwood v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, CV. NO. 16-00505 DKW-
KJM, 2016 WL 4974948, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 16, 2016) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)).
The Court subjects each civil action
commenced pursuant to Section 1915(a) to
mandatory screening and can order the dismissal
of any claims it finds “frivolous, malicious,
failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeking monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but
requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 4 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

5
forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a
claim);[ 3 ] Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845
(9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not
limited to prisoners”).
Id. at *3.
In addition, the following standards apply in the
screening analysis:
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently,
the court liberally construes her pleadings.
Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir.
1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the
federal courts to liberally construe the
‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (citing
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam))). The court also recognizes that
“[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no
amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se
litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s
deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to
dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of
Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th. [sic]
Cir. 2000).
Despite the liberal pro se pleading
standard, the court may dismiss a complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on its own motion. See Omar v.
Sea–Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir.
1987) (“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua
sponte under [Rule] 12(b)(6). Such a dismissal
may be made without notice where the claimant
cannot possibly win relief.”); see also Baker v.
Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (holding that district court may
dismiss cases sua sponte pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) without notice where plaintiff
could not prevail on complaint as alleged). . . .
3 Lopez has been overruled, in part, on other grounds by
Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 5 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

6
Flores v. Trump, CIVIL 16-00652 LEK-RLP, 2017 WL 125698, at *1
(D. Hawai`i Jan. 12, 2017) (some alterations in Flores) (some
citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Anger’s Section 1983 Claim
This Court first addresses the issue of whether
Anger’s Section 1983 claim is timely. Anger’s Section 1983 claim
is governed by the limitations period for personal injury
actions under Hawai`i law. See Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 174
(2022). In Hawai`i, the statute of limitations for personal
injury actions is two years. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7. State
tolling statutes apply to Section 1983 claims, see Artis v.
Dist. of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 83 (2018), as do equitable
tolling rules, “except to the extent any of these laws is
inconsistent with federal law[,]” Butler v. Nat’l Cmty.
Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). However, “the time at
which a § 1983 claim accrues is a question of federal law,
conforming in general to common-law tort principles.” McDonough
v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 (2019) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Courts look to “the most natural
common-law analogy” to determine when a particular Section 1983
claim accrues. Id. at 114.
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 6 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

7
Anger’s Section 1983 claim is based on the allegedly
erroneous entry of the June 22, 2005 arrest in his CJIS record, 4
and the allegedly wrongful arrests that Anger was subjected to
because of the erroneous record. See Complaint at §§ III.C.1,
V.I.B. Anger’s Section 1983 claim is most closely analogous to
the common law torts of false arrest and false imprisonment. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that “[f]alse arrest and
false imprisonment overlap,” and can therefore be referred to
collectively as “false imprisonment.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 388-89 (2007). The tort of false imprisonment addresses
“detention without legal process.” See id. at 389.
The running of the statute of limitations on
false imprisonment is subject to a distinctive
rule — dictated, perhaps, by the reality that the
victim may not be able to sue while he is still
imprisoned: “Limitations begin to run against an
action for false imprisonment when the alleged
false imprisonment ends.” 2 H. Wood, Limitation
of Actions § 187d(4), p. 878 (rev. 4th ed. 1916);
see also 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899,
Comment c (1977); A. Underhill, Principles of Law
of Torts 202 (1881). Thus, to determine the
beginning of the limitations period in this case,
we must determine when petitioner’s false
imprisonment came to an end.
4 Anger’s reference to the CJIS appears to refer to the
Criminal Justice Information System, which is a statewide
information system that is maintained by a state department. Cf.
Silva v. Hawai`i, No. CAAP–11–0000121, 2014 WL 1744077, at *2
(Hawai`i Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014) (summarizing a declaration
submitted by the State of Hawai`i in support of a motion for
summary judgment). Thus, to the extent that Anger’s claim is
based upon the allegedly erroneous entry of the June 22, 2005
arrest in the CJIS, it appears that the County is not the proper
defendant for such a claim.
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 7 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

8
Reflective of the fact that false
imprisonment consists of detention without legal
process, a false imprisonment ends once the
victim becomes held pursuant to such process —
when, for example, he is bound over by a
magistrate or arraigned on charges. 1 [D.] Dobbs,
[Law of Torts] § 39, at 74, n.2 [(2001)];
[W.] Keeton, [D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts], § 119, at
888 [(5th ed. 1984)]; H. Stephen, Actions for
Malicious Prosecution 120–123 (1888). Thereafter,
unlawful detention forms part of the damages for
the “entirely distinct” tort of malicious
prosecution, which remedies detention
accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but
by wrongful institution of legal process. Keeton,
supra, § 119, at 885–886; see 1 F. Harper,
F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 3.9, p. 3:36
(3d ed. 1996); 7 [S.] Speiser, [C. Krause, &
A. Gans, American Law of Torts] § 27:2, at 943–
945 [(1990)]. “If there is a false arrest claim,
damages for that claim cover the time of
detention up until issuance of process or
arraignment, but not more. From that point on,
any damages recoverable must be based on a
malicious prosecution claim and on the wrongful
use of judicial process rather than detention
itself.” Keeton, supra, § 119, at 888; see also
Heck [v. Humphrey], [512 U.S. 477,] 484 [(1994)];
8 Speiser, supra, § 28:15, at 80. Thus,
petitioner’s contention that his false
imprisonment ended upon his release from custody,
after the State dropped the charges against him,
must be rejected. It ended much earlier, when
legal process was initiated against him, and the
statute would have begun to run from that date,
but for its tolling by reason of petitioner’s
minority.
Id. at 389-90 (footnotes omitted).
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, this Court
cannot determine when the allegedly wrongful arrests and
detentions occurred. Each allegedly wrongful arrest would be the
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 8 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

9
basis of a separate Section 1983 claim, and this Court cannot
determine when those claims accrued. It is likely that some of
the allegedly wrongful arrests occurred well beyond the statute
of limitations period. See, e.g., Complaint at § IV.2 (alleging
Anger “sustained irreparable harm to two marital relationships
over the course of the twenty-five (25) year period during which
the erroneous record remained in effect”). Anger’s Section 1983
claims based on those arrests would be time-barred because they
accrued more than two years before Anger filed this action.
However, it is possible that either: 1) some of the allegedly
wrongful arrests referred to in the Complaint occurred within
the limitations period; or 2) some of the claims based upon
arrests that occurred beyond the limitations period did not
accrue until a date within the limitations period. Therefore,
Anger’s Section 1983 claims are dismissed because they appear to
be time-barred, but the dismissal is without prejudice because
it may be possible for Anger to cure the defect in his
Section 1983 claims by amendment. See Lucas, 66 F.3d at 248.
Because Anger will have the opportunity to file an
amended complaint, this Court provides the following guidance
for Anger to consider in preparing his amended complaint, if he
chooses to file one.
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 9 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

10
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
Section 1983 liability cannot be based on
respondeat superior. Ewing v. City of Stockton,
588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009).
A municipality may be held liable as a
“person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it
maintains a policy or custom that causes the
deprivation of a plaintiff’s federally
protected rights. Monell [v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of N.Y.C.], 436 U.S. [658,] 694, 98
S. Ct. 2018 [(1978)]. To state such a claim,
a plaintiff must allege either that (1) ”a
particular municipal action itself violates
federal law, or directs an employee to do
so”; or (2) the municipality, through
inaction, failed to implement adequate
policies or procedures to safeguard its
community members’ federally protected
rights. Board of Commissioners of Bryan
County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 407–08,
117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997);
see also Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698
F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012). When, as
here, a plaintiff pursues liability based on
a failure to act, she must allege that the
municipality exhibited deliberate
indifference to the violation of her
federally protected rights. Tsao, 698 F.3d
at 1143.
Park v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136,
1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in Park).
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 10 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

11
Spriestersbach v. Hawai`i, 622 F. Supp. 3d 948, 958-59 (D.
Hawai`i 2022) (alterations in Spriestersbach). To the extent
that Anger alleges the County failed to correct his erroneous
arrest record, the Complaint fails to allege facts that, if
proven, would establish the requirements for a Monell claim. In
addition, this Court questions whether the County is the proper
defendant as to any Section 1983 claim based on the allegedly
wrongful arrest that occurred in the State of Washington. See
Complaint at § V.I.B.
II. 	ADA Claim
Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from
discriminating on the basis of disability. Payan v. Los Angeles
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 737 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12132). A plaintiff asserting an ADA Title II claim
must ultimately prove that “(1) [he] is a qualified individual
with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in
or otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public
entity’s services, programs, or activities, and (3) such
exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.”
Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted).
A two-year statute of limitations applies to Anger’s
ADA claim, unless the claim was made possible by the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”). See Spriestersbach, 622 F.
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 11 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

12
Supp. 3d at 958. This Court must liberally construe Anger’s
Complaint because Anger is proceeding pro se. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even
liberally construing Anger’s Complaint, the only arguable
assertion of disability discrimination is in relation to the
October 2024 911 call. See Complaint at § III.C.3. Because this
Court construes Anger’s ADA Title II claim as based solely upon
the October 2024 911 call, even assuming that the two-year
statute of limitations period applies, Anger’s ADA claim is
timely.
Anger alleges he has been diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder, and he states he “suffer[s] ongoing emotional
distress, trauma, and psychological injury.” [Complaint at
§ V.6.] This is sufficient to allege that Anger has a disability
for purposes of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (“The term
‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual — (A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment . . . .”).
The Complaint, however, only makes a conclusory
allegation that “reasonable accommodations were not provided”
for Anger’s disability during the October 2024 911 call. See
Complaint at § III.C.3. Even without a motion to dismiss filed
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 12 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

13
by a defendant, this Court may dismiss Anger’s Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Omar,
813 F.2d at 991. Under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the factual
allegations of Anger’s Complaint are assumed to be true, but
this Court does not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court
therefore does not accept as true the Complaint’s allegation
that reasonable accommodations for Anger’s disability were not
provided during the October 2024 911 call. The Complaint fails
to plead sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible ADA
Title II claim, and the claim must be dismissed. See id. (“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)). The dismissal of Anger’s ADA Title II claim is
without prejudice because it may be possible for Anger to cure
the defect in his claim by amendment.
This Court provides the following guidance for Anger
to consider if he chooses to file an amended complaint. The
Complaint seeks various forms of monetary damages, although it
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 13 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

14
is unclear whether some of the damages sought are associated
solely with Anger’s Section 1983 claims. See Complaint at
§§ V.I-III. If the amended complaint seeks monetary damages as
to Anger’s ADA Title II claim, to ultimately prevail on that
claim, Anger will be required to prove intentional
discrimination. See Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 950
(9th Cir. 2017). “To show intentional discrimination, this
circuit requires that the plaintiff show that a defendant acted
with ‘deliberate indifference,’ which requires both knowledge
that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially
likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 950-
51 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, because Anger’s ADA Title II claim appears to
be based on a failure-to-accommodate theory, see Complaint at
§ III.C.3, this Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has stated:
A public entity must “make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures when the modifications are necessary
to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability.” Zukle [v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal.], 166 F.3d [1041,] 1046 [(9th Cir. 1999)]
(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)). The [ADA
does] not require an [entity] “to make
fundamental or substantial modifications to its
programs or standards,” however. Id. Because the
issue of reasonableness depends on the individual
circumstances of each case, this determination
requires a fact-specific, individualized analysis
of the disabled individual’s circumstances and
the accommodations that might allow him to meet
the program’s standards. See Crowder v. Kitagawa,
81 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1996). As we have
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 14 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

15
observed in the employment context, “mere[]
speculat[ion] that a suggested accommodation is
not feasible” falls short of the “reasonable
accommodation” requirement; the [ADA] creates “a
duty to ‘gather sufficient information from the
[disabled individual] and qualified experts as
needed to determine what accommodations are
necessary to enable [the individual to meet the
standards in question].’” Buckingham v. United
States, 998 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423
(9th Cir. 1985)).
Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir.
1999), as amended (Nov. 19, 1999) (some alterations in Wong)
(some citations omitted).
This Court also notes that, although the 911 system is
a service that is available to the public, the Complaint does
not allege that the County is responsible for the portion of the
911 system that Anger was using when he was allegedly subjected
to discrimination on the basis of a disability.
III. Rehabilitation Act Claim
Similar to Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination, but
“[t]he ADA applies only to public entities, whereas the
[Rehabilitation Act] proscribes discrimination in all federally-
funded programs.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052; see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability
in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 15 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

16
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
To establish a violation of § 504 of the
[Rehabilitation Act], a plaintiff must show that
(1) she is handicapped within the meaning of the
RA; (2) she is otherwise qualified for the
benefit or services sought; (3) she was denied
the benefit or services solely by reason of her
handicap; and (4) the program providing the
benefit or services receives federal financial
assistance.
Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052.
The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[t]here is no
significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations
created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” Zukle, 166 F.3d
at 1045 n.11 (some citations omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133
(“The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [the
Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, procedures, and
rights [applicable to ADA claims].”)). “Thus, courts have
applied the same analysis to claims brought under both
statutes.” Id. (citation omitted). Anger’s Rehabilitation Act
claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice for the same
reasons set forth above regarding Anger’s ADA Title II claim.
IV. 	Summary and the Potential Amended Complaint
All of Anger’s claims in the Complaint have been
dismissed without prejudice. In other words, if Anger chooses to
pursue his claims in this case, Anger may attempt to remedy the
deficiencies in the Complaint by filing an amended complaint.
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 16 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

17
This Court emphasizes that it has only conducted a preliminary
screening of Anger’s claims, and there may be other deficiencies
in Anger’s claims that are not identified in this Order.
If Anger chooses to file an amended complaint, he
cannot incorporate any part of his original Complaint into the
amended complaint by merely referring to portions of the
original Complaint. Further, Anger may not add new claims in the
amended complaint, unless the new claims relate to the claims
alleged in the original Complaint. New claims that are not
related to the claims in the Complaint are subject to dismissal.
Anger is cautioned that, if he chooses to file an
amended complaint, he must do so by the deadline set in this
Order, unless he obtains an extension of the deadline from this
Court. If no amended complaint is filed by the deadline, the
claims in the Complaint that were dismissed without prejudice
will be dismissed with prejudice. Anger would then have no
remaining claims in this case, and the Clerk’s Office would be
directed to close the case.
Anger is also cautioned that, if he files an amended
complaint, the claims in the amended complaint may be dismissed
with prejudice if the amended complaint fails to cure the
defects identified in this Order.
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 17 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

18
V. 	Application
Insofar as the Complaint has been dismissed without
prejudice, this Court declines to rule on the Application at
this time. If Anger chooses to file an amended complaint, and if
any portion of the amended complaint survives the screening
process, this Court will then rule upon the Application and
address whether Anger is entitled to proceed in this case
without prepaying fees and costs. If Anger either chooses not to
file an amended complaint or if all of the claims in the amended
complaint are dismissed with prejudice, the Application will be
denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Anger’s Complaint for
Violation of Civil Rights, filed January 5, 2026, is DISMISSED.
The dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of an amended
complaint that cures the defects identified in this Order. If
Anger chooses to file an amended complaint, he must do so by
April 17, 2026. The amended complaint must comply with the terms
of this Order. Anger is CAUTIONED that, if he fails to file an
amended complaint by April 17, 2026, the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice on April 20, 2026.
In addition, the Court RESERVES RULING on Anger’s
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees
or Costs, filed January 5, 2026. If Anger chooses to file an
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 18 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

19
amended complaint, and at least a portion of it survives the
screening process, the merits of the Application will be
addressed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, February 17, 2026.
JORDAN JAMES ANGER VS. COUNTY OF HAWAII, ETC; CV 26-00004 LEK-
WRP; ORDER: 	DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF
CIVIL RIGHTS WITHOUT PREJUDICE; AND RESERVING RULING ON
PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT
PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS
Case 1:26-cv-00004-LEK-WRP Document 6 Filed 02/17/26 Page 19 of 19
PageID.<pageID>