Simmons v. Holma et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
KELVIN SIMMONS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KARIN L. HOLMA, in her individual
and official capacity as Judge of the
First Circuit Court, State of Hawaii, et
al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-00307-DKW-WRP
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS, (2) DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND, AND (3) DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S VARIOUS
MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS
Defendants Karin Holma, Lisa Cataldo, Lori Ann Okita, Susan Pang
Gochros, and John/Jane Doe ADA Coordinator1 (collectively, State Defendants)
move to dismiss with prejudice all claims brought in Pro Se Plaintiff Kelvin
Simmons’ July 22, 2025 Complaint. 	Dkt. No. 127. 	The State Defendants do so
on numerous grounds, including the Rooker-Feldman2 and Younger3 doctrines and
judicial and qualified immunity. 	For his part, since filing the Complaint less than
five months ago, Simmons has filed a steady stream of documents – more than one
1 As discussed further below, the John/Jane Doe ADA Coordinator named in the Complaint has
been identified as Debi Tulang-DeSilva. 	See Dkt. No. 127-1 at 1 n.2.
2Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).
3Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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hundred -- some of which appear to request some form of non-dispositive relief
from the Court, including motions to disqualify counsel, strike filings, and review
decisions of the assigned U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Upon review of the record in toto, while the Court disagrees that the
liberally construed pro se Complaint implicates the Rooker-Feldman or Younger
doctrines, all claims against the State Defendants are subject to dismissal based on
judicial and qualified immunity. 	However, because Simmons is proceeding
without counsel and this is the first opportunity to apprise him of certain relevant
legal principles, dismissal is with leave to amend, to the extent permitted below.
In short, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED AND DENIED IN PART. 	As for
Simmons’ many filings since his Complaint, they are either mistaken, misplaced,
and/or moot in light of the rulings herein. 	They are, therefore, all DENIED, as
explained below.
BACKGROUND
Simmons initiated this proceeding on July 22, 2025, with the filing of the
Complaint against Defendants Karin Holma and Lisa Cataldo, in both their official
and individual capacities as Judges of the First Circuit Court of the State of
Hawai‘i, John/Jane Doe “Clerk(s) of the Court”, in his and/or her official and
individual capacity(ies), Lori Okita as the “Court Administrator”, in her official
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and individual capacity, John/Jane Doe “ADA Coordinator”, in his or her official
and individual capacity, Susan Pang Gochros as “Chief Staff Attorney”, in her
official and individual capacity, Jason Woo, Stott Property Management LLC, and
Timothy Kelley. 	Dkt. No. 1.
Liberally construed, Simmons alleges the following in the Complaint. 	At
some unalleged time and date, Judge Holma and Jason Woo, an alleged attorney,
“conspired to create a procedural trap designed to deprive” Simmons of access to
the courts. 	Dkt. No. 1 at 4.4 	This conduct included “scheduling a hearing”,
“refusing to rule”, and “advancing litigation while withholding decisions”. 	Id.
at 4-5. 	According to the Complaint, Judge Cataldo joined in the “conspiracy”
“through a pattern of mutual reinforcement, conflicting orders, and retaliatory
silence.” 	Id. at 5. 	On July 14 and 15, 2025, Judge Cataldo issued a “retaliatory
order” in “exce[ss]” of her jurisdiction and an order “calculated to undermine”
Simmons. 	Between July 11 and 15, 2025, Judge Cataldo also issued orders in
“violation of judicial restraint and appellate comity….” 	Id. at 7.
The Complaint further alleges that, in July 2025, Simmons faxed a “detailed
administrative complaint” to “officials” of the “Court Administrator Judiciary” and
4 The pages and paragraphs of the Complaint are unnumbered. 	See generally Dkt. No. 1.
Therefore, in citing to the Complaint and Simmons’ other filings, the Court uses the page
numbers assigned by CM/ECF in the top-right corner of the same, e.g., “Page 4 of 15”.
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received a response from Chief Staff Attorney Gochros acknowledging the
complaint, but denying authority to intervene and referring Simmons to the
“Commission on Judicial Conduct.” 	Id. at 4. 	In addition, on unalleged dates,
unidentified “[c]ourt clerks” “participated in docket tampering by omitting,
suppressing, or mislabeling” Simmons’ filings. 	Id. at 5. 	The “court clerks” also
“refused to docket” or “acknowledge receipt” of other filings Simmons submitted.
Id. at 6. 	“Clerks” further “failed to serve orders[.]” 	Id. at 7.
The Complaint asserts 12 numbered causes of action allegedly involving
numerous violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Section 1985, the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA), abuse of process, civil conspiracy, “failure to perform
ministerial duties”, and “litigation fraud”. 	Id. at 9-10. 	The Complaint seeks $40
million in damages, a declaration that Simmons’ rights have been violated,
prospective injunctive relief to “mandate ADA compliance”, and the “referral” of
“judges”, Woo, Kelley, and Stott Property Management to various licensing and/or
disciplinary boards. 	Id. at 13.
On October 27, 2025, the State Defendants moved to dismiss all claims in
the Complaint with prejudice. 	Dkt. No. 127. 	First, the State Defendants argue
that Simmons’ claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 	Second, they
argue that this Court should abstain from deciding the claims under Younger.
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Third, they argue that all claims against Judges Holma and Cataldo are barred by
principles of judicial immunity. 	Fourth, they argue that Okita, Gochros, and
Tulang-Silva are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. 	Fifth, they argue
that the Complaint fails to allege any specific act or omission by the State
Defendants that caused Simmons’ alleged injuries, as required under Section 1983.
Finally, the State Defendants argue that Simmons is not entitled to leave to amend
the Complaint.
On November 10, 2025, Simmons filed a “reply” to the motion to dismiss,
which the Court liberally construes as his response to the same. 	Dkt. No. 150.
Therein, Simmons argues, among other things, that all proceedings in a State court
case “are void under the poison-tree doctrine…”,5 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not apply here, and Judges Holma and Cataldo “acted under suspended
jurisdiction”. 	Id. at 4-7.6 	On November 21, 2025, the State Defendants filed a
reply in support of their motion to dismiss. 	Dkt. No. 168.
Since the Complaint, Simmons has filed a plethora of documents. 	In large
part, these documents purport to provide “notice” of various things Simmons
5 The State court case is identified as case number 1DRC-23-0006533. 	Dkt. No. 150 at 4.
6 Simmons also argues that the motion to dismiss is “void ab initio” because it was filed prior to
the State Defendants being served, or waiving service of, process. 	Dkt. No. 150 at 2. 	Simmons
is mistaken, however, because the State Defendants waived service of process in August 2025,
two months before filing their motion. 	Dkt. Nos. 45-49.
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presumably believes are relevant to this case. 	For example, Simmons has
provided “notice” of “anticipated” arguments he thinks defendants may raise, Dkt.
No. 40, the “procedural posture” of this case, Dkt. No. 56, “record preservation and
judicial housekeeping”, Dkt. No. 70, and “anticipated retaliation and procedural
interference”, Dkt. No. 99. 	Other documents arguably seek affirmative relief from
this Court, some of which remain undecided. 	Those undecided documents, which
are liberally construed as motions, are: (1) a motion for “prejudgment asset
protection and notice of bankruptcy shield assertion”, Dkt. No. 22; (2) a motion for
“separate counsel”, Dkt. No. 65; (3) a motion to “clarify and reinstate Rule 4(m)
extension”, Dkt. No. 108; (4) a motion for “record clarification and preservation”,
Dkt. No. 109; (5) a motion for “preservation of DOJ oversight record and federal
chain of custody”, Dkt. No. 112; (6) a motion to “clarify and vacate EO 87”, Dkt.
No. 115; (7) a motion to “clarify, vacate, or reconsider EO 104”, Dkt. No. 116;
(8) a motion for “clarification and preservation”, Dkt. No. 121; (9) a motion for
“judicial preservation of logs and metadata”, Dkt. No. 125; (10) a motion to
“convert January 2 hearing to sanctions/show-cause”, Dkt. No. 140; (11) a motion
to “confirm void jurisdiction”, Dkt. No. 145; (12) a motion for “review” regarding
“EO 143”, Dkt. No. 146; (13) a motion to “strike EO 147 as void for lack of
authority”, Dkt. No. 148; (14) a motion for “protective order”, Dkt. No. 173; (15) a
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motion to “disqualify for conflicts of interest and unauthorized representation”,
Dkt. No. 177; (16) a motion to “strike Docket 168 in its entirety”, Dkt. No. 178;
and (17) a motion for various relief, Dkt. No. 179 (collectively, the Miscellaneous
Motions).
This Order now follows.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal district courts
generally lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state court judgments.”
Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). 	A challenge to the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). 	See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (concerning lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); see also Murray v. Dep’t of Consumer & Bus. Services, 2010 WL
3604657, at *9 n.4 (D.Or. Aug. 12, 2010) (applying Rule 12(b)(1) principles to a
Rooker-Feldman argument).
When presented with an argument under Rule 12(b)(1), “the district court is
ordinarily free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue prior
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to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary.” 	Augustine v. United States,
704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). 	Where the court considers evidence outside
the pleadings for this purpose, “[n]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s
allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial
court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” 	Id.
II. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint that fails “to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction
with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). 	Pursuant to Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” 	556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). 	A court “must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as
true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 	Interpipe
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Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 879, 886-887 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation
omitted).
III. 	Pro Se Status
Because Simmons is proceeding without counsel, the Court liberally
construes the Complaint. 	Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).
However, the Court cannot act as counsel for a pro se litigant, such as by
suggesting or supplying the essential elements of a claim. 	Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S.
225, 231 (2004); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
Cir. 1982).
“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a
pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an
opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” 	Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66
F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). 	A court, however, may deny leave to amend
where, inter alia, further amendment would be futile. 	E.g., Gardner v. Martino,
563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512
F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Dismiss
The State Defendants move for dismissal on numerous grounds. 	The Court
begins with the State Defendants’ jurisdictional-related arguments.
A. 	Rooker-Feldman
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that a claim is forbidden
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “when the plaintiff in federal district court
complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court[] and seeks
relief from the judgment of that court.” 	Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2003). 	However, when “the federal plaintiff does not complain of a legal
injury caused by a state court judgment, but rather of a legal injury caused by an
adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” 	Id. 	Similarly, “ a
prior state court judgment and a federal plaintiff seeking to relitigate a matter
already litigated in state court [are] not circumstances sufficient to invoke Rooker-
Feldman….” 	Miroth v. Cty. of Trinity, 136 F.4 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 2025).
Here, upon review, the Court does not understand Simmons’ liberally
construed claims as implicating the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 	Specifically, while
the Complaint’s allegations clearly take aim at decisions made and actions taken
during a State court litigation involving Simmons, the claims do not necessarily
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seek relief from any judgment entered by a State court, assuming the existence of
such a judgment. 	For example, the relief sought in the Complaint–in particular,
the large damages request–appears untethered to any judgment that was
purportedly entered in the State court. 	Of course, the foregoing is based upon a
liberal construction of the Complaint. 	Should the contours of the relief sought in
this case alter to an extent different than the ones now construed by the Court, it
may be more evident that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable, as the State
Defendants contend. 	At this juncture, though, the Court DENIES dismissal based
upon Rooker-Feldman.
B. 	Younger
Having determined that subject matter jurisdiction is not barred under
Rooker-Feldman, the Court now addresses whether to refrain from exercising such
jurisdiction under Younger. 	See Canatella v. Cal., 404 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir.
2005) (“Although Younger neither provides a basis for nor destroys federal
jurisdiction, Younger does determine when the federal courts must refrain from
exercising jurisdiction.”) (quotation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit has explained that Younger applies “only to three”
categories of cases: (1) ongoing state criminal prosecutions; (2) certain civil
enforcement proceedings; and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders
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uniquely in the furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions.” 	Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lara, 37 F.4 579, 588 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quotation and ellipsis omitted). 	As for the second category, the Ninth Circuit
explained that its “hallmark” is that “such proceedings are akin to a criminal
prosecution in important respects.” 	Id. (concluding that an “insurance
conservatorship” was not such a proceeding) (quotations omitted). 	As for the
third category, it stands “in aid of the authority of the judicial system, so that its
orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory[,]” and has been applied with
respect to civil contempt orders and the posting of appeal bonds. 	Id. at 590 n.4
(quotation omitted).7
Here, upon review, the Court does not find that any of the three categories
identified above exist and, thus, there is no reason to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction under Younger. 	First, unsurprisingly, no one argues that the State
court proceedings at issue in this case, which the State Defendants describe as
stemming from a “summary possession complaint” for unpaid rent, Dkt. No. 127-1
at 3, involve a state criminal prosecution. 	Second, perhaps for similar reasons, no
7 The Ninth Circuit further explained that, if the State proceeding fell into one of the three
categories of cases, Younger abstention may be warranted if an additional three requirements
were met. 	Lara, 37 F.4th at 588. 	For the reasons discussed below, because the State
proceedings here do not fall into one of the three categories, it is unnecessary to address the
additional requirements for application of Younger.
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one argues that the State court litigation is a civil enforcement proceeding “akin” to
a criminal prosecution in any important respect. 	This leaves the third category.
The State Defendants appear to contend that the State court litigation implicates
the third category, asserting that the litigation “involve[s] the enforcement of state
court orders and judgments.” 	Dkt. No. 127-1 at 10. 	Even if so, however, it is
true only to the extent that Simmons is pursuing attempts to overturn what the
State Defendants describe as unfavorable rulings. 	See id. (describing “Simmons’
subsequent attempts to have that decision reversed.”). 	In other words, whether
warranted or not, the State Defendants characterize this action as Simmons
pursuing appellate opportunities, which is hardly of the ilk necessary to implicate
the third category of Younger cases. 	See Lara, 37 F.4th at 590 n.4. 	As a result,
because none of the three categories identified by the Ninth Circuit are at-play
here, the Court declines to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case.
C. 	Judicial Immunity
Turning to the non-jurisdictional-related arguments, the State Defendants
next assert that all claims against Judges Holma and Cataldo are barred by judicial
immunity. 	Dkt. No. 127-1 at 14-19. 	Based upon the allegations of the
Complaint, the Court agrees. 	Specifically, in the Complaint, all of Judge Holma
and Judge Cataldo’s alleged acts are ones related to the judicial process, including
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“scheduling a hearing”, “creat[ing]” judgment, “refusing to rule”, “advancing
litigation”, and “issu[ing]” orders. 	Dkt. No. 1 at 4-6. 	This is classic fare barred
by judicial immunity. 	See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that courts have “long recognized judicial immunity, a sweeping form
of immunity for acts performed by judges that relate to the judicial process.”)
(quotations omitted). 	This is true even of the Judges’ alleged “conspiracy” with
Woo. 	See Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Nor is judicial
immunity lost by allegations that a judge conspired with one party to rule against
another party….”). 	Therefore, the Court finds the claims for damages against
Judges Holma and Cataldo to be barred by judicial immunity. 	See id. (“state
officials enjoy judicial or quasi-judicial immunity from damages only”) (citing
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-542 (1984)).
D. 	Qualified Immunity
The State Defendants next argue that Okita, Gochros, and Tulang-DeSilva
are entitled to qualified immunity because the Complaint fails to allege how any of
these individuals violated constitutional rights that were clearly established. 	Dkt.
No. 127-1 at 19-22. 	The Court agrees. 	Specifically, the Complaint is almost
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devoid of any factual allegations concerning these individuals.8 	Gochros is
merely alleged to have “acknowledged” a misconduct complaint and “refer[ed]”
Simmons to a “Commission on Judicial Conduct.” 	Dkt. No. 1 at 4. 	The ADA
Coordinator is mysteriously alleged to have “disclaimed responsibility” for an
unidentified matter. 	Id. at 7. 	Meanwhile, there are no factual allegations directed
specifically toward Okita. 	Simmons provides no explanation in his briefing on the
motion to dismiss or in the Complaint how this minimal conduct comes close to
violating a constitutional right, let alone a clearly established one. 	See Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (explaining that qualified immunity protects officials
who do “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”) (quotations omitted). 	And the Court
cannot think of how either. 	Therefore, all claims against Okita, Gochros, and
Tulang-DeSilva/ADA Coordinator are dismissed on the grounds of qualified
immunity and failure to state a plausible claim.
8 With respect to Tulang-DeSilva, as mentioned, she is not identified by name in the Complaint.
Instead, the Complaint names John/Jane Doe ADA Coordinator, Dkt. No. 1 at 2, which the State
Defendants assert is Tulang-DeSilva, Dkt. No. 127-1 at 1 n.2. 	While Simmons appears to have
protested Tulang-DeSilva being identified as the John/Jane Doe ADA Coordinator, see, e.g., Dkt.
No. 51, he has provided no evidence that Tulang-DeSilva is not the ADA Coordinator.
Therefore, at this juncture, the Court accepts the State Defendants’ representations in this regard.
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E. 	Leave to Amend
As just discussed, the Complaint does not come close to stating claims
against any of the State Defendants because, as alleged, their conduct is protected
by principles of judicial and qualified immunity. 	Nonetheless, Simmons is
proceeding without counsel and, prior to this Order, the Court has not provided
him with an explanation of any deficiencies with the Complaint. 	In addition,
while judicial immunity is a “sweeping form of immunity”, there are exceptions.
See Moore, 96 F.3d at 1244 (explaining that “the doctrine of judicial immunity
knows two limits”, which are: (1) when a judge acts “in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction”; and (2) “only judicial acts are protected.”) (quotations omitted).
Therefore, under these circumstances, the Court finds leave to amend the
Complaint to be appropriate.
Specifically, should he so choose, Simmons may file an amended complaint
to address the deficiencies identified herein with respect to the claims against the
State Defendants. 	In doing so, he must write short, plain statements of: (1) the
legal right he believes was violated; (2) the name of the specific defendant(s) who
violated that right; (3) exactly what each defendant did or failed to do and when;
(4) how the action or inaction of that defendant is connected to the violation of the
legal right; and (5) what specific injury he suffered because of the defendant’s or
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defendants’ conduct. 	Simmons must repeat this process for each right and
each person or entity named as a defendant.
In addition, should he file an amended complaint, Simmons may not
incorporate any part of the Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, therein. 	Instead, the amended
complaint must stand alone; in other words, if filed, it must contain all factual
allegations and claims upon which Simmons wishes to rely. 	Therefore, to the
extent any claims from the Complaint are not re-alleged in any amended
complaint, those claims will be deemed voluntarily dismissed. 	See Lacey, 693
F.3d at 928 (stating that claims dismissed with prejudice need not be re-alleged in
an amended complaint to preserve them for appeal, but claims that are voluntarily
dismissed are considered waived if they are not re-pled).
II. 	Miscellaneous Motions
As mentioned, Simmons has filed a multitude of documents in this case,
some of which appear to seek relief from this Court and remain pending. 	The
Court now turns to these Miscellaneous Motions.
A. 	Motion for Prejudgment Asset Protection, Dkt. No. 22
At the initiation of this case, Simmons asked this Court to issue “an advisory
notice discouraging any transfers or concealment of assets” because he had “reason
to believe” Defendants may attempt to “obstruct judgment or evade
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accountability”. 	Dkt. No. 22 at 2-3. 	This motion is DENIED for numerous
reasons, including the fact that Simmons’ suspicions and beliefs are not a reason
for the Court to take any action in this case.
B. 	Motion for Separate Counsel, Dkt. No. 65
On September 8, 2025, Simmons moved for an order seeking “recognition”
that Woo is “disqualified” from acting as counsel in this case and for an order
requiring each Defendant to obtain separate counsel. 	Dkt. No. 65 at 2-3. 	This
motion is DENIED for numerous reasons, including the fact that Simmons cannot
dictate counsel for any of the Defendants or create a scenario, such as Woo acting
as counsel, that does not presently exist.
C. 	Motion to Clarify and Reinstate Rule 4(m) Extension, Dkt. No. 108
On October 17, 2025, Simmons sought clarification of an October 16, 2025
Entering Order denying his motion to extend the deadline to serve the Complaint.
The premise for both motions appears to be Simmons’ belief that the State
Defendants have not properly appeared in this case because their waivers of
service were “fabricated”. 	Dkt. No. 108 at 3. 	Other than his say-so, Simmons
provides nothing to substantiate this position. 	Therefore, this motion is DENIED.
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D. 	Motion for Record Clarification and Preservation, Dkt. No. 109
On October 20, 2025, Simmons asked the Court to take “judicial notice” of
an “ongoing benefit” being allegedly derived by Woo, Stott Property Management,
and Kelley from the State court litigation. 	Dkt. No. 109 at 5. 	This motion is
DENIED for numerous reasons, including the fact that the matter is not appropriate
for taking judicial notice. 	Fed.R.Evid. 201(b) (permitting judicial notice of
“adjudicative fact[s]” that are “not subject to reasonable dispute”).
E. 	Motion for Preservation of DOJ Oversight, Dkt. No. 112
On October 20, 2025, Simmons also asked this Court, among other related
things, to take “judicial notice” of “DOJ” involvement in this case and order the
“preservation of all DOJ and USAO communications”. 	Dkt. No. 112 at 4. 	This
motion is DENIED for numerous reasons, including, as mentioned, the
inappropriateness of this matter for judicial notice and the complete lack of a basis
for the requested relief.
F. 	Motion to Clarify and Vacate EO 87, Dkt. No. 115
Still on October 20, 2025, Simmons moved for vacatur of an October 6,
2025 Entering Order that denied three motions all related to the State Defendants’
waivers of service. 	This motion is DENIED for the same reason mentioned
above. 	Specifically, other than simply stating that the waivers were
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“unauthorized”, Simmons provides no evidence of the same or that counsel from
the State of Hawai‘i Attorney General’s Office are otherwise “unauthorized” to
represent the State Defendants.
G. 	Motion to Clarify, Vacate, or Reconsider EO 104, Dkt. No. 116
Again on October 20, 2025, Simmons moved to vacate an October 17, 2025
Entering Order that denied a motion he filed seeking sanctions against the State
Defendants’ counsel related to the waivers of service discussed above. 	For the
reasons mentioned already, this motion is DENIED.
H. 	Motion for Clarification and Preservation, Dkt. No. 121
On October 23, 2025, Simmons requested “[c]larification” that the period to
serve the Complaint had been “toll[ed]” through December 31, 2025. 	Dkt.
No. 121 at 3. 	With respect to the State Defendants, this motion is DENIED AS
MOOT because they have waived service of summons. 	Dkt. Nos. 45-49. 	In
other words, there is no further need to serve a copy of the Complaint on them.
With respect to Woo, Stott Property Management, and Kelley, the motion is
DENIED because Simmons provides no explanation or basis for extending the 90-
day period to serve the Complaint under Rule 4(m).
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I. 	Motion for Judicial Preservation of Logs and Metadata, Dkt. No. 125
On October 27, 2025, Simmons moved for a “protective order” to allegedly
preserve all logs, metadata, and “email/fax headers” from the CM/ECF system due
to Simmons “confirming systematic tampering and metadata anomalies during
post-shutdown reinitialization.” 	Dkt. No. 125 at 2-3. 	Because this motion is
clearly frivolous and completely irrelevant, it is DENIED.
J. 	Motion to Convert January 2 Hearing, Dkt. No. 140
On November 3, 2025, Simmons sought to “convert” a January 2, 2026
hearing to a “sanctions/show-cause” hearing, “withdrawal” of the State
Defendants’ counsel, and an order “prohibit[ing]” Woo from serving as counsel.
Because the January 2, 2026 hearing has been vacated, Dkt. No. 149, this motion is
DENIED AS MOOT with respect to the same. 	The motion is also DENIED for
the reasons already discussed to the extent Simmons seeks to disqualify or bar any
attorney in this case.
K. 	Motion to Confirm Void Jurisdiction Status, Dkt. No. 145
On November 4, 2025, Simmons moved for, among other things,
“Magistrate anti-communication orders” to be declared void and “confirm[ation]”
of “void jurisdiction posture retroactive to Oct[ober] 2023”. 	Dkt. No. 145 at 4.
This motion is DENIED. 	With respect to unidentified orders of the assigned
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Magistrate Judge, Simmons provides no explanation for why any such order may
be void. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (providing that a Magistrate Judge can
hear and determine any pretrial matter, except for certain motions not relevant
here). 	As for an alleged “void jurisdiction posture”, this appears to concern the
State court litigation involving Simmons, rather than the jurisdiction of this Court.
See Dkt. No. 145 at 2 (citing a State court case number). 	It is, therefore, not
something properly raised here.9
L. 	Motion for Review of EO 143, Dkt. No. 146
On November 4, 2025, Simmons also moved for “review” of a November 3,
2025 Entering Order denying various requests for relief Simmons had sought.
Dkt. No. 146 at 1. 	Simmons appears to contend that the November 3, 2025
Entering Order was “void” because the Magistrate Judge is not an “Article III
Judge”, subject-matter jurisdiction has been challenged, and this case has
“documented poison-origin defects”. 	Id. at 3. 	This motion is DENIED for
numerous reasons, most of which have already been mentioned, including the
9 The premise of the argument—that the State court lacked jurisdiction because Simmons raised
purported “federal defenses” in his “state court Answer”—is also misplaced. 	See Holmes
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (explaining that
neither a defendant’s counterclaim nor answer can serve as the basis for federal question
jurisdiction); Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that a
case arises under federal law “only if the federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded complaint.”)
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Magistrate Judge having authority to determine pretrial matters, Simmons not
actually challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court, and the purported
“poison-origin defect[]” neither being poisonous nor relevant to the jurisdiction of
this Court.
M. 	Motion to Strike EO 147 as Void for Lack of Authority, Dkt. No. 148
For the reason discussed above, this motion is DENIED because, contrary to
Simmons’ belief, the assigned Magistrate Judge has the authority to determine
pretrial matters, such as Simmons’ requests to strike filings and disqualify counsel.
N. 	Motion for Protective Order, Dkt. No. 173
On November 26, 2025, Simmons moved for a “protective order” from
“abusive filings” and the referral of counsel for the State Defendants due to
assertions in the reply in support of the motion to dismiss. 	Dkt. No. 173 at 2.
This motion is DENIED for numerous reasons, including the fact that the State
Defendants have not engaged in any “abusive filings” in this case, which includes
the reply.10
10 It also strains credulity for a litigant, such as Simmons, to seek a “protective order” from
“abusive filings” when, in less than five months, he has made well over 100 filings of his own,
none of which has resulted in any relief sought by Simmons.
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O. 	Motion to Disqualify, Dkt. No. 177
On November 28, 2025, Simmons moved again to disqualify Woo and
counsel for the State Defendants from involvement in this case. 	Because
Simmons provides no new or good reasons for doing so, for the reasons already
discussed above, this motion is DENIED.
P. 	Motion to Strike Docket 168 in its Entirety, Dkt. No. 178
On November 28, 2025, Simmons also moved to strike the State
Defendants’ reply in support of the motion to dismiss. 	Because Simmons
provides no valid reason for striking the reply, which was expressly authorized by
the Court’s briefing schedule on the motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 149, this motion is
DENIED.
Q. 	Motion for Various Relief, Dkt. No. 179
Still on November 28, 2025, Simmons moved for a greatest-hits worth of
relief, including the striking of the reply, a “metadata/NEF preservation order”,
“Rule 16 protections”, and a “block” on Woo. 	Dkt. No. 179 at 6-7. 	For all the
reasons discussed above, and because Simmons provides no valid basis for any of
the requested relief, this motion is DENIED.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 127, is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 	The Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is
DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to the extent permitted herein.
Simmons may have until January 9, 2026 to file an amended complaint.
Should Simmons not file a timely amended complaint, this action will be
dismissed without further notice and with prejudice.
The Miscellaneous Motions (Dkt. Nos. 22, 65, 108, 109, 112, 115, 116, 121,
125, 140, 145, 146, 148, 173, 177-179) are DENIED for the reasons set forth
above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 22, 2025 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
___________________________
Derrick K. Watson
Chief United States District Judge
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