Zemeckis v. Sloan Servicing

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
The Estate Trust known as CAROLYN
ZEMECKIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SLOAN SERVICING,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-00375 MWJS-RT
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF LEAVE
TO AMEND AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND
AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Before the court are Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend to file a further revised
proposed First Amended Complaint, Dkt. Nos. 36, 39, 43–47, and Defendant’s motion
for sanctions against Plaintiff under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Dkt. Nos. 35–38, 40–42. For reasons that follow, both are DENIED.
1. In a prior order, this court granted Defendant Sloan Servicing’s motion to
dismiss the initial complaint in this case. Dkt. No. 34. Although it appeared highly
unlikely that Plaintiff could salvage the claims in the initial complaint through
amendment, the court reserved decision on whether leave should be granted. Id. at
PageID.439–41. Plaintiff responded with a proposed First Amended Complaint that
sought to incorporate additional factual material. Dkt. No. 39. But since that time—
and, in part, as a result of evidence Defendant has presented—Plaintiff has abandoned
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each of the claims in the initial complaint and now seeks leave to amend only to bring a
new claim. Dkt. No. 47. In a newly revised proposed First Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff would now allege a state-law unjust enrichment claim, along with a request for
declaratory relief hinging on that unjust enrichment claim. Id.
In its current form, however, the newly revised proposed First Amended
Complaint does not adequately allege an unjust enrichment claim. Its premise is that
Defendant is not lawfully servicing a student loan. But as the court explained in a prior
order, the proposed First Amended Complaint’s own allegations support the conclusion
that Defendant is indeed properly servicing that loan. Dkt. No. 48, at PageID.563–64.
The court also explained that to state a valid claim of unjust enrichment, it is Plaintiff’s
task—as the party here bearing the burden of proof—to allege facts that, if accepted as
true, would plausibly establish that Defendant is not the lawful servicer. Id. at
PageID.564–65. As the court made clear, it is not Defendant’s obligation to lay out the
“complete chain of title” of the assignments of the role of servicer to Plaintiff’s
satisfaction. Id. at PageID.564. That is because “Plaintiff may not sue first and then
demand that Defendant prove it should never have been sued at all.” Id. at PageID.564–
65.
Nonetheless, in order to ensure a full record, the court authorized Plaintiff to
make one additional letter submission explaining “what facts support Plaintiff’s
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assertion that Defendant is not the lawful servicer of [the] student loans” at issue here.
Id. at PageID.565.
Plaintiff has now filed that letter. Dkt. No. 49. The letter, however, serves only
to confirm that Plaintiff cannot allege facts that would plausibly establish Defendant is
unlawfully servicing the student loan. Instead, Plaintiff again contends that Plaintiff
may simply demand that Defendant prove that it is not an unlawful servicer. That is
not correct. As the court previously explained, “[t]o prove an unjust enrichment claim
on the theory that Defendant is, essentially, stealing student loan payments”—the only
claim Plaintiff now seeks to advance in this lawsuit—“Plaintiff must provide factual
detail to plausibly establish that is so.” Dkt. No. 49, at PageID.564. Plaintiff’s latest
submission makes plain that there is no possibility of Plaintiff making that showing,
which is not surprising, because the facts that even Plaintiff accepts as true (in the
proposed First Amended Complaint) themselves go a long way toward demonstrating
that Defendant is the proper servicer.
Leave to amend must freely be granted, especially to self-represented litigants.
But it need not be granted when it is futile to do so. See Ramirez v. Galarza, 334 F.3d 850,
861 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that leave need not be granted when the pleading
“could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (cleaned up)). The
procedural history of this case—including the multiple opportunities Plaintiff has been
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given to offer facts to support the unjust enrichment claim—demonstrate that leave
would be futile here.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend—so that Plaintiff might
submit a further revised proposed First Amended Complaint—is DENIED. The court’s
earlier grant of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, therefore, is with prejudice.
2. That leaves the question of whether sanctions are warranted under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a strong motion. Defendant explains that
after Plaintiff filed a series of motions, counsel for Defendant “wrote to Plaintiff
demanding that the Motions be withdrawn and the Amended Complaint dismissed
within 21 days or face Rule 11 Sanctions.” Dkt. No. 35-1, at PageID.444. As Defendant
further explained, “Plaintiff was fully informed of the basis for the Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions,” including that Plaintiff’s own motion for sanctions (and to compel
discovery) “presented a materially false statement to the Court.” Id. at PageID.444–45.
But Plaintiff did not withdraw Plaintiff’s submissions.
Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, Plaintiff still has the obligation to
become familiar with court rules and procedures, as well as the duty to be candid in
factual submissions and to make legal arguments that are defensible. The court agrees
that Defendant has proved that Plaintiff at times has made submissions that were
“frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation.” Simpson v. Lear
Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). Specifically, some of Plaintiff’s
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submissions have included “claims” and “legal contentions” that were neither
“warranted by existing law” nor “by a nonfrivolous argument for the extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b)(2). The court therefore has the authority to impose sanctions and order that
Plaintiff pay reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
The court nonetheless concludes that sanctions are not appropriate here.
Plaintiff’s frivolous and legally indefensible filings appear to be the result largely of
Plaintiff’s misreading of legal authorities. For example, as noted above, Plaintiff
appears to be convinced that it is not Plaintiff’s obligation to allege facts that would
show Defendant is unlawfully servicing the student loan, but rather that Defendant
must prove to Plaintiff’s satisfaction that Defendant is not an unlawful servicer. That
argument is neither supported by existing law nor a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension of law. But while “Rule 11 applies to pro se plaintiffs, the court must take into
account a plaintiff’s pro se status” in considering “both the reasonableness of the
[litigant’s] behavior and the appropriate measure of sanctions.” Warren v. Guelker, 29
F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). Given that Rule 11’s “express goal is
deterrence,” id., the court concludes that, under the circumstances presented here, it is
sufficient deterrence to emphasize the high probability of sanctions should Plaintiff seek
to bring a similarly frivolous claim in a future lawsuit. Accord id. (quoting Kurkowski v.
Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that a pro se complaint may
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be “frivolous if filed in the face of previous dismissals involving the exact same parties
under the same legal theories”).
Defendant’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.
* 	* 	*
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a further revised
proposed First Amended Complaint is DENIED; the court’s earlier dismissal of the
initial complaint is, therefore, with prejudice. Furthermore, Defendant’s motion for
sanctions under Rule 11 is likewise DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 3, 2026, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Civil No. 25-00375 MWJS-RT; The Estate Trust Known as Carolyn Zemeckis v. Sloan
Servicing; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
/s/ Micah W.J. Smith
Micah W.J. Smith
United States District Judge
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